Совет Безопасности Distr.: General 15 October 2012 Russian Original: English

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Совет Безопасности Distr.: General 15 October 2012 Russian Original: English Организация Объединенных Наций S/2012/528 Совет Безопасности Distr.: General 15 October 2012 Russian Original: English Идентичные письма Постоянного представителя Сирийской Арабской Республики при Организации Объединенных Наций от 9 июля 2012 года на имя Генерального секретаря и Председателя Совета Безопасности По поручению моего правительства и в дополнение к моим письмам от 16–20 и 23–25 апреля, 7, 11, 14–16, 18, 21, 24, 29 и 31 мая, 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 25, 27 и 28 июня и 2 и 3 июля 2012 года имею честь препроводить настоящим подробный перечень нарушений плана прекращения насилия, совершенных вооруженными группами Сирии 2 июля 2012 года (см. приложение). Буду весьма признателен за распространение текста настоящего письма и приложения к нему в качестве документа Совета Безопасности. (Подпись) Башар Джаафари Посол Постоянный представитель 12-54821 (R) 181012 191012 *1254821* S/2012/528 Приложение к идентичным письмам Постоянного представителя Сирийской Арабской Республики при Организации Объединенных Наций от 9 июля 2012 года на имя Генерального секретаря и Председателя Совета Безопасности [Подлинный текст на арабском языке] Monday, 2 July 2012 Rif Dimashq governorate 1. At 2000 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law en- forcement personnel in Duma, killing Colonel Yassir Hamdan and conscript Husain Ahmad and wounding 14 officers, including a lieutenant colonel, a major and a lieu- tenant. 2. At 2100 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group in the Manin district abducted Conscript Ahmad Mustafa. 3. At 2300 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law en- forcement personnel in Misraba, wounding three. 4. At 2300 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group detonated a car bomb and opened fire on a law enforcement checkpoint in Jadiyah, Ayn Tarma. 5. At 2300 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law en- forcement personnel in Jawbar. 6. At 2330 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire from sev- eral directions on the Harmalah checkpoint. 7. At 0100 hours, an armed terrorist group in Ayn Tarma abducted Lieutenant Muhammad Jaafar Isa. 8. At 0500 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on the Dabbaghat checkpoint from the direction of Jawbar. 9. At 0630 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on the law enforcement checkpoints in Hafir al-Fawqa and the town of Badda. 10. At 0700 hours, an armed terrorist group attacked the Adra construction group and abducted Conscript Salim Qanas and a civilian worker, Ibrahim Hamoud; a rifle was stolen. 11. At 0730 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device as a law enforcement patrol was driving through Bayt Saham, wounding one officer. 12. At 1200 hours, an armed terrorist group blew up the oil pipeline that passes through the district of Widyan al-Rabi', east of Damascus International Airport. 13. At 1445 hours, an armed terrorist group detonated a noise bomb on the Ruhay- bah-Dumayr road. 14. At 1700 hours, an armed terrorist group opened fire on border guard headquar- ters in Yabrud. 2 12-54821 S/2012/528 15. An armed terrorist group blocked the Damascus-Dar‘a highway near the al-Madinah al-Munawwarah petrol station and stole a Sham vehicle, licence plate No. 595850 (Damascus), belonging to the Arab Union Company, together with the sum of 248,500 Syrian pounds from the accountant of the Lu'ayy ibn Husain al-Saqa Company. 16. The body of an unidentified man was found on Four Seasons Road in the city of Darayya; he had been shot. 17. A seven-year-old girl, Hibbah Nazih Qadih, was admitted to the Mahjub Hos- pital in the city of Darayya after being shot by armed terrorists. 18. Armed terrorists in the city of Qatana opened fire on law enforcement check- point personnel, who returned fire. A citizen, Samir Khalaf Kanbahar (born in 1955), was killed. 19. Armed terrorists in the city of Qatana attacked the home of Salim Hamdan, di- rector of the Ibn Rushd Institute for Girls in Mu'addamiyah and stole his Govern- ment Mitsubishi double-cabin pickup, licence plate No. 894348 (Damascus). 20. Armed terrorists in the city of Qatana stole a private Hyundai vehicle, licence plate No. 000827. 21. The body of an unidentified man was found near the Fatih mosque in the town of Hirista; he had been shot by unidentified armed terrorists. 22. Armed terrorists in the city of Jaramanah stole a private Toyota Corolla vehicle, licence plate No. 484187 (Damascus). 23. Armed terrorists were heavily deployed in the towns of Irbin, Zamalka and 'Ayn Tarma. 24. A civilian, Omar Muhammad Dib Homsi (born in 1959), was found to be dead upon arrival at the Fatih hospital in Kafr Batna. Civilians Abdulkhaliq Ahmad Asi (born in 1966), Muhammad Abdulkhaliq Asi (aged 10) and Ziyad Ghunum ibn Ri- yad (born in 1946) were treated after being shot by armed terrorists. 25. The body of an unidentified man was found on the Dayr Attiyah road, behind the Anis breezeblock factory, in the city of Nabk. His hands had been tied in front with a bandage and he bore marks of torture; his skull was fractured. 26. The body of an unidentified man was found dumped in the main street in Dhi'abiyah. 27. The body of an unidentified man was found near the stadium in Ali al-Wahsh Street in the town of Babila. 28. In the town of Babila, an explosive device was detonated at the Aqraba round- about, in front of the Bara' mosque, as a law enforcement forces patrol was passing. Two members of the patrol were wounded, as were a passing civilian and two po- licemen. 29. In the town of Babila, a remotely controlled explosive device was found in a Vieira, licence plate No. 470060 (Damascus), belonging to a policeman, Fadi ibn Malik Saqr (born in 1984), when he took it for repair in the Bayt Saham district; the device was defused by military engineers. 12-54821 3 S/2012/528 30. In the city of Tall, an armed terrorist group stole a Government pickup, licence plate No. 545028 (Damascus), from Engineer Bassam Rai; the vehicle belonged to the General Company for Studies and Technical Consultations. A Kia Rio belonging to the Ministry of Housing, licence plate number unknown, was stolen. 31. In the city of Tall, an armed terrorist group stole a Government Mercedes, li- cence plate No. 779095 (Rif Dimashq), from in front of the home of Jihad Surur, head of Manin municipality. Damascus governorate 32. At 2230 hours on 1 July 2012, civilian Firas Hajj Ali ibn Adnan (born in 1983 in Idlib) was admitted, fatally wounded, to Tishrin military hospital in Damascus. He had been shot in the head by armed terrorists. 33. At 0900 hours, the body of Chief Warrant Officer Hilal ibn Ismail Saad (born in 1967) was found. He had been shot in the chest by armed terrorists while leaving home in the Qabun neighbourhood in his Peugeot 504, licence plate No. 314830 (Damascus); the vehicle was stolen. 34. At 1000 hours, parts of the dismembered and decapitated body of an unidenti- fied man were found in the Yarmuk district. He had been placed in a nylon bag, in- side a plastic box. 35. At 1000 hours, Khalid Ibrahim Ibrahim (born in 1984 in Damascus) claimed that three unidentified men had stolen his Kia Rio, licence plate No. 695952 (Rif Dimashq), in the Zahirah district. 36. At 1130 hours, a remotely-controlled, 7-kg explosive device was found inside a rubbish container in the industrial area, by the first garden, beside Roma Flowers; the device was defused by military engineers. 37. At 1330 hours, a remotely controlled, 2-kg explosive device was found at- tached to a Peugeot 307, licence plate No. 404221/Army, belonging to Colonel Gha- yath al-Najjar, that was parked on Salahaddin street in the Ruknaddin neighbour- hood; the device was defused by military engineers. 38. At 0300 hours, armed terrorists in a private Kia Rio, without licence plates, shot and killed Ala'addin ibn Fa'iz Aas (born in 1985) in Hafiz Street in the Qabun neighbourhood as he was driving his Saba taxi, licence plate No. 464777 (Damas- cus). 39. At 0300 hours, armed terrorists in the Qabun neighbourhood shot and killed Muhammad Musa al-Masuti (born in 1977), a policeman from the law enforcement forces. 40. The body of police constable Husain Isa Abdu (born in 1977 in Homs) was found. He had been abducted and killed by armed terrorists in the town of Dayr al- 'Asafir. 41. Three armed terrorists with military pistols and Kalashnikov rifles stole a Mazda minibus, licence plate No. 877360, belonging to the Ministry of Communica- tions and Technology, as it was taking employees to the Yarmuk neighbourhood. The terrorists disappeared. 4 12-54821 S/2012/528 42. Basim Hamadi, a policeman from the law enforcement battalion, was admitted to the police hospital after being shot by armed terrorists in the Qabun neighbour- hood as he was repairing his car. His military pistol was stolen. Dar‘a governorate 43. At 2100 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on law en- forcement personnel on the Dar‘a-Yadudah road. 44. At 2200 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened random fire in Manshiyah, wounding seven citizens. 45. At 2300 hours on 1 July 2012, an armed terrorist group opened random fire in Dar‘a, killing civilians Mu'ayyad Muhammad and Adnan Ahmad and wounding two other civilians. 46. At 0145 hours, an armed terrorist group shot and wounded Conscript Muham- mad Darwish in Khan Dannun.
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