ontextualizing ’s Operation in on the CLebanon- Border Introduction A delicate timing: Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Washington, DC Mapping the tenuous –Hezbollah relationship Redrawing the demographic equation in northeastern Connecting the dots: Arsal, Qusayr, and al-Zabadani and the issue of strategic depth Conclusion

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© KFCRIS, 2017

ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 32 - 27/08/2017 L.D. No: 1438/2868

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Introduction

On July 21, 2017, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters certainly reverberated in . Hariri’s visit initiated an assault across the Qalamoun thus provides a glimpse into the prospects for Mountains near Arsal in northern Lebanon’s seemingly rockier American-Lebanese ties in the - governorate. Soon joined by not-too-distant future, as Hezbollah’s political the , the offensive was aimed integration and military grip continue, at the at rooting out pockets of entrenched fighters expense of a weakened Lebanese Armed Forces affiliated with the former Syrian al-Qaeda branch, (LAF). Jabhat al-Nusra, which was relabeled in 2016 as Under the Barack Obama administration, the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). LAF was among the top six foreign recipients Just one week after the onset of the operation, of American military aid. This tenet seems to Hezbollah declared victory over the militants be shifting with Trump’s presidency, however, who were stranded in the contested Jroud Arsal bringing with it the potential to alter the balance region. As an immediate result, the belligerent of Lebanon’s politico-military power. parties struck a deal, which was mediated and A second lesson pertains to the Arsal offensive, confirmed by Lebanon’s General Security which sheds light onto the movement’s Agency. The agreement would allow for the increasingly assertive role as part of the Assad- evacuation of adherents of the defeated Jabhat loyalist camp in Syria. Arsal has long been Fateh al-Sham group and the exchange of the affected by uncontrolled spillover from the bodies of dead fighters. Beyond the transfer of civil war of its neighbor Syria. Tensions in and militant Syrians from Lebanon to Idlib Province around Arsal spiraled out of control soon after via Aleppo, the temporary truce paved way for the the onset of the Syrian uprising. Arsal is home to gradual shuttling of up to 9,000 Syrian refugees a majority Sunni Lebanese population, while the back to Syria. nearby Bekaa Valley has been one of Hezbollah’s While Syrian militant hotbeds have been present strongholds since the early 1980s. With Hezbollah in Arsal since at least 2012, the latest confrontation secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s pledge of with Hezbollah fighters along the barren allegiance to Assad in spring 2013, his fighters Lebanon-Syria border provides some important stepped to the fore as an official faction engaged lessons that merit further investigation. First, on Syrian soil. As a result, Jroud Arsal, which these lessons touch on the Shi’ite movement’s is bounded by the Qalamoun Mountains on the current domestic standing inside Lebanon’s east and the Bekaa Valley on the west, evolved political landscape, as the timing of the offensive into a battlefield where Hezbollah- and Lebanese coincided with the visit of Lebanon’s Sunni Shi’ite–populated areas were targeted by various prime minister, Saad Hariri, to Washington, DC. Syrian insurgent groups. The fierce rhetoric of the American president Conversely, from 2013 to the present day, about Hezbollah and the prospect of tightening Hezbollah has expanded its footprint in the US. congressional sanctions against the militia Qalamoun region in both size and scope, as the

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movement’s military wing was instrumental in latest Hezbollah campaign in Arsal therefore the victories of the Syrian regime, including effectively extends a pro-Assad buffer zone along the battles of al-Qusayr and al-Zabadani. The the turbulent Lebanese-Syrian border.

A delicate timing: Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Washington, DC

On July 25, Lebanese prime minister Saad In such a climate, it is noteworthy that Hariri Hariri, a powerful rival of Hezbollah, visited the openly declared the support of his parliamentary White House in Washington, DC. Speaking to bloc for Michel Aoun preceding formation US President Donald Trump, Hariri asked for of the new government in fall 2016. Many support in the struggle of his pro-Western camp pundits consider this move a Faustian bargain against overtly pro-Iranian forces in his country. that considerably increased Hariri’s chances of “Hezbollah is a threat to the Lebanese state, its garnering Aoun’s support for becoming prime people and the entire region,” said Trump during minister in December 2016. the meeting. In his eyes, the militia, with support It is against that backdrop that additional remarks from Tehran, threatened Israel with its growing by Hariri during his July visit to the United weapons arsenal and was one of the causes “for States can be interpreted. For instance, he the humanitarian disaster happening in Syria.” decisively criticized US lawmakers for enacting While Hariri underlined his general commitment new sanctions aimed against Hezbollah, as to curb any overt foreign influence in Lebanon, the organization’s paramilitary wing has been he was ostensibly more reserved vis-à-vis designated a terrorist organization by the US Hezbollah’s military operation in Arsal. In many Department of State since 1995. In Hariri’s ways, this is not surprising. In December 2016, view, hastily schemed sanctions harbor the risk Hariri became prime minister in the wake of of causing damage to Lebanon’s already fragile almost two and a half years of political stalemate. economy. Trump, for his part, further portrayed However, Hariri’s election came at a price; the Lebanese army as a potential counterbalance he was tacitly accepted by current Lebanese to Hezbollah, suggesting that it could help pro- president Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian Western forces in the country stem the influence who maintains a de facto strategic alliance with of Hezbollah in Beirut. To this end, the US Hezbollah. With Hezbollah enjoying the support government had supported the Lebanese army of the Lebanese head of state, Hariri could hardly for years. However, recent events indicate the be expected to go out on a limb and emphasize utopian nature of such a strategy. his otherwise historically adversarial relationship As a matter of fact, Hezbollah is not only with the Shi’ite movement when representing his increasingly influencing the Lebanese army—a country abroad. Lebanese institution that portrays itself as

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balancing and bipartisan in light of the country’s Syria since 2014, the organization managed to various religious sects—but also rivaling it in regain and hold strategically significant territories the bid for operational supremacy in securing without the aid of the Lebanese army in Lebanon Lebanon’s porous eastern border. As a case in proper. This was particularly true in its numerous point, despite Hezbollah’s open interference in operations along the Qalamoun Mountains.

Mapping the tenuous Lebanese Armed Forces– Hezbollah relationship

Hezbollah’s posture in Arsal is thus a stern years. It should therefore hardly come as a confirmation of its aspiration to be a potent surprise that Hezbollah filled this security vacuum military force in the country. With a momentum by developing from a mere resistance movement of de-escalation in Syria allowing the group to to a party that, in fact, shares the monopoly on redeploy its resources from that region,1 Hezbollah power in securing Lebanon’s territorial integrity. seems to have chosen the timing of its campaign Moreover, although Hassan Nasrallah has in Arsal deliberately. At the end of July, Lebanese repeatedly pledged to withdraw his fighters army outposts in close proximity to Arsal were from the immediate vicinity of Arsal in recent on high alert, whereas Hezbollah was closing in months, the group has maintained its posture in from the north and south, effectively surrounding securing sizable Lebanese Shi’ite communities trapped JFS fighters. south of Arsal and west of the village of Tufail. As far as the actual hostilities are concerned, it is, After all, within May and August 2017, Nasrallah however, noteworthy that only Hezbollah engaged executed a spectacular change of mind that operationally. Besides providing logistical and effectively sidelined the presence of the Lebanese intelligence assistance, the Lebanese army army in Jroud Arsal. In not being willing to refrained from the battle, as it continued to double down on his previous commitment to maintain a neutral stance in regard to the conflict dismantle Hezbollah fortifications around Arsal, in Syria. While such a tenet may be consistent in Nasrallah quietly set the stage for the offensive theory, that development is nonetheless troubling, operation in July. This rhetorical and operational as it has allowed cross-border militancy along unpredictability is both testament to Hezbollah’s Lebanon’s eastern border to flourish in recent increasing influence in shaping defense policies and to the Lebanese army’s apparent dwindling (1) In early July 2017, the United States and Russia agreed on establishing deescalation zones along Syria’s authority in that respect. borders, a plan backed by Jordan. As a result of the American-Russian cease-fire mechanism, Hezbollah What is more, Hezbollah’s decisive move to was forced to retreat from the area, giving it an dislodge Syrian militants militarily put the LAF opportunity to use its forces to inflict a final onslaught on the militants in the border region between Syria in a precarious situation, as Nasrallah managed and Lebanon. to turn the operation in Jroud Arsal into an all-

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encompassing media campaign. In a move that one hundred casualties and injured hundreds proved uncomfortable for the LAF, Hezbollah more. These bombings included an attack against portrays itself as the major force capable of the Iranian embassy in the south of Beirut on rolling back Syrian Islamists, clearly showing November 19, 2013, and subsequent attacks hit how the Shi’ite militia is actually less bound Shi’ite and Sunni targets alternately, sparking by domestic institutional and politico-military further fears of vengeful action. Unlike the limitations than some factions of Lebanon’s new attacks that had previously occurred in Tripoli government might have hoped. on August 23 and in a Hezbollah stronghold in Hezbollah garners widespread support among southern Beirut on August 15, the bomb attack on the local Lebanese people, who gradually the Iranian embassy showed no sign of the use of have developed resentment toward what they remote-controlled bomb devices but rather held perceive as a paralyzed and untenable leadership the signature of two suicide bombers. role that under normal circumstances should Soon after, the Jihadi Abdullah Azzam Brigades— be fulfilled by the LAF. The sentiment of a the al-Qaeda branch in Lebanon—took lack of leadership on behalf of LAF has also responsibility for the attack and warned of further to do with the fact that the army can hardly attacks if Iran did not pull out of the conflict in show open antagonism vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Syria. Since then, partisans of the radical Sunni Hezbollah is battle-hardened after years of sheikh Ahmed al-Assir, who was persecuted by fighting on Syrian turf (as well as its decade- the Lebanese army, have called on the Sunni long resistance against Israel) and has amassed Lebanese people to support their brothers in their critical fighting capabilities. The LAF, on the struggle on Syrian soil. The deliberately stoked other hand, has, since 2014, missed multiple ethnic resentments suggest a kind of “blood feud” opportunities to craft and implement any larger that some radical Lebanese Sunnis have yet to military strategy to tackle the presence of Jabhat settle with the Shi’ite Hezbollah. al-Nusra and the and Syria In that context, it becomes clear how difficult it (ISIS) in northeastern Lebanon. While the LAF has become for the LAF to navigate the Arsal has launched a few limited operations in recent theater. Open collaboration or the sharing of a years, the overwhelming sentiment among joint command unit along the Lebanese-Syrian northern Lebanon’s population is the fear of border would make the army susceptible to inaction against nonstate actors that maintain accusations of colluding with the Shi’ite militia. ties to radical groups in Syria. Such a sentiment Such a move would cause growing fears among has prevailed historically. Lebanon’s Sunni community. Today, continuous Between 2013 and 2014, Arsal, which is home LAF inaction against Sunni nonstate actors along to a majority Sunni population, gradually turned the border may not necessarily erode the army’s into a transit route for some of the booby-trapped institutional posture in Beirut, but it alienates vehicles that aimed at inflicting damage on a variety of Christian Lebanese sects who live Hezbollah strongholds across Lebanon. During not far from Arsal and to whom the conflict has that time, the country had to cope with three become present in a palpable and threatening major bomb attacks, which caused more than manner.

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Redrawing the demographic equation in northeastern Lebanon

Given Hezbollah’s key role in propping the being the most prominent precedent—it slowly but regime of Assad in recent years, the movement surely erodes Syria’s multifaceted demographic became a major target of various Syrian rebel patterns. The same fate appears now to take place groups in Syria and Lebanon. Once Hezbollah in Arsal, with the largest formal repatriation of finishes the clearing of Arsal, it will assert refugees and Sunni militants since the start of the virtually uninterrupted control along the entirety in 2011. As the vast majority of of the peripheral Lebanese-Syrian border. This shuttles were carried out in swift manner and with strategic achievement, however, carries inherent limited oversight of international aid groups, the risks. One of the main repercussions of the assault move will cement the new demographic order in against JFS militants in Arsal is Hezbollah’s the Syria-Lebanon border area. announcement that it will help grant safe passage For now, the volatile peripheries of the Lebanese- of Syrian Sunnis to “return” to Idlib Province in Syrian border will be marked by a systematic Syria. While Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets displacement of the presence of both Lebanese have presented this development as applicable and Syrian Sunnis. As for Syria, the cities of 2 only to refugees who “wish to return,” on a Damascus and Aleppo are under overwhelming number of occasions local sources have described regime control. The same goes for Syria’s coastal the transfers as forced evacuations. governorates of and Tartus, which Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence for such harbor the majority of and Christians evacuations being part of a larger operational in the area. As for Lebanon, it is no secret that goal. Stemming from Bashar al-Assad’s playbook Syria’s small neighboring country has carried in ensuring his governance in parts of Syria, a remarkable burden in hosting up to a million numbers of evacuations and forced shuttling of Syrian refugees registered under the UN High rebels from contested areas to opposition forces- Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well controlled land surged throughout 2016 and 2017 as what is estimated to be a considerable number in Syria. While such transfers have enabled Assad of unregistered individuals. to regain control of a number of formerly held Thus, Hezbollah’s operation in Arsal was hardly rebel bastions—with the evacuation of Aleppo the result of a legitimate claim to clearing a hotbed of (Sunni) insurgency. Rather, the operation is (2) Hezbollah’s Al Manar television reported that close symptomatic of Assad’s tactical considerations, to 100 buses had begun leaving the town of Arsal on Wednesday, August 2, 2017, headed for Fleita on which over the years have ensured relatively the Syrian side. At least 26 buses earlier left refugee safe routes for Sunni Syrians to flee to Lebanon, camps in the nearby Jroud Arsal area and crossed to Turkey, and Jordan. If Hezbollah—a mainstay Wadi Hmeid further northeast in the direction of the Syrian frontier, it said, before their onward journey in ensuring the Assad regime’s longevity—now to Idlib. expels the same Syrians who came to Lebanon

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with tacit consent from the Assad regime, this can sensitive sectarian constellation in the north of be said to be evidence concerning the pro-Assad Lebanon. Hezbollah thus aims at instilling a camp’s long-term calculation. narrative of being the sole capable guarantor of In short, the regime, with help from Hezbollah, security for northeastern Lebanon’s considerable incentivizes Sunni Syrians to leave for Idlib Christian and Shi’ite populations. Ultimately, Province. In doing so, both parties not only this concerted effort by Nasrallah and Assad has systematically stigmatize any Syrian refugees created new facts on the ground. The numbers of remaining in Lebanon, but also alienate Lebanon’s Sunni populations on both sides of the Qalamoun own Sunni population, which increasingly Mountains have dropped considerably compared feels Hezbollah’s surging grip on the already to pre-2011 levels.

Connecting the dots: Arsal, Qusayr, and al-Zabadani and the issue of strategic depth

In addition to clearing the hotbed of insurgency, troops regain control of the city, which they Hezbollah has other important strategic tenets in ultimately accomplished in mid-February 2012. this peripheral region. Over the past four years, Since then, the al-Zabadani district has continued it has steadily carved out a zone of influence for to sustain damage, as it has been affected by itself, stretching from Qusayr along the border resurfacing Syrian rebel activities as well as pro- to al-Zabadani in the south of Syria. With the government operations. operational gains in Jroud Arsal, Hezbollah The most critical recurrence of urban clashes thus nears the point where it is able to project took place in July 2015. However, the reality considerable power from both sides along almost across the battlefield of the al-Zabadani district the entirety of Lebanon’s eastern border. had fundamentally changed from the situation three and a half years prior. First, the spectrum of splinter groups operating on the ground had Lessons from al-Zabadani increased dramatically. While the FSA represented The Syrian town of al-Zabadani, nestled in the a comparatively cohesive bloc operating around mountains, surrounded by a fertile valley, and al-Zabadani in the earlier stages of the conflict, located approximately 30 km northwest of by 2015 Islamist fighters belonging to groups Damascus, has repeatedly been the setting of such as Syria’s al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al- fierce fighting between fighters of the Free Syrian Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, the Islamic Army (FSA) and the Syrian Arab Army. Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant The city was the first to fall under the control of (ISIS) had become entrenched in the al-Zabadani FSA in early January 2012, and Hezbollah fighters district as well as in the nearby southern part of proved to be key in helping Syrian government the Qalamoun Mountains.

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In May and June 2015, Hezbollah waged an cuts through Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, the fertile offensive in the Qalamoun, as all factions involved land from which Hezbollah emerged in the early realized the importance of the mountain range—it 1980s, al-Qusayr’s strategic weight is apparent: provided an elevated retreat, shelter, and a tactical just as al-Zabadani marks Syria’s and Lebanon’s lookout from which to wage future assaults. On interconnectedness in the south, control over the one hand, Hezbollah’s operations were aimed Qusayr is tantamount to maintaining the link to at containing the spillover of antiregime fighters the Bekaa Valley, and controlling the stretch of and various Islamist factions into Lebanese land that constitute Assad’s Alawite heartland. territory, and limiting the flow of logistical The fierce siege of Qusayr in 2013 lasted two support, weaponry, and reinforcements into the and a half weeks. Ultimately, pro-government mountains. On the other hand, the recapture of forces handed the rebels a heavy defeat when al-Zabadani, which finally took place on July 3, they forced the latter to withdraw from the city 2015, was a crucial element of a broader attempt on the eve of June 5, 2013. to connect the dots in securing a pro-Assad buffer The decisive victory achieved in al-Qusayr zone along that contested strip of land. provides further insight into the strategy pursued By early September 2015, the outcome of the by Hezbollah. Its paramilitary units exploited the offensive paved the way for a well-calibrated fact that the hinterland between Qusayr and the media campaign that portrayed the Syrian regime Lebanese border is home to a large part of Syria’s and its allies as capable of dominating the course Shi’ite community. In these areas, Hezbollah of events on their own terms. At the same time, the proved to be professional in creating a widespread heavy blood toll borne by Hezbollah was testament system of sophisticated, agile pockets of defense to the indispensability of its fighters in bolstering serving as shelter and storage facilities. In similar the regime’s foothold in southwestern Syria. fashion, it exploited the topographical situation of that strip of land: the hilly and densely wooded landscape was crucial for the performance of Lessons from Qusayr Hezbollah’s guerrilla squads. It enabled them to While Hezbollah’s efforts in 2012 were, for the operate covertly and to camouflage a vast array most part, clandestine in nature, the battle of of command posts. Drawing on more than twenty Qusayr that erupted in early April 2013 served as a years of experience in low-intensity warfare first public litmus test of Hezbollah’s interference against Israel in its natural habitat of southern on Syrian soil. In hindsight, the operation provides Lebanon, Hezbollah excelled in its urban and relevant insights into any following military steps guerilla-style warfare. taken by the militia, and specifically in regard to Hezbollah successfully internalized the art the latest events in Jroud Arsal. of blending into built-up civilian areas and Qusayr sits in the immediate vicinity of the concealing its operating squads and equipment crossroads of the Syrian Route 5, which links among such facilities, which was useful in Damascus via Homs to the northwestern creating spaces to hide and disperse. As a result, governorates of Latakia and Tartus, and Highway it lowered the threshold of direct vulnerability 4, leading to Baalbek, Lebanon. As the latter also in the field.

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Conclusion

In retrospect, the lessons learned from the battles have witnessed as a clear and imminent danger in Qusayr in 2013, al-Zabadani in 2015, and shoring up along the eastern border in recent years. Arsal 2017 are evidence of Hezbollah’s growing Only in early August 2017 did the Lebanese army capability in securing geographical pivots for the announce to step up their efforts in capturing ISIS- survival of the Syrian regime and the longevity controlled hilltops around Arsal and . of its own military foothold in Lebanon. With the However, this hardly marks a pivotal departure successful operation in Arsal, Hezbollah gained from the Lebanese army’s long-lasting and more control over yet another strategic gatekeeper prudent stance vis-à-vis militants entrenched on the Lebanese-Syrian border. From Jroud along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Rather, Arsal, Hezbollah can control the maintenance of Hezbollah has proven to be more agile and swift supply lines from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah’s in taking the lead to shape the optics of its actions, strongholds in Lebanon. thus eliciting a bolder approach by the LAF in In the grand scheme of things, Hezbollah’s the wake of Hezbollah’s spearheading of efforts successful attempts alleviate the mounting disarray to dislodge the JFS from Arsal. across the Qalamoun area and account for a wider Hezbollah’s instruments that aim at presenting strategy that the Syrian regime and its supporting a favorable narrative for its constituency are Lebanese proxy adamantly pursue. First, the fairly sophisticated. These include, for instance, provision of strategic depth by securing vital an extensive field tour that Hezbollah has transit routes connecting the Syrian capital with its offered various press members of national and strategic backyard in Lebanon. Second, improving international media around Arsal, portraying Hezbollah resilience in order to maintain control its tactical achievements on the battlefield. In over contested territory linking the Alawite- addition, the group goes to great lengths in either dominated Mediterranean coastal regions in obfuscating fatal casualties, such as in Syria, or northwestern Syria with the southwestern sphere glorifying them as martyrs, as happened with of influence along the Lebanese border. Third, huge fanfare in light of the group’s suffered Hezbollah’s latest operation carries a distinctly casualties in Arsal. The intended message is domestic repercussion as far as intermilitary clear: the security of Lebanon’s borders hinges relations are concerned. on Hezbollah, and not solely on the LAF, the To be sure, both the Hezbollah and the LAF are state army, which ought to carry the exclusive aware of the sectarian complexity that has shaped responsibility of ensuring sovereign duties across the arduous reality for the local Lebanese population Lebanese territory. as well as for Syrian refugees in Arsal. Hezbollah Boon and burden alike, Hezbollah will continue carefully aims at maintaining cooperative relations to be perceived as an indispensable faction with the LAF on the operational level, while not in securing the country’s borders and, most shying away from subtly hinting at LAF’s restraint important, a faction with an unrivaled ability to to confront independently what many Lebanese dictate Lebanon’s public discourse in its favor.

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