Contextualizing Hezbollah's Operation in Arsal on the Lebanon-Syria Border

ontextualizing Hezbollah’s Operation in Arsal on the CLebanon-Syria Border Introduction A delicate timing: Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Washington, DC Mapping the tenuous Lebanese Armed Forces–Hezbollah relationship Redrawing the demographic equation in northeastern Lebanon Connecting the dots: Arsal, Qusayr, and al-Zabadani and the issue of strategic depth Conclusion Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 32 August - September 2017 2 © KFCRIS, 2017 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 32 - 27/08/2017 L.D. No: 1438/2868 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 3 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 4 Introduction On July 21, 2017, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters certainly reverberated in Beirut. Hariri’s visit initiated an assault across the Qalamoun thus provides a glimpse into the prospects for Mountains near Arsal in northern Lebanon’s seemingly rockier American-Lebanese ties in the Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Soon joined by not-too-distant future, as Hezbollah’s political the Syrian air force, the offensive was aimed integration and military grip continue, at the at rooting out pockets of entrenched fighters expense of a weakened Lebanese Armed Forces affiliated with the former Syrian al-Qaeda branch, (LAF). Jabhat al-Nusra, which was relabeled in 2016 as Under the Barack Obama administration, the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). LAF was among the top six foreign recipients Just one week after the onset of the operation, of American military aid. This tenet seems to Hezbollah declared victory over the militants be shifting with Trump’s presidency, however, who were stranded in the contested Jroud Arsal bringing with it the potential to alter the balance region. As an immediate result, the belligerent of Lebanon’s politico-military power. parties struck a deal, which was mediated and A second lesson pertains to the Arsal offensive, confirmed by Lebanon’s General Security which sheds light onto the movement’s Agency. The agreement would allow for the increasingly assertive role as part of the Assad- evacuation of adherents of the defeated Jabhat loyalist camp in Syria. Arsal has long been Fateh al-Sham group and the exchange of the affected by uncontrolled spillover from the bodies of dead fighters. Beyond the transfer of civil war of its neighbor Syria. Tensions in and militant Syrians from Lebanon to Idlib Province around Arsal spiraled out of control soon after via Aleppo, the temporary truce paved way for the the onset of the Syrian uprising. Arsal is home to gradual shuttling of up to 9,000 Syrian refugees a majority Sunni Lebanese population, while the back to Syria. nearby Bekaa Valley has been one of Hezbollah’s While Syrian militant hotbeds have been present strongholds since the early 1980s. With Hezbollah in Arsal since at least 2012, the latest confrontation secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s pledge of with Hezbollah fighters along the barren allegiance to Assad in spring 2013, his fighters Lebanon-Syria border provides some important stepped to the fore as an official faction engaged lessons that merit further investigation. First, on Syrian soil. As a result, Jroud Arsal, which these lessons touch on the Shi’ite movement’s is bounded by the Qalamoun Mountains on the current domestic standing inside Lebanon’s east and the Bekaa Valley on the west, evolved political landscape, as the timing of the offensive into a battlefield where Hezbollah- and Lebanese coincided with the visit of Lebanon’s Sunni Shi’ite–populated areas were targeted by various prime minister, Saad Hariri, to Washington, DC. Syrian insurgent groups. The fierce rhetoric of the American president Conversely, from 2013 to the present day, about Hezbollah and the prospect of tightening Hezbollah has expanded its footprint in the US. congressional sanctions against the militia Qalamoun region in both size and scope, as the Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 5 movement’s military wing was instrumental in latest Hezbollah campaign in Arsal therefore the victories of the Syrian regime, including effectively extends a pro-Assad buffer zone along the battles of al-Qusayr and al-Zabadani. The the turbulent Lebanese-Syrian border. A delicate timing: Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Washington, DC On July 25, Lebanese prime minister Saad In such a climate, it is noteworthy that Hariri Hariri, a powerful rival of Hezbollah, visited the openly declared the support of his parliamentary White House in Washington, DC. Speaking to bloc for Michel Aoun preceding formation US President Donald Trump, Hariri asked for of the new government in fall 2016. Many support in the struggle of his pro-Western camp pundits consider this move a Faustian bargain against overtly pro-Iranian forces in his country. that considerably increased Hariri’s chances of “Hezbollah is a threat to the Lebanese state, its garnering Aoun’s support for becoming prime people and the entire region,” said Trump during minister in December 2016. the meeting. In his eyes, the militia, with support It is against that backdrop that additional remarks from Tehran, threatened Israel with its growing by Hariri during his July visit to the United weapons arsenal and was one of the causes “for States can be interpreted. For instance, he the humanitarian disaster happening in Syria.” decisively criticized US lawmakers for enacting While Hariri underlined his general commitment new sanctions aimed against Hezbollah, as to curb any overt foreign influence in Lebanon, the organization’s paramilitary wing has been he was ostensibly more reserved vis-à-vis designated a terrorist organization by the US Hezbollah’s military operation in Arsal. In many Department of State since 1995. In Hariri’s ways, this is not surprising. In December 2016, view, hastily schemed sanctions harbor the risk Hariri became prime minister in the wake of of causing damage to Lebanon’s already fragile almost two and a half years of political stalemate. economy. Trump, for his part, further portrayed However, Hariri’s election came at a price; the Lebanese army as a potential counterbalance he was tacitly accepted by current Lebanese to Hezbollah, suggesting that it could help pro- president Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian Western forces in the country stem the influence who maintains a de facto strategic alliance with of Hezbollah in Beirut. To this end, the US Hezbollah. With Hezbollah enjoying the support government had supported the Lebanese army of the Lebanese head of state, Hariri could hardly for years. However, recent events indicate the be expected to go out on a limb and emphasize utopian nature of such a strategy. his otherwise historically adversarial relationship As a matter of fact, Hezbollah is not only with the Shi’ite movement when representing his increasingly influencing the Lebanese army—a country abroad. Lebanese institution that portrays itself as Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 Dhu Al-Qidah - Dhu Al-Hijjah 1438 - August - September 2017 6 balancing and bipartisan in light of the country’s Syria since 2014, the organization managed to various religious sects—but also rivaling it in regain and hold strategically significant territories the bid for operational supremacy in securing without the aid of the Lebanese army in Lebanon Lebanon’s porous eastern border. As a case in proper. This was particularly true in its numerous point, despite Hezbollah’s open interference in operations along the Qalamoun Mountains. Mapping the tenuous Lebanese Armed Forces– Hezbollah relationship Hezbollah’s posture in Arsal is thus a stern years. It should therefore hardly come as a confirmation of its aspiration to be a potent surprise that Hezbollah filled this security vacuum military force in the country. With a momentum by developing from a mere resistance movement of de-escalation in Syria allowing the group to to a party that, in fact, shares the monopoly on redeploy its resources from that region,1 Hezbollah power in securing Lebanon’s territorial integrity. seems to have chosen the timing of its campaign Moreover, although Hassan Nasrallah has in Arsal deliberately. At the end of July, Lebanese repeatedly pledged to withdraw his fighters army outposts in close proximity to Arsal were from the immediate vicinity of Arsal in recent on high alert, whereas Hezbollah was closing in months, the group has maintained its posture in from the north and south, effectively surrounding securing sizable Lebanese Shi’ite communities trapped JFS fighters. south of Arsal and west of the village of Tufail. As far as the actual hostilities are concerned, it is, After all, within May and August 2017, Nasrallah however, noteworthy that only Hezbollah engaged executed a spectacular change of mind that operationally. Besides providing logistical and effectively sidelined the presence of the Lebanese intelligence assistance, the Lebanese army army in Jroud Arsal. In not being willing to refrained from the battle, as it continued to double down on his previous commitment to maintain a neutral stance in regard to the conflict dismantle Hezbollah fortifications around Arsal, in Syria. While such a tenet may be consistent in Nasrallah quietly set the stage for the offensive theory, that development is nonetheless troubling, operation in July. This rhetorical and operational as it has allowed cross-border militancy along unpredictability is both testament to Hezbollah’s Lebanon’s eastern border to flourish in recent increasing influence in shaping defense policies and to the Lebanese army’s apparent dwindling (1) In early July 2017, the United States and Russia agreed on establishing deescalation zones along Syria’s authority in that respect. borders, a plan backed by Jordan.

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