August 2013 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 6 . Issue 8

Contents Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price INTRODUCTION 1 Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price special Reports 4 Turkey’s Tangled Syria Policy By Hugh Pope 9 Israel’s Response to the Crisis in Syria By Arie Perliger 11 Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria By Karim Sadjadpour 14 Hizb Allah’s Gambit in Syria By Matthew Levitt and Aaron Y. Zelin 18 The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance By Nicholas Blanford 23 The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria By Aron Lund 28 From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi`a Militias By Phillip Smyth

32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Syrian rebels stand guard as protesters wave Islamist flags during an anti-regime demonstration in Aleppo in March 2013. - AFP/Getty n august 26, 2013, Secretary from those that were truly “wicked.”3 In of State John Kerry called their interpretation, wicked problems the recent use of chemical feature innumerable causes, are weapons outside of Damascus tough to adequately describe, and by O“undeniable” and a “moral obscenity.”1 definition have no “right” answers. This is the latest chapter in an already In fact, solutions to wicked problems complex civil war in Syria, a crisis are impossible to objectively evaluate; About the CTC Sentinel that Kerry’s predecessor called a rather, it is better to evaluate solutions The Combating Terrorism Center is an “wicked problem” for the U.S. foreign to these problems as being shades of independent educational and research policy establishment.2 That term good and bad.4 institution based in the Department of Social was introduced 40 years ago by two Sciences at the United States Military Academy, professors of urban planning who were By anyone’s account, the Syrian civil West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses trying to identify what differentiated war satisfies all of the criteria of a the Center’s global network of scholars and hard but relatively ordinary problems wicked problem. Like most crises, the practitioners to understand and confront issues surrounding the Syrian conflict contemporary threats posed by terrorism and are complex and interrelated, and there other forms of political violence. are multiple competing foreign policy 1 John Kerry, “Remarks on Syria,” U.S. Department of State, August 26, 2013; Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, The views expressed in this report are those of “Syrian Rebels Accuse Government of Chemical Attack,” 3 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, New York Times, August 21, 2013. in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973). the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 “The President and the Secretary of State,” 60 Minutes, 4 John C. Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Har- January 27, 2013. vard Business Review, May 2008.

1 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 interests at stake for the United States. The second camp is more skeptical about some important questions that so far As a result, there is no shortage of the rebel opposition and believes that have received limited attention. This disagreement about the way forward the United States has wisely exercised edition purposefully avoids proposing for the United States in responding to restraint throughout the crisis, any policy prescriptions. Rather, it the conflict. especially given the uncertainty of what identifies and analyzes the central a post-Assad Syria may look like. Retired actors and their strategic interests in an The discourse on U.S. policy options Ambassador Ryan Crocker, former chief effort to inform the debate surrounding for Syria features two contradictory diplomat to Syria from 1998-2001 and no this wicked problem. approaches. One camp argues that stranger to challenging situations after an effective solution requires direct serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Selected authors in this edition were American involvement, including likened the current crisis in Syria to the asked to view the Syrian civil war military intervention, and the removal massive wildfires raging in the American through the strategic lenses of some of President Bashar al-Assad from West: “You can’t put them out. You can’t of the conflict’s most important state power. While the United States called stop them…That’s kind of like Syria. We actors; others were asked to “deep- for al-Assad to step down as early can’t stop that war…What we can do, or dive” into the complicated non-state as August 2011,5 supporters of this should do, is everything possible we can militant landscape and profile the most approach complain that U.S. actions to to keep it from spreading.”11 important groups fighting in Syria. end the violence and remove al-Assad While this issue does not exhaust all have not matched its rhetoric.6 Even Many who side with Crocker’s relevant angles of the conflict, grouping this summer’s decision to send limited assessment suggest that the urge to these different perspectives in a single arms in support of the rebel cause is, “do something” should be tempered issue will hopefully advance the collective in their view, a case of too little, too by the United States’ first-hand understanding of the Syrian crisis and late.7 Those wanting more American knowledge of the tradeoffs, limitations, provide insight into the behavior and involvement in Syria argue that an al- and uncertainty associated with military policies of the relevant actors.13 Assad victory would increase Iran’s intervention during the last decade of influence, embolden Hizb Allah, and war. In a recent letter to Congressman Central Themes and Pressing Concerns risk the United States’ reputation as a Eliot Engel, the chairman of the Joint Syria poses several significant security superpower and its credibility among Chiefs commented that “the use of U.S. concerns for the United States and its allies (and enemies) in the region.8 military force can change the military allies. First, there are concerns about Detractors already point to the U.S. balance [in Syria]…But it cannot resolve Syria’s chemical weapons. Two months failure to stem humanitarian abuses the underlying and historic ethnic, prior to the most recent use of chemical by the Syrian government, including religious, and tribal issues that are weapons in August, a U.S. report al-Assad’s alleged use of chemical fueling this conflict.”12 in June concluded that the al-Assad weapons despite U.S. warnings that regime had used chemical weapons such use constituted crossing a “red The purpose of this article is two-fold. against rebel forces multiple times in line.”9 Others look at the United States’ First, it clearly outlines the intent the previous year.14 No U.S. ally is more inability to get other major powers, behind publishing a special issue of concerned about this development than especially Russia, on board to end the the CTC Sentinel focused exclusively on Israel. As Arie Perliger explains in his crisis quickly. Although no one argues the Syrian crisis. Second, it frames article, controlling Syria’s chemical that a post-Assad Syria will be a panacea the central themes surrounding the weapons stockpile is a critical concern for peace in the region, proponents conflict, identifies future implications for Israeli security officials. Israel has of this camp think that the benefits of for political violence in the region, and already conducted at least one attack intervening outweigh the costs.10 highlights several notable findings from inside Syria to prevent these weapons the issue’s contributors. from falling into the wrong hands, and

5 Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the more unilateral attacks can be expected Intent of this Issue Situation in Syria,” White House, August 18, 2011. if Israel feels positive control of these 15 6 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Lawmakers Call for Stronger US This special edition of the CTC Sentinel weapons is jeopardized in any way. Action in Syria,” New York Times, April 28, 2013. looks at the Syrian conflict from 7 Michele Kelemen, “U.S. Supplies for Syrian Rebels May multiple angles, including analyses 13 For example, the issue does not include a separate Be Too Little, Too Late,” National Public Radio, June 14, that closely examine the threats article on the important role Russia plays in the crisis. 2013; Tom A. Peter, “How Syria’s Conflict Became More posed by violent non-state actors in For analyses that address Russia’s strategic interests, see Complicated as US Debated Arms for Rebels,” Christian the region. The contributors address Radha Iyengar and Brian Fishman, The Conflict in Syria: Science Monitor, June 14, 2013. key issues and debates while raising An Assessment of US Strategic Interests (Washington, D.C.: 8 Barry Pavel, “What Was Obama Thinking?” Foreign New America Foundation, 2013); Anna Borshchevskaya, Policy, May 1, 2013. Michael Doran and Max Boot, “Five Reasons to Intervene “Russia’s Many Interests in Syria,” The Washington In- 9 Benjamin J. Rhodes, “Statement by Deputy National in Syria Now,” New York Times, September 26, 2012. stitute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2013; “Russia’s Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben 11 Stephanie Gaskell, “Interview with Ryan Crocker: As- Syrian Stance: Principled Self-Interest,” Strategic Com- Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use,” White sad Will Prevail ‘Yard by Bloody Yard,’” Defense One, Au- ments 2012:31 (2012). House, June 13, 2013; James Ball, “Obama Issues Syria gust 5, 2013; Ryan Crocker, “Containing the Fire in Syria,” 14 Rhodes. a ‘Red Line’ Warning on Chemical Weapons,” New York Yale Global, July 23, 2013. 15 Dominic Evans and Oliver Holmes, “Israel Strikes Times, August 20, 2012. 12 Bradley Klapper, “Dempsey: Syrian Rebels Won’t Back Syria, Says Targeting Hezbollah Arms,” Reuters, May 10 For a spirited argument for intervention in Syria, see US Interests,” Associated Press, August 21, 2013. 5, 2013; Arie Perliger, “Israel’s Response to the Crisis in

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Second, with possibly hundreds of State and Non-State Actors in the Syrian Looking at the rebel side, Aron foreign fighters returning to their Crisis Lund’s article dissects the diverse and home countries following the conflict Iran, according to Karim Sadjadpour’s complicated Sunni non-state militant in Syria, the United States and its allies analysis, views its alliance with Syria as landscape in Syria. His analysis must now contend with a potentially an essential pillar of its grand strategy. should give pause to those seeking dangerous foreign fighter problem. Most He argues that Iran’s strong support of simplistic narratives to describe the are familiar with the spate of terrorist the al-Assad regime is driven less by composition and motivations of the groups spawned in the years following historical precedent and cultural affinity rebel opposition.24 The complex the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and and more by realpolitik realities. As a mosaic of anti-Assad forces fighting Pakistan, to include al-Qa`ida. The same result, Iran’s commitment to al-Assad in Syria is one of the chief reasons dynamics may emerge in the aftermath remains steadfast, and it is willing to American policymakers are reluctant of the Syrian conflict.16 Many fear that spend significant blood and treasure to provide more resources to the foreign fighters hailing from Europe, to prevent a Sunni replacement rebel cause, especially when the “big the Middle East and North Africa will government from taking root in umbrella” of the opposition includes return to their home countries hardened Damascus.19 a group like Jabhat al-Nusra that has by battle and empowered by an extremist been designated as a foreign terrorist ideology. They may conduct attacks in Iran could not achieve its goals in Syria organization by the United States. The their home countries or use their Syrian without Lebanese Hizb Allah. Nicholas chairman of the Joint Chiefs shared experience to export violence to other Blanford’s article shows that the this concern recently to Representative countries. Closer to home, American group’s performance during the battle Engel: “Syria is not about choosing and European policymakers are also of Qusayr was a game-changer in the between two sides but rather about concerned about the return of hundreds conflict, stopping the momentum choosing one among many sides. It is of Western fighters who have also of the rebels and showcasing the my belief that the side we choose must traveled to Syria to conduct jihad.17 group’s ability to execute offensive be ready to promote their interests and operations in an urban environment.20 ours when the balance shifts in their Another obvious security concern for The addition of Hizb Allah drastically favor. Today, they are not.”25 the United States and its allies is an improved the fighting capability expansion of the conflict beyond Syria’s of the pro-Assad forces, but it may Hugh Pope’s article highlights Turkey’s borders.18 Low-level violence has come at a steep cost for the Lebanese many challenges with the Syrian already spilled over into Lebanon and group, according to Matthew Levitt crisis. In addition to withstanding Turkey, and the conditions that could and Aaron Y. Zelin. After Hizb Allah both conventional and unconventional ignite an escalation of the conflict are announced its direct support of the al- attacks along its border from pro-Assad present in spades. A cursory analysis Assad regime and spilled Sunni blood forces, Turkey has struggled to manage of the main actors and their strategic during the battle of Qusayr, its long- a massive influx of refugees from motivations, using many of the insights cultivated image of remaining above Syria.26 Additionally, Ankara’s alleged found later in this special issue, reveals the sectarian fray is now tarnished.21 support of Sunni rebel groups, both in the complexity of this crisis and paints By fighting alongside pro-Assad and outside its borders, has heightened a bleak picture for peace prospects in forces in Syria, Hizb Allah has also ethnic tensions at home.27 the near future. ignored the Lebanese government’s policy of non-intervention in the Jordan, like Turkey, is facing similar conflict.22 In fact, the group has had to problems with Syrian refugees and has recently implement “intensive security significant concerns about violence measures” in response to multiple car spilling across its border. Although bomb attacks in Shi`a areas south of the it overtly backs rebel groups fighting Lebanese capital “to head off retaliatory against al-Assad’s forces, Jordan is attacks spurred by anger over its role in highly concerned about the concentration 23 Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 (2013). Syria.” of Islamist extremist groups with ties to 16 For some interesting work on this issue, see Thomas al-Qa`ida fighting along its border in 28 Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explain- southern Syria. In June, the United ing Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice Between 19 Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Sci- Assad’s Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 (2013). 24 Aron Lund, “The Non-State Militant Landscape in ence Review 107:1 (2013). Although he found evidence to 20 Nicholas Blanford, “The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 (2013). suggest foreign fighter violence back home is less than Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance,” CTC 25 Klapper. The original letter can be found on Rep. En- conventional wisdom may suggest, foreign fighters that Sentinel 6:8 (2013). gel’s website at www.democrats.foreignaffairs.house. do conduct violence upon their return home are more ef- 21 Scott Helfstein, “The Rise of Sectarian Populism,” Na- gov/113/Letter_for_Rep_Engel_19_Aug_13.pdf. fective than non-veterans. tional Interest, July 18, 2013; Matthew Levitt and Aaron 26 Hugh Pope, “Turkey’s Tangled Syria Policy,” CTC 17 Raffaello Pantucci, “British Fighters Joining the War Y. Zelin, “Hizb Allah’s Gambit in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 Sentinel 6:8 (2013). in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:2 (2013); “Jihadis in Syria: A (2013). 27 Sophia Jones, “How the War in Syria Has Helped to Salafi Shindig,”Economist , June 18, 2013. 22 Levitt and Zelin. Inspire Turkey’s Protests,” Foreign Policy, June 11, 2013. 18 Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Con- 23 Nicholas Blanford, “Under Threat of Attack, Hezbol- 28 Suleiman al-Khalidi and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Reb- tagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space,” lah Turns Beirut Neighborhood into Fortress,” Christian el Gains in Southern Syria Sharpen Jordan’s Dilemma,” International Studies Quarterly 52:2 (2008). Science Monitor, August 25, 2013. Reuters, May 1, 2013.

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States took active measures—deploying Implications on the Future of Political Patriot missile batteries and F-16s to Violence in the Region Turkey’s Tangled Syria Jordan—to reassure its long-standing The Syrian crisis has important Policy regional ally.29 implications for future political violence in the region, regardless of what fate By Hugh Pope Iraq’s involvement in the Syrian ultimately befalls the al-Assad regime. conflict spans multiple fronts. The First, sectarian violence may now be the since the start of the civil war in Syria, United States has repeatedly called on defining feature of the civil war. Rival Turkey has struggled to develop the Iraq’s Nuri al-Maliki government to storylines have portrayed the conflict best strategy to manage the crisis. The stop facilitating the transfer of weapons differently: as the Syrian people’s fight war has brought fatalities, shellfire, from Iran to al-Assad’s forces through against an authoritarian dictator; as a bombs, militias, sectarian tensions and its borders.30 Additionally, the sectarian Sunni majority taking what is rightfully uncertainty to Turkey’s long southern strife that has plagued Iraq over the last theirs from an Alawite minority; or even border. Turkey has also welcomed decade is now being exported to the the jihadist movement attacking the at least 450,000 Syrian refugees, Syrian conflict. Al-Qa`ida in Iraq has “near enemy.” As Levitt and Zelin note a number that could rise sharply.1 reportedly sent significant numbers of in their article, the decision by Iran and Security problems are also multiplying fighters to Syria and even attempted Lebanese Hizb Allah to support al-Assad for Turkey, with Syria’s conflicts in a well-documented “merge” with its was an “all-in” moment. With Hizb a roiling stalemate and Syria itself jihadist counterpart in the Levant, Allah now in the fight, the Sunni-Shi`a turning into a failed state. Jabhat al-Nusra.31 To better understand dynamic overshadows other storylines Iraq’s pro-Assad non-state actors, and will likely prolong the conflict. Turkey’s security and humanitarian Phillip Smyth profiles and analyzes the challenges are exacerbated by the numerous Shi`a proxy organizations Second, coming on the heels of Usama historic and societal overlaps along from Iraq that have flocked to fight bin Ladin’s death in May 2011 and the frontier—particularly in Hatay alongside Hizb Allah and other Shi`a what appeared to be several peaceful Province, where geography and militant groups in Syria.32 transitions of power throughout population make it a Syrian microcosm the Middle East following the Arab in Turkey. Regionally, the Syria Finally, the conflict in Syria is fueled in Spring, the Syrian conflict was a timely conflict exemplifies how Turkey’s part by donor states hoping to influence lifeline of sorts for the broader jihadist “zero problem” policy has become the war’s outcome in accordance with movement. The Syrian conflict has multiple problems.2 Moreover, Ankara their own strategic interests. Russia attracted thousands of jihadist fighters allowed its bitter feud with Syrian has maintained its steadfast support from Europe, the Middle East, and leader Bashar al-Assad and its open of Syria, a long-standing ally, by North Africa who are answering the call support for opposition fighters to box in funneling a steady stream of arms to the to jihad in Syria in numbers that other its options. The crisis blocked Turkey’s regime and refusing to join the United conflicts in Mali and Yemen have not main trade routes to the Arab world States and the West in calling for al- been able to replicate. Additionally, the and opened a new front in its Kurdish Assad’s removal.33 Wealthy Sunni Gulf conflict in the Levant is unquestionably problem.3 states such as Saudi Arabia, the United the most popular topic on jihadist web Arab Emirates, and Qatar have played forums today. Viewed in conjunction This article examines Turkey’s important roles in bankrolling and with the Egyptian military’s removal strategic interests and level of arming specific rebel groups in their of President Mohamed Morsi and the involvement in Syria, as well as the attempt to oust al-Assad and balance Muslim Brotherhood from power, the challenges and opportunities that Syria against their regional rival, Iran.34 Syrian civil war also helps reinforce the jihadist narrative that violence is the 1 “Poor Transparency Shadows Turkey’s Syria Refugee best way to remove apostate regimes Policy,” Hurriyet, May 27, 2013. and restore the caliphate. 2 The “zero problem with neighbors” foreign policy term was coined by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet 29 Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, “US to Keep Syria is indeed a wicked problem, and it Davutoglu and is associated with the period of his ascen- Warplanes in Jordan, Pressuring Syria,” New York Times, will not be resolved in the near future. dancy with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in June 15, 2013. The conflict is complicated by sectarian power since 2002. In practice, it reflects Turkey’s ability 30 Arshad Mohammad, “Top US Diplomat Kerry Asks issues, fears about chemical weapons, between 1999 and 2008 to have much better relations Iraq to Stop Arms to Syria,” Reuters, March 24, 2013. foreign fighters, and a web of non-state with neighbors than had been possible in the Cold War 31 Ryan Lucas, “Jabhat al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to al proxies that are supported by donor era. Officially, it is a broad statement of good -will, rec Qaeda, But Has Not Merged, Syrian Leader Says,” Huff- states from afar. We hope the remaining onciles idealism and pragmatism, and reflects Turkey’s ington Post, April 10, 2013. articles help those interested in Syria belief that its relative economic strength and democratic 32 Phillip Smyth, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: make better sense of the crisis. advances should translate into a leading regional role. Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ definition of (2013). Major Bryan Price, Ph.D., is the Director the term is available at www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero- 33 Borshchevskaya. of the Combating Terrorism Center. The problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa. 34 C.J. Shivers and Eric Schmitt, “Arms Shipments Seen viewpoints expressed in this article do not 3 By mid-2013, however, a new engagement with Syrian From Sudan to Syria Rebels,” New York Times, August 12, necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army Kurds gave Ankara more tools with which to work, if not 2013. or the Department of Defense. the greater control that it seeks.

4 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 presents. It finds that whereas Turkey role during the past century as a leader After becoming increasingly embroiled until 2008 was praised for its ability to of the hard line Arab resistance against in disputes with Israel from 2009 speak to all regional players from Israel the encroachments of Israel, and the onwards, Turkey’s neutrality began to Iran, the Syrian crisis has accelerated prestige of Damascus in Arab opinion. to unravel.8 When Syrians began a new tendency for Ankara to be seen as After Iraqi internal security collapsed demonstrating against al-Assad in a partisan actor. While Turkish leaders with the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, March 2011, Turkey tried for months claim that their country has sufficient Syria also became the main truck route to stave off the budding rebellion, with resources to be the region’s main for Turkey’s Middle Eastern exports. Erdogan pressing al-Assad to reform in power, leverage over Syrian events Syria’s fulcrum role in the Arab world repeated telephone calls and visits to is clearly limited. The government’s also made it a multiplier of Turkish Damascus by Turkish Foreign Minister sense of defensiveness has been policy—a redoubtable problem when Ahmet Davutoglu.9 When al-Assad increased by domestic, pro-secularist, Ankara-Damascus ties have soured. brushed this advice aside, Turkey anti-government unrest in June 2013, executed another 180 degree turn: it followed by the June 30 overthrow of For instance, squabbles over the publicly sponsored an opposition Syrian Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, demarcation line of the 570-mile National Council (SNC) at a meeting in a close Islamist ally of Turkey’s Recep border between the two states have Istanbul in August 2011.10 In September Tayyip Erdogan government. long strained Ankara-Damascus ties. 2011, Erdogan called unequivocally for During the Cold War, NATO member al-Assad to relinquish power, saying he Turkey’s Strategic Interests in Syria Turkey and Soviet ally Syria marked had been betrayed by al-Assad’s broken Traditional Turkish policy in the Middle the frontier with minefields, barbed promises and angered at the regime’s East and elsewhere has been primarily wire and watchtowers, built dams on attacks on civilian protesters.11 Turkey based on defensive security, commercial major cross-border rivers such as the was convinced by an international opportunities, energy supplies, and Euphrates and Orontes, and accused consensus that the Damascus regime if possible some prestige. Policy each other of backing domestic armed would fall quickly, and it did not want choices in the last few years of Justice insurgents.5 to lag behind any foreign intervention, a and Development Party (AKP) rule, “latecomer” role that limited its leverage however, have become more ideological, In 1998-1999, after Turkey threatened after Libya’s regime change. especially in seeking partnerships with to invade Syria over its support (since Sunni Muslim actors such as Qatar, 1984) for the insurgent Kurdistan Turkey’s quick recognition of the and sometimes implicitly reflecting a Workers’ Party (PKK), Damascus SNC umbrella of political groups and Sunni Turkish version of the Islamist expelled PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.6 opposition militias as the official worldview both at home and abroad.4 There followed an extraordinary representative of the Syrian opposition Ankara has explicitly chosen one or turnaround. Where Syria had been in November 2011 was encouraged by more foreign Sunni Muslim internal the main obstacle blocking Turkey’s its established relationship with the players as a partner: it has moved closer progress in the Arab world, it became SNC’s main member, the Syrian Muslim to Sunni Kurds and Arabs in Iraq, has Turkey’s partner. The late 2000s saw Brotherhood.12 Although foreign been hostile to Iraq’s Shi`a Muslim frequent public closeness between backers tried to make the SNC non- prime minister, preferred Hamas among Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip all Palestinian factions, and is one of Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar 8 Having seen its good relations with all sides result in the only states to support the ousted al-Assad. Syria became the poster child being trusted as a mediator between Israel and Syria in Muslim Brotherhood government of of Turkey’s late 2000s policy of “zero 2008, Turkey turned angrily on Israel after its attack Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. In the case problems” with neighbors, leading the on Gaza at the end of that year. Relations hit a new low of Syria, this new policy has become way with freer travel, trade agreements, in 2010 when Israel killed eight Turks and a Turkish- adventurous, including support for infrastructure integration and regular American on the high seas, part of an international con- 7 Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and the high-level political meetings. In a way, voy led by a Turkish non-governmental organization Sunni armed opposition groups. this was a continuation of Turkey’s trying to break Israel’s blockade on Gaza. For the latter traditional policy of engaging the incident, see Isabel Kershner, “Deadly Israeli Raid Draws Syria—a core part of the Ottoman Empire Middle East, but in a warmer and more Condemnation,” New York Times, May 31, 2010. for four centuries until the First World friendly guise: seeking neutrality, able 9 For a detailed chronology of Turkish actions on Syria War—has always been a cornerstone of to speak to all parties including Israel, since March 2011, see Aslı Ilgıt and Rochelle Davis, “The Turkey’s Middle East strategy. This is and respecting existing borders. Many Roles of Turkey in the Syrian Crisis,” Middle East due to Syria’s geographic position, its Research and Information Project, January 28, 2013. 10 “After Istanbul Meeting, Syrian Dissidents Form ‘Na- 4 “Cemevis [Alevi prayer houses] are not places of wor- 5 Hugh Pope and Nicole Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A His- tional Council’ to Oust Assad,” Agence France-Presse, ship, they are centres where cultural events take place,” tory of Modern Turkey (New York: Overlook TP, 1999), August 23, 2011. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in an pp. 270-271. 11 “The time of autocracies is over,” said Erdogan. “Total- interview on Turkish television channel ATV on August 6 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish itarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people 5, 2012. Also see Semih Idiz, “The Sunnification of Turk- Fight for Independence (New York: New York University is coming.” See “Syria’s Oppressors Will Not Survive, ish Foreign Policy,” al-Monitor, March 1, 2013, in which Press, 2007). Erdogan Says in Libya,” Today’s Zaman, September 16, Idiz said, “The same Turkey that once hoped to be a peace 7 “Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Con- 2011. broker in its region is now increasingly seen as inflaming straints,” International Crisis Group, April 7, 2010, pp. 12 “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood Open to Turkish ‘Role,’” sectarian divisions and fuelling instability.” 4-14. Agence France-Presse, November 17, 2011.

5 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 sectarian, it never managed to be fully seized control of northern Syria, five even more important as psychological representative, partly because Syria’s Turkish townspeople were killed and support at home and a general deterrent Kurds and secular groups remained nine wounded by a stray shell in the to Damascus. Ankara attempted to suspicious of Turkey’s involvement, town of Akcakale on October 3.17 On persuade its Western allies to take a motives, and ethnic and religious October 4, the Turkish parliament more proactive role in the war, calling priorities, and some gravitated to approved a bill that would allow the at times for a no-fly zone to protect the other groups before a new umbrella government to order troops abroad, rebel-held areas of the country and for organization, the National Coalition of including to Syria.18 Over the next stronger backing for opposition militias. Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition nine months, stray bullets and shells It allowed Gulf states and Western Forces, was established in Qatar in killed and injured more people in the intelligence agencies to support, finance November 2012.13 and arm opposition militias.23 “The Syrian crisis pushed Supporting the SNC and then It is not clear how much arming and the National Coalition of Syrian Turkey deeper into training Turkey did independently, Revolutionary and Opposition Forces alignment with mainly aside from some groups close to its also signaled an end to Turkey’s border, as well as multiple reports efforts to be viewed as a Muslim Sunni Muslim opposition of Turkey allowing an Islamist power that rose above sectarianism, fighters and conservative group to cross the border to attack a and a subsequent slide in its regional Syrian Kurdish militia in November influence. There have still been signs Sunni powers, notably 2012.24 The Turkish government also of the former neutrality—in 2011, Prime Qatar.” faces considerable if muted domestic Minister Erdogan visited Iraqi Shi`a opposition to its Syria policy, with shrines, clerics and politicians, and one poll showing only one-third of Foreign Minister Davutoglu clearly the Turkish population supporting tried to make the Syrian opposition eastern Turkish town of Ceylanpinar.19 Ankara’s anti-Assad Syria policy, and broad-based.14 Yet the Syrian crisis Turkish artillery batteries were moved 43% saying that Turkey should have pushed Turkey deeper into alignment to the border area and have returned remained neutral.25 For now, several with mainly Sunni Muslim opposition fire, sometimes for hours on end. The refugee camps and the Turkish towns fighters and conservative Sunni powers, most dramatic single event was a May near them are frequently used by notably Qatar. In Iraq, another key 11, 2013, car bombing in the border Syrian opposition fighters as off-duty border state for Turkey, Ankara felt town of Reyhanli that killed 53 people resting places to visit their families, forced into deeper opposition to Iraqi and which Turkey blamed on Syrian receive medical services and purchase Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whom covert action.20 By mid-August 2013, an supplies.26 it increasingly saw as an irredeemably unofficial casualty toll maintained by pro-Iran, Shi`a actor and supporter of the International Crisis Group counted Challenges and Opportunities the al-Assad regime.15 74 dead in Turkey from Syria-related Ankara has seized one opportunity border violence since 2011.21 from the crisis in Syria: to launch a Level of Involvement in Syria process to solve the Kurdish problem Military tensions began to rise in 2012. Turkey quickly requested and and the PKK insurgency. This has given In June, a Turkish reconnaissance jet in January 2013 received NATO Turkey some leverage over the situation crashed in Syrian waters, with Syria protection from possible Syrian in northern Syria, where the PKK- saying it shot the plane down and attack, with American, Dutch, and aligned Democratic Union Party (PYD) Turkey responding with initially fiery German Patriot missile defense systems has primacy over the Syrian Kurds. At rhetoric and more aggressive rules of deployed to protect major cities.22 times, Turkish government officials engagement.16 As anti-Assad rebels Nominally this was a measure against explicitly stated that their motive in Syria’s presumed chemical-tipped seeking reconciliation was to bolster a 13 Sebnem Arsu and Tim Arango, “Turks Grant Recog- missiles, but NATO public support was regional standing that had been hobbled nition to Coalition of Syrians,” New York Times, Novem- by the continued PKK and Turkish army ber 15, 2012. June 26, 2012. fighting in Turkey. In July 2013, Turkish 14 Personal interview, Turkish official, Ankara, Febru- 17 “Mortar from Syria Kills Five Family Members in ary 2013. Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, October 3, 2012. 23 “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Tur- 15 After Erdogan intervened in support of Iraq’s Sunni 18 “Mandate to Send Troops Abroad Gets Criticism from key,” International Crisis Group, April 30, 2013, p. 37. leaders in April 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Mali- Opposition,” Today’s Zaman, June 26, 2012. 24 “Islamists Fighting Kurds in Syria Admit to Turkish ki declared Turkey was turning into an “interfering” and 19 “Fourth Victim of Syrian Stray Bullets Buried in Military Support,” Rudaw [Iraqi Kurdistan], February 6, “enemy” state. Erdogan then said that “there’s no need Ceylanpınar,” Today’s Zaman, August 4, 2013. 2013; Halil M. Karaveli, “Turkey, the Unhelpful Ally,” to let Maliki steal the show or gain prestige. Bad words 20 “Tensions High as Funerals Held in Hatay,” Hurriyet, New York Times, February 27, 2013. implicate only those who use them.” See “Tough Words May 12, 2013; “Turkey Blames Syria for Border Gate At- 25 See the Kadir Has University poll in January 2013, from Erdogan on Maliki and Kılıçdaroglu,” Radikal [Is- tack,” Hurriyet, March 11, 2013. available at www.khas.edu.tr/news/799/1278/Khas- tanbul], April 21, 2012. 21 The International Crisis Group provided these statis- 2012-Tuerkiye-Sosyal-Siyasal-Egilimler-Arastirmasi- 16 “Turkey Says Syria Down its Air Force Jet,” Today’s tics to the author in August 2013. Sonuclari-Aciklandi.html. Zaman, June 23, 2012; “Army on High Alert on Syrian 22 “U.S. to Send 2 Missile Units to Turkey to Deter Syr- 26 “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Tur- Border as Turkey Warns of Retaliation,” Today’s Zaman, ians,” New York Times, December 13, 2012. key,” p. 36.

6 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 officials also had apparently productive One aspect of the de facto refugee One bright spot in this gloomy picture meetings with the main Syrian Kurdish situation in Turkey is the way Syrians has been the economic resilience of militia leader, Salih Muslim, of the PYD. living outside refugee camps in Turkey the Turkish border area, a principal Yet a variety of domestic challenges seem to be fitting in as a new working beneficiary of the past decade’s Turkey- in mid-2013 distracted the Ankara class. There seems to be few obstacles to Syria trade boom. In Hatay Province, for government, and doubts now cloud the their long-term integration, but the May example, despite real damage in some future of Turkey’s relationship with the 2013 car bomb in Reyhanli, where many sectors, local businesses have adapted Kurds—a problem that since 1984 has Syrian refugees live, did trigger local remarkably. Some have even pioneered killed more than 30,000 people, cost demonstrations. The presence of largely a new roll-on/roll-off truck convoy Turkey $300 billion, hamstrung its Sunni Muslim refugees is exacerbating route by sea to Haifa, across Israel and democratization efforts and damaged its sensitive ethnic and sectarian balances, the West Bank to the Gulf.35 In the end, relationship with the European Union.27 particularly in Hatay Province, where overall exports and economic output in more than one-third of the population the province were both down only 1% Separately, one of Turkey’s major is of Arab Alevi descent and directly from a year earlier.36 challenges involves the presence of related to Syria’s Alawites.32 The 450,000 Syrian refugees, most of Turkish authorities have so far defused Preferred Strategic Endstate whom are in Turkish border provinces, tensions in Hatay that had peaked with From the moment they turned against nearly half in 17 camps and the rest demonstrations in September 2012.33 the Bashar al-Assad regime in August in towns and villages.28 Turkey has Much of the problem appears to be based 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan and his spent an estimated $1 billion so far, but on misperceptions and fears—including AKP government have been betting has only received one tenth of that in possibly exaggerated reports that rival on a quick resolution that would put international aid due to disagreements communities are arming. into power representatives of what it with donors over control of the funds.29 sees as Syria’s natural 70% majority of Another 100,000 Syrians are stuck in The security challenge naturally looms Sunni Muslims.37 Today, Ankara has insecure, often unpleasant conditions large. Turkey has little capacity to solve not retreated from the position that al- on the Syrian side of the border,30 and the intractable problems inside Syria if Assad should relinquish power, despite the United Nations predicts the total it acts alone, and it is unlikely to stage strong evidence that the Syrian leader number of those fleeing could double a solo military intervention. It is bound will neither step down nor extend his or triple in 2013.31 Opposition fighters by its membership in NATO’s defensive control over the half of the country he and Syrians with passports can cross alliance and is responsible for the safety does not control. the border freely, but Ankara allows of the American, Dutch and German incoming refugees only when there is Patriot missile systems symbolizing The emotional and domestic policy room in camps. that solidarity. Actual interventions commitment to this policy means it have so far been confined to returning is unlikely to change. A new Turkish Another major challenge is receiving fire if shells or bullets do damage in government in 2014, however, would the external support Turkey needs as Turkey and quiet support for the armed likely return to a more cautious, the refugee crisis becomes larger and Syrian opposition. traditional stance that is more respectful more protracted. Turkey has begun of existing borders. Even now, the to register a few more international Still, these policies remain open to current government is trying to harden aid organizations, and it should debate. Increased arming of opposition parts of the border with barbed wire to allow UN agencies and international fighters seems unlikely to enable the reassert control. Army units have even humanitarian organizations greater rebels to topple the regime quickly, and opened fire on groups—that official access. Turkey could also take more these militias have become enmeshed statements refer to as “smugglers”— steps to speed international aid in other problems, including fighting trying to cross the border.38 shipments destined for the far greater among themselves. AKP leaders’ repeated humanitarian problems inside Syria. statements about the glories of the Turkey adopted its aggressive strategy Ottoman Empire that collapsed in 1918 and toward Syria and its generous but a leading historical and economic role in expensive hosting of refugees for its Sunni Muslim neighborhood is at odds

27 For discussion of casualty figures, see “Turkey: End- with the present reality that it now has 35 Due to a special agreement with Israel, Turkish trucks ing the PKK Insurgency,” International Crisis Group, an uncontrollable, fractured, radicalized that used to transit Syria to the Middle East can now by- 34 September 20, 2011, p. 1. Prime Minister Erdogan gave “no-man’s land” on its doorstep. pass that country by using a special ferry service to the the figure for the cost in “The Democratic Initiative Pro- Israeli port of Haifa. From Haifa they drive in secure cess,” Justice and Development Party, February 2010. 32 According to interviews conducted by the author in convoys through Israel, the Palestinian West Bank until 28 “Poor Transparency Shadows Turkey’s Syria Refu- January 2013, local politicians claim the one-third figure, they reach Jordan to continue their journey. gee Policy,” Hurriyet, May 27, 2013. but activists such as Ali Yeral, an Arab Alevi leader and 36 Didem Collinsworth, “Hatay: The Syrian Crisis and 29 “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Tur- founding president of the Ehl-i Beyt Kültür ve Dayanısma a Case of Turkish Economic Resilience,” Turkish Policy key,” pp. 13-14. Vakfı, think that half the province is Alevi. Quarterly 12:1 (2013). 30 Ibid., p. 30. 33 “Shabiha Behind Pro-Assad Rally in Hatay, Daily 37 Jonathan Randal, “Syria’s Threatened Minorities,” 31 “Guterres: UNHCR Not to Assume Operational Role Claims,” Today’s Zaman, September 3, 2012. New York Times, May 4, 2012. in Turkish Refugee Camps,” Today’s Zaman, March 10, 34 Ahmet Davutoglu, speech at Dicle University, March 38 “Turkish Army Places Tanks on Syria Border to De- 2013. 15, 2013. ter Smugglers,” Bloomberg, August 15, 2013.

7 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 several understandable reasons. Regional Government (KRG), including not sustainable if Turkey is forced These include: the wish to aid those deals for energy pipelines to Turkey, to accept another large exodus from fleeing the fighting, the belief that independent of the relationship with Syria. Turkey has adopted language many Syrians want to return home Baghdad and with less concern than implying its desire to redraw the as soon as it is safe to do so, the in the past for consequences for the borders of the Middle East, which has unexpectedly massive scale of the territorial unity of Iraq.41 It is not clear stoked regional suspicions. Turkey’s emergency, and encouragement from how this pattern might be reproduced in traditional Western alliances have been international partners who have Syria; there is no pre-existing Kurdish weakened by the AKP’s authoritarian promised much support but given little. regional structure (as was the case for tendencies and scornful rhetoric toward Yet a more controversial reason luring Iraq’s KRG since 1974) and the main the European Union.42 Although a sharp Turkish policymakers deeper into Syrian Kurdish militia says it has no difference in Syrian priorities has not Syria’s problems is a sense of historical federal aim. been a big issue between Ankara and responsibility for parts of its regional Washington, there is a perception in backyard that until 1918 were part of Conclusion the United States of an overconfident the Ottoman Empire, which Turkey Turkey’s Syria policy is in jeopardy, Turkish prime minister acting against views as its predecessor state. with few obvious opportunities and stated U.S. wishes for international many grave problems. A bet since 2011 support for a united Iraq. Turkish nationalists have never fully that al-Assad would be ousted quickly accepted the legitimacy of the 1916 has not paid off. Turkey has blurred its At the same time, Turkey cannot be Sykes-Picot agreement that drew the border with Syria and already suffered expected to disassociate itself from the border that became a reality after blowback on its own territory in terms turmoil in its neighborhood, especially the international recognition of the of refugees, bomb attacks and ethnic given the way its regional rivals Iran new Republic of Turkey in 1923. tensions. It has few levers over the and Russia are standing so firmly Turkey engineered the annexation of emerging mosaic of militias, radical behind the Damascus regime. Humane, Alexandretta Province, which was groups and impoverished people just generous and flexible policies have also part of the French-mandate of Syria, across its border. made Turkey by far the best place to be in 1939 (now the Turkish province a Syrian refugee. of Hatay). Going further than any The catastrophic problems of Syria previous Turkish government, Foreign since 2011 would have been a severe New contacts with the Syrian Kurdish Minister Davutoglu is repeatedly on test for any Turkish government, PYD militia, the peace talks with the record saying that Turkey would like to coming as they did in the wake of PKK, and better relations with Iraq’s overthrow the “colonialist” Sykes-Picot the uprisings that have rocked the KRG all show a new pragmatism that can order.39 At the same time, it is not clear Arab world. A variety of aggravating at least add predictability to areas just what border or regional arrangement factors have made it even worse for across its borders. Nevertheless, there with which Turkey seeks to replace the ruling AKP. It had invested in the is no doubt that the Syrian crisis has it, given that resurrecting any version al-Assad regime and in the idea of a done great damage to Turkey’s hopes of the Ottoman Empire is out of the region characterized by free trade, free and plans for a Middle East that would question due to Turkey’s lack of power movement of people, infrastructure offer it heightened security, sustained and antipathy to the idea in the region. integration and high-level political new commercial opportunities, and harmony—all of which remain idealistic increased leadership and prestige. Turkey has no policy to annex dreams at this point. The AKP’s obvious neighboring, formerly Ottoman later support for the Sunni Muslim Hugh Pope is the co-author of Turkey territories, but it is seeking more Brotherhood and Islamist elements Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, influence, economic access, and control. in the Syrian opposition signaled a and the author of Sons of the Conquerors: Turkish officials do not talk of changing sectarian tendency to intervene in favor The Rise of the Turkic World and Dining borders, but recognize that their actions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with al-Qaeda: Three Decades Exploring are blurring them.40 One hint at the or against the Shi`a prime minister in the Many Worlds of the Middle East. He kind of new approach to be expected Iraq—both of these moves have had is the Turkey/Cyprus Project Director of is that senior Turkish officials make it limited success and have diminished International Crisis Group. clear that they are building up a close Turkey’s image as an impartial and relationship with Iraq’s Kurdistan strong regional power.

39 In a speech at Dicle University on March 15, 2013, For- Many of Turkey’s problems linked to eign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said, “The future cannot Syria’s strategic quicksand remain be constructed, first with their Sykes-Picot maps, then unresolved. Ankara’s refugee policy has with colonial methods, and then with their newly con- come at great domestic cost, requires cocted state understandings based on artificial maps and Turkey to keep some refugees from mutually hostile nationalist ideologies. We will break the crossing the border and is probably mould drawn for us by Sykes-Picot” (author’s transla- tion). 41 Turkey has long worked with the more conservative 42 “EU-Turkey Relations on Edge after Germany Blocks 40 “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Tur- Iraqi Kurdish leadership in the hope of outflanking the Talks,” EU Observer, June 21, 2013; “Turkish PM Slams key,” p. 39. more radical, left-wing Turkish Kurds of the PKK. EU, Threatens to Freeze Ties,” Hurriyet, July 19, 2013.

8 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8

Israel’s National Security Doctrine 1990s (at that time the most important Israel’s Response to the Israel’s national security doctrine sponsor of Israel’s main rivals in the Crisis in Syria was mainly developed by Israel’s first region) further solidified the asymmetry prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, between Israel and its neighboring By Arie Perliger who together with a small number countries. Considering these changes of military and political leaders in the security environment and the on may 1, 2013, the Israeli ambassador to established its main principles as early declining probability of conventional the United Nations, Ron Prosor, visited as the 1950s. Most of these principles wars, the Israeli security establishment the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. are still accepted today within the started to pay closer attention to the In his comments to cadets, he described Israeli political and security realms and efforts of some Arab countries to in general terms Israel’s position on include: 1) the presumption that Israel various Middle Eastern policy issues. He faces a continuous existential threat, emphasized Israel’s desire to continue which demands an active security “The crisis in Syria promoting the conciliation process approach; b) the extreme imbalance represents a ‘lose-lose’ with its neighbors and the Palestinians. between Israel and its neighbors in When asked about Israel’s position terms of population compels Israel to outcome for Israel as regarding Syria’s unconventional construct its army as a militia-style it serves as a breeding weapons, the ambassador stated that force, where almost the entire relevant Israel would not allow a situation in population can be enlisted in case ground for new emerging which forces hostile to Israel took of a crisis (via reserve units), while threats and provides possession of these weapons. The short, in times of peace the Israeli Defense but clear answer provided a glimpse Forces (IDF), based on compulsory growing opportunities for into the major factors that have shaped service, sustain most of the security existing hostile actors.” Israel’s approach to Syria in the last few burden; c) the use of reserve forces decades as well as during the current may impact the small Israeli economy crisis. It also reflected Israel’s concerns severely, thus Israel must aspire to with the growing strength of existing achieve quick and decisive results in compensate their disadvantage in terms sub-state entities like Lebanese Hizb its military campaigns; d) decisive of conventional and unconventional Allah and newer entities such as the al- victories are required to deter Israel’s power by developing unconventional Qa`ida-linked Jabhat al-Nusra. enemies, and deterrence is essential for weapons programs. The Israeli attack a country without real strategic depth; on the Iraqi nuclear facility near These developments raise a series of e) Israel’s lack of strategic depth means Baghdad in June 1981 was a first sign interesting questions. Why did Israel that combat must take place on enemy of Israel’s determination to address tolerate the Syrian government’s territory.1 actively these new developments.3 possession of chemical weapons given Ongoing Israeli efforts against the its hostility to Israel, but is willing to The final component of Israel’s doctrine Iranian nuclear program are another use extreme measures to prevent sub- has led not just to an emphasis on the example. Thus, the superiority of state groups from taking possession of importance of early warning, but also Israel’s conventional power has not those same weapons? Is there a strategic Israel’s preference to attack first, even led to abandoning the idea that Israel rationale behind the recent Israeli at the cost of directly violating the is under existential threat. Rather, the military strikes in Syria? Why does sovereignty of neighboring countries and Israeli security establishment gradually it appear that the Israeli leadership is accusations of unprovoked aggression. modified the concept to prevent ambivalent about the potential end- Most aspects of this doctrine are clearly neighboring countries from developing state of the ongoing civil war in Syria? evident in the current Syrian crisis. unconventional weapons systems.

To answer these questions, this article Syria: An Existential Threat? While the most acute concern for Israel introduces the major foundations Since the late 1970s and early is still Iran, Syria was always a close of Israel’s security doctrine and its 1980s, Israel’s conventional military second with its ongoing investment in, relevancy to the civil war in Syria, and superiority has become increasingly and development of, a ballistic missiles it analyzes Israel’s actions and policies apparent. During this period, a growing program to achieve what former Syrian in response to the Syrian crisis. It number of non-Israeli sources also President Hafiz al-Assad termed finds that the crisis in Syria represents indicated that Israel was able to “strategic parity” with Israel.4 In the a “lose-lose” outcome for Israel as it develop a significant arsenal of nuclear early 1980s, Syria was successful in serves as a breeding ground for new weapons.2 The collapse of the Soviet acquiring Scud-C missiles (with an emerging threats and provides growing Union in the late 1980s and early operational range of 320-370 miles) opportunities for existing hostile actors. 1 Arie Perliger, “Democracy in an Ongoing Conflict: The 3 David K. Shipler, “Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Politics of Defence in Israel,” in James Forest and Isaiah Reactor; Attack Condemned by U.S. and Arab Nations,” Wilson eds., Defence Politics: International and Compara- New York Times, June 9, 1981. tive Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 293-307. 4 Michael Eisenstadt, Arming for Peace: Syria’s Elusive 2 David Stout, “Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal Vexed Nixon,” Quest for Strategic Parity (Washington, D.C.: The Wash- New York Times, November 29, 2007. ington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

9 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 from North Korea as well as the Soviet The Israeli Response military and political class were united Union.5 Later that decade, these were Until recently, Israel showed limited in their opposition to a hostile polity supplemented with the more advanced interest in actively countering Syria’s acquiring nuclear capabilities. When Soviet OTR-21 (120-mile range) and efforts to develop weapons of mass on July 13, 2007, President George W. OTR-23 (310-mile range) missiles.6 An destruction (WMD) capabilities. Bush reportedly informed Israeli Prime important step for the Syrian program To begin with, the Syrian focus on Minister Ehud Olmert that the United was the construction of the first two chemical weapons, which, despite their States would not use military force to Syrian missile complexes in Aleppo and potential for causing mass fatalities are eliminate the facility, Israel decided to Hama in the 1990s, as well as the recent not comparable to the potential harm act alone.14 It is important to note that development of its Scud-D program, from nuclear weapons, contributed the decision to bomb the Syrian reactor using technologies provided from North to a more patient approach by Israel, in September 2007 came despite the Korea, Iran and possibly Russia.7 especially since for many years it was fact that there were significant concerns unclear how much progress the Syrian within the Israeli establishment about While expanding its arsenal of regime really made in fitting chemical possible retaliation by Syria and the ballistic missiles, Syria also stepped agents to ballistic warheads. Second, potential for the outbreak of war.15 Yet up its chemical weapons production. the vast Israeli investment in defensive the bombing of the Syrian facility may According to Israeli sources, Syria measures during the first Gulf War not have been the only Israeli response. experimented with an indigenous (e.g., equipping the entire population On August 1, 2008, Syrian Brigadier chemical production capability with gas masks and the formation of the General Mohammed Suleiman, one of al- already in the early 1970s (mainly at IDF’s Home Front Command) provided Assad’s close associates and the figure the Scientific Studies and Research more leverage in responding to this allegedly responsible for managing the Center, a facility near Damascus).8 threat and may have contributed to the Syrian nuclear program, was shot dead Nonetheless, a more systematic limited public demand to act against at his chalet in the Rimal al-Zahabiya production of nerve agents likely began Syria’s efforts to develop chemical resort area nine miles north of the port in the 1980s, including the installation weapons. Third, the proximity between city of Tartus.16 While some sources of a chemical warhead-fitting in the the countries, combined with Israel’s indicate that his death was a result of an Aleppo complex.9 By the early 1990s, military superiority, enabled in the “inside job,” other sources are confident both the international news media and eyes of Israeli policymakers effective that snipers of the IDF’s elite “Shayetet statements by U.S. officials indicated deterrence that lowered significantly the 13” unit were responsible for his that Syria had converted several chances of Syria using these weapons assassination.17 While the repercussions agrochemical factories into sarin gas against Israel. Finally, the significant of General Suleiman’s death are difficult production facilities in places such as progress in the conciliation process to discern, if reports about his expertise Homs, Latakia and Palmyra.10 Today, it between Israel and other Arab entities and role in managing the facility are is believed that Syria holds one of the (Egypt, Jordan, the Oslo Accords) accurate, then his assassination likely largest arsenals of chemical weapons, during the 1990s and 2000s, including made potential efforts to reconstruct while experimenting with various several phases of negotiations between the nuclear program more difficult. chemical substances, including mustard Israel and Syria, did not facilitate a gas, sarin gas and the more toxic (nerve sense of urgency regarding Syria’s The Israeli leadership confronted gas) V series.11 chemical arsenal. a new set of challenges with the outbreak of civil war in Syria that

5 See the “Missile” listing on the Syria country profile Several developments, however, led to further pushed it to adopt a more published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, available at changes in the status quo and eventually aggressive approach. The first is the www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/delivery-systems. to a more aggressive approach by potential for Lebanese Hizb Allah 6 Magnus Normak et al., “Syria and WMD Incentives Israel. The first was the decision of and other actors to acquire advanced and Capabilities,” Swedish Defense Research Agency, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in weapons systems from Syria, including June 2004, p. 69. 2001 to utilize his close relations with surface-to-air missiles, ballistic 7 Angelo M. Codevilla, “Missiles, Defense and Israel,” in North Korea to construct a nuclear missiles and chemical warheads. 12 Arieh Stav ed., The Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle facility in northeastern Syria. The Israel maximized its intelligence and East (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004) p. 61. Israeli establishment was shocked operational capabilities to ensure that 8 David Eshel, “Syria’s Chemical Weapons Proliferation when Mossad agents copied the hard WMDs would not spill over to hostile Hydra,” Defense Update News Analysis, September 23, disk of a member of the Syrian atomic non-state actors. Although the picture is 2007. Israel bombed this facility in January and May committee and discovered evidence still unclear, since the beginning of the 2013. of a Syrian nuclear facility in mid- 13 9 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Syrian Weapons of Mass 2007. For Israel, Syria’s shift into 14 Ibid. These comments were made by Elliott Abrams Destruction: An Overview,” Center for Strategic and In- the nuclear realm signaled a severe during the True Faces interview. ternational Studies, June 2, 2008. escalation. Similar to the case of Iraq 15 David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israel Struck 10 “Special Weapons Facilities,” Global Security, undat- in 1981, and today with Iran, Israel’s Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say,” New York Times, ed, available at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ October 14, 2007. syria/facility.htm. January to 30 June 2002,” U.S. Office of the Director of 16 Nicholas Blanford, “The Mystery Behind a Syrian 11 “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition National Intelligence, 2002, p. 4. Murder,” Time Magazine, August 7, 2008. of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 12 True Faces, Channel 10, Israel, August 26, 2012. 17 True Faces; “The Long Road to Syria,” Yedioth Ahro- and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the Period 1 13 Ibid. noth, August 26, 2010.

10 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 civil war in Syria Israel has attacked a Israel is also concerned about the end shipment of surface-to-surface missiles state of the war in Syria. On the one Iran’s Unwavering Support traveling from Iran to Hizb Allah near hand, there is a risk that a militant to Assad’s Syria al-Hamah on January 29, 2013,18 a Islamist regime will replace al- shipment of sophisticated anti-aircraft Assad’s government. In the eyes of By Karim Sadjadpour weaponry (probably Iran’s Fateh-110) the Israeli security establishment, that was stationed in a warehouse at the effectiveness of conventional throughout the current war in Syria, Damascus International Airport and deterrence against such a regime is in Iran has remained a steadfast supporter was intended for Hizb Allah on May doubt, thus the chances of escalation of the Bashar al-Assad regime. The 3, 2013,19 and Syria’s Scientific Studies and that regime’s usage of WMD is surprising endurance of the Iran-Syria and Research Center near Damascus on higher. Moreover, an “Islamic republic” alliance is made more striking by the May 5, 2013, a facility possibly involved in Syria may provide violent Salafist fact that it is based on neither shared in the development of biological and groups another platform to engage national interests nor religious values, chemical weapons.20 in militant activities against Israel but is rather a tactical-cum-strategic (in addition to the Gaza Strip). These partnership between two authoritarian These attacks were not just intended to concerns are reflected in the IDF’s plans regimes. Mutual contempt for Saddam prevent militant actors from acquiring to form a new regional compulsory Hussein’s Iraq brought Syria and Iran strategic weapons that could undermine division that will be responsible for the together in 1980, and mutual fear and Israel’s ability to maintain the status protection of the Golan Heights from loathing of the United States and Israel quo on the Lebanese and Syrian borders, infiltration of hostile forces, as well has helped sustain their alliance.1 but they also reflected Israel’s concerns as developing response mechanisms about implementing its security against artillery attacks on Israeli Iran initially supported the popular doctrine. In other words, these new population centers in the region. On uprisings in the Middle East—calling weapons would have allowed Hizb Allah the other hand, a victory for al-Assad’s them “Islamic awakenings”—when (and potentially other actors) to speed forces does not mean a return to the it appeared that only Western-allied up processes that started to take shape pre-war status quo. A weak al-Assad Arab autocracies in Tunisia, Egypt, in the last two decades, including: a) the regime, highly dependent on Iran and and Yemen were vulnerable to collapse. growing inability of Israel to prevent Hizb Allah, will become a severe liability, In Syria, however, Tehran has offered the war in Syria from spilling into the further solidify an eastern front against unwavering support to the embattled Israeli home front, a development that Israel, and provide Hizb Allah more al-Assad regime and denounced the has severe implications on Israel’s resources that eventually may lead to the Syrian opposition as “terrorists” ability to mobilize reserve units resumption of violence in Lebanon. supported by a motley alliance of Gulf effectively in case of crises, as well as Arab states, Israel, and the United on the Israeli public’s resiliency; b) Conclusion States. Senior Iranian figures, such growing difficulties (as seen also during For Israel, the crisis in Syria represents as former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar the 2006 war in Lebanon) to achieve a a “lose-lose” situation. Yet there are Velayati, have referred to Syria as “decisive victory” in the traditional already low expectations that a more “a golden ring of resistance against sense of the term of “eliminating” the pragmatic regime will emerge following Israel,” and Supreme Leader Ayatollah military capabilities of the enemy; the current war. Moreover, Israel is Ali Khamenei-confidante Mehdi Taeb c) the latter impacts the ability to highly concerned about the potential said that Syria is Iran’s “35th province… achieve effective deterrence, hence eruption of a war of attrition in the if we lose Syria we won’t be able to hold further narrowing military options Golan Heights that will challenge Israel Tehran.”2 Without Iranian military in the future; d) these developments across three fronts—the Golan Heights, aide and financial largesse, al-Assad’s may lead to Israel’s inability to control the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. regime may have fallen long ago. the volume and expansion of future conflicts, increasing unpredictability, In all these arenas, Israel has limited This article examines the factors and thus the Israeli inclination to be capabilities to project its superior driving Iran’s support for the al- even more vigilant and proactive in conventional capabilities and to Assad regime, including its concern initiating preliminary attacks. implement the fundamental principles over the alternatives. It argues that of its security doctrine. Therefore, it is despite Iran’s economic travails and 18 Isabel Kershner and Michael R. Gordon. “Israeli Air- not surprising that voices from Israel, the surprise election of “moderate” strike in Syria Targets Arms Convoy, U.S. Says,” New while somewhat inconsistent regarding cleric Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s new York Times, January 30, 2013. preferred outcomes of the war, are all president, Tehran’s political, financial 19 Liz Sly and Suzan Haidamous, “Israel Bombs Out- indicating growing concern that as bad skirts of Damascus for Second Time in Recent Days,” as the situation is now, it will likely 1 For an excellent account of the origins of the Iran-Syria Washington Post, May 4, 2013. only become worse. alliance, see Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic 20 Dominic Evans and Oliver Holmes, “Israel Strikes Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (New York: Syria, Says Targeting Hezbollah Arms,” Reuters, May Dr. Arie Perliger is the Class of 1977 Director I.B. Tauris, 2009). 5, 2013; Alexander Marquardt, “Israel Tries to Cool Ten- of Terrorism Studies at the Combating 2 These quotes are excerpted from the following study: sion With Syria After Missile Attacks,” ABC News, May Terrorism Center and Associate Professor in Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday and Sam Wyer, “Iranian 6, 2013. Israel also attacked the facility on January 30, the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Strategy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War and the 2013. Military Academy, West Point. American Enterprise Institute, May 2013.

11 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 and military support for the al-Assad $700 million per year, which is less than Soleimani and Operations and Training regime is unlikely to waver. half of its trade with Afghanistan and Commander Mohsen Chizari for their a small fraction of its $30 billion trade role in “the violent repression against Strategic Interests at Stake in Syria with China.6 This figure, however, does the Syrian people.”12 Syria has been Tehran’s only consistent not take into account the subsidized ally since the 1979 Islamic revolution. oil Iran has provided Syria since 1982, Iran has also allegedly dispatched IRGC Whereas the rest of the Arab world when Damascus agreed to close Iraq’s ground forces to Syria with experience supported, and in some cases oil pipeline through Syrian territory.7 suppressing popular unrest in provincial bankrolled, Saddam Hussein during areas within Iran, such as ethnic and the Iran-Iraq war, Hafiz al-Assad’s Since the tumult began in Syria, Iranian tribal insurgencies.13 Dozens of these Syria sided with Tehran. While financial largesse has been ever more forces were allegedly kidnapped by Iranian and Syrian tactical interests critical. In January 2013, Syrian state anti-Assad rebels in August 2012, only have occasionally diverged during the media announced a $1 billion “credit to be released later as part of a prisoner last three decades, on macro-strategic facility agreement” with Iran.8 Five exchange.14 While Tehran alleges that issues the two regimes have more often months later, Syrian officials announced they were religious pilgrims, evidence worked in unison. that Iran would provide Damascus an suggests otherwise.15 additional $3.6 billion line of credit Beyond its political support, Syria is “to finance the purchase of petrol and Iran also reportedly helped Syria also critical to Iran in that it provides it associated products.”9 expand its chemical weapons arsenal.16 a geographic thoroughfare to Lebanese Iranian support for Syria’s chemical Shi`a militia Hizb Allah, which is Iran has also offered Syria conventional weapons programs has allegedly one of the crown jewels of the Iranian and unconventional military aid and included the deployment of Iranian revolution. Both Syria and Hizb Allah intelligence training and cooperation scientists, the supply of equipment are crucial elements of Iran’s resistance to help quell popular unrest. According and precursor chemicals, and technical alliance, and much of Hizb Allah’s to both U.S. government reports and training.17 armaments are thought to emanate from Iranian official statements, Tehran has Iran via the Damascus airport.3 helped create a 50,000 strong Syrian In addition to financial and military paramilitary group known as Jaysh al- support, during the last three decades Iranian motivations in keeping the al- Shabi (The People’s Army) to aid Syrian Iran has made a concerted effort to forge Assad regime in power are also driven by government forces.10 cultural and religious bonds between deep concerns about the composition of the Iranian and Syrian populations by a post-Assad government. Given Syria’s Similar to other Iranian strategic offering its citizens heavily subsidized overwhelming Sunni Arab demographic outposts in countries undergoing flight and hotel packages to Syria.18 majority, Iran fears the prospect of tumult—such as Iraq and Afghanistan— Millions of Iranian religious tourists Syria being rendered a Sunni sectarian it is the elite wing of the Islamic have visited the Sayyida Zaynab Shi`a regime aligned with Saudi Arabia or the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), shrine in Damascus. United States and hostile to Shi`a Iran.4 known as the Qods Force, that oversees While visiting Damascus in August Tehran’s activities in Syria—not the 2012, former Iranian Supreme National Iranian Foreign Ministry. Defected Security Adviser Saeed Jalili stated that former Syrian Prime Minister Riyad “Iran will absolutely not allow the axis Hijab went so far as to say that “Syria 12 “Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry of Intelligence of resistance, of which it considers Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime. and Security for Human Rights Abuses and Support for to be a main pillar, to be broken in any The person who runs the country is Terrorism,” U.S. Treasury Department, February 16, 5 way.” In other words, if the ends are not Bashar al-Assad but [Qods Force 2012. 11 opposing the United States and Israel, commander] Qasem Soleimani.” The 13 Fulton et al. almost any means are justified. U.S. Treasury department sanctioned 14 “Tensions Rise Over Iranian Hostages,” Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2012; Anne Barnard and Sebnem Iran’s Level of Involvement in Syria 6 Alex Vatanka, “Syria Drives a Wedge Between Turkey Arsu, “Iranian Captives Freed in Prisoner Exchange in While Iran’s major role in Syria is and Iran,” Middle East Institute, May 16, 2012. Syria,” New York Times, January 9, 2013. undeniable, it is impossible to discern 7 “Syria,” U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies, 15 “‘Everyone on this trip was either a Guard or a Basij Tehran’s precise financial and military April 1987. militia. This wasn’t a regular tour group,” said an em- assistance to the al-Assad regime. 8 “Syria and Iran Ink Credit Deals,” al-Bawaba, January ployee of the tour agency that organized the trip. See According to official estimates, Iran’s 17, 2013. ibid. annual trade with Syria is only around 9 “Iran Grants Syria $3.6 Billion Credit to Buy Oil Prod- 16 James Ball, “Syria Has Expanded Chemical Weapons ucts,” Reuters, July 31, 2013. Supply With Iran’s Help, Documents Show,” Washington 3 Ibid. 10 “Head of Ammar Strategic Base: Syria is Iran’s 35th Post, July 27, 2012. 4 “If it weren’t for Syria’s active government,” said for- Province; If We Lose Syria We Cannot Keep Tehran,” 17 Ibid. For the most up-to-date and in-depth study on mer Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, “the Iran Pulse, February 14, 2013; “Treasury Sanctions Iran’s role in Syria, see Fulton et al. country would become like Qatar or Kuwait. Iran is not Al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and Militias Sup- 18 Western media reports about Iran’s state-sponsored prepared to lose this golden counterweight.” See ibid. porting the Asad Regime,” U.S. Treasury Department, tourism in Syria date back to 1984. See, for example, Ned 5 “Iran: We’re in ‘Axis of Resistance’ with Syria,” CBS/ December 11, 2012. Temko, “Iranian Tourists in Syria: A Sign of Political Co- AP, August 7, 2012. 11 Fulton et al. ziness,” Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1984.

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Challenges and Opportunities Ayatollah Ali Khamenei once said, be shaken by any force in the world.”26 Iran’s greatest challenge is sustaining “We will support and help any nations, In private, however, a former senior its large financial aid to Syria while any groups fighting against the Zionist Rouhani aide was far more equivocal simultaneously enduring draconian regime across the world.”24 Iran’s Sunni about Tehran’s continued support for international sanctions—in place due to allies Hamas and Palestinian Islamic al-Assad. The best way to resolve U.S.- its nuclear ambitions—that have cut its Jihad are cases in point. Yet despite Iranian tensions in Syria, he argued, oil exports by half.19 One Arab official sharing common enemies with some is to find a “Syrian Karzai”—a Sunni estimated that Tehran is spending as Syrian rebels, it may prove impossible Arab politician palatable to Tehran, much as $600 to $700 million per for Iran to befriend the same forces it Washington, and the Syrian people.27 month to keep al-Assad solvent.20 helped attack during the past two years. Absent a nuclear deal that reduces Anti-Shi`a, anti-Persian sentiment is rife While Rouhani’s desire to alter Iran’s economic sanctions and allows Iran among Syria’s rebels, and the attraction approach to Syria is questionable, his to increase its production and export of future Iranian financial support is ability to do so is even more uncertain. more oil, Tehran’s financial support for eclipsed by the deeper pockets of Saudi The officials who manage Iran’s Syria Syria could be viewed with increasing Arabia and Qatar. policy—namely, current Qods Force scrutiny at home by a population chafing commander Qasem Soleimani—do under external economic pressure and What is paramount for Tehran is that not report to Rouhani, but answer to internal mismanagement.21 Syria remains an Iranian strategic Ayatollah Khamenei. Given Syria’s “resistance” ally and a way-station to centrality to another indispensable Apart from its financial burden, Iran’s Hizb Allah in Lebanon. While Iran’s ideal resistance ally, Hizb Allah, one official support for Syria has caused it great endstate—the status quo ante, which is al- Iranian source said that those who reputational harm in the predominantly Assad regaining control over all Syrian believe that Rouhani can alter Tehran’s Sunni Arab world. Whereas several territory—appears outside the realm of patronage of Hizb Allah are “either naïve years ago Shi`a, Persian Iran was able to possibilities, for Tehran the key questions or daydreamers…Whoever the president transcend ethnic and sectarian divides are how long can al-Assad hold Damascus, is, whoever the ministers are, Hizb by appealing to popular Arab outrage how much Iranian support will it require, Allah will still be the same Hizb Allah against the U.S.-led war in Iraq or the and what happens if he loses power? to Iran. Hizb Allah to Iran isn’t a card to 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, today According to one assessment, Iran’s play with. Hizb Allah today is the crown Iran is increasingly perceived by Sunni supply routes to Hizb Allah via Syria jewel of the resistance bloc; presidential Arabs as a nefarious, sectarian actor.22 could be maintained even if al-Assad moderation doesn’t mean giving up the Lebanese Hizb Allah has suffered a similar only maintains control of Damascus, nation’s strengths.”28 fate due to its support of al-Assad. Homs, and the coast. If al-Assad falls, proxy groups might be able to protect In this context, it appears highly If the al-Assad regime loses Damascus, supply lines if the opposition does not unlikely that Iran will abandon its Tehran will face a difficult strategic establish control over Syria’s borders.25 support for the al-Assad regime in the decision: whether to preserve a near future. For U.S. policymakers, sphere of influence by supporting Implications of Rouhani’s Election in Iran Iran’s unabashed support for al-Assad a predominantly Alawite militia While Iran’s alliance with the al-Assad is a mixed blessing. Iranian support representing only a small fraction of regime has endured for more than three prolongs al-Assad’s shelf-life and Syrian society, or to befriend the Sunni decades, the biggest question in the further tarnishes U.S.-Iran tension and rebels poised to wield authority in coming months is whether the surprise mistrust, making a potential nuclear Damascus. Contrary to conventional election of “moderate” cleric Hassan accommodation less likely. At the same wisdom, what is most important for Rouhani will alter Iran’s strategy in time, it simultaneously darkens Iran’s Iran is not the sectarian composition Syria. More specifically, does Rouhani regional reputation among Sunnis and of Syria’s future leaders, but a like- have the will, ability or interest in hemorrhages it financially, weakening minded ideological worldview premised changing Iran’s Syria policy? Publicly, its ability to project power and influence on resistance to the United States and Rouhani has expressed solidarity with throughout the Middle East. Israel.23 As Iranian Supreme Leader the al-Assad regime, declaring in a recent meeting with visiting Syrian Prime Karim Sadjadpour is a Senior Associate at 19 “Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanc- Minister Wael al-Halqi that “the Islamic the Carnegie Endowment for International tions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013. Republic of Iran aims to strengthen its Peace. He is author of Reading Khamenei: 20 Samia Nakhoul, “Hezbollah’s Syria Victory Risks relations with Syria and will stand by The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Wider Sunni-Shi’ite Conflict,” Reuters, June 6, 2013. it in facing all challenges. The deep, Leader. He was a visiting fellow at the 21 Some Iranians protesting rising inflation in 2012 chant- strategic and historic relations between American University of Beirut in 2003-2004 ed slogans such as, “Forget about Syria, think about us.” the people of Syria and Iran…will not and frequently visited Syria. See Joby Warrick and James Ball, “Food Prices, Inflation Rise Sharply in Iran,” Washington Post, October 4, 2012. 26 Bassem Mroue, “New Iranian President Vows Sup- 22 James Zogby, “The Rise and Fall of Iran in Arab and Hates Most, U.S. or Iran?” Bloomberg, February 5, 2013. port for Assad,” Associated Press, August 5, 2013. Muslim Public Opinion,” Huffington Post, March 9, 24 Thomas Erdbrink, “Khamenei: Iran Will Back ‘Any 27 Personal interview, former senior Rouhani aide, 2013. Nations, Any Groups’ Fighting Israel,” Washington Post, Washington, D.C., July 2013. 23 For more on this argument, see Karim Sadjadpour February 3, 2012. 28 Ali Hashem, “Iran’s Ties to Hezbollah Unchanged,” and Firas Maksad, “Syria’s Fate Hinges on Whom It 25 Fulton et al. al-Monitor, August 10, 2013.

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While the Sayyida Zaynab shrine is the fight in Syria, Nasrallah lamented, Hizb Allah’s Gambit in indeed a major Shi`a pilgrimage site, the international community only Syria Hizb Allah has more than just spiritual complained about foreign intervention ties to the shrine. As early as the 1980s, in Syria when “a small group from Hizb By Matthew Levitt and Aaron Y. Zelin Hizb Allah used the site as a place to Allah entered Syria.”9 identify potential militant recruits. For speaking in late May 2013, Hizb Allah Saudi Shi`a recruits in particular, Yet Hizb Allah’s destabilizing activities Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah the Sayyida Zaynab shrine served as in Syria date almost to the beginning of declared that the battle in Syria was a transfer hub and a cover for travel the country’s uprising in 2011. These Hizb Allah’s fight: “We will continue between Saudi Arabia and training activities, as a journalist in Lebanon along the road, bear the responsibilities camps in Lebanon or Iran.3 wrote, have “torn away the party’s and the sacrifices. This battle is ours, mask of virtue.”10 Within weeks of the and I promise you victory.”1 To that Evidence of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine’s uprising, Nasrallah himself called on end, Lebanese Hizb Allah went “all- operational significance to Hizb Allah all Syrians to stand by the al-Assad in” fighting alongside Bashar al- emerged in the context of the FBI regime.11 As reports emerged in May Assad regime loyalists and Iranian investigation into the 1996 Khobar 2011 that Iran’s Qods Force was helping revolutionary guardsmen against Syrian Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. Air the Syrian regime crack down on rebels. The impact of Hizb Allah’s Force personnel and wounded another antigovernment demonstrators, Hizb involvement has been significant, as 372 Americans.4 Five of the Khobar Allah denied playing “any military role was seen most clearly in the battle for Towers conspirators were recruited in in Arab countries.”12 By the following Qusayr in May-June 2013, where Hizb Damascus, according to the findings of month, however, Syrian protesters Allah gunmen reportedly fought house U.S. investigators, most at the Sayyida were heard chanting not only for al- to house, suffered losses, and played the Zaynab shrine. When Abdallah al- Assad’s downfall, but also against decisive role in turning the tide against Jarash was recruited at the site, he was Iran and Hizb Allah.13 Video footage anti-Assad rebels who ultimately lost told that the goal of this “Saudi Hizb showed protesters burning posters of the town. That battle also laid bare the Allah” group was “to target foreign Nasrallah.14 According to a senior Syrian myth that Hizb Allah was not fighting interests, American in particular, in defense official who defected from the in Syria. Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.”5 Later, regime, Syrian security services were at least one of the operatives recruited unable to handle the uprising on their This article identifies Hizb Allah’s at Sayyida Zaynab, Ali al-Marhoum, own. “They didn’t have decent snipers strategic calculus for joining the fight would return to Saudi Arabia to recruit or equipment,” he explained. “They in Syria. First, it contextualizes Hizb more operatives.6 needed qualified snipers from Hizb Allah’s historical connection to the Allah and Iran.”15 Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus Just days before the bombing, several since it is utilized heavily in Hizb of the conspirators met in Damascus at Over time, Hizb Allah increasingly Allah’s propaganda. It then probes the Sayyida Zaynab shrine to confer one struggled to conceal its on-the-ground Hizb Allah’s military involvement as last time with senior leadership of Saudi support for the al-Assad regime. well as its training advisory role with Hizb Allah.7 Abdel Karim al-Nasser, In August 2012, the U.S. Treasury new militias. It finds that Hizb Allah is the group’s chief, reportedly went over Department blacklisted Hizb Allah, heavily involved in Syria not only to help the operational details of the bomb plot already on the department’s terrorism its patrons in Damascus and Tehran, with the men to be sure everyone knew list, for providing support to the al- but also to stave off an existential crisis their roles.8 Assad regime.16 Since the beginning in Lebanon if the Syrian rebels were to of the rebellion, the U.S. Treasury achieve victory. Hizb Allah Joins the Fray

When did Hizb Allah join the fight in 9 Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqawama and the Lib- Hizb Allah’s Historical Ties to the Sayyida Syria? Hizb Allah, Nasrallah insisted eration.” Zaynab Shrine in May 2013, had not intervened 10 Michael Young, “Syria Widens Hezbollah’s Contra- Although Hizb Allah has admitted to in the fighting in Syria until just dictions,” al-Arabiya, October 4, 2012. fighting in Syria, it initially insisted several months earlier. While “tens of 11 “Hezbollah Chief Calls on Syrians to Stand by Assad that it was only either defending ethnic thousands of [Sunni] fighters” joined Regime,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2011. Lebanese living on the Syrian side of 12 Joby Warrick, “Iran Reportedly Aiding Syrian Crack- the border, or protecting Shi`a shrines, Policy, May 22, 2013. down,” Washington Post, May 27, 2011; Thomas El-Basha, specifically the Sayyida Zaynab in 3 Toby Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The “Nasrallah Blasts Obama, Urges Arabs Withdraw Peace southern Damascus. These defensive Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group,” Middle East Initiative,” Daily Star [Beirut], May 25, 2011. narratives used by Hizb Allah and its Journal 64:2 (2010): pp. 179-197. 13 “Syrian Protestors Turn on Iran and Hezbollah,” allies in Iran and Iraq have dominated 4 The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident (Washington, D.C.: France 24, June 3, 2011. their propaganda in the past two U.S. House National Security Committee, 1996). 14 Ibid. 2 years. 5 U.S.A. v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Eastern District of Vir- 15 Nate Wright and James Hidler, “Syrian Regime ‘Im- ginia, 2001. porting Snipers’ for Protests,” Australian, January 26, 1 Hassan Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqawama and 6 Ibid. 2012. the Liberation,” al-Manar, May 25, 2013. 7 Ibid. 16 “Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership,” U.S. 2 Phillip Smyth, “Hezbollah’s Fallen Soldiers,” Foreign 8 Ibid. Treasury Department, September 13, 2012.

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Department contended, Hizb Allah movement catering first and foremost— Hizb Allah’s standing in Lebanon and had been providing “training, advice though not exclusively—to Lebanon’s the region. and extensive logistical support to the Shi`a community. Hizb Allah is also Government of Syria’s increasingly Lebanon’s largest militia, the only Syria has been Hizb Allah’s reliable ruthless efforts” against the opposition.17 Lebanese militia to keep its weapons patron for years, a relationship that Most funerals for Hizb Allah members and rebrand its armed elements as an only grew deeper under the rule of killed in the fighting were quiet “Islamic resistance” in response to the Bashar al-Assad.25 While Hafiz al-Assad affairs, as Hizb Allah tried to conceal terms of the 1989 Taif Accord, which used Hizb Allah as a proxy, he also kept the extent of its activities in Syria; ended the Lebanese Civil War. the group at arm’s length and at times however, news of its involvement began employed force to keep it in line. In to emerge. In August 2012, Hizb Allah While the group’s various elements are 1988, for example, Hafiz al-Assad’s parliamentarians reportedly attended intended to complement one another, Syria issued a warrant for the arrest the funeral of military commander Musa the reality is often messier. In part, of Imad Mughniyyeh, the head of Hizb Ali Shehimi who “died while performing this is due to the compartmentalization Allah’s Islamic Jihad Organization.26 his jihadi duty.”18 A few weeks later, of Hizb Allah’s covert activities. It is By 2010, however, Bashar al-Assad was another Hizb Allah military commander, also, however, a result of the group’s not just allowing the transshipment Ali Hussein Nassif, was killed in Syria, multiple identities—Lebanese, pan- of Iranian arms to Hizb Allah through along with two bodyguards, also “while Shi`a, pro-Iranian—and the group’s Syria, but was reportedly providing performing his jihadi duties,” according various strategic interests tied to these Hizb Allah long-range Scud rockets to a Hizb Allah newspaper.19 different identities. Nowhere has this from its own arsenal.27 Nasrallah been starker than in Syria, where the explained the nature of Hizb Allah’s Hizb Allah’s “resistance” rhetoric group has turned the weapons it has alliance with Syria: notwithstanding, U.S. officials long maintained were solely intended informed the UN Security Council in for “resistance” against Israel toward I frankly say that Syria is the October 2012 that “the truth is plain to fellow Muslims to the east. Moreover, backbone of the resistance, and see: Nasrallah’s fighters are now part of by engaging in sectarian violence in the support of the resistance. The Assad’s killing machine.”20 Two months Syria, Hizb Allah threatens the stability resistance cannot sit with hands later, a UN report confirmed Hizb Allah of the fractured and deeply divided crossed while its backbone is members were fighting on behalf of the sectarian society in Lebanon. Ignoring held vulnerable and its support al-Assad government.21 Amid increasing the Lebanese government’s stated policy is being broken or else we will be concern that the struggle in Syria would of non-intervention in Syria, Hizb Allah stupid. Stupid is he who stands engulf the region in conflict, Hizb Allah has dragged Lebanon into a sectarian motionless while watching death, established training camps near Syrian war. Recognizing this, Nasrallah even the siege and conspiracy crawling chemical weapons depots in November suggested Lebanese could fight each towards him. He would be stupid 2012.22 According to a senior U.S. official, other in Syria, just not in Lebanon: then. However, the responsible, “The fear these weapons could fall into the rational man acts with absolute wrong hands is our greatest concern.”23 We renew our call for sparing responsibility.28 Lebanon any internal clash or Hizb Allah’s Strategic Interests in Syria conflict. We disagree over Syria. Hizb Allah’s support of the al-Assad Hizb Allah has multiple identities, You fight in Syria; we fight in regime is not due to a romantic sense of with several and sometimes competing Syria; then let’s fight there. Do obligation. Hizb Allah is keen to make goals and interests. It is one of the you want me to be more frank? sure that air and land corridors remain dominant political parties in Lebanon, Keep Lebanon aside. Why should open for the delivery of weapons, cash as well as a social and religious we fight in Lebanon? There are and other materials from Tehran. Until different viewpoints, different the Syrian civil war, Iranian aircraft

17 Ibid. visions, and different evaluation would fly into Damascus International 18 Babak Dehganpisheh, “Hezbollah Increases Support of obligations. Well so far so good. Airport where their cargo would be for Syrian Regime, U.S. and Lebanese Officials Say,” However, let’s spare Lebanon loaded onto Syrian military trucks Washington Post, September 26, 2012. fighting, struggle and bloody and escorted into Lebanon for delivery 24 29 19 Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “Official: Hezbollah Fighters confrontations. to Hizb Allah. Now, Hizb Allah is Killed in Syria,” Daily Star, October 2, 2012. 20 Edith M. Lederer, “US Says Hezbollah is Part of As- Yet Hizb Allah’s fight has not limited 25 Ze’ev Schiff, “Don’t Underestimate Assad Jr.,” Haaretz, sad’s War Machine,” Associated Press, October 15, 2012. itself to the Syrian side of the border. August 2, 2002. 21 “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Nor will Hizb Allah withdraw from 26 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Syria Arab Republic Established Pursuant to United its support of the al-Assad regime. the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Nations Human Rights Council Resolutions S-17/1, 19/22 Hizb Allah sees at stake a number 1997), pp. 71, 85-86. and 21/26,” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Hu- of interlocking strategic interests so 27 Mark Lavie, “Israeli Officials: Syria Gave Hezbollah man Rights, December 20, 2012. critical to the group that Nasrallah is Scuds,” Associated Press, April 14, 2010. 22 David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Says willing to risk further undermining 28 Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqawama and the Lib- 75,000 Troops Might Be Needed to Seize Syria Chemical eration.” Arms,” New York Times, November 15, 2012. 24 Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqawama and the Lib- 29 Yossi Melman and Sof Hashavua, “In Depth: How 23 Ibid. eration.” Iranian Weapons Go Through Syria to Hezbollah,” Je-

15 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 desperate to either secure the al-Assad the UN-demarcated border between Brigade), Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, regime, its control of the airport and the two countries, killing three Israeli Liwa Zulfiqar, and Liwa Ammar ibn the roads to Lebanon or, at a minimum, soldiers, and kidnapping two more in Yasir.39 establish firm Alawite control of the an ambush.33 These consequences came coastal areas so that Hizb Allah can to the fore again two years later when Jaysh al-Shabi (The People’s Army) is a receive shipments through the air and Hizb Allah took over West Beirut by U.S.-designated terrorist organization seaports in Latakia, Syria. Over the force of arms, turning its weapons of and militia force that maintains a past few years, FBI investigations into “resistance” against fellow Lebanese connection to the al-Assad regime’s Hizb Allah’s criminal enterprises in citizens.34 They are now more present military apparatus.40 This highlights the United States and Europe revealed than ever as Hizb Allah and the Islamic how the regime has adapted its forces at least two cases where Hizb Allah Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to fight an asymmetric and irregular operatives planned to procure weapons— work together to shore up the al-Assad war. According to the U.S. Treasury in one instance, man-portable air regime. Department, Jaysh al-Shabi “was created, defense systems (MANPADs) intended and continues to be maintained, with to take down Israeli aircraft—and ship Finally, in the event that—after some support from Iran and Hizballah and is them to Hizb Allah through Latakia.30 100,00035 reported deaths in the civil modeled after the Iranian Basij militia.”41 In one of the cases, the European Hizb war—Iran, Hizb Allah and Syria are Allah procurement operative told an unable to definitively defeat the rebels In contrast to Jaysh al-Shabi, the other FBI undercover agent that the weapons and pacify the country’s Sunni majority, militias are not within Syria’s security would be exported to Latakia, where Hizb Allah is already establishing local apparatus, but are new independent Hizb Allah controlled the port.31 proxies (as it did in Iraq just a few years proxies allegedly established with the Secrecy would be guaranteed there, he earlier) through which it can maintain assistance of the IRGC and Hizb Allah.42 assured the undercover agent, because influence and conduct operations to Most of these groups use the same type Hizb Allah could shut down all of the undermine stability in the country in of iconography and narratives that Hizb security cameras when the shipment the future.36 Allah has put forward as it relates to the arrived and no shipping paperwork “resistance,” its “jihadist duties,” and would be required once the items Building Proxies protecting Shi`a shrines. Of these four reached Syria.32 Helping establish, train, and equip militias, the al-Abbas Brigade is the militias in Syria is not new for Hizb most prominent and has been involved Hizb Allah is also fighting for the al- Allah. It also took part in these activities in the conflict since the fall of 2012. Assad regime in support of Iran’s last decade during the Iraq war in The al-Abbas Brigade’s fighters are a interests. Hizb Allah’s ideological coordination with the IRGC.37 Hizb combination of members of Lebanese commitment to Iranian Ayatollah Allah is now employing two of these Hizb Allah, Kataib Hizb Allah, and Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Iraqi militias—Kataib Hizb Allah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq.43 It operates mainly doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (guardianship Asaib Ahl al-Haq—to build up auxiliary in southern Damascus.44 of the jurist), which holds that a Shi`a forces to assist the al-Assad regime.38 Islamic cleric should serve as the The key militias that Hizb Allah has Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Liwa supreme head of government, is a key assisted in Syria include Jaysh al-Shabi, Zulfiqar have spawned from the al- source of tension since it means that the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (the al-Abbas Abbas Brigade and have been key group is simultaneously committed to the additions to assisting the fight in 45 decrees of Iranian clerics, the Lebanese 33 Greg Myre and Steven Erlanger, “Israelis Enter Leba- southern Damascus. Kataib Sayyid state, its sectarian Shi`a community non After Attacks,” New York Times, July 13, 2006. al-Shuhada and Liwa Zulfiqar both within Lebanon, and fellow Shi`a abroad. 34 Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes draw fighters from Lebanese Hizb Control in West Beirut,” New York Times, May 9, 2008. The consequences of these competing 35 Albert Aji and Edith M. Lederer, “U.N.: More Than ideological drivers were clear in July 100,000 Now Dead in Syria’s Civil War,” Associated 39 See Phillip Smyth’s work at www.jihadology.net/ 2006, when Hizb Allah dragged Israel Press, July 25, 2013. hizballah-cavalcade. and Lebanon into a war by crossing 36 Phillip Smyth, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: 40 “Treasury Sanctions al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi`a Militias,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 Syria and Militias Supporting the Asad Regime,” U.S. rusalem Post, May 25, 2013; Phil Alito, “Iran-Lebanese (2013). Treasury Department, December 11, 2012. Hezbollah Relationship in 2008,” American Enterprise 37 Michael R. Gordon and Dexter Filkins, “Hezbol- 41 Ibid. Institute, March 1, 2009. lah Said to Help Shiite Army in Iraq,” New York Times, 42 Smyth, “Hezbollah’s Fallen Soldiers.” 30 Personal interview, U.S. law enforcement officials, November 28, 2006; Michael R. Gordon, “Hezbollah 43 Phillip Smyth, “What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Ab- Philadelphia, PA, March 11, 2010; “Arrests Made in Trains Iraqis in Iran, Officials Say,”New York Times, May bas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia ‘International Bri- Case Involving Conspiracy to Procure Weapons, Includ- 5, 2008; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Iraq Frees gade’ Through Their Social Media Presence,” Jihadology. ing Anti-Aircraft Missiles,” U.S. Department of Justice, Hezbollah Commander who Helped Mold Shia Terror net, May 15, 2013. November 23, 2009; U.S.A. v. Dani Nemr Tarraf et al., Groups,” The Long War Journal, November 16, 2012. 44 Ibid. Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2009; “Alleged Arms 38 For more on these two Iraqi Shi`a militias, see 45 Phillip Smyth, “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Dealer for Hezbollah Charged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, No- “Kata’ib Hizballah,” The International Centre for Po- Supplier of Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria,” Jihadology.net, vember 24, 2009. litical Violence and Terrorism Research, March 5, 2010; June 3, 2013; Phillip Smyth, “Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of 31 Ibid. Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq,” In- A New Shia Militia in Syria?” Jihadology.net, June 20, 32 Ibid. stitute for the Study of War, December 2012. 2013.

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Allah and Iraqi Shi`a.46 Liwa Zulfiqar May 2013. Determining the number of Conclusion is also believed to gain some fighters fighters Hizb Allah has sent to Syria For a group that has always portrayed from Moqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa al-Yum is difficult to ascertain, but according itself as the vanguard standing up for al-Mawud.47 Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada to French intelligence sources some the dispossessed, and has consistently was established in mid-April 2013, 3,000-4,000 individuals have made downplayed its sectarian and pro- while Liwa Zulfiqar was established in the trip to assist the al-Assad regime.52 Iranian identities, supporting an Alawite early June 2013.48 Unlike the al-Abbas regime against the predominantly Sunni Brigade, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada or Hizb Allah’s fighters have proven Syrian opposition risked shattering a Liwa Zulfiqar, Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir valuable to the Syrian regime. Within long-cultivated image. In the end, the does not operate in southern Damascus a few weeks of Nasrallah’s public strategic necessity of preventing the around the area where Sayyida Zaynab is proclamation that Hizb Allah had collapse of the al-Assad regime—which, located. Instead, Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir entered the conflict, Hizb Allah if replaced by a regime representing the mainly operates in rural Aleppo, even delivered the strategic city of Qusayr country’s Sunni majority would, at the farther north than Lebanese Hizb Allah’s to the regime and wrested control from least, be far less friendly to Hizb Allah operations in Qusayr and Homs.49 Liwa the rebels. Highlighting the nature of and possibly oppose it outright—took Ammar ibn Yasir first began operating in the battle, Hizb Allah lost at least 60 precedence over the need to maintain May 2013 and has been involved in some men.53 While there may have been a the party’s image. fighting. According to their own videos or costly price, it vindicated Nasrallah’s Facebook messages, 10 of their fighters words a few weeks prior: “I say to all Whether al-Assad maintains or loses have been killed so far in Syria.50 the honorable people, to the mujahidin, power will have a different set of to the heroes: I have always promised consequences for Hizb Allah. If al- Although Lebanese Hizb Allah and the you a victory and now I pledge to you Assad succeeds, Hizb Allah is unlikely IRGC have helped to build up these a new one in Syria.”54 As a result, this to enjoy the sympathy of the majority auxiliary forces, Lebanese Hizb Allah feat was then sold on the Shi`a street in Sunni Arab world; it will be isolated itself has also engaged in fighting Lebanon as being just as important as and more reliant than before on Iran against Syrian rebel forces. the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the al-Assad regime. Hizb Allah and its “victory” over Israel in the will face delicate sectarian issues and Hizb Allah’s Spring Offensive summer of 2006.55 consequences at home in Lebanon as the A more public presence in the fight Sunni population is not likely to accept against Syrian rebels came in the spring Since then, Hizb Allah has moved from an emboldened Hizb Allah. On the other of 2013 when martyrdom notices for securing Qusayr to attempting to retake hand, if Hizb Allah fails and the Syrian Hizb Allah began to appear on their all of Homs for the regime and helping regime falls, they will still be despised official and unofficial websites, forums, in a counteroffensive in Latakia.56 There by the majority of the Sunni Arab and Facebook pages.51 Based on Hizb have also been rumors—although no world but will also lose a strategic ally Allah’s organizational structure and evidence—that Hizb Allah has sent men to and route for obtaining weapons from disciplined messaging, it is likely that Aleppo to help with that battle as well.57 Iran. It is also possible that in such a these notices were sanctioned by the Since the overall war in Syria appears to desperate scenario, they could rely leadership even though the group did be in a stalemate, and Hizb Allah is fully more on terrorist attacks due to a loss not publicly admit to involvement until supporting the Syrian regime and their of power and prestige. Regardless, the patron in Iran, it is likely that more war in Syria has exposed Hizb Allah’s 46 Ibid. Hizb Allah operatives will continue to true strategic interests. 47 “Tashkil ‘Liwa’ Zulfiqar’ thani milisha li-hamayya become involved over time. maqam al-Sayyida Zaynib,” al-Hayat, June 8, 2013. Dr. Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow at The 48 Smyth, “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Sup- Washington Institute for Near East Policy plier of Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria”; Smyth, “Liwa’a where he directs the Institute’s Stein Program Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria?” 52 Jana El Hassan, “4,000 Hezbollah Fighters Reach on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. 49 Phillip Smyth, “Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Rebel-Held Aleppo: FSA,” Daily Star, June 4, 2013. Previously, Dr. Levitt served as the Deputy Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, Syria,” Jihadology.net, 53 Gili Cohen, “Thousands of Hezbollah Troops Fight- Assistant Secretary for Intelligence July 20, 2013. ing, Hundreds Killed in Syria, Study Confirms,” Haaretz, and Analysis at the U.S. Department of 50 Substantiation of these can only be confirmed via their June 5, 2013. the Treasury and before that as an FBI own videos (without other documents to solidly identify 54 Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqawama and the Lib- counterterrorism analyst. He also served as it) and Facebook statuses unlike the other groups where eration.” a State Department counterterrorism adviser other sources have been able to independently confirm 55 Phillip Smyth, “‘Divine Victory’ in Qusayr: Hizballah to General James L. Jones, the special envoy the content. Therefore, for now, one should be cautious Promotes Their Success on the Web,” Jihadology.net, for Middle East regional security (SEMERS). when analyzing this particular data point. See Smyth, June 16, 2013. Dr. Levitt is the author of the forthcoming “Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operat- 56 “Reports: Syrian Troops, Hezbollah Consolidate Gains book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of ing In Aleppo, Syria.” in Homs,” Voice of America, July 28, 2013; “More Than Lebanon’s Party of God. 51 While efforts to publicize these death notices only oc- 10,000 Hezbollah Members Fighting in Syria, Source curred in the spring of 2013, there were other signs that Says,” Agence France-Presse, August 25, 2013. Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow Hizb Allah was already fighting in Syria. This was based 57 Instead, it could be sending members of Liwa Ammar at The Washington Institute for Near on funerals publicized in the press as noted earlier in the ibn Yasir to Aleppo. See Smyth, “Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Ya- East Policy, and maintains the website following article: Smyth, “Hezbollah’s Fallen Soldiers.” sir: A New Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, Syria.” Jihadology.net.

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The Battle for Qusayr: How and artillery support from the SAA, east.6 Furthermore, the highway linking the organization lacks the capacity to Damascus to the Mediterranean coastal the Syrian Regime and Hizb replicate its Qusayr tactics on a more port town of Tartus runs between Homs Allah Tipped the Balance frequent basis and in larger urban and Qusayr. Rebel control of Qusayr and environments across Syria. Since the parts of Homs threatened regime traffic. By Nicholas Blanford conclusion of the Qusayr campaign, Hizb Allah has reverted to its previous The SAA put Qusayr under siege in the 17-day assault spearheaded by duty of combat support to regular SAA November 2011, and three months later Lebanon’s Shi`a militia Hizb Allah units in other villages. Nevertheless, heavy fighting erupted as Syrian rebels against the Syrian town of Qusayr that does not preclude Hizb Allah and the SAA fought for control of the set a number of precedents both for from pursuing similar Qusayr-style town. By July 2012, Qusayr was in rebel Syria’s civil war and for Hizb Allah. operations if the circumstances match hands and sporadic clashes broke out in The return of Qusayr to the regime of the organization’s capabilities. villages to the west, roughly along a line Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in separating Shi`a- and Sunni-populated June 2013—after being held in rebel The Pre-Assault Campaign villages. hands for more than a year—marked Qusayr, a town of approximately the beginning of a broader campaign by 30,000 mainly Sunni residents,2 lies According to Lebanese Shi`a residents the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to restore five miles north of Lebanon’s northern of the villages inside Syria, the rebels control over key strategic areas that border and 16 miles southwest of Homs, were attempting to drive them out had fallen to rebel hands. The loss of Syria’s third largest city. The terrain of their homes to establish a rebel Qusayr was a significant blow to the around Qusayr is a flat arable landscape (effectively a Sunni) belt of territory armed opposition, perhaps more in of orchards and fields well irrigated across the top of northeast Lebanon.7 terms of morale and perception than by the Assi River.3 The population They also accused the rebels—whom strategic value, a sentiment reinforced of the Qusayr area is a tangled mix of they described as Salafi-jihadis—of by subsequent regime gains on the confessions including Sunni, Shi`a, killing civilians, looting homes and ground, continued hesitation by the Alawite and Christian.4 Around four destroying crops in Shi`a areas.8 On the international community to provide miles west of Qusayr is a belt of small other hand, anti-Assad rebels accused weapons to rebel forces and signs villages, hamlets and farms populated Hizb Allah of fighting in territory of growing animosity among rebel by Lebanese Shi`a. Border controls in west and south of Qusayr. On October factions.1 The battle also marked the first this area are traditionally lax, which 2, 2012, Ali Nassif, a top Hizb Allah time that Hizb Allah played a significant allow Lebanese and Syrians to move at commander, was killed near Qusayr,9 lead combat role in the Syria war, even will across the frontier.5 an incident that hardened the growing though its fighters operated in Syria suspicion in Lebanon at the time that for at least a year prior to the Qusayr Qusayr’s importance lays in the fact the militant group was operating in offensive. Furthermore, it was Hizb that it served as a logistical conduit for Syria alongside the SAA.10 The rebels Allah’s first experience in launching a the anti-Assad revolt facilitating the described the Hizb Allah combatants as major offensive operation in an urban movement of weapons and militants “professional” and “tough” and “none of environment. Hizb Allah suffered a between Lebanon and Homs. Lebanon’s them were under 35-years-old.”11 relatively high number of casualties northeast Bekaa Valley is home to during the battle, yet the casualty toll a Sunni population, most of which In mid-April 2013, the SAA and Hizb and blowback in Lebanon—politically sympathizes with the Syrian opposition. Allah launched a more determined and in terms of security—has not deterred Syrian rebels and Lebanese volunteers campaign to seize the villages around the organization from deploying to other infiltrated Syria from Lebanon via the Qusayr as a prelude to an assault on combat theaters in Syria in support of the flat arable Masharei al-Qaa district the town itself. SAA and Hizb Allah SAA, underlining its commitment to the and the adjacent arid mountains to the forces achieved initial success with the trilateral “axis of resistance” with the al- Assad regime and Iran. 6 Personal interviews, Syrian rebel fighters, Jdeideh, 2 “General Consensus of Population and Housing 2004,” Arsal, Masharei al-Qaa, Lebanon, May 2012-May 2013. This article examines how Hizb Allah Syria Central Bureau of Statistics, Homs Governor- 7 Personal interviews, Shi`a residents from Safafah vil- and the SAA waged offensive operations ate, undated; Hwaida Saad and Kareem Fahim, “Syrian lage in Syria and Hawsh Beit Ali and Qasr villages in in Qusayr, how the anti-Assad rebels Forces Chase Rebels Who Fled Fallen Town,” New York Lebanon, Qasr and Hawsh Beit Ali, Lebanon, October sought to defend the town against the Times, June 6, 2013. Some reports place the population at 16, 2012. assault, and if Hizb Allah’s success 40,000. See “A Look at the Fighting in Syria’s Town of 8 Ibid. in Qusayr will embolden it to escalate Qusair,” Associated Press, June 3, 2013. 9 “Hezbollah Military Commander ‘Killed in Syria,’” militancy elsewhere in Syria. It finds 3 Rameh Hamieh, “Assi River Basin: Lebanese Farm- BBC, October 2, 2012. that although Hizb Allah eventually ers Struggle for Survival in Syria,” al-Akhbar, October 10 Hizb Allah only fully admitted it was active in Syria in ousted the rebel forces and reclaimed 27, 2012; Radwan Mortada, “Syria: Turning Point in the May 2013 after the battle for Qusayr had begun. the town with the assistance of air Battle of Qusayr,” al-Akhbar, May 20, 2013; Nasser Sha- 11 Personal interviews, rebels belonging to the Jusiyah rara, “Hezbollah Defends Shiite Villages in Syria War,” Martyrs Brigade (a unit in the Farouq Battalions), Masha- 1 Mariam Karouny and Oliver Holmes, “New Front al-Monitor, February 20, 2013. rei al-Qaa, Lebanon, October 8-9, 2012. See also Nicholas Opens in Syria as Rebels say al-Qaeda Attack Means 4 Ibid. Blanford, “Accusations Mount of Hezbollah Fighting in War,” Reuters, July 12, 2013. 5 Ibid. Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 2012.

18 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 seizure of Tel Nabi Mindo, four and a Assault Preparations operated in Qusayr, although these half miles northwest of Qusayr.12 The Qusayr’s defenders were drawn from a reports could not be confirmed.24 Rebel small hill in Tel Nabi Mindo afforded broad array of rebel units, many of them fighters claimed there were no Jabhat the SAA and Hizb Allah an overview of local village- or town-based entities al-Nusra personnel in the town. the surrounding flat terrain. that were part of the Farouq Battalions, the largest single faction operating in The rebels appeared to have been Reports of the ebb and flow of fighting in Qusayr.17 The Farouq Battalions are reasonably well-equipped in terms the following weeks were often confused one of the largest rebel units in Syria of weapons and ammunition at the and contradictory. Nevertheless, the and are a core component of the Syria beginning of the battle for Qusayr. SAA and Hizb Allah slowly gained Islamic Liberation Front, a coalition of Their arms stockpile was augmented ground, capturing villages to the rebel factions.18 They emerged in Homs by the capture of the Dabaa airbase west and southwest of Qusayr. Hizb as a sub-unit of the Khaled bin Walid and the seizure of SAA weapons and Allah’s role in the fighting triggered Brigades but have since expanded ammunition.25 The fighters were armed several rocket barrages into the Shi`a- across Syria.19 with an assortment of rifles, the most populated Hermel district of Lebanon’s common being AK-47 variants, RPG-7s, northern Bekaa. On April 14, rockets The number of rebel units and fighters PKC light machine guns, twin-barreled struck Hawsh Sayyed Ali, Sahlat al- who fought in Qusayr is unclear. 23mm anti-aircraft guns, a variety of My, Qwak and Qasr in Lebanon, killing Estimates placed the number of units mortars and small caliber artillery two people.13 More rockets hit the same at around 15, and the total number of rockets (107mm and 122mm).26 area on April 21 and April 23.14 As the fighters was probably less than a few SAA and Hizb Allah pushed the rebels thousand.20 One estimate given to the Rebel fighters undertook extensive back toward Qusayr, the Lebanese author by rebel fighters from Qusayr defensive preparations in the knowledge Shi`a-populated areas of the northern was between 11,000 and 12,000, figures that the town would be assaulted by Bekaa fell beyond the range of the that appear exaggerated.21 Another government forces at some point. 107mm, 122mm and homemade rockets figure cited by a rebel fighter of 2,000 The town was split into sectors and fired by the anti-Assad rebels from the combatants is likely more accurate.22 different units were assigned to their northeast.15 The Hermel area, however, The Qusayr Military Council, headed defense.27 Rebels excavated tunnels and was subject to several more rocket by Lieutenant Colonel Mohieddin underground bunkers, erected earth salvoes fired from a mountainous area al-Zain (also known as Abu Arab), barricades across streets, booby- in Syria due east.16 grouped all factions in Qusayr under a trapped buildings and mined roads.28 single command. The chain of command They made homemade explosives By mid-May 2013, the SAA and Hizb appeared confused as rebel militants who that they turned into “belly charge” Allah had taken control of most of the fought in the battle later gave different mines—consisting of dozens of pounds terrain surrounding Qusayr except for names when asked to identify the overall of explosives buried beneath streets a corridor running north that included commander of rebel forces in Qusayr.23 and detonated by a command wire—to the disused Dabaa military airbase, There were reports that members of the destroy the SAA’s armored vehicles. which lay in rebel hands. al-Qa`ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra Hizb Allah’s battle plans included

17 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from splitting the town into 16 operational Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. sectors and assigning code numbers 29 18 For details on the Farouq Battalions and the Syria Is- to different objectives and locations. Designating code numbers is standard 12 Tel Nabi Mindo is the site of Kadesh where one of his- lamic Liberation Front, see Aron Lund, “The Non-State Hizb Allah practice in which fighters tory’s earliest battles with detailed records took place in Militant Landscape in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:8 (2013). adopt a verbal code system for use over 1274 BC pitting the Egyptian empire under Ramesses II 19 Ibid. Also see Joseph Holliday, “Syria’s Maturing In- unencrypted radio communications.30 against the Hittite empire under Muwatalli II. surgency,” Institute for the Study of War, June 2012. Hizb Allah was given tactical control of 13 “2 More Rockets Land in Hermel Town as Lebanon 20 Abdul Jabber Mohammed Aqidi, head of the Aleppo the battle even to the extent of issuing Asks for Arab League Assistance,” Naharnet, April 15, Military Council, said there were 17 units in Qusayr. See 2013. “Interview with Abdul-Jabbar Aqidi,” June 14, 2013, 14 Rakan al-Fakih, “Syrian Rebels Step Up Rocket At- available at www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_ 24 Radwan Mortada, “Syria: Opposition’s Booby Trap tacks, Two Hit Hermel,” Daily Star [Beirut], April 22, embedded&v=On8NWqOcXm8#at=162. Another article Blueprint for Qusayr,” al-Akhbar, May 23, 2013. 2013; “Two Grad Rockets From Syria Land on Outskirts cited the names of 15 rebel units. For details, see Alex 25 Personal interview, rebel fighter, north Lebanon, May of Hermel,” Naharnet, April 23, 2013. Rowell, “Qusayr Resisting All-out Attack,” Now Leba- 20, 2013. 15 Numerous videos were posted online showing rebels non, May 20, 2013. Various reports placed the number 26 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from launching rockets toward Lebanon. For two examples, of fighters in the low thousands. See Mariam Karouny, Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. see www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhHMiqQz7Ew and “Syrian Rebels Lose Strategic Town in Boost for Assad,” 27 Ibid. www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXz6do74u04. Reuters, June 5, 2013. 28 Ibid. 16 The Liwa al-Tawhid fired six 122mm Katyusha rockets 21 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from 29 Mona Alami, “Hezbollah Fighter Details Ops in into the Hermel area on May 28, wounding three people. Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. Qusayr,” Now Lebanon, June 4, 2013; personal inter- Judging from a video, the rebel unit was located approxi- 22 Personal interview, rebel fighter, northern Lebanon, view, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, June 5, 2013. mately 12-14 miles due east of Hermel, the outer limit May 20, 2013. 30 For example, see Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: of the 122mm rocket’s range. See www.youtube.com/ 23 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (New watch?feature=player_embedded&v=8BtnpMm-gGo. Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. York: Random House, 2011), p. 342.

19 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 orders to Syrian officers.31 Hizb Allah’s of assault, becoming more methodical later transpired that Hizb Allah used strength was placed at between 1,200 and ensuring control of each objective improvised rocket-assisted munitions and 1,700 fighters, most of them older before advancing further.40 One Hizb (IRAMs) consisting of a large explosive combat veterans and members of the Allah fighter said they were not fighting charge of undetermined origin boosted party’s special forces units.32 One report meter by meter, but “centimeter by by the rocket of a 107mm Katyusha.48 said that Hizb Allah split its forces centimeter.”41 The rebel mortar fire into 17 units of 100 men each.33 During was a serious problem for the attacking As the battle unfolded, the rebels were combat operations, however, the units force.42 The small Hizb Allah fighting gradually pushed back into the northern broke down into typical fighting squads units pressed ahead to draw as close to area of Qusayr. Ammunition stocks of three to five men each.34 the rebel lines as possible in the hope began to dwindle as did food and water that the rebel mortar fire would cease and with it the morale of the defending Initially, each fighter served a seven-day out of the rebels’ concern that they force. The rebels had received some tour on the frontline, but as the battle would hit their own side. Despite Hizb reinforcements on the second day of dragged on the duration was extended Allah’s engineering teams working to the battle when a group reached the to 20 days.35 Careful reconnaissance dismantle booby traps and improvised town from Bab Amr in Homs.49 On was conducted prior to the assault and explosive devices (IED), the Hizb Allah June 2, a larger group of rebel fighters Hizb Allah’s combat engineers cleared fighters avoided doorways and windows arrived in Qusayr having traveled from booby traps from buildings.36 and instead blasted holes in the walls of Deir al-Zour in the east and Aleppo buildings to move around.43 Some of the in the north.50 The commander of the The Assault IEDs used by the rebels bore similarities Aleppo rebels was Colonel Abdul- The attack began on May 19, 2013, with to those that Hizb Allah had taught the Jabber Mohammed Aqidi, the head of a heavy artillery bombardment and Palestinian Hamas Movement to build. the Aleppo Military Council.51 Yet the airstrikes against Qusayr in the early additional reinforcements, other than hours followed by advances of Hizb The rebel defenders acknowledged providing a momentary boost to flagging Allah fighters from the south, east the fighting prowess of their Hizb morale in the town, were unable to alter and west backed by SAA troops.37 The Allah enemies. “They were very fierce the course of the battle. attacking forces made quick gains in fighters,” said one rebel fighter from the southern end of the town, reaching Qusayr. “You would shoot at them On June 3, the 17 rebel commanders held the town hall. One Syrian opposition but they kept on coming. They wore a meeting at which 14 of them voted to activist said that by the end of the first headbands with ‘O Husayn’ written on retreat from Qusayr.52 Although they day, SAA and Hizb Allah forces had them.”44 The rebels noted how the Hizb were apparently persuaded to change seized some 60% of the town.38 Allah fighters were constantly trying their minds, morale had declined to advance, even under heavy fire, and significantly and the rebels realized Hizb Allah was expecting a swift outflank their positions.45 that the town could not be held for victory in Qusayr, but despite the much longer.53 The rebels had been gains of the first hours, the battle grew Hizb Allah’s combat units were supported pushed into a small area in northern more protracted as the rebels put up a by the SAA’s air and artillery power, Qusayr—“10,000 people in a space spirited defense and Hizb Allah suffered and the Lebanese group employed RPG- no more than 500 square meters,” as unexpectedly high casualties. On May 7s and snipers equipped with Dragunov explained by one rebel fighter.54 A 19, the first day of the offensive, up to 7.62mm rifles for close quarters combat.46 Hizb Allah combatant who fought in two dozen Hizb Allah fighters were Yet Hizb Allah also had at its disposal Qusayr said, “we squashed them into reportedly killed in a rebel ambush.39 an ad hoc short-range rocket system The SAA and Hizb Allah slowed the pace that could deliver a more powerful Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. The author was punch than an RPG-7 while preserving shown a video recorded on a Hizb Allah fighter’s phone 31 Personal interview, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, greater accuracy than artillery of the IRAM in action. June 5, 2013. deployed outside the town. Rebel 48 “DIY Weapons in Syria – Hezbollah Deploys IRAMs 32 Ibid. “Hezbollah Losses in Syria Steep, but Morale fighters spoke of Hizb Allah’s ability in Qusayr,” Brown Moses blog, June 18, 2013. High,” Agence France-Presse, May 24, 2013. to destroy specific buildings or entire 49 “Abdel-Jabber and the Commander Abdel-Qadir 47 33 “Hezbollah Losses in Syria Steep, but Morale High.” street barricades with a missile. It Give Advice to Hezbollah While in a Resting Area Dur- 34 Personal interview, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, ing Their Journey,” May 22, 2013, available at www.you- June 5, 2013. 40 Personal interviews, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, tube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=l6y4aN_ 35 Ibid. June 5, 2013. kY0U. 36 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 37 Ibid. “A Look at the Fighting in Syria’s Town of 42 Ibid. 51 “Colonel Abdel-Jabber Aqidi’s Message from the City Qusair,” Associated Press, June 3, 2013; “Syrian Forces 43 Ibid. of Qusayr,” June 1, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ Storm Rebel Bastion of Qusayr,” Agence France-Presse, 44 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from watch?feature=player_embedded&v=65zT73wNEUc. May 20, 2013. Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. 52 “Interview with Abdul-Jabbar Aqidi,” June 14, 2013, 38 Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Hezbollah Aids 45 Ibid. available at www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_ Syrian Military in a Key Battle,” New York Times, May 19, 46 Personal interviews, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, embedded&v=On8NWqOcXm8#at=162. 2013. June 5, 2013. The Dragunov 7.62mm rifle is the standard 53 Ibid. 39 Radwan Mortada, “Syria: Qusayr Battle’s Unofficial sniper rifle used by Hizb Allah. 54 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from Story,” al-Akhbar, June 6, 2013. 47 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013.

20 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 the northern part of the town and then through a field, pushing a mortally urban warfare skills into practice with pinned them down with sniper fire.”55 wounded comrade in front of him as the SAA providing key artillery and protection against machine gun fire.62 aerial support. In addition to a shortage of ammunition and deteriorating morale, the rebels Most of the fleeing rebels and civilians Since 2006, Hizb Allah has included could no longer cope with large numbers avoided the roads and moved on foot urban warfare skills in its training of wounded and lack of food and water. around the northeastern corner of program at Military Operations in Urban Rebel fighters described scenes of children Lebanon to the area of Hassia on the Terrain (MOUT) camps in Lebanon forced to drink sewage water, people Damascus-Homs highway before and Iran. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hizb eating leaves from trees, and wounds slipping into Lebanon.63 Hundreds, Allah pursued hit-and-run guerrilla- rotting due to lack of medicine.56 possibly thousands, ended up in Arsal, style tactics in a rural environment a Sunni populated town in northeast against Israeli troops then occupying Walid Jumblatt, the paramount leader Lebanon that has served as a logistical southern Lebanon. The group fought of Lebanon’s Druze community and hub for Syrian rebel groups in Qusayr and in urban areas during the month-long an arch critic of the al-Assad regime, Homs to the north and rebel-held areas on war with Israel in 2006, but mainly in a intervened with Hizb Allah to seek a the eastern side of the border.64 defensive rather than offensive capacity. safe withdrawal of some 400 wounded The post-2006 urban warfare training, militants from Qusayr.57 Jumblatt’s Qusayr: A Test Case for Hizb Allah’s Developing which includes offensive and defensive interlocutor was Wafiq Safa, a top Hizb Offensive Tactics tactics, is thought to be preparation Allah security official, who said that the The 17-day battle for Qusayr took for possible commando-style raids into party would accept whatever decision longer than Hizb Allah anticipated Israel in the event of another war with was made by the al-Assad regime. The and caused a relatively high number of the country.69 regime refused to negotiate with the casualties.65 Hizb Allah has not released rebels in Qusayr, but said there was a a tally of its losses, but estimates range Qusayr allowed Hizb Allah to gain known corridor to the north that was between 70 and 120 dead with dozens experience using these new skills. open.58 more wounded.66 There were scattered Furthermore, although the bulk of reports during the campaign citing SAA Hizb Allah combatants in Syria appear The battle concluded early on June 5 and allied militia losses, but an overall to be older combat veterans, a younger, when the SAA and Hizb Allah launched total is unknown.67 The figures suggest post-2006 generation of recruits a heavy bombardment of the last rebel- that Hizb Allah experienced its highest have been deployed into battles. The held enclave of Qusayr, described by casualty attrition rate since the 34-day experience accrued in combat and urban one rebel fighter as the most intense war against Israel in the summer of warfare should make the organization a shelling of the entire battle.59 Rebels, 2006. The rebels published the names of more formidable challenge in any future civilians and wounded began streaming 431 fighters they said died in the battle, war against Israel, an assessment that north from Qusayr toward the villages but the true figure is probably higher.68 has been recognized by the Israeli of Dabaa and then onto Buwaydah The outcome, however, was inevitable military.70 Sharqiyah. Instead of following a “safe” given the logistical resources at corridor to the villages, however, those the disposal of the al-Assad regime After Qusayr: The Regime Tips the Balance fleeing Qusayr allegedly came under compared to those of the town’s rebel During the Qusayr assault, Hassan withering mortar and machine gun defenders. Qusayr’s relative isolation Nasrallah, Hizb Allah’s secretary fire.60 Survivors recounted people being from other rebel strongholds made general, admitted what by then was shot around them as they ran through it difficult to deliver material and common knowledge—his cadres were orchards.61 One rebel recalled crawling logistical support. Qusayr was also close heavily involved in fighting in Syria. to Hizb Allah’s supply lines in Lebanon Nasrallah’s acknowledgement and the 55 Personal interviews, Hizb Allah combatants, Beirut, via the Shi`a-populated villages on the success at Qusayr paved the way for June 5, 2013. Syrian side of the border. These reasons more open and tangible support by 56 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from made Qusayr an appropriate test case Hizb Allah for the al-Assad regime. Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. for Hizb Allah to put its newly-acquired In the wake of the Qusayr battle, Hizb 57 Ibid. Lauren Williams, “Twists in Qusair Evacuation Allah’s fighters have been deployed Plan Spark Confusion,” Daily Star, June 14, 2013; “PSP Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. Leader Mediates Between Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizbul- 62 Ibid. 69 Personal interviews, multiple Hizb Allah fighters, lah,” al-Akhbar, June 4, 2013; Saleh Hodaife, “Rebel 63 Ibid. Lebanon, 2007-2008. In a speech on February 16, 2011, Withdrawal from al-Qusayr Result of Deal with Hezbol- 64 Personal observations and interviews, residents of Hizb Allah leader Hassan Nasrallah alluded for the first lah,” Now Lebanon, June 5, 2013. Arsal, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. time to a possible incursion into northern Israel in the 58 Jean Aziz, “Qusair Victory Could Prove Fateful for 65 Mortada, “Syria: Qusayr Battle’s Unofficial Story.” event of a war: “I tell the Resistance fighters to be pre- Hezbollah’s Role,” al-Monitor, June 6, 2013; “PSP Leader 66 Ibid. “Hezbollah Losses Laid Bare After Victory in pared for the day when war is imposed on Lebanon. Mediates Between Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizbullah”; Wil- Syrian Town,” Sapa-DPA, June 6, 2013; “Hezbollah Op- Then, the Resistance leadership might ask you to lead the liams. eratives Killed in Syria,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Resistance to liberate Galilee.” Also see Blanford, War- 59 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from Terrorism Information Center, July 2013. riors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013. 67 “The Free Syrian Army is Called to Defend Qoussair,” Israel, p. 460. 60 Ibid.; Williams. Le Monde, May 22, 2013. 70 Yoav Zitun, “Top IDF Officer: Hezbollah Marked Our 61 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from 68 Mortada, “Syria: Qusayr Battle’s Unofficial Story.” Artillery Guns,” ynetnews.com, August 7, 2013.

21 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 to southern Deraa province, Idlib and Syrian rebels say that the units that can afford to deploy to Syria. Despite Aleppo provinces in the north and in retreated from Qusayr have regrouped Hizb Allah’s focus on Syria, Israel the Damascus suburbs.71 and are located in and around the town remains the paramount threat to the of Yabroud in the Qalamoun area that organization, and its confrontation with The defeat of the rebels in Qusayr has lies between Damascus and Homs the Jewish state remains its raison d’être. allowed the al-Assad regime to gain adjacent to the Lebanese border.76 This was made evident on August 7 when ground along the crucial corridor Arms supplies have increased following at least two IEDs exploded beside a unit linking Damascus to Tartus and the the seizure on August 2 of three SAA of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers Mediterranean coast. Furthermore, it arms depots at Danha in the Qalamoun who had penetrated Lebanese territory had a knock-on effect of compelling the area, which yielded large quantities up to a distance of around 400 meters rebel defenders of Tel Kalakh, which of anti-tank missiles, including AT-5 on an as yet undisclosed mission.81 The lies close to the Homs-Tartus highway, Spandrel, Metis-M and AT-14 Kornet.77 IDF unit reportedly fell into a Hizb two miles north of the border with One Syrian rebel fighter said that Allah ambush, illustrating the vigilance Lebanon and 21 miles northwest of reconnaissance has been conducted that the group continues to exert in its Qusayr, to surrender the town in June in the Qusayr area and an assault is traditional theater of conflict along the 2013 to government forces after a two- imminent.78 The wisdom of such a move Lebanon-Israel border.82 year siege.72 The rebels in Tel Kalakh might be questioned given the expected recognized that they could no longer hold fall of Homs and the relative isolation Nevertheless, Hizb Allah may be out against the SAA given dwindling of Qusayr from other rebel-held areas. called upon to take the lead in future food supplies and expectations that the Furthermore, the rebels deployed in campaigns to capture isolated towns fall of Qusayr could be a prelude to a Qalamoun are expecting a Hizb Allah- similarly sized or smaller than Qusayr. similar assault against them.73 led assault against the area once Homs One example is the Qalamoun area, has fallen.79 Diverting rebels from the centered on the rebel-held towns of Fresh from victory in Qusayr, the Qalamoun area for an attack on Qusayr Yabroud and Nabk. It is the last section SAA turned its attention to regaining would weaken their ability to confront a of the border with Lebanon open to rebel the last rebel-held pockets in Homs, a Hizb Allah and SAA assault. traffic. Rebels use dirt tracks that wind strategically placed transport node. On east and southeast of Arsal through an July 29, the Syrian regime announced Hizb Allah’s Activities in Syria Still Limited arid mountainous landscape to move that the SAA had seized the central Although Hizb Allah spearheaded the back and forth between Lebanon and district of Khaldiya in Homs. The strike on Qusayr, the party has played Syria.83 Hizb Allah has conducted retaking of Khaldiya was facilitated more of a support role in its other reconnaissance of the Yabroud area in by the rebels apparently deciding to engagements across Syria. In street preparation for an attack against the “sacrifice” the city to concentrate on fighting in Homs, for example, veteran rebels.84 If the Qalamoun area falls to holding its ground in northern Aleppo Hizb Allah fighters command squads the regime, it will effectively seal off Province and around Damascus.74 of Syrian soldiers, essentially acting as rebel support from Lebanon to Syria. non-commissioned officers (NCO) to the Furthermore, and depending on the Yet there are indications that the rebels less experienced regular troops.80 outcome of the mooted rebel counterattack are planning to mount a counterattack on Qusayr, it will allow the regime to exert against SAA forces in Qusayr to Hizb Allah does not have the capacity to full control over the strategic corridor recapture the town.75 Lebanese and replicate its role in Qusayr by taking the between Damascus and Tartus. tactical lead in assaults against major 71 Wassim Mroueh, “Analysts See Qusair as First Hez- urban areas. This is partly due to a limit Nicholas Blanford is Beirut correspondent bollah Step in Syria,” Daily Star, June 6, 2013; Jana El- on the number of fighters Hizb Allah of The Times of London and the Christian Hassan, “4,000 Hezbollah Fighters Reach Rebel-Held Science Monitor and is a consultant for Aleppo: FSA,” Daily Star, June 4, 2013; “Hezbollah Fight- Lebanese fighter with the Farouq Battalions, northern IHS/Jane’s. He is author of Warriors of ers Seen in Daraa Province,” SyriaDirect.org, June 14, Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, August 8, 2013. God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year 2013; “Jordan Salafists Warn Hezbollah of Advancing to 76 Ibid. Struggle Against Israel (Random House, Jordan-Syria Border,” Ammon [Amman], May 14, 2013; 77 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 2011) and Killing Mr Lebanon: The Nuha Shabaan, “Rebels say Hezbollah, Iraqi Fighters 3, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvDUh- Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Flooding into Syria,” USA Today, June 4, 2013. uEwkI&feature=youtu.be and www.youtube.com/ Impact on the Middle East (IB Tauris, 72 Patrick Cockburn, “Tel Kalakh: Syria’s Rebel Town watch?v=9PRlI0ds83I&feature=c4-overview&list=UUE 2006). He has lived in Beirut since 1994. that Forged its Own Peace Deal,” Independent, June 25, FYPfPLGO92Bmc5DpTxITQ. 2013. 78 Personal interview, Farouq Battalions rebel, Arsal, 73 Ibid. Personal interview, Syrian activist from Tel Ka- Lebanon, August 12, 2013. lakh, north Lebanon, August 7, 2013; personal interview, 79 Personal interviews, multiple rebel fighters from 81 Ibrahim al-Amine, “The Lowdown on Hezbollah’s Lebanese logistical supporter for the rebels, Akkar Prov- Qusayr, Arsal, Lebanon, June 13, 2013; personal inter- Ambush in South Lebanon,” al-Akhbar, August 8, 2013. ince, Lebanon, August 8, 2013. view, Farouq Battalions rebel, Arsal, Lebanon, August 82 Ibid. 74 Personal interview, European diplomat in contact 3, 2013; personal interview, Lebanese logistical sup- 83 Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanese Brace for Violence if with the al-Assad regime and Syrian opposition groups, porter for the rebels, Akkar Province, Lebanon, August Assad Cuts Off Rebels’ Lifeline,” Times [London], Au- telephone interview, July 11, 2013. 8, 2013. gust 5, 2013. 75 Personal interview, Lebanese logistical supporter for 80 Personal interview, Hizb Allah fighter, Beirut, July 84 Personal interview, Hizb Allah fighter, Beirut, July the rebels, Akkar Province, Lebanon; personal interview, 11, 2013. 11, 2013.

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Anti-Assad Rebel Groups The SMC is formally led by Brigadier The Non-State Militant The Free Syrian Army General Salim Idris, but there is Landscape in Syria Media reporting has consistently no evidence that it functions as a focused on the Free Syrian Army (FSA), conventional military organization By Aron Lund but the FSA has always been more of a or that Idris enjoys real control over brand name than an actual organization. member factions. To the contrary, the uprising against Syrian President The term was first used by the Turkey- member groups retain their separate Bashar al-Assad that began in 2011 has based military defector Colonel Riad identities and operational autonomy always been disorganized, and it has al-Asaad, who in late July 2011 issued a and proclaim loyalty to their own become increasingly reliant on foreign statement proclaiming himself supreme commanders.4 support. It has grown large enough, commander of a rebel army, which he however, to push regime forces out of dubbed the FSA.2 The name quickly The SMC, however, facilitates vast areas of Syria’s north and east. became popular among the autonomous coordination between these member According to a recent estimate by the armed factions that had begun to spring groups and serves as a joint political U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, up across Syria. Their widespread use platform. Most of all, it is intended an estimated 1,200 rebel groups are of the FSA brand gave the impression of to function as a unified distribution currently fighting against the al-Assad a unified movement, but no nationwide channel for military supplies and funds government.1 FSA structure was ever created to match from the uprising’s main state backers. the name. Rebels have been told by these states Most of these factions first emerged that they must endorse the SMC and its out of a narrow local context, typically The uprising’s international backers— politics to gain access to future arms in a rural Sunni Arab village or chief among them Turkey, Qatar, Saudi shipments.5 Recently, the United States, neighborhood. With the passage of Arabia, and the United States—have the United Kingdom and France have all time, however, many have merged into since early 2012 repeatedly sought to indicated that they will channel money bigger formations and connected across encourage a centralized rebel leadership and possibly weapons via the SMC.6 provincial boundaries, creating a web by using their control over funding of interlocking alliances. These unity and weapons shipments to coax local The SMC has provided wildly varying efforts have typically been initiated and commanders into larger alliances. A estimates of the total number of fighters sustained by foreign actors, including number of such coalitions were formed in its member groups. In June 2013, states, exiled Syrian businessmen and during the past two years, many using Idris claimed to control 80,000 fighters, activists, and Islamist aid groups, the FSA name. Yet a multitude of but days later an SMC representative which thereby gained leverage over practical difficulties, as well as flare- insisted that the true figure is 320,000.7 their ideological and political agendas. ups of an old Saudi-Qatari rivalry, long In practice, a meaningful headcount of The result is an extraordinarily complex undermined these efforts. rebels is almost impossible to make, both insurgency, trapped in a political due to the scarcity of reliable information dynamic shaped by parochial roots on the The General Staff of the Military and and to myriad problems of definition.8 one hand and international influences on Revolutionary Forces There is no disputing, however, that the other, but seemingly unable to develop The most recent and ambitious attempt most of Syria’s large rebel factions have effective national actors. to create an “FSA” leadership occurred chosen to publicly align themselves in December 2012, when the General with the SMC, recognizing it as the best This article identifies and profiles some Staff of the Military and Revolutionary way to tap into Gulf, Western and other of the most important non-state actors Forces was formed at a conference in support. in Syria. It finds that the opposition Antalya, following concerted pressure 3 remains severely fragmented. Although from Saudi Arabia and other financiers. 4 Ibid. Personal interviews, spokespersons of the SMC foreign-backed efforts to realize the This group, which built on earlier and several SMC-affiliated armed factions, Skype and e- long-standing goal of a central “Free unification attempts, is often referred to mail correspondence, spring and summer 2013. Syrian Army” leadership for the as the Supreme Military Command (SMC). 5 Phil Sands, “Gulf States Put New Conditions on Arms mainstream insurgency have achieved Today, the SMC and FSA names are often Supplies to Syrian Rebels,” The National, April 7, 2013; some progress recently, the resulting used interchangeably, although the FSA “Qatar Tightens Coordination on Syria Arms Flow,” Supreme Military Command has term also remains in use as a catch-all Reuters, May 15, 2013. little internal cohesion and is held phrase for the insurgency in general. 6 O’Bagy; Liz Sly, “Defector Syrian General Will be Con- together almost entirely by outside duit for U.S. Military Aid to Rebels,” Washington Post, funding. The Syrian regime has also June 16, 2013. The European Union embargo on Syria has begun to experience a fragmentation formally been modified, following pressure from France of its security apparatus, caused by its and the United Kingdom, to allow deliveries of arms to increased reliance on local and foreign the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Op- militia forces, although these problems 2 “Announcement of the Creation of the Free Syrian position Forces, but in practice this means the SMC, are still in their early stages. Army. Colonel Riad al-Asaad,” July 29, 2011, available at since the national coalition has no other armed wing. www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItzI_AIFUWg. 7 Sly; personal interview, SMC spokesperson Moham- 1 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Intelligence Of- 3 The best current study on the SMC is Elizabeth O’Bagy, med al-Mustafa, Skype, June 2013. ficial Says Syrian War Could Last for Years,” New York “The Free Syrian Army,” Institute for the Study of War, 8 The numbers cited in this text are only as credible as Times, July 20, 2013. March 24, 2013. their sources.

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By providing centralized funding, collectively control 35,000-40,000 The Islamist-leaning Tawhid Brigade these states seek to build up Idris and fighters.10 Some of the more well- belatedly joined the SILF in January the core SMC command as an effective known rebel groups that are part of the 2013.16 It was first created in July and sympathetic leadership, able to SILF include: the Farouq Battalions, a 2012 as a merger of militias from the control the insurgency and negotiate national network with roots in Homs; northern Aleppo countryside, and on its behalf. As a quid pro quo for SMC the Islamic Farouq Battalions, mainly quickly seized a part of Aleppo City. support, members are expected to in Homs-Hama; the Tawhid Brigade, Its formal head is `Abd al-`Aziz distance themselves from al-Qa`ida- mainly in Aleppo; the Fath Brigade, Salame (“Hajji Anadan”), but his linked factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra also in Aleppo; the Islam Brigade, deputy `Abd al-Qadir Salih (“Hajji and other forces hostile to the SMC’s mainly in Damascus; the Suqour al- Mari`”) runs the military wing and backers, and track any arms provided Sham Brigades, mainly in Idlib; and the may be the de facto leader. Tawhid to them. They are also expected to Deir al-Zour Revolutionaries’ Council, was recently reorganized into nearly obey orders from Idris and recognize a coalition of eastern groups. 30 sub-factions, most of them in the the National Coalition of Syrian Aleppo region. It claims to control some Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, The Farouq Battalions first emerged in 11,000 fighters in total.17 a group of exiled politicians supported Homs Province in late summer 2011, and by these same states. In practice, they gained prominence in the battle of Ahmad `Isa commands the Suqour al- compliance with these terms seems to Baba Amr in February 2012.11 Since then, Sham Brigades and is also the head vary considerably, and some factions the group has grown into a sprawling of the SILF itself. His group claims to pay only lip service to SMC conditions. network of militias across Syria, and have 17 sub-brigades totaling at least Most representatives of SMC-linked they now claim to control some 14,000 9,000 fighters, although some recently rebel groups interviewed by the author fighters.12 Perhaps as a result of their defected to form the independent have voiced mixed or negative opinions rapid expansion, the Farouq Battalions Dawood Brigade.18 Suqour al-Sham of the National Coalition of Syrian have suffered repeated splits. Their first belongs to the most stringently Islamist Revolutionary and Opposition Forces leader, First Lieutenant `Abd al-Razzaq wing of the SMC/SILF, along with the and are reluctant to fully recognize it as Tlass, was ousted after a sex scandal in Salafist figure Zahran Alloush, who their political leadership. October 2012, and he later joined the heads the Islam Brigade and is also the Asala wa-al-Tanmiya Front.13 Two other SILF’s secretary-general.19 At this stage, rebel leaders who have leading figures, Amjad Bitar and Bilal joined the SMC retain control over al-Jurayhi, were expelled in the spring The Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades their own forces, effectively reducing of 2013 after organizing a breakaway The pro-SMC Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades, Idris to a figurehead role. Many SMC- faction called the Islamic Farouq a moderate Islamist alliance that linked commanders are simultaneously Battalions.14 A smaller 2012 splinter allegedly operates on Qatari money,20 involved with other foreign-funded group called the Independent Omar el- were created in 2012 and grew in alliances and benefit from additional Farouq Battalion made headlines early influence through early 2013. They and often more generous sources in 2013 after its leader was caught on have now co-opted around 50 groups of support. This helps ensure their camera desecrating and pretending to across Syria, including in the southern continued autonomy from the SMC’s eat the corpse of a pro-Assad fighter.15 provinces of Damascus, Deraa and core leadership. Qunaytira, although they are by far strongest in the Idlib region.21 An The insurgency’s foreign backers still Ahfad al-Rasoul source has informally hope that strong and continuous funding estimated their numbers to be above through the central SMC apparatus will 10 Personal interview, SILF spokesperson, e-mail cor- increase the rebels’ dependency on its respondence, June 2013. 16 “The Tawhid Brigade Joins the Syria Islamic Libera- support functions, enabling it to expand 11 David Enders, “Rare Inside View of Syria’s Rebels tion Front,” Tawhid Brigade website, January 10, 2013. its influence and develop into a real Finds a Force Vowing to Fight On,” McClatchy Newspa- 17 Personal interview, Abu Obeida, spokesperson for military leadership over time. pers, April 23, 2012. `Abd al-Qadir Salih, Skype, June 2013; Liqa al-Yawm, al- 12 Personal interview, Yezid al-Hassan, spokesperson of Jazira, June 15, 2013. The Syria Islamic Liberation Front the Farouq Battalions, Skype, June 2013. 18 Personal interview, Ahmed Asi, director of the Suqour Some of the SMC’s most powerful 13 “Statement Issued by the Political Commission of the al-Sham Brigades’ media office, e-mail correspondence, commanders are also members of an Farouq Battalions in Syria,” Farouq Battalions website, June 2013. older coalition called the Syria Islamic October 6, 2012; “Announcement of the Creation of the 19 Liqa al-Yawm, al-Jazira, June 19, 2013; personal inter- Liberation Front (SILF), established Asala wa-Tanmiya Front, November 10, 2012 AD,” view, Mohammed Alloush, SILF executive director, in- 9 in September 2012. It currently November 11, 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ ternet correspondence, June 2013. consists of around 20 rebel groups, watch?v=LnUUwZex1H0. 20 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qa- all of which have joined the SMC. A 14 “Farouq Battalions: The military spokesperson Mo- tar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution,” Financial SILF representative claims that they hammed al-Ruz reads the statement of the executive of- Times, May 17, 2013. fice about severing all relations between Amjad al-Bitar 21 For details, see the Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades website, 9 “Founding Statement for the Syria Liberation Front,” and Bilal al-Jurayhi (Basem Amer) and the Farouq Bat- available at www.ahfadalrasoul.com. Also see personal Farouq Battalions website, September 12, 2012. “Syria talions,” Farouq Battalions website, April 13, 2013. interview, Ibrahim al-Idlebi, director of the Ahfad al-Ra- Liberation Front” was the original name of the group, 15 Paul Wood, “Face-to-Face with Abu Sakkar, Syria’s soul Brigades’ media office, Skype, June 2013; personal with “Islamic” added later. ‘Heart-Eating Cannibal,’” BBC, July 5, 2013. interview, anonymous diplomatic sources, 2013.

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10,000, but this is impossible to presents itself as a moderate Islamic- In the Deraa region, there are local verify.22 democratic movement, is composed factions such as the Yarmouk Brigade of a few dozen small armed factions, and the Maghawir Houran Gathering, The Asala wa-al-Tanmiya Front most of them in Idlib or Hama.27 Many both created this winter.33 The Asala wa-al-Tanmiya Front, led by Syrian opposition activists consider `Abd al-Qadir Da`fis, also supports the the commission a bona fide armed wing The Hardline Islamist Factions SMC. It was created in late 2012 and of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Ahrar al-Sham and the Syrian Islamic Front claims to have unified approximately 36 typically secretive Brotherhood has The Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) was factions comprised of 13,000 fighters admitted only to supporting the group formed by 11 Islamist groups in December and civilian auxiliaries, organized across and shies away from acknowledging 2012.34 It is strongly dominated by its five “fronts” covering most of Syria. It any real organizational ties.28 A largest faction, the Islamic Ahrar al- presents itself as a moderate Salafist spokesperson for the commission has Sham Movement, whose leader Hassan movement.23 Its best known member confirmed that it receives support from Abboud (also known as Abu Abdullah groups are the Ahl al-Athar Battalions, the Brotherhood and that it considers al-Hamawi) doubles as president of spread across several provinces but their interpretation of Islam to be “the the SIF. By May 2013, most original strongest in the tribal areas of eastern best school of thought” for Syria, but he SIF factions had merged into Ahrar Syria, and the Noureddin al-Zengi refused to admit a direct link.29 al-Sham, which now operates armed Battalions, a rebel coalition in the groups all over Syria. Other current Aleppo region. Other Mainstream Rebel Factions SIF members include the Haq Brigade There are hundreds of additional (Homs), the Ansar al-Sham Battalions Ansar al-Islam Gathering rebel units and coalitions. Many are (Latakia-Idlib), the Tawhid Army (Deir In August 2012, seven Damascene groups affiliated with the SMC or some other al-Zour), and the Mujahedi al-Sham created the Ansar al-Islam Gathering, large alliance, but there are also those Brigade (Hama).35 In late 2012, the SIF but it quickly began to crumble, with that work alone. Most seem to be small informally suggested that it controls factions peeling off to join the SILF, groups representing a single village or nearly 30,000 fighters, but it has since the Syrian Islamic Front, and Ahfad a few families, but some are far bigger refused to confirm this figure or provide al-Rasoul instead.24 The most recent and capable of offensive operations a new one.36 defector was Mohammed al-Khatib even outside their home region. and his Furqan Brigades, active west are Holding the Shiites in Syria,” SyriaComment, August of Damascus down toward the Golan For example, the Syria Martyrs’ Brigade 11, 2013. 25 Heights. Of the remaining factions, is active alongside Suqour al-Sham in 33 Videos were released announcing the creation of the al-Habib al-Mustafa Brigade and the the Jabal al-Zawiya region of Idlib. Its both groups. See “Announcement of the Creation Sahaba Brigades are the most important. leader, Jamal Ma`rouf, at one point of the Maghawir Houran Battalions Gathering,” The Sahaba Brigades spokesperson, boasted of 18,000 men, although this January 28, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ 30 Abu Mu`adh al-Agha, now leads the must have been an exaggeration. The watch?v=DpDJFktin8Q; “Announcement of the Creation Ansar al-Islam Gathering. Ahrar Souriya Brigade from Anadan, of the Yarmouk Battalion – Deraa, December 27, 2012,” which says it has nearly 2,500 fighters, December 27, 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ Durou al-Thawra Commission has carved up a fiefdom in the northern watch?v=LG_YE2LynAQ. The Yarmouk Brigade should 31 Another alliance linked to the SMC is suburbs of Aleppo. Another locally not be confused with the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade, a Brigadier General Sami Hamza’s Durou influential faction, the Northern Storm smaller group active on the Golan Heights cease-fire line, al-Thawra Commission, created in 2012 Brigade, shares control with the Tawhid which has been involved in several kidnappings of UN with assistance from the Syrian Muslim Brigade over an important border observer troops. 26 32 Brotherhood. The commission, which crossing between Turkey and Syria. 34 Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syr- ian Islamic Front.” 22 Ibid. egie Endowment for International Peace, May 7, 2013. 35 For a fuller description of the SIF groups and their 23 Personal interview, Abu Yazin, media spokesperson 27 Ibid. mergers and coalitions, see Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insur- for the Asala wa-al-Tanmiya Front, Skype, June 2013. 28 Personal interview, Molham al-Droubi, member of gents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front”; Aron Lund, 24 For more on the rise and fall of Ansar al-Islam, see the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership, e-mail cor- “New Addition to the Syrian Islamic Front,” SyriaCom- Aron Lund, “Syrian Jihadism,” Swedish Institute of respondence, January 2013; Abdullah al-Ghadawi, “The ment, May 3, 2013. The Mujahedi al-Sham Brigade was International Affairs, September 17, 2012; Aron Lund, Hesitation of the West Exacerbated ‘The Extremism’… created recently through a merger of local factions with “The Islamist Mess in Damascus,” SyriaComment, Feb- Syria Will Not Become an Iraq or a Scene for Revenge,” the Tayybet al-Imam-based Haqq Battalions Gathering. ruary 9, 2013; Aron Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: Okaz, January 12, 2013. See “Announcement of the Creation of the Mujahedi The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front,” Swedish Institute 29 Personal interview, Durou’ al-Thawra Commission al-Sham Brigade in Hama,” August 3, 2013, available at for International Affairs, March 19, 2013. The author is spokesperson Khaled Suleiman, e-mail correspondence, www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3nH-Mdrg2U. grateful to the British-Syrian opposition journalist Malik July 2013. 36 “Statement on the Hamza bin Abdelmuttaleb Bat- al-Abdeh for some of this information, interviewed via 30 Muqabala Khassa, al-Arabiya, December 30, 2012. talion’s Facebook Site,” December 22, 2012; personal Skype in February 2013. 31 Muqabala Khassa, al-Arabiya, February 3, 2013. interview, Abu Ezzeddin al-Ansari, member of the SIF 25 “Statement about the Withdrawal of the Furqan Divi- 32 “Agreement Between the Northern Storm Brigade Political Office and head of the Liwa al-Haq Political Of- sions from the Ansar al-Islam Gathering,” Furqan Divi- and the Tawhid Brigade About Joint Control Over the fice, Skype, February, 2013; personal interview, Moham- sions website, April 11, 2013. Bab al-Salama Crossing at the Turkish Border,” Aks al- med Talal Bazerbashi, official spokesperson of the SIF 26 For more on this group, see Aron Lund, “Struggling to Ser, July 9, 2013; “Why Were the Turks Kidnapped in and member of the Ahrar al-Sham leadership, internet Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria,” Carn- Lebanon and Who are the Liwaa Asifat al-Shamal who correspondence, June 2013.

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Ahrar al-Sham was never a part of the al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Muhammad al- Syrian Kurds and the PKK SMC, but it has a record of working well Julani, however, rejected the decision.43 The Popular Protection Units with its affiliates. One SIF faction, Al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Popular Protection Units (YPG) is the Haq Brigade, has a seat on the allegedly tried to resolve the dispute a secular, mixed-gender Kurdish militia SMC’s Homs Command, but the SIF through a Solomonic settlement, led by Sipan Hemo. It has controlled itself has rejected both the SMC and blaming both groups equally and most Kurdish towns in northern Syria the Syrian National Coalition of Syrian ordering them to remain in their since al-Assad’s army withdrew from Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. country of origin.44 Al-Baghdadi these areas in the summer of 2012. It is an explicitly Salafist alliance refused the mediation, saying that Formally, the YPG operates on behalf that makes no pretense of supporting this would consecrate an illegitimate of the Supreme Kurdish Committee, democracy, instead demanding an colonial border.45 Instead, the ISIL has a feckless umbrella organization. In Islamic state.37 The SIF and Ahrar al- dismissed the idea of Jabhat al-Nusra as practice, it is an armed wing of the Sham have had an excellent working an independent entity and portrays al- Democratic Unity Party (PYD), a Syrian relationship with al-Qa`ida factions Julani as a soldier gone rogue.46 front for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party such as Jabhat al-Nusra, and regularly (PKK).50 praise their contributions on the By July 2013, both Jabhat al-Nusra and battlefield. Yet they have also cautiously the ISIL are separately active in Syria, The PKK/PYD/YPG have tried to forge marked their differences with the most and the latter also in Iraq.47 Relations a middle path between al-Assad and radical jihadists, and spoken against a with other rebels vary from location to his opposition, and sought to keep “regionalization” of the Syrian war—a location, but the ISIL seems to be viewed the Kurds out of the war. They have tactful reference to al-Qa`ida’s global with more suspicion due to its foreign occasionally defended against regime jihad.38 connections, perceived extremism, and incursions, but more often clashed with dominant ambitions suggested by its Arab rebels, particularly Islamist Al-Qa`ida and the Salafi-Jihadi Hardliners self-designation as a “state.” There are factions and Turkey-backed groups. Al-Qa`ida has taken a keen interest in few reports about infighting, however, The YPG’s ambiguous political stance the Syrian war. In mid- to late-2011, its and in many areas Jabhat al-Nusra and and its reluctance to confront the Iraqi affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq the ISIL seem to work together. regime has provoked anti-Assad Arab (ISI), helped create Jabhat al-Nusra,39 groups, some of which refer to the a Syrian spinoff that declared its Of the other Salafi-jihadi factions in YPG as “Kurdish Shabiha.” Pre-existing existence publicly in January 2012. The Syria, the most prominent has been Arab-Kurdish tensions have added fuel U.S. government listed it as a terrorist Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar. It to the fire. group in December 2012.40 consists of hundreds of mostly foreign fighters in the Aleppo area, led by a When left to their own devices, the In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra split.41 Chechen jihadist called Abu Omar al- Syrian PKK affiliates have focused on The ISI’s amir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Shishani who has now aligned himself ensuring party control over all Kurdish announced that he would unite the with the ISIL. There are also several areas and repressing or co-opting local Syrian and Iraqi factions under his smaller independent jihadist groups, rivals. In July 2013, they unveiled plans own command, called the Islamic State such as the Homs-based Jund al-Sham, to set up a mechanism for Kurdish “self- of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).42 Jabhat which draw on militant networks in administration” within Syria, with a northern Lebanon.48 A few small Syro- parliament and constitution.51 Lebanese networks that predate the 37 See the SIF charter, available at www.archive.org/ 2011 uprising are still active, such as Syrian and Foreign Pro-Government Militias download/Mithaq/Mithaq.pdf. For a fuller discussion, Fatah al-Islam and the Abdullah Azzam The activities of Syrian and foreign pro- see Lund, “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syr- Battalions.49 government militias have been obscured ian Islamic Front.” by the leading role of the official Syrian 38 Aron Lund, “Major Salafi Faction Criticizes Jabhat al- Arab Army, but there are a number of Nosra,” SyriaComment, May 4, 2013. 43 “English Translation: Speech of the General Com- non-state and foreign-linked actors 39 The ISI’s role in helping to establish Jabhat al-Nusra mander of Jabhat Al-Nusra Abu Mohammed al-Golani in Syria that fight for the al-Assad has now been confirmed by both the Jabhat al-Nusra about the al-Sham front,” Ansar al-Mujahidin forum, regime. leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani and the ISI leader April 18, 2013. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in their April 2013 statements, 44 Basma Atassi, “Qaeda Chief Annuls Syrian-Iraqi Ji- although they differ on the implications of this. had Merger,” al-Jazira, June 9, 2013. 40 “Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front Leadership 45 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Remaining in Iraq and the 50 “Official announcement of the Creation of the Popu- in Syria and Militias Supporting the Asad Regime,” U.S. Levant,” June 15, 2013. lar Protection Units,” Welate Roje, July 19, 2012; “Syria’s Treasury Department, December 11, 2012. 46 “Speech by the Mujahed Sheikh Abu Mohammed al- Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle,” International 41 For an excellent chronological walkthrough of state- Adnani entitled: ‘So, leave them and their deceptions,’” Crisis Group, January 22, 2013; Eva Savelsberg, “The ments by the actors involved, see “Special Report on the Sanam al-Islam forum, June 28, 2013. Kurdish Factor in the Syrian Revolution,” Syrian Studies Power Struggle Between al-Qaeda Branches and Leader- 47 There is not enough evidence to determine to which Association Bulletin 18:1 (2013); Mutlu Civiroglu, “YPG ship,” SITE Institute, July 1, 2013. group the majority of fighters went. Commander: Kurds Are Bulwark Against Islamic Ex- 42 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Islamic State of Iraq: An- 48 Personal interview, Jund al-Sham spokesperson “Abu tremism in Syria,” Rûdaw, July 22, 2013. nouncement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Hamza,” internet correspondence, July 2013. 51 Sherzad Sheikhani, “‘Elected’ Parliament and ‘Own’ - Speech by Emir al-Mouminin Abu Bakr |April 9,” April 49 Aron Lund, “Holy Warriors,” Foreign Policy, October Constitution in the Syrian Kurdish Areas Within Three 9, 2013. 15, 2012. Months,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 14, 2013.

26 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8

The war has stirred up a significant At the start of the uprising, several There have been growing reports of Shi`a Islamist mobilization in families and tribes who had enjoyed friction and even minor clashes between surrounding countries, encouraged government patronage organized the regular Syrian Arab Army and by Iran. Hizb Allah has backed al- vigilante groups. In Aleppo, the Berri rogue Popular Committees.59 Perhaps Assad with expertise, by organizing mafia—a criminal gang from a politically- fearing a fragmentation of the security Shi`a militias in Syria and monitoring connected Sunni clan—helped quash apparatus, the regime has sought to demonstrations until rebels massacred impose a more organized structure several Berri leaders in July 2012.53 In on its armed supporters. From mid- “Major infighting among multi-religious areas, the regime has 2012, hundreds of Popular Committees Syria’s rebel groups has recruited with most success among and other irregulars merged into what minorities. In Qusayr, for example, eventually became the National Defense been relatively rare, but members of a Greek Orthodox clan and Forces.60 President Bashar al-Assad has time will inevitably chip Alawite villagers helped to repress the described the group as “local citizens mostly Sunni demonstrators in 2011.54 fighting alongside the army to defend away at the insurgents’ In Latakia Province, a faction known as their communities and regions.”61 original unity of purpose.” the Popular Front for the Liberation of Members draw a government paycheck, Iskanderoun/Syrian Resistance, led by and some have reportedly received a radical Marxist refugee from Turkey, specialist training in Iran.62 has emerged as the preeminent Alawite and intimidating anti-Assad activists paramilitary force.55 Conclusion in Lebanon. In 2013, it stepped up its Syria’s insurgent movement remains previously low-key raids into Syria Regime-connected businessmen have extraordinarily fractured, even after from northern Lebanon. The group provided much of the funding for two years of warfare. The December played an important role in the regime’s such groups. The most well-known 2012 creation of the SMC seems to re-conquest of Qusayr, on the Syrian- example is the president’s cousin, Rami have facilitated cooperation among the Lebanese border, in May and June Makhlouf, who has used his business insurgents and established a framework 2013. fortune to sustain militia activity across for more effective unification, but it the country.56 In Homs, he is a main is still far from a functioning rebel Another Twelver Shi`a group, called sponsor of militias drawn from the local leadership. Complicating matters Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, has taken up Alawite population.57 further, several of the insurgency’s positions around the Sayyida Zaynab strongest factions—including the SIF, shrine area in southern Damascus, Official Pro-Assad Militia Formations both al-Qa`ida wings, and the Kurdish recruiting from the local Shi`a From the first months of the uprising, so- YPG—actively oppose the SMC. The immigrant community and sympathetic called Popular Committees began to form SMC’s influence is likely to grow only factions in Iraq. Some other Shi`a across Syria. They typically function as if it receives unified and sustained militant factions are fighting for al- a lightly armed neighborhood watch, foreign support, including more Assad as well. with volunteers manning checkpoints advanced weapons, but the success and conducting night patrols in their of such a strategy depends on the The “Shabiha” Phenomenon home areas. uncertainties of American, European The al-Assad regime is also supported and Arab politics. by its own militias, often referred to The Popular Army—an old paramilitary in the media as shabiha. This catch- wing of al-Assad’s Ba`ath Party—has Thus far, major infighting among all term for al-Assad supporters was worked more as a cohesive militia force, Syria’s rebel groups has been popularized by the opposition in 2011, and at times participated in offensives relatively rare, but time will inevitably but there is no organization by that alongside the regular army.58 chip away at the insurgents’ original name.52 Armed support for the regime has come from many different sources, 59 Lund, “Gangs of Latakia: The Militiafication of the including clients of the intelligence 53 Eliot Higgins, “Aleppo - Zaino Berri, Shabiha Leader, Assad Regime”; “They forced him and his men to kneel... services, Ba`athist true believers, old Captured And Executed,” Brown Moses blog, July 31, the ‘Shabbiha’ strips a security officer of his arms be- paramilitary groups created in the early 2012; “Zeino Berri Martyred in Aleppo, People’s Council cause of a problem in the bread line in Aleppo!” Aks al- decades of Ba`ath Party rule, and armed Member Hassan Shaaban Berri Wounded,” Cham Times, Ser, August 1, 2013. gangs in thrall to individual members of August 1, 2012. 60 In some areas at least, the National Defense Forces the ruling family. 54 Sam Dagher, “Syrian Conflict Draws In Christians,” include female fighters. See “In Assad’s Syria, Women a Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2012. Small, Symbolic Part of Fighting Force,” Reuters, June 5, 55 Aron Lund, “Gangs of Latakia: The Militiafication of 2013. the Assad Regime,” SyriaComment, July 23, 2013. 61 “President al-Assad Gives Interview to the German 56 Aziz Nakkash, “The Alawite Dilemma in Homs: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Newspaper,” Syrian 52 That has not prevented the U.S. government from for- Survival, Solidarity and the Making of a Community,” Arab News Agency, June 18, 2013. mally sanctioning “The Shabbiha” as if it were an orga- Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2013. 62 “Insight: Syrian Government Guerrilla Fighters Be- nized militia. See “Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front 57 Ibid. ing Sent to Iran for Training,” Reuters, April 4, 2013; Leadership in Syria and Militias Supporting the Asad 58 Marah Mashi, “People’s Committees in Syria: Patrol- “Insight: Battered by War, Syrian Army Creates its Own Regime,” U.S. Treasury Department, December 11, 2012. ling Local Borders,” al-Akhbar, September 4, 2012. Replacement,” Reuters, April 21, 2013.

27 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 unity of purpose. Factional power From Karbala to Sayyida further point to how Iran is using its struggles, economic interests, ethnic ideologically loyal proxies to keep the or tribal divides, and foreign-instigated Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syrian regime in power. proxy rivalries are all likely to trigger Syria’s Shi`a Militias rebel-on-rebel fighting. Ideology also This article examines the Iraqi plays a part, but the media narrative of By Phillip Smyth organizations that supply fighters to a looming war between al-Qa`ida and Syria, in addition to their training, other rebels has likely overstated the as the sectarian nature of Syria’s civil tactics and weapons. It finds that role of doctrinal issues. Western and war grows, the theme of a larger pan- professional fighters and well- Gulf pressure on the SMC to confront al- Shi`a struggle supportive of Syrian trained volunteer forces, with a strong Qa`ida is likely to be a more important leader Bashar al-Assad against radical adherence to Iranian revolutionary cause of such conflict, if it eventually Sunni elements is quickly becoming ideology, form the bulk of the Iraqi erupts. the norm. Reports have surfaced of Shi`a militia contingent in Syria. Afghan Shi`a possibly fighting with Bashar al-Assad’s government is also pro-Assad militia organizations,1 as The Combatants: Ideology and becoming increasingly dependent well as a Shi`a fighter from the Ivory Professionalism on paramilitary groups, including Coast.2 Nevertheless, it is Iraqi Shi`a The press and social media assert autonomous or foreign-led militias. groups and individuals, mainly from that many of the Iraqi Shi`a fighters Their support has improved al-Assad’s Iranian-backed groups, that have sent operating as part of Syria-based Shi`a staying power in many areas, but it the majority of militiamen to fight for al- militias, such as Liwa Abu Fadl al- also underlines the regime’s gradual Assad in Syria. Abbas (the al-Abbas Brigade), are loss of sovereignty and cohesion. The somewhat disorganized “volunteers” Ba`ath government’s strict messaging Beginning in early 2012, Iraqi Shi`a who lack training.6 In terms of discipline and the centrality of Bashar fighters started to trickle into Syria.3 messaging importance, the emphasis al-Assad himself has delayed and Participating Iraqi groups include Asaib on volunteers demonstrates a specific obfuscated this slow unwinding of the Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hizb Allah, the Badr narrative that is meant to unite state, but not stayed it. If the war drags Organization, Harakat Hizb Allah al- disparate Shi`a behind an Iranian- on long enough, the al-Assad regime is Nujaba (Harakat al-Nujaba), and Kataib organized effort. This has especially likely to devolve into a decentralized Sayyid al-Shuhada.4 There is also the been the case for Iraqis, whose main patchwork of sectarian and client possibility that militiamen affiliated clerical leadership, both radical and militias, only superficially resembling with Moqtada al-Sadr, namely Liwa al- traditional, have not been supportive of Syria’s pre-2011 dictatorship. Yum al-Mawud, may be contributing Shi`a militia activities in Syria.7 fighters as well.5 Aron Lund is a Swedish freelance journalist Volunteer fighters are clearly fighting and researcher working on Middle Eastern The employment of these Shi`a fighters in Syria.8 Yet according to the fighters affairs. He is the author of several books in Syria has been widespread in major themselves, members of Shi`a militias and reports on Syria, including Drömmen areas of conflict, especially Damascus. are both vetted by Iranian and Syrian om Damaskus (The Dream of Damascus), a Their training, tactics and weapons authorities and often endure rigorous political history of Syria and its opposition training regimens.9 One Iraqi Shi`a movements. 1 Meena Haseeb, “Afghans Involvement in Syria War to be Investigated: Mosazai,” Khaama Press [Kabul], April 6 Salah Nasrawi, “Iraqi Shia Dilemma in Syria,” al- 8, 2013. Ahram Weekly, June 26, 2013; Tim Arango, Anne 2 “Nakhstin shahid afriqaya madafa’herm hadhrat Barnard, Duraid Adnan, “As Syrians Fight, Sectarian zaynab + ‘aks,” AhlulBayt News Agency, July 27, 2013. Strife Infects Mideast,” New York Times, June 1, 2013; 3 Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango, “Iraqi Sects Join Battle in Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites Flock to Assad’s Side as Syria on Both Sides,” New York Times, October 27, 2012. Sectarian Split Widens,” Reuters, June 19, 2013; “Footage 4 Some of these groups, namely Harakat Hizb Allah al- from a Dead Iraq Shia Jihadists Phone-Cam: Iraqi Officer Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, may be fronts for Volunteers Members of Abu-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade,” Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hizb Allah. August 13, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ 5 Al-Sadr, however, has denied sending any forces to watch?v=6fQxC5PI7cw. Syria and instead blamed “splinter groups.” See Anissa 7 Hadeel al-Sayegh, “Iraq’s Clergy Strive to Maintain Haddadi, “Syria: Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Reported Legacy Amid Rise of Shia Militias,” The National [Abu Sending Fighters to Prop Up Assad Regime,” International Dhabi], August 6, 2013. Business Times, November 23, 2011; “Moqtada al-Sadr 8 In Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s Says His Followers Not Fighting in Syria, but Members Assad,” some of the Iraqi Shi`a groups that have claimed of ‘Splinter’ Groups Could be Involved,” al-Arabiya, to have sent fighters denied any presence in Syria. June 8, 2012; Ali Abel Sadah, “Sadr Gives Maliki ‘Final 9 “Iraqi Shiite Militants Start to Acknowledge Role in Warning,’” al-Monitor, May 29, 2013; Frud Bezhan, Syria,” Reuters, April 11, 2013; Mona Mahmood and “Reports of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Political Demise May Be Martin Chulov, “Syrian War Widens Sunni-Shia Schism Greatly Exaggerated,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight for Shrines,” Guardian, June August 19, 2013. 4, 2013.

28 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 militia commander told National Public Iraq-Based Groups Supplying Fighters to Syria Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada Radio that Lebanese Hizb Allah manages Before March 2013, Iraq-based Shi`a Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada is another some of the training.10 militia groups denied that they were supplier of Iraqi Shi`a fighters to Syria. sending fighters to Syria.16 When these It was allegedly created in May 2013 There has also been speculation over groups posted death notices for fallen with its founding goal to “protect Shi`a the ideological motivations of Iraqi fighters, the location of death was not holy sites.”23 The group is reportedly Shi`a fighters in Syria. From Lebanese provided. Militants were generally led by Falah al-Khazali.24 According Hizb Allah to Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, described as having died performing to unnamed sources, however, Abu organizations that have officially stated their “jihadist duties.”17 Only in March Mustafa al-Sheibani created the group they have supplied Shi`a militiamen to 2013 did Iraqi Shi`a organizations begin after he left Kataib Hizb Allah and still Syria have all announced they follow to announce the deaths of members killed currently leads it.25 The group has not Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary fighting in Syria. Public funerals and clarified the leadership confusion. ideological concept of wilayat al-faqih social media posts suggest that a number In a May 8, 2013, statement issued by (guardianship of the jurist).11 According of new and more established organizations Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, it claimed to one Lebanese Hizb Allah fighter, are fielding fighters for Syria. Based on it would defend Shi`a religious sites the group’s order to fight in the May- the casualty reports released by Iraqi across the globe, had “fought the U.S. June 2013 battle of Qusayr was a direct Shi`a fighters in Syria, the majority of occupation in Iraq,” and wanted to religious order called a taklif shar`i.12 these militiamen originated from Basra, “liberate Jerusalem.”26 In May, it held According to Alia Ibrahim, the Beirut Maysan Province, Najaf, and Baghdad.18 three funerals for members killed in correspondent for Dubai TV, with the Syria,27 and in late August it announced issuance of a taklif shar`i, “Supporters are The key Iraqi Shi`a militia groups that the deaths of eight more fighters.28 The obliged to follow his [Iranian Supreme have sent fighters to Syria to operate Associated Press also reported in May Leader Ali Khamenei’s] commands, under the banner of Syria-based militias that its fighters had headed to Iran prior and disobeying him is considered include: Kataib Hizb Allah, Kataib to flying to Syria.29 tantamount to disobeying God.”13 Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Hizb Allah al-Nujaba, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and the It is possible that Kataib Sayyid al- The Associated Press noted in June 2013 Badr Organization. Shuhada is a front for a Syrian civil that highly organized Iranian proxy war-focused military arm of the groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hizb Allah Basra, Iraq-based Sayyid al-Shuhada Kataib Hizb Allah “are organizing much The first “martyr” announcements came Movement.30 The fact that most of of the transfer of Iraqi fighters to Syria, from Kataib Hizb Allah with the death of Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s publicly according to Shiite politicians, clerics Ahmed Mahdi Shuweili in March 2013.19 announced fallen fighters have and militia members.”14 One Asaib The Iraq-based Kataib Hizb Allah, an Ahl al-Haq commander told the news Iranian-backed Iraqi organization, Dissidents, Wounds Dozens in Iraq,” Washington Times, agency, “I personally get dozens of calls neither hides its affinity for Iran nor June 15, 2013; “Al Baghdadiya TV Watheg al Battat Iran each day from people [volunteers] in disguises that Lebanese Hizb Allah is its MEK PMOI Attack Camp Liberty,” al-Baghdadiya TV 20 the provinces and Baghdad who want role model. Following the withdrawal [Cairo], July 14, 2013. to go…We send well-trained ideological of coalition forces from Iraq, Kataib 23 “Tashyee’ Iraqi Fi Al Basra Qutil Athna’a Al Difa’a 15 fighters.” Hizb Allah rejected calls to put down a’an Maqam Al Sayyida Zeinab Qorb Dimashq,” al-Quds its arms and has continued on a militant al-Arabi, May 6, 2013. 21 10 Kelly McEvers, “Shiite Fighters Drawn To Fight In path in Iraq. While deploying forces to 24 “Tashiya ahd ‘anasr kata’ib sayyid al-shuhada fi al- Syria By Islamic Prophecy,” National Public Radio, June Syria, Kataib Hizb Allah has been linked basra alathi saqat fi suriya,” National Iraqi News Agency, 20, 2013. The claim that Lebanese Hizb Allah and Iran to attacks targeting Iranian dissidents May 6, 2013. 22 were training/equipping Shi`a forces in Syria was also in Iraq in June 2013. 25 “Anshqaq amin ‘ala kata’ib hizb allah al-iraq w repeated by “Abu Mujahid” as early as October 2012. tashikeel kata’ib ‘sayyid al-shuhada,’” al-Masalah The Iraqi Shi`a fighter in Damascus told Reuters, “Iran is Associated Press, May 23, 2013. [Baghdad], April 14, 2013. working there by using Hezbollah, there are officers and 16 Barbara Surk, “Fighting in Syria, Hezbollah Charts 26 For a copy of the statement, see figure 2 in Phillip militants from Hezbollah-Lebanon training the citizens Risky Course,” Associated Press, May 29, 2013. Smyth, “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Supplier of and developing their fighting skills and abilities.” See Al- 17 Martin Chulov, “Hezbollah Commander Killed While Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria,” June 3, 2013, Jihadology.net, Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s Assad.” on ‘Jihad Duties’ in Syria,” Guardian/Sydney Morning available at www.jihadology.net/2013/06/03/hizballah- 11 Wilayat al-faqih means the rule by the specialist in Herald, October 4, 2012. cavalcade-kataib-sayyid-al-shuhada-another-supplier- religious law. For Iraqi groups that support this principle, 18 Phillip Smyth, “Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria,” of-iraqi-shia-fighters-in-syria. see Reidar Visser, “Religious Allegiances among Pro- parts 1-3, available at www.jihadology.net/hizballah- 27 Adam Schreck and Nabil al-Jurani, “Iraqi Death Hints Iranian Special Groups in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 4:9 (2011). cavalcade. of Iran’s Role In Syrian Crisis,” Associated Press, May 6, 12 Mona Alami, “Hezbollah Fighter Details Ops in 19 “Al-muqawama al-islamiyya kata’ib Hizballah ta’lan 2013. Qusayr,” Now Lebanon, June 4, 2013. al-istishahid ahd afrahd khilal al-difla’ ‘an muqadisat w 28 On August 25, 2013, the official Facebook page for the 13 Alia Ibrahim, “Hezbollah’s Mix of Prayer and Politics,” al-a’qida,” al-Etejah TV [Iraq], April 16, 2013. Badr Organization’s military wing posted the announce- Washington Post, April 1, 2007. 20 For details, see the group’s official webpage at www. ment. 14 “Iraqi Shiite Fighters’ Role in Syria Grows More kataibhizbollah.org. 29 Nabil al-Jurani, “Iraqis Mourn 2 Shiite Fighters Killed Prominent, Raising Sectarian Tensions at Home,” 21 Aref Mohammed, “Iraq Militia Says to Keep Weapons, in Syria,” Associated Press, May 17, 2013. Associated Press, June 10, 2013. Citing Instability,” Reuters, January 17, 2012. 30 “Sayyid al-Shuhada’ Movement: ‘We’re for a federal 15 Sam Dagher, “Fighters Enter Syria to Defend Shi’ites,” 22 Ashish Kumar Sen, “Rocket Attack Kills 2 Iranian region in the south,’” Niqash [Berlin], October 6, 2007.

29 august 2013 . special issue . Vol 6. Issue 8 originated from Basra also points to suppliers of fighters to Syria. In July 1,500 members into Syria.43 As with the possibility that there may be a link 2013, Asaib Ahl al-Haq announced that Liwa Kafil Zaynab, Quwet Shahid al- with the political organization.31 the fighters they were sending to Syria Sadr appears to be a subgrouping of the belonged to a special unit named Liwa main Badr Organization militia which is Harakat Hizb Allah al-Nujaba Kafil Zaynab. Liwa Kafil Zaynab is not a tasked with actions in Syria. On July 21, In June 2013, another new group new militia; instead, it is a separate unit 2013, the Badr Organization confirmed emerged, calling itself Harakat Hizb within Asaib Ahl al-Haq, similar in scope the group had suffered its first combat Allah al-Nujaba (also known as Harakat to other military expeditionary units. The death in Syria. Nujaba). Like Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, announcement of a subgrouping follows Harakat Nujaba announced its existence other geographically-oriented military Syria-Based Militias during a funeral in Maysan Province for units created by Asaib Ahl al-Haq during Since many Shi`a fighters arriving in seven of its fallen fighters.32 The group the Iraq war, such as the group’s Kataib Syria come from established political also claimed to be a supplier of Shi`a Imam Hassan al-Askari, which primarily and militant organizations, their fighters into Syria, particularly to the operated in Diyala Province.38 Liwa presence in Syria has been obscured by Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir militia.33 Kafil Zaynab’s main goal is the “Defense efforts to repackage them as part of a of Sayyida Zaynab,” an important Shi`a number of Syria-based militia groups. Asaib Ahl al-Haq shrine located in southern Damascus Syria-based militia groups, which do Formed in 2006 after it split from whose “defense” has served as a main not operate in Iraq publicly, include the Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army theme with Shi`a militias operating al-Abbas Brigade, Liwa Zulfiqar, Liwa militia, Asaib Ahl al-Haq has been the in Syria.39 Immediately following the al-Imam al-Husayn and Liwa Ammar recipient of extensive training from announcement of its existence, the group ibn Yasir. Lebanese Hizb Allah and the Islamic created its own YouTube station that Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).34 promptly issued videos of its fighters. Al-Abbas Brigade The group is also a proponent of Iran’s These videos also openly stated that The al-Abbas Brigade has served as wilayat al-faqih doctrine.35 During the Iraq fighters from Lebanese Hizb Allah and the primary front group for Iranian- war that began in 2003, the group was Liwa Kafil Zaynab actively cooperated backed combatants and organizations a direct Iranian proxy that carried out and supported one another in Syria.40 based in Iraq. Numbers for the group hundreds of attacks on coalition forces range between 500-1,500 fighters.44 and helped introduce the specialized The Badr Organization The al-Abbas Brigade was the first explosively formed penetrator (EFP) The Badr Organization, which recently prominently mentioned Shi`a militia in warhead.36 Despite Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s split from the Islamic Supreme Council Syria and announced its presence to the claims that it was considering giving up of Iraq and extensive links to the world via a music video and Facebook its armed elements, the group retains IRGC, also supports Iran’s wilayat al- posts in the fall/winter of 2012.45 A and continues to utilize them.37 faqih.41 Starting in May 2013, the group Reuters report suggested that the al- threatened to become more involved Abbas Brigade may have been initially In spring 2013, Asaib Ahl al- in the Syrian conflict.42 The Badr started by former members of Moqtada Haq released numerous death Organization Military Wing’s Quwet al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, all Iraqi Shi`a, announcements and held funerals for Shahid al-Sadr later announced its living in the area of Sayyida Zaynab.46 fighters killed in Syria. The relatively existence at around the same time as It combined a local al-Assad-controlled larger numbers (when juxtaposed to the Liwa Kafil Zaynab. In one social media militia and new Iraqi Shi`a fighters losses of other Shi`a groups) established post, the group claimed to have flown from a number of Iranian-backed Iraqi Asaib Ahl al-Haq as one of the major Shi`a organizations. 38 See al-Hak.org for a list of operations by Asaib Ahl 31 Schreck and al-Jurani; “Ibna al-Basra yashi’yun al-Haq subgroups (including Kataib Imam Hassan al- jethmani shaheedin sharaka fi hamaya merqad sayyida Askar) and where they were carried out, available at zaynab ‘aliha al-salaam,” Young Journalists Club (Iran), www.alhak.org/vb/showthread.php?t=2810. May 19, 2013. The term “Sons of Basra” was regularly used 39 These details were originally on the group’s official on social media by Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada supporters Facebook pages, but they have been removed. and in Iranian media to describe their fighters. 40 See the video marked, “AAH-LKZ fighters, including 43 The post was dated July 13, 2013. 32 “Al-Sadr al-Zawahiri yehdhur satbuqa saniya ‘alwiya,” Karar join Lebanese Hizballah fighters near Damascus 44 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s al-Mada Press [Baghdad], June 16, 2013. Airport,” at Phillip Smyth, “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s Liwa’a Assad.” For the higher number, see “Bafidiyu ashrita 33 Ibid. Kafeel Zaynab,” Jihadology.net, August 14, 2013, musajila w suwr tuwkid qatl hizballah fi aldakhil al- 34 Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” available at www.jihadology.net/2013/08/14/hizballah- suri,” Elaph [London], April 19, 2013. Institute for the Study of War, December 2012. cavalcade-asaib-ahl-al-haqs-liwaa-kafeel-zaynab. 45 Nicholas Blanford, “Video Appears to Show Hezbollah 35 Visser. 41 Joel Wing, “Iraq’s Badr Organization Maintains its and Iraqi Shiites Fighting in Syria,” Christian Science 36 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Longtime Ties With Iran,” Musings on Iraq blog, July 10, Monitor, January 18, 2013. For more details on the music The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from 2013. videos created to support al-Abbas Brigade and Shi`a George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Random 42 See figure 5 at Phillip Smyth, “Breaking Badr: Is Iraq’s fighters in Syria, see Phillip Smyth, “The Songs of Liwa’a House, 2012), p. 327. Badr Organization Operating in Syria?” Jihadology. Abu Fadl al-Abbas: Militant Iraqi Shia Music & Syria,” 37 Jack Healy and Michael S. Schmidt, “Political Role for net, June 25, 2013, available at www.jihadology. Jihadology.net, July 3, 2013. Militants Worsens Fault Lines in Iraq,” New York Times, net/2013/06/25/hizballah-cavalcade-breaking-badr-is- 46 Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites Flock to Assad’s Side as January 5, 2012. iraqs-badr-organization-operating-in-syria. Sectarian Split Widens.”

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The group is also suspected to have and loyalty to Moqtada al-Sadr. Training, Tactics and Weapons connections to Lebanese Hizb Allah Unlike fighters from other Iraqi According to the Saudi newspaper and other Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi`a Shi`a organizations, Liwa al-Imam al-Sharq, training for Iraqi Shi`a groups, such as Kataib Hizb Allah, due al-Husayn’s fighters have not been militiamen headed to Syria was, at to its name and tactics.47 In fact, Kataib pictured with photographs of Iranian one point, organized by the IRGC and Hizb Allah once had an armed group Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. would occur over a two-week period in named the “al-Abbas Brigade.”48 Instead, they have pictures featuring the western Iranian city of Sanandaj.56 Moqtada al-Sadr. At times, personnel The newspaper added that Iraqi The al-Abbas Brigade’s own imagery in the group have been presented as government sources claimed that these also suggests further links between also having former military experience fighters were paid around $50 a day the militia and Iranian revolutionary in the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi military for their activities.57 Iraqi government ideology. Its imagery includes photos connection has been a highlighted sources also asserted that Iraqi Shi`a of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah feature in Liwa al-Imam al-Husayn’s fighters would train for longer periods Khamenei and Hizb Allah leader Hassan imagery. The group’s reported leader, in camps run by Iran’s elite IRGC Qods Nasrallah, and symbols which draw Majid Abu Dhiba, is at times shown Force, primarily in the Iranian city of their inspiration from IRGC and Hizb wearing Iraqi military insignia and Varamin.58 Allah logos.49 camouflage fatigues. The group’s size is hard to ascertain; the largest number Following their training, these fighters Liwa Zulfiqar of their militiamen photographed at would be flown in small batches of 10- Liwa Zulfiqar, a group that shares one time has been 16 members. It is 15 from Iran to Syria.59 At Damascus many leaders and fighters with the likely the group is comprised of more Airport, these Iraqi Shi`a were bused al-Abbas Brigade, also reportedly fighters. Liwa al-Imam al-Husayn first to their areas of operation after a short operates in Damascus. The group has publicly announced its establishment meeting with Shi`a militia leaders.60 been photographed “raising the banner with the June 30, 2013, creation of a of Abu Fadl al-Abbas” in the northern Facebook page. Throughout the Islamic Iraqi Shi`a fighters, particularly those section of Damascus called Barzeh.50 holy month of Ramadan, the group also who had fought U.S. and coalition Information on Liwa Zulfiqar’s force announced it would be holding nightly forces in an asymmetric manner, are deployments are unknown. Through iftar meals for the residents of the not narrowed to a specific set of combat photos and videos released by Liwa Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood.52 strategies. These groups have utilized Zulfiqar, the group actively promotes a multitude of conventional tactics its Iraqi Shi`a identity and combat Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir and techniques to project their power. operations.51 In another photograph Another newer militia, Liwa Ammar Instead of being limited to the types released by the group, a sniper is shown ibn Yasir, claims to operate outside of of environments in which they engage with the group’s logos, wearing an Iraqi Damascus in Aleppo. Liwa Ammar ibn Syrian rebel forces, these groups have flag breast patch. Yasir announced its existence with a also demonstrated abilities to fight in Facebook page on May 27, 2013.53 On both urban and rural areas. Liwa al-Imam al-Husayn June 4, the first non-internet based Liwa al-Imam al-Husayn is a Shi`a evidence of its existence was presented Iraqi Shi`a fighters often employ militia that operates in Damascus. at a mass funeral for seven members combined small unit tactics, with The group’s imagery often promotes of the group.54 While the organization fighters wielding assault rifles their affiliation with Sadrist militias claims to have strong links to Harakat (particularly Kalashnikov varieties), Hizb Allah al-Nujaba, its propaganda machine guns (namely versions 47 Blanford. suggests a close relationship with Asaib of the 7.62x54mm PKM), rocket- 48 Ibid. Ahl al-Haq and also suggests a strong propelled grenades (RPGs), and 55 49 “Militant Shia Organizations & Iranian Revolutionary belief in Iranian ideological concepts. sniper rifles (including anti-materiel Symbolism” chart and image figures 7, 8, and 9 in Phillip type sniper rifles). The Shi`a militias Smyth, “What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: have reportedly assembled defensive Assessing Syria’s Shia ‘International Brigade’ Through sniper positions, conducted ambushes Their Social Media Presence,” Jihadology.net, May 15, and counter-ambushes, and established 2013, available at www.jihadology.net/2013/05/15/ hizballah-cavalcade-what-is-the-liwaa-abu-fadl-al- 52 See Liwa Imam Husayn’s official Facebook page, 56 “Ajnabi yaqatun fi suriya: al-tadreeb lisbu ‘ayn fi abbas-lafa-assessing-syrias-shia-international-brigade- available at www.facebook.com/LwaAlamamAlhsyn. madinat sanandaj al-iran al..w kamsun dawlan youmiyan through-their-social-media-presence. 53 See Liwa Ammar ibn Yasir’s official Facebook page, al-mutadhuwa’ al-iraqi,” al-Sharq, June 13, 2013. 50 See, for example, a Liwa Zulfiqar Facebook post dated available at www.facebook.com/L.sedazinab. 57 Ibid. August 12, 2013, available at www.facebook.com/photo. 54 “Al-Sadr al-Zawahiri yehdhur satbuqa saniya 58 “Iraqi Shiite Fighters’ Role in Syria Grows More php?fbid=493805254039729&set=a.463904500363138. ‘alwiya.” Prominent, Raising Sectarian Tensions at Home.” 1073741828.463672427053012&type=1&theater. 55 See figures 9-10 in Phillip Smyth, “Liwa’a ‘Ammar 59 Mahmood and Chulov; Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites Flock 51 See Liwa Zulfiqar’s official Facebook page, available Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, to Assad’s Side as Sectarian Split Widens.” Photos of Iraqi at www.facebook.com/loa.zolfaqar. Also see AhlulBayt Syria,” Jihadology.net, July 20, 2013, available at www. Shi`a fighters being bused to combat zones are featured in News Agency, August 20, 2013. In the photo set, “Abu jihadology.net/2013/07/20/hizballah-cavalcade-liwaa- figure 3 in Smyth, “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Hajar” a former leader for the al-Abbas Brigades and now ammar-ibn-yasir-a-new-shia-militia-operating-in- Supplier of Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria.” a leader of Liwa Zulfiqar, is shown visiting Iran. aleppo-syria. 60 Ibid.

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checkpoints in urban and rural areas. Conclusion CTC Sentinel Staff Additionally, direct cooperation, in the The influx of Iraqi Shi`a fighters form of providing infantry support for to Syria demonstrates that Iran is Editor-in-Chief Syrian armored units, has also been employing its ideologically-driven Erich Marquardt promoted in certain released video fighters from its network of regional Senior Editor, CTC clips by the fighters. Like their rebel proxies. As the conflict continues to be foes, Shi`a militias manned by Iraqi marketed as a pan-Shi`a conflict, Iraq Editorial Board fighters have also used “technicals.” also presents a fertile recruiting ground COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. These improvised trucks and jeeps for new fighters. Iraqi Shi`a militias Department Head often feature recoilless rifles, 23mm and and fighters also benefit Iranian policy Department of Social Sciences (West Point) 14.5mm cannons, 12.7mm and 7.62mm vis-à-vis the region’s Shi`a Muslims by machine guns, or rockets.61 demonstrating that Iran is supportive COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. of efforts to “defend Shi’ism.” Tehran’s Deputy Department Head Highlighting the use of specific weapons support of Iraqi Shi`a fighters in Department of Social Sciences (West Point) has been another feature of the foreign- Syria displays a broader acceptance of manned Shi`a groups. The emphasis on its ideology in a community that has MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. particular weapons is also part of the increasingly felt embattled. Director, CTC training schedule organized by Iran. According to one former fighter, “You Judging from the creation of two have to enroll on a 45-day training new organizations, Kataib Sayyid al- course in Iran to be specialized in using Shuhada and Harakat Hizb Allah al- a specific weapon like rocket launchers, Nujaba, it is highly probable that as Kalashnikov, sniper rifle or RPGs.”62 the war continues and more Iraqi Shi`a fighters are funneled into Syria, further Iraqi Shi`a operating as part of Syria’s announcements for new groups will be Contact Shi`a militias have demonstrated higher made. Nevertheless, these groups are Combating Terrorism Center levels of training, with more utilization likely to function as proxies for other U.S. Military Academy of snipers. Many of these sniper tactics forces offering training and equipment 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall were perfected in Iraq with Iranian for Iraqi Shi`a fighters heading to Syria. West Point, NY 10996 aid during the U.S.-led intervention 63 Phone: (845) 667-6383 in Iraq. Iraqi Shi`a snipers—using Tehran’s reliance on Lebanese Hizb Email: [email protected] optics-mounted 7.62x51mm FAL-type, Allah and its Iraqi Shi`a proxies in Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ the 7.62x51 bolt-action Steyr SSG 69 support of al-Assad demonstrates rifles, and especially versions of the how these groups could be used in the * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Russian 7.62x54mm SVD (also known future as a type of rapid reaction force as the Dragunov)—are a regular feature to support Iranian interests elsewhere. of al-Abbas Brigade, Liwa Ammar ibn Additionally, with the increase in Yasir, and Liwa Zulfiqar propaganda trained, experienced, and ideologically posted on the internet.64 Occasionally, motivated Iraqi fighters, their return fighters wielding these weapons have home could further increase Iran’s support functioned as designated marksmen influence in Iraq. Due to their adherence The Combating Terrorism Center would on the squad level. In more publicized to wilayat al-faqih, these organizations or like to express its gratitude to its financial instances, teams of snipers and lone their fighters may not engage in rogue 65 supporters, for without their support and snipers are used in urban operations. militant activities, but instead further shared vision of the Center products like the the interests of Iran. CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how 61 See figure 35 in Smyth, “What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl If the al-Assad regime does collapse, to support the Combating Terrorism Center, al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia ‘International Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi`a militias please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Brigade’ Through Their Social Media Presence.” within Syria will be on the ground to Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association 62 Mahmood and Chulov. assist in salvaging the remaining al- of Graduates at 845-446-1561. 63 Richard N. Haass and Martin S. Indyk, Restoring Assad establishment. It is probable that the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President they will also be utilized as a core anti- (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, rebel combat force to fight in Syria and to 2008), p. 197. secure vital geostrategic transportation 64 See figures 30-34 in Smyth, “What is the Liwa’a links to Lebanese Hizb Allah. Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia ‘International Brigade’ Through Their Social Media Phillip Smyth is a researcher affiliated with The views expressed in this report are those of Presence.” Also see photo marked figure 17 and videos the University of Maryland. He focuses the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, marked “AAH-LKZ Sniper Firing” and “Another AAH- on Lebanon and Syria and specializes in the Department of the Army, or any other agency Shi`a militias in Syria. His work tracking of the U.S. Government. LKZ Sniper Video” in Smyth, “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab.” Shi`a militia activity can be found on 65 Ibid. Jihadology.net’s Hizballah Cavalcade.

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