DOCSLIB.ORG

Syria: a Wicked Problem For

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Syria: a Wicked Problem For AUGUST 2013 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 6 . ISSUE 8 Contents Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price INTRODUCTION 1 Syria: A Wicked Problem for All By Bryan Price SPECIAL REPORTS 4 Turkey’s Tangled Syria Policy By Hugh Pope 9 Israel’s Response to the Crisis in Syria By Arie Perliger 11 Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria By Karim Sadjadpour 14 Hizb Allah’s Gambit in Syria By Matthew Levitt and Aaron Y. Zelin 18 The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance By Nicholas Blanford 23 The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria By Aron Lund 28 From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi`a Militias By Phillip Smyth 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Syrian rebels stand guard as protesters wave Islamist flags during an anti-regime demonstration in Aleppo in March 2013. - AFP/Getty n august 26, 2013, Secretary from those that were truly “wicked.”3 In of State John Kerry called their interpretation, wicked problems the recent use of chemical feature innumerable causes, are weapons outside of Damascus tough to adequately describe, and by O“undeniable” and a “moral obscenity.”1 definition have no “right” answers. This is the latest chapter in an already In fact, solutions to wicked problems complex civil war in Syria, a crisis are impossible to objectively evaluate; About the CTC Sentinel that Kerry’s predecessor called a rather, it is better to evaluate solutions The Combating Terrorism Center is an “wicked problem” for the U.S. foreign to these problems as being shades of independent educational and research policy establishment.2 That term good and bad.4 institution based in the Department of Social was introduced 40 years ago by two Sciences at the United States Military Academy, professors of urban planning who were By anyone’s account, the Syrian civil West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses trying to identify what differentiated war satisfies all of the criteria of a the Center’s global network of scholars and hard but relatively ordinary problems wicked problem. Like most crises, the practitioners to understand and confront issues surrounding the Syrian conflict contemporary threats posed by terrorism and are complex and interrelated, and there other forms of political violence. are multiple competing foreign policy 1 John Kerry, “Remarks on Syria,” U.S. Department of State, August 26, 2013; Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, The views expressed in this report are those of “Syrian Rebels Accuse Government of Chemical Attack,” 3 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, New York Times, August 21, 2013. in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973). the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 “The President and the Secretary of State,” 60 Minutes, 4 John C. Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Har- January 27, 2013. vard Business Review, May 2008. 1 AUGUST 2013 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 6. ISSUE 8 interests at stake for the United States. The second camp is more skeptical about some important questions that so far As a result, there is no shortage of the rebel opposition and believes that have received limited attention. This disagreement about the way forward the United States has wisely exercised edition purposefully avoids proposing for the United States in responding to restraint throughout the crisis, any policy prescriptions. Rather, it the conflict. especially given the uncertainty of what identifies and analyzes the central a post-Assad Syria may look like. Retired actors and their strategic interests in an The discourse on U.S. policy options Ambassador Ryan Crocker, former chief effort to inform the debate surrounding for Syria features two contradictory diplomat to Syria from 1998-2001 and no this wicked problem. approaches. One camp argues that stranger to challenging situations after an effective solution requires direct serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Selected authors in this edition were American involvement, including likened the current crisis in Syria to the asked to view the Syrian civil war military intervention, and the removal massive wildfires raging in the American through the strategic lenses of some of President Bashar al-Assad from West: “You can’t put them out. You can’t of the conflict’s most important state power. While the United States called stop them…That’s kind of like Syria. We actors; others were asked to “deep- for al-Assad to step down as early can’t stop that war…What we can do, or dive” into the complicated non-state as August 2011,5 supporters of this should do, is everything possible we can militant landscape and profile the most approach complain that U.S. actions to to keep it from spreading.”11 important groups fighting in Syria. end the violence and remove al-Assad While this issue does not exhaust all have not matched its rhetoric.6 Even Many who side with Crocker’s relevant angles of the conflict, grouping this summer’s decision to send limited assessment suggest that the urge to these different perspectives in a single arms in support of the rebel cause is, “do something” should be tempered issue will hopefully advance the collective in their view, a case of too little, too by the United States’ first-hand understanding of the Syrian crisis and late.7 Those wanting more American knowledge of the tradeoffs, limitations, provide insight into the behavior and involvement in Syria argue that an al- and uncertainty associated with military policies of the relevant actors.13 Assad victory would increase Iran’s intervention during the last decade of influence, embolden Hizb Allah, and war. In a recent letter to Congressman Central Themes and Pressing Concerns risk the United States’ reputation as a Eliot Engel, the chairman of the Joint Syria poses several significant security superpower and its credibility among Chiefs commented that “the use of U.S. concerns for the United States and its allies (and enemies) in the region.8 military force can change the military allies. First, there are concerns about Detractors already point to the U.S. balance [in Syria]…But it cannot resolve Syria’s chemical weapons. Two months failure to stem humanitarian abuses the underlying and historic ethnic, prior to the most recent use of chemical by the Syrian government, including religious, and tribal issues that are weapons in August, a U.S. report al-Assad’s alleged use of chemical fueling this conflict.”12 in June concluded that the al-Assad weapons despite U.S. warnings that regime had used chemical weapons such use constituted crossing a “red The purpose of this article is two-fold. against rebel forces multiple times in line.”9 Others look at the United States’ First, it clearly outlines the intent the previous year.14 No U.S. ally is more inability to get other major powers, behind publishing a special issue of concerned about this development than especially Russia, on board to end the the CTC Sentinel focused exclusively on Israel. As Arie Perliger explains in his crisis quickly. Although no one argues the Syrian crisis. Second, it frames article, controlling Syria’s chemical that a post-Assad Syria will be a panacea the central themes surrounding the weapons stockpile is a critical concern for peace in the region, proponents conflict, identifies future implications for Israeli security officials. Israel has of this camp think that the benefits of for political violence in the region, and already conducted at least one attack intervening outweigh the costs.10 highlights several notable findings from inside Syria to prevent these weapons the issue’s contributors. from falling into the wrong hands, and 5 Barack Obama, “Statement by President Obama on the more unilateral attacks can be expected Intent of this Issue Situation in Syria,” White House, August 18, 2011. if Israel feels positive control of these 15 6 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Lawmakers Call for Stronger US This special edition of the CTC Sentinel weapons is jeopardized in any way. Action in Syria,” New York Times, April 28, 2013. looks at the Syrian conflict from 7 Michele Kelemen, “U.S. Supplies for Syrian Rebels May multiple angles, including analyses 13 For example, the issue does not include a separate Be Too Little, Too Late,” National Public Radio, June 14, that closely examine the threats article on the important role Russia plays in the crisis. 2013; Tom A. Peter, “How Syria’s Conflict Became More posed by violent non-state actors in For analyses that address Russia’s strategic interests, see Complicated as US Debated Arms for Rebels,” Christian the region. The contributors address Radha Iyengar and Brian Fishman, The Conflict in Syria: Science Monitor, June 14, 2013. key issues and debates while raising An Assessment of US Strategic Interests (Washington, D.C.: 8 Barry Pavel, “What Was Obama Thinking?” Foreign New America Foundation, 2013); Anna Borshchevskaya, Policy, May 1, 2013. Michael Doran and Max Boot, “Five Reasons to Intervene “Russia’s Many Interests in Syria,” The Washington In- 9 Benjamin J. Rhodes, “Statement by Deputy National in Syria Now,” New York Times, September 26, 2012. stitute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2013; “Russia’s Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben 11 Stephanie Gaskell, “Interview with Ryan Crocker: As- Syrian Stance: Principled Self-Interest,” Strategic Com- Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use,” White sad Will Prevail ‘Yard by Bloody Yard,’” Defense One, Au- ments 2012:31 (2012). House, June 13, 2013; James Ball, “Obama Issues Syria gust 5, 2013; Ryan Crocker, “Containing the Fire in Syria,” 14 Rhodes.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
    Distr.: General 18 March 2014 Original: English Human Rights Council Twenty-fifth session Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Oral Update of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 1 I. Introduction 1. The harrowing violence in the Syrian Arab Republic has entered its fourth year, with no signs of abating. The lives of over one hundred thousand people have been extinguished. Thousands have been the victims of torture. The indiscriminate and disproportionate shelling and aerial bombardment of civilian-inhabited areas has intensified in the last six months, as has the use of suicide and car bombs. Civilians in besieged areas have been reduced to scavenging. In this conflict’s most recent low, people, including young children, have starved to death. 2. Save for the efforts of humanitarian agencies operating inside Syria and along its borders, the international community has done little but bear witness to the plight of those caught in the maelstrom. Syrians feel abandoned and hopeless. The overwhelming imperative is for the parties, influential states and the international community to work to ensure the protection of civilians. In particular, as set out in Security Council resolution 2139, parties must lift the sieges and allow unimpeded and safe humanitarian access. 3. Compassion does not and should not suffice. A negotiated political solution, which the commission has consistently held to be the only solution to this conflict, must be pursued with renewed vigour both by the parties and by influential states. Among victims, the need for accountability is deeply-rooted in the desire for peace.
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
    Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies.
    [Show full text]
  • The Potential for an Assad Statelet in Syria
    THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras policy focus 132 | december 2013 the washington institute for near east policy www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessar- ily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. MAPS Fig. 1 based on map designed by W.D. Langeraar of Michael Moran & Associates that incorporates data from National Geographic, Esri, DeLorme, NAVTEQ, UNEP- WCMC, USGS, NASA, ESA, METI, NRCAN, GEBCO, NOAA, and iPC. Figs. 2, 3, and 4: detail from The Tourist Atlas of Syria, Syria Ministry of Tourism, Directorate of Tourist Relations, Damascus. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Digitally rendered montage incorporating an interior photo of the tomb of Hafez al-Assad and a partial view of the wheel tapestry found in the Sheikh Daher Shrine—a 500-year-old Alawite place of worship situated in an ancient grove of wild oak; both are situated in al-Qurdaha, Syria. Photographs by Andrew Tabler/TWI; design and montage by 1000colors.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria: 'Nowhere Is Safe for Us': Unlawful Attacks and Mass
    ‘NOWHERE IS SAFE FOR US’ UNLAWFUL ATTACKS AND MASS DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-WEST SYRIA Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2020 Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons Cover photo: Ariha in southern Idlib, which was turned into a ghost town after civilians fled to northern (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. Idlib, close to the Turkish border, due to attacks by Syrian government and allied forces. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode © Muhammed Said/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2020 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 24/2089/2020 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS MAP OF NORTH-WEST SYRIA 4 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 2. METHODOLOGY 8 3. BACKGROUND 10 4. ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS 12 4.1 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES 14 AL-SHAMI HOSPITAL IN ARIHA 14 AL-FERDOUS HOSPITAL AND AL-KINANA HOSPITAL IN DARET IZZA 16 MEDICAL FACILITIES IN SARMIN AND TAFTANAZ 17 ATTACKS ON MEDICAL FACILITIES IN 2019 17 4.2 ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS 18 AL-BARAEM SCHOOL IN IDLIB CITY 19 MOUNIB KAMISHE SCHOOL IN MAARET MISREEN 20 OTHER ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS IN 2020 21 5.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Direction of Which Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan Forms a Part Is the Most Significant Development in Israe
    FRAGMENTED SYRIA: THE BALANCE OF FORCES AS OF LATE 2013 By Jonathan Spyer* Syria today is divided de facto into three identifiable entities. These three entities are: first, the Asad regime itself, which has survived all attempts to divide it from within. The second area is the zone controlled by the rebels. In this area there is no central authority. Rather, the territory is divided up into areas controlled by a variety of militias. The third area consists of majority-Kurdish northeast Syria. This area is under the control of the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian franchise of the PKK. This article will look into how this situation emerged, and examine its implications for the future of Syria. As the Syrian civil war moves toward its The emergence of a de facto divided Syria fourth anniversary, there are no signs of is the result first and foremost of the Asad imminent victory or defeat for either of the regime’s response to its strategic predicament sides. The military situation has reached a in the course of 2012. By the end of 2011, the stalemate. The result is that Syria today is uprising against the regime had transformed divided de facto into three identifiable entities, from a largely civilian movement into an each of which is capable of defending its armed insurgency, largely because of the existence against threats from either of the regime’s very brutal and ruthless response to others. civilian demonstrations against it. This These three entities are: first, the Asad response did not produce the decline of regime itself, which has survived all attempts opposition, but rather the formation of armed to divide it from within.
    [Show full text]
  • War Economy in Syria Study
    War Economy in Syria Study 1 War Economy in Syria Study 1 War Economy in Syria Study .................................................................................................................. ............................ .......... ......................................... ............................ .................................................................................................................... ........................................ ................................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................ ....... ............................................................................................................. .................................................. .................................................................................................... .......................................................................................... ...................... ...................................................................... .............................................................................................. .....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • When Maqam Is Reduced to a Place Eyal Sagui Bizawe
    When Maqam is Reduced to a Place Eyal Sagui Bizawe In March 1932, a large-scale impressive festival took place at the National Academy of Music in Cairo: the first international Congress of Arab Music, convened by King Fuad I. The reason for holding it was the King’s love of music, and its aim was to present and record various musical traditions from North Africa and the Middle East, to study and research them. Musical delegations from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia and Turkey entered the splendid building on Malika Nazli Street (today Ramses Street) in central Cairo and in between the many performances experts discussed various subjects, such as musical scales, the history of Arab music and its position in relation to Western music and, of course: the maqam (pl. maqamat), the Arab melodic mode. The congress would eventually be remembered, for good reason, as one of the constitutive events in the history of modern Arab music. The Arab world had been experiencing a cultural revival since the 19th century, brought about by reforms introduced under the Ottoman rule and through encounters with Western ideas and technologies. This renaissance, termed Al-Nahda or awakening, was expressed primarily in the renewal of the Arabic language and the incorporation of modern terminology. Newspapers were established—Al-Waq’i’a al-Masriya (Egyptian Affairs), founded under orders of Viceroy and Pasha Mohammad Ali in 1828, followed by Al-Ahram (The Pyramids), first published in 1875 and still in circulation today; theaters were founded and plays written in Arabic; neo-classical and new Arab poetry was written, which deviated from the strict rules of classical poetry; and new literary genres emerged, such as novels and short stories, uncommon in Arab literature until that time.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Conflict Summary | 9 - 15 March 2020
    WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 9 - 15 MARCH 2020 WHOLE OF SYRIA SUMMARY • NORTHWEST | Conflict levels in the northwest remained low the week following a Russian/Turkish ceasefire agreement on 5 March. Protesters blocked a joint Russian/Turkish patrol on the M4 Highway. In Operation Euphrates Shield areas, attacks increased against Turkish-backed opposition armed groups. In the southeast corner of Aleppo Governorate, four alleged ISIS attacks occurred, the first in the area in over 2 years. • SOUTH & CENTRAL | Following Government of Syria (GoS) re- enforcements arriving to southern Syria, attacks against GoS personnel in Daraa Governorate decreased. For the second time in the month, an explosive device detonated in Damascus. In Homs Northern Countryside, gunmen opened fire against a GoS military officer. • NORTHEAST | In addition to shelling exchanges between SDF forces and Turkish-backed opposition groups around Operation Peace Spring area, ACLED reported increases in explosive attacks and looting activity. Attacks against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) personnel and oil infrastructure along the Euphrates River Valley included a suicide attack, only the third in the preceding 12 months. Israeli airstrikes targeted the Abu Kamal area. Figure 1: Dominant actors’ area of control and influence in Syria as of 15 March 2020. NSOAG stands for Non-state Organized Armed Groups. Also, please see the footnote on page 2. Page 1 of 5 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 9 -15 March 2020 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 Conflict levels in northwest Syria decreased in the week following the implementation of a Turkish/Russian ceasefire agreement reached on 5 March. ACLED data recorded no GoS/Russian airstrikes in the northwest this week, and just 13 GoS shelling bombardments on eight locations.2 Hayyat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-dominated opposition shelled two GoS locations; Qardaha town in Latakia Governorate and the Russian operated Hmeimim Airbase.
    [Show full text]
  • Was the Syria Chemical Weapons Probe “
    Was the Syria Chemical Weapons Probe “Torpedoed” by the West? By Adam Larson Region: Middle East & North Africa Global Research, May 02, 2013 Theme: US NATO War Agenda In-depth Report: SYRIA Since the perplexing conflict in Syria first broke out two years ago, the Western powers’ assistance to the anti-government side has been consistent, but relatively indirect. The Americans and Europeans lay the mental, legal, diplomatic, and financial groundwork for regime change in Syria. Meanwhile, Arab/Muslim allies in Turkey and the Persian Gulf are left with the heavy lifting of directly supporting Syrian rebels, and getting weapons and supplementary fighters in place. The involvement of the United States in particular has been extremely lackluster, at least in comparison to its aggressive stance on a similar crisis in Libya not long ago. Hopes of securing major American and allied force, preferrably a Libya-style “no-fly zone,” always leaned most on U.S. president Obama’s announcement of December 3, 2012, that any use of chemical weapons (CW) by the Assad regime – or perhaps their simple transfer – will cross a “red line.” And that, he implied, would trigger direct U.S. intervention. This was followed by vague allegations by the Syrian opposition – on December 6, 8, and 23 – of government CW attacks. [1] Nothing changed, and the allegations stopped for a while. However, as the war entered its third year in mid-March, 2013, a slew of new allegations came flying in. This started with a March 19 attack on Khan Al-Assal, a contested western district of Aleppo, killing a reported 25-31 people.
    [Show full text]
  • PRISM Syrian Supplemental
    PRISM syria A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.
    [Show full text]
  • The Islamic Front by Aaron Y
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2177 Rebels Consolidating Strength in Syria: The Islamic Front by Aaron Y. Zelin Dec 3, 2013 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Aaron Y. Zelin Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy where his research focuses on Sunni Arab jihadi groups in North Africa and Syria as well as the trend of foreign fighting and online jihadism. Brief Analysis The latest umbrella organization for key rebel factions in Syria may not include U.S.-designated terrorist groups, but it does oppose many U.S. objectives. he recent merger of several Syrian rebel groups into the Islamic Front (IF) is one of the war's most important T developments. Although the political and military opposition has long been fragmented, the new umbrella organization brings seven groups and their combined force of 45,000-60,000 fighters under one command. It also links the fight in the north and the south. Most notably, though, it affirms the troubles Washington will have setting policy in Syria going forward. WHO ARE THEY? F ormally announced on November 22, the IF includes groups from three prior umbrella organizations: the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), and the Kurdish Islamic Front (KIF). From the SIF, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya (HASI), Kataib Ansar al-Sham, and Liwa al-Haqq joined, as did the KIF as a whole and former SILF brigades Suqur al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, and Jaish al-Islam. None of these groups has been designated by the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Beyond
    THE JIHADI THREAT ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND The Jihadi Threat ISIS, al- Qaeda, and Beyond Robin Wright William McCants United States Institute of Peace Brookings Institution Woodrow Wilson Center Garrett Nada J. M. Berger United States Institute of Peace International Centre for Counter- Terrorism Jacob Olidort The Hague Washington Institute for Near East Policy William Braniff Alexander Thurston START Consortium, University of Mary land Georgetown University Cole Bunzel Clinton Watts Prince ton University Foreign Policy Research Institute Daniel Byman Frederic Wehrey Brookings Institution and Georgetown University Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Jennifer Cafarella Craig Whiteside Institute for the Study of War Naval War College Harleen Gambhir Graeme Wood Institute for the Study of War Yale University Daveed Gartenstein- Ross Aaron Y. Zelin Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Washington Institute for Near East Policy Hassan Hassan Katherine Zimmerman Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy American Enterprise Institute Charles Lister Middle East Institute Making Peace Possible December 2016/January 2017 CONTENTS Source: Image by Peter Hermes Furian, www . iStockphoto. com. The West failed to predict the emergence of al- Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate— and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strate- gies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analy sis and diverse views.
    [Show full text]