Oil in Syria Between Terrorism and Dictatorship

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Article Oil in Syria between Terrorism and Dictatorship

Hussein Almohamad * and Andreas Dittmann

Department of Geography, Justus Liebig University of Giessen, Giessen 35390, Germany; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +49-641-993-6290

Academic Editor: Martin J. Bull Received: 14 January 2016; Accepted: 9 May 2016; Published: 17 May 2016

Abstract: The sale of oil and gas is one of the most important components of the Syrian economy. Unfortunately, since the discovery of these resources, the Syrian people have not benefited from the revenues earned. This study deals with the development of oil and gas production and the geographical distribution of fields, as well as production control, deterioration of production, refining and selling mechanisms, and the resulting health and environmental impacts following Islamic State’s (IS) control of the majority of oilfields in Syria. Since summer 2015, IS controls 80% of the fields with a production of 65,000 barrels per day (b/d); the Assad regime controls 8% of fields with 10,000 b/d; and Kurdish forces dominate the remaining 12% with 25,000 b/d. IS depends on oil as a major source of financing for its military and civilian activities, and has also managed to set up an extensive network of middlemen in neighbouring territories and countries, with the aim of trading crude oil for cash and other resources. IS produces and exports within its areas of control and sells part of the oil to the Assad regime, and another portion to the liberated areas, as well as to Iraq and Turkey.

Keywords: Syria; oil-selling; Islamic State; Kurdish forces; Assad regime

1. Introduction Although not a large oil producer or exporter on the world market, Syria produced pre-war approximately 400,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil from its oilfields in the eastern part of the country, near the Iraqi border, while exporting approximately 150,000 b/d of crude oil, virtually all over Europe [1]. Estimated net crude oil exports were 109,000 bbl/d in 2010, the vast majority of which went to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s European countries. Germany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands received over 80% of Syria’s crude oil exports. According to the European Commission, European Union (EU) countries imported 1.35% of their petroleum from Syria in 2010 (Figure1). Although exports from Syria represented a small share of the EU’s overall oil needs, these exports accounted for 30% (or $4.1 billion) of Syrian government revenues in 2010 [2]. However, most of this production has not been exploited to the benefit of the Syrian people. Since its discovery in 1968 until 2001, the retail value of oil was not included in the general budget, and billions of dollars disappeared under the pretext of military build-up against Israel [3]. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, oil and gas production declined because of massive economic sanctions and conflicts in the country. At present, the oil and gas fields are divided between the players of the Syrian conflict. The Syrian government, Kurdish forces, and Islamic State (IS) all control portions of the fields and are locked in conflict with each other. All of these factions have been using oil to serve their own agendas and ambitions, far removed from the will of the common people. While Assad’s government uses it as a “weapon” to kill opposing Syrians, namely as fuel for military equipment, in addition to civilian purposes, IS uses it to finance its terrorist operations and the foundation of their state. Kurdish forces use oil to establish their authority and military operations. Thus, oil is not used in favour of the Syrian people; on the contrary, it is used against their interests.

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20; doi:10.3390/socsci5020020 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 2 of 16

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 2 of 16 operations and the foundation of their state. Kurdish forces use oil to establish their authority and military operations. Thus, oil is not used in favour of the Syrian people; on the contrary, it is used Theagainst opposition their interests. groups The (rebels) opposition do not havegroups any (rebels) oil resources, do not thoughhave any they oil buyresources, it from though the Islamic they State buy andit from the the Assad Islamic regime, State for and both the military Assad regime, and civilian for both purposes. military and civilian purposes.

Figure 1. Syria crude oil exports by destination, 2010 [[2]2]..

IS controls a variety of public resources and infrastructure in parts of Iraq and Syria, enabling it IS controls a variety of public resources and infrastructure in parts of Iraq and Syria, enabling it to to assemble a “diverse financial portfolio” [1]. Unfortunately, most of the oilfields in Syria at present assemble a “diverse financial portfolio” [1]. Unfortunately, most of the oilfields in Syria at present are are under IS control. Senior US officials have described IS as one of the best-funded terrorist under IS control. Senior US officials have described IS as one of the best-funded terrorist organizations, organizations, financed in different ways: financed in different ways:  Selling of crude oil and oil products to the Assad regime, rebels, and the world market ‚ Sellingthrough of Turkey crude; oil and oil products to the Assad regime, rebels, and the world market  throughDonations Turkey; from financially strong individuals, mainly from countries in the Arabian Peninsula; ‚ DonationsBank looting from and financially extortion; strong individuals, mainly from countries in the Arabian Peninsula; ‚ BankRansom looting money and from extortion; the kidnapping of journalists and other people from Western countries; ‚ RansomReturns from money the from sale theof abducted kidnapping women of journalists and girls and; other people from Western countries; ‚ ReturnsTrade in fromstolen the cultural sale of goods abducted. women and girls; ‚ Trade in stolen cultural goods. The revenue from the sale of crude oil continues to be its major source of income, although the coalitionThe conducted revenue from airstrikes the sale in ofSyria, crude targeting oil continues oil refineries to be itsunder major the sourcecontrol of of income, IS militants. although This thepaper coalition thus aims conducted to study airstrikesthe trends in of Syria, oil and targeting gas production, oil refineries the geographical under the control distribution of IS militants.of Syrian Thisoilfields paper and thus their aims control to study by the the active trends forces of oil andin the gas sector, production, in addition the geographical to examining distribution the refining, of selling and smuggling mechanisms, especially by the IS, and the health and environmental impacts Syrian oilfields and their control by the active forces in the sector, in addition to examining the refining, sellingfrom the and extraction, smuggling refining mechanisms, and transportation especially by of theoil. IS, and the health and environmental impacts This study was conducted using data available from journals and the internet, including from the extraction, refining and transportation of oil. websites,This studysocial wasnetworks, conducted and usingonline data video available-sharing from platforms. journals This and inform the internet,ation was including later extended websites, through field visits to some of the points of sale and areas of smuggling, and interviews with social networks, and online video-sharing platforms. This information was later extended through fieldacademicians, visits to some oil smugglers, of the points sellers of sale and and brokers, areas of smuggling,including sympathizers and interviews and with sometimes academicians, even assumed IS members. All the interviews were collected in 2014 and 2015. oil smugglers, sellers and brokers, including sympathizers and sometimes even assumed IS members. All the interviews were collected in 2014 and 2015.

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Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 3 of 16 2. History of Oil and Gas Exploration—The Distribution of Oil and Gas Fields 2. History of Oil and Gas Exploration—The Distribution of Oil and Gas Fields Syria, located in the northern part of the Arabian plate, has oil reserves of 2.5 thousand million barrelsSyria, (tmb), located which correspondsin the northern to part 0.15% of ofthe world Arabian reserves. plate, has In addition, oil reserves the of country 2.5 thousand had 10.6 million trillion cubicbarrels feet (tmb), (TCF) which of natural corresponds gas in 2014, to 0.15% corresponding of world reserves. to 0.15% In addition, of the total the world country reserves had 10.6 [4 ].trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas in 2014, corresponding to 0.15% of the total world reserves [4]. Syrian oil exploration first began in 1930 during the French mandate by the Iraq Petroleum Syrian oil exploration first began in 1930 during the French mandate by the Iraq Petroleum Company (a consortium of Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Total, and Gulbekian). However, it did not emerge as Company (a consortium of Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Total, and Gulbekian). However, it did not emerge as an oil producer until May 1968, when the first barrel of oil arrived at Tartus port. The first petroleum an oil producer until May 1968, when the first barrel of oil arrived at Tartus port. The first petroleum shows have been realized in Jebissa and Ghouna (NE part of Syria) during the late 1930s and ‘40s by shows have been realized in Jebissa and Ghouna (NE part of Syria) during the late 1930s and ‘40s by thethe Iraq Iraq Petroleum Petroleum Company Company (IPC) (IPC) in in association association withwith the state state-owned-owned petroleum petroleum company company (later (later to to bebe known known asSyrian asSyrian Petroleum Petroleum Company Company SPC). SPC). It It relinquished relinquished itsits concessionconcession inin 1951 and never never made made a commerciala commercial discovery. discovery. The The first first major major discovery, discovery, the the Karatchok Karatchok fieldfield near the the border border with with Iraq Iraq and and TurkeyTurkey (Figure (Figure2), 2) was, was made made in in 1956 1956 by by the the independent independent US-basedUS-based Menhall Company, Company, followe followedd by by thethe discovery discovery of of the the Suwaidiyah Suwaidiyah field field in in 19591959 byby thethe German company company Concordia. Concordia. Subsequently, Subsequently, the the discoverydiscovery of the of Rumailan the Rumailan field by field the Syrianby the Petroleum Syrian Petroleum Company Company was followed was by followed the nationalization by the of allnationalization oil operations of inall 1962oil operations [5]. in 1962 [5].

FigureFigure 2. 2.Geographical Geographical distribution distribution ofof oiloil andand naturalnatural g gasas d deposits,eposits, refineries reﬁneries and and pipelines. pipelines.

InIn 1974, 1974, the Syrianthe Syrian government government began began to award to award production-sharing production-sharing contracts contracts to foreign to operators. foreign In theoperators. mid-1980s, In the signiﬁcant mid-1980s, discoveries significant werediscoveries made inwere the made Euphrates in the Graben, Euphrates which Graben, is located which in is the easternlocated part in ofthe the eastern country. part Figure of the2 country. shows the Figure oil and 2 shows gas ﬁelds the oil in and Syria ga ins fields the late in 1990s.Syria in One the oflate the 1990s. One of the most important oilfields in the Euphrates Graben is the Omar field, which is the

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 4 of 16 most important oilfields in the Euphrates Graben is the Omar field, which is the largest field in the portfolio of Al Furat Petroleum Company (AFPC), and it is located in the northeast of the country, 45 kilometres southeast of Deir ez Zor. The field was discovered in 1987. Originally, the field at its peak produced some 80,000 b/d, but production declined rapidly due to the lack of any pressure support. The Omar field was mismanaged by overproduction in early 1990, thereby damaging the field and Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 4 of 16 leading to a drop in production to 16,000 b/d by 1991. From 1991 onwards, water injection was used at the site,largest and field a plateau in the portfolio production of Al Furat level Petroleum of 60,000–70,000 Company (AFPC), b/d was and reached it is located between in the northeast 1994 and 1997. As of 2008,of the the country, production 45 kilometres rate has southeast declined of Deir to 20,000 ez Zor. b/d The [field6]. Since was discovered 2004, various in 1987. sets Originally, of international sanctionsthe have field at been its peak imposed produced on some the Syrian80,000 b/d, regime but production by the US declined and the rapidly EU, due with to implicationsthe lack of any for the country’spressure extractives support. industries The Omar [7 ]. field was mismanaged by overproduction in early 1990, thereby damaging the field and leading to a drop in production to 16,000 b/d by 1991. From 1991 onwards, Anotherwater injection field in was the Euphratesused at the site, region, and a Thayyem, plateau production was discovered level of 60,000 in 1984.–70,000 The b/d discovery was reached motivated the establishmentbetween 1994 of and the 1997. AFPC. As of Though 2008, the Thayyem production is rate the ha AFPC’ss declined main to 20,000 field, b/d it is[6]. a matureSince 2004 field, and productionvarious levels sets haveof international been declining sanctions since have 1991. been Likeimposed other on AFPCthe Syrian fields, regime Thayyem by the US produces and the a light grade ofEU, oil with with implications low sulfur for content the country’s [7] extractives industries [7]. Other SyrianAnother oilfields field in include the Euphrates Maleh, reg Qahar,ion, Thayyem, Sijan, Azraq, was anddiscovered Tanak. in Jafra 1984. was The discovered discovery in late motivated the establishment of the AFPC. Though Thayyem is the AFPC’s main field, it is a mature 1991 and is located near Deir ez Zor, operated by Total Final. The fields had a production of around field and production levels have been declining since 1991. Like other AFPC fields, Thayyem 60,000 b/dproduces in 2010. a ligh Int grade December of oil with 2011, low Total sulfur announced content [7] it was suspending operations in Syria in line with recentlyOther tightened Syrian oilfields sanctions include by theMaleh, EU Qahar, which Sijan, indirectly Azraq, targetand Tanak. its local Jafra partner,was discovered the Deir in Ez Zor Petroleumlate Corporation1991 and is located [7]. Crudenear Deir oils ez producedZor, operated from by Total oilfields Final. are The transported fields had a production through the of Syrian pipelinearound to the 60,000 two refineries b/d in 2010. in In Homs December and 2011 Banias,, Total in announced addition it to was the suspending Tartus Port, operations for exports in Syria [5 ,8]. Aboutin line 58% with of recently Syrian tightened gas is non-associated, sanctions by the EU while which gas indirectly cap reserves target its and local associated partner, the gas Deir (with oil) Ez Zor Petroleum Corporation [7]. Crude oils produced from oilfields are transported through the respectively account for 26% and 16%. Some two-thirds of the country’s non-associated gas reserves Syrian pipeline to the two refineries in Homs and Banias, in addition to the Tartus Port, for exports [5,8]. are locatedAbout in the 58% Syrian of Syrian Petroleum gas is non Company’s-associated, whi concessionle gas cap reserves area, containing and associated the gas Palmyra (with oil) fields in the centrerespectively of the country. account for The 26% Cherrife and 16%. andSome Ashtwo-thirds Shaer of fields, the country’s also in non central-associated Syria, gas arereserves other large sourcesare of non-associatedlocated in the Syrian gas, Petroleum with more Company’s than 30 concession billion cubic area, meterscontaining (bcm) the Palmyra of reserves. fields Inin the June 1999, a new naturalcentre of gas the field, country. North The Cherrife al-Faydh, and was Ash discovered Shaer fields, byalso SPC. in central The fieldSyria,reportedly are other large has sources a production of non-associated gas, with more than 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of reserves. In June 1999, a new potential of 35 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d). Gas cap reserves are mainly located in the natural gas field, North al-Faydh, was discovered by SPC. The field reportedly has a production northeasternpotential part of of35 Syria,million as cubic are feet the per majority day (Mmcf/d). of the country’sGas cap reserves associated are mainly gas reserves, located in which the can be foundnortheastern in the Deir part ez of Zor Syria, region as are asthe well majority as around of the country’s the Rumailan associated and gas Suwaidiyeh reserves, which fields. can be The gas producedfound had in been the Deir fluctuating ez Zor region between as well 5 and as around 6 bcm/year the Rumailan for a decadeand Suwaidiyeh and increased fields. The to 7.8gas bcm in 2010 [9].produced had been fluctuating between 5 and 6 bcm/year for a decade and increased to 7.8 bcm in 2010 [9]. 3. Trend of Oil Production (1968–2011) 3. Trend of Oil Production (1968–2011) Over the last 50 years, oil has been important as a foreign exchange earner and contributor to the Over the last 50 years, oil has been important as a foreign exchange earner and contributor to budget.the Oil budget. was discovered Oil was discovered in Syria in inSyria the in early the early 1950s, 1950s, but but the the sector sector developed developed slowly slowly (Hasan (Hasan and Dridi, 2008),and Dridi, and sizeable2008), and production sizeable production did not did begin not untilbegin 1968until 1968 (albeit (albeit with with the the relatively relatively small small amount of 21,000amount b/d) (seeof 21,000 also b/d) Figure (see 3also). Figure 3).

FigureFigure 3. Syria’s 3. Syria’s oil production, oil production, based based on on datadata of the the BPBP Statistical Statistical Review Review of World of World Energy Energy [3]. [3].

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The general general long-term long-term trend trend of Syria’s of Syria’s physical physical production production and consumption, and consumption, as perthe as available per the availabledata from data the BPfrom Statistical the BP Statistical Review [4 Review], is depicted [4], is indepicted Figure1 in. However, Figure 1. oilHowever, production oil production increased increasedrapidly in rapidly the following in the following years to peak years at to 200,000 peak at b/d 200,000 in 1976. b/d Oil in production1976. Oil production stabilized stabilized in the range in theof 16,000 range b/dof 16,000 to 185,000 b/d to b/d 185,000 in 1985. b/d Following in 1985. Following stagnation stagnation in production, in production, the sector the was sector reopened was reopenedto foreign to investments foreign investments under production-sharing under production agreements-sharing agreements with the Syrianwith the Petroleum Syrian Petroleum company (SPC).company This (SPC). led to This discoveries led to ofdiscoveries new fields of and new significantly fields and increased significantly oil production, increased oil which production, reached which31,577,000 reached b/d 31 in, 1996577,000 [10 ].b/d in 1996 [10]. However, oil production has been declining since then by 4% annually due to technological problems coupled with depletion of reserves ( (especiallyespecially Jebisseh and Omar Omar);); serving to open up the sector to attract large investments [[7]7];; andand outputoutput levelslevels fallingfalling toto justjust 376,000376,000 b/db/d [[11].11]. This period nevertheless saw a slight boom in production to 622,000622,000 b/db/d in in 2002 2002 [6] [6].. In 2011, Syria’s proven gas reserves were estimated to to be 258 bcm, a level that has remained constant over the past two decades. According According to to BP BP [4], [4], Syria Syria produced produced about about 8 8 bcm bcm of of gas gas in in 2010. 2010. Production rose by 11.6% per year between 1970 and 2010 (see also Figure 44).). DuringDuring the late 2000s, the natural gasgas sectorsector attractedattracted hugehuge investments, investments, and and production production rose rose sharply sharply in in 2010 2010 and and 2011 2011 due due to tothe th start-upe start- ofup two of twomajor major projects projects in central in central Syria: the Syria: Al-Shaer the Al field-Shaer developed field developed by Ebla Gas by Company, Ebla Gas Company,in which Canada’s in which SuncorCanada’s was Suncor the operating was the operating partner; andpartner; the Jiharand the scheme Jihar scheme developed developed by Hayan by HayanPetroleum, Petroleum, operated operated by Croatia’s by Croatia’s INA. These INA. twoThese schemes two schemes helped helped to raise to total raise gas total output gas output to 8 bcm to 8in bcm 2010 in and 2010 to and 8.7 bcmto 8.7 in bcm 2011, in from2011, anfrom average an average of 5.5 of bcm 5.5 inbcm the in previous the previous five years.five years. The gasThe wasgas wasmainly mainly used used for generating for generating electricity, electricity, and feeding and feeding new combined-cyclenew combined-cycle power power stations stations [12]. The[12]. steep The steepdrop overthedrop over lastthe four last years four reflects years reflects the disruptions the disruptions wrought wrought by civil warby civil and internationalwar and international sanctions, sanctions,in addition in to addition depletion. to depletion.

FigureFigure 4.4. Syria’s gas production (198 (1982–2011)2–2011) based based on on data data of of the the BP BP StatisticalStatistical Review Review of of World World Energy Energy [3][3]..

4. Deterioration Deterioration of of Production Production during during the the on on-Going-Going Civil Civil War War (2011 (2011–2015)–2015) Average Syrian oil production from 2006 to 2010 was approximately 400,000 barrels per day (b/d), but but declined declined steadily steadily after after that that period. Military Military conflict conflict combined combined with economic sanctions considerably slowed down average production, which had dropped from 380,000380,000 b/db/d in in March March 2011 2011 to 117,000 b/d in in March March 2013, 2013, a a nearly nearly 70% 70% decline decline from from pre pre-conflict-conflict levels. The latest estimates by USA’s EIAEIA indicateindicate that that Syrian Syrian production production of of crude crude oil oil and and condensates condensates has has fallen fallen to barely to barely 25,000 25,000 b/d, b/d,including including production production outside outside the controlthe control of the of Syrianthe Syrian government, government, whereas whereas the the oil ministeroil minister in the in theSyrian Syrian government government said said that that production production fell fell to to 9837 9837 b/d b/d during during the the first first quarter quarter ofof 20152015 [[13].13]. This is a drop of roughly 97% since the conf conflictlict began in March 2011. According According to to government government officials, officials, the majority majority of Syria’s Syria’s oilfields oilfields are are no no longer longer under under the the control control of of forces forces supporting supporting the the Assad Assad regime. regime. The natural natural gas gas system system has has suffered suffered relatively relatively little little damage damage compared compared to the to oil the sector oil [1 sector]. During [1]. Duringthe course the ofcourse 2012, of the 2012, Syrian the armySyrian recognized army recognized that it hadthat toit prioritizehad to prioritize its resources. its resources. This meant This meant concentrating forces in areas with larger populations in the western part of the country, and protecting its natural gas fields, which are critical for generating electricity [12]. Syria produced 8

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 6 of 16 concentrating forces in areas with larger populations in the western part of the country, and protecting its natural gas fields, which are critical for generating electricity [12]. Syria produced 8 bcm natural gas in 2010. Following the start of the military conflict and international sanctions against Syria, Total suspended operations in the country since December 2011. Production since then dipped to 5.3 bcm in 2012, 4.7 bcm in 2013, and 4.4 bcm in 2014 [4]. It is estimated that production of Syrian natural gas declined by about 45% from 2011 to 2014 (See also Figure5). Soc. Sci.Syria 2016, has 5, 20 two state-owned refineries in Homs and Banias. According to the Oil & Gas Journal6 [of14 16], the combined nameplate capacity of the two refineries at the beginning of 2015 was slightly less than bcm240,000 natural b/d, gas a total in 2010. capacity Following that metthe start only of three-fourths the military conflict of Syria’s and pre-conflict international demand sanctions for against refined Syria,products. Total With suspended damage operations to pipelines in the and country other infrastructuresince December around 2011. Production the refineries, since particularly then dipped in toHoms, 5.3 bcm Syrian in 2012, officials 4.7 bcm claimed in 2013, that and the country’s4.4 bcm in actual 2014 [4]. refining It is estimated capacity nowthat production is closer to 50%of Syrian of its naturalpre-war gas nameplate declined capacity by about [15 45%,16]. from 2011 to 2014 (See also Figure 5).

Figure 5. Syria’sSyria’s oiloil and and gas gas production production (2012–2015) (2012–2015) based based on dataon data of the of BPthe Statistical BP Statistical Review Review of World of WorldEnergy Energy [4] and [4] U.S. and Energy U.S. Energy Information Information administration administration (EIA) [ 16(EIA)]. [16].

5. GeographicalSyria has two Distribution state-owned of refineries the Control in Homs of Syrian and OilBanias. and According Gas Fields to by the Forces Oil & Gas Journal [14], the combined nameplate capacity of the two refineries at the beginning of 2015 was slightly less than 240,000The status b/d, of a thetotal oilfields capacity in that east met and only northeast three- Syriafourths has ofbeen Syria’s in pre a state-conflict of flux demand since the for summer refined products.of 2012. The With situation damage is complicatedto pipelines by and the other existence infrastructure of several organizedaround the military refineries, forces part inicularly the region: in Homs,the Syrian Syrian Army, officials the Syriaclaimed Free that Army, the country’s IS, the Alnusra actual refining Front, and capacity Kurdish now forces, is closer as wellto 50% as otherof its pregroups-war fighting nameplate the capacity Syrian government. [15,16]. By the end of 2014, Syrian oil and gas fields were controlled by three forces: IS, Kurdish forces, and the government (see also Figure6). 5. GeographicalIS gained control Distribution of the majorityof the Control of oilfields of Syrian as well Oil asand several Gas Fields gas fields by Forces in Syria. According to a map issued by the Ministry of Communications, Transport, and Industry in the Syrian Interim Government,The status Transport of the oilfields Department in east GIS and Office northeast in 2015 Syria [17 has], IS been controls in a 80%state ofof theflux oil since and the gas summer fields in ofthe 2012. country, The Kurdish situation forces is complicated dominate 12%, by the and existence the Syrian of regime several retains organized control military over only forces about in the 8% region:after more the thanSyrian four Army, years the of ongoingSyria Free civil Army, war IS, in Syria.the Alnusra Front, and Kurdish forces, as well as other groups fighting the Syrian government. By the end of 2014, Syrian oil and gas fields were controlled by three forces: IS, Kurdish forces, and the government (see also Figure 6). IS gained control of the majority of oilfields as well as several gas fields in Syria. According to a map issued by the Ministry of Communications, Transport, and Industry in the Syrian Interim Government, Transport Department GIS Office in 2015 [17], IS controls 80% of the oil and gas fields in the country, Kurdish forces dominate 12%, and the Syrian regime retains control over only about 8% after more than four years of ongoing civil war in Syria.

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FigureFigure 6. 6.GeographicalGeographical distribution distribution of of the the control control of of Syrian Syrian oil oil and and gas gas fields ﬁelds by by forces forces and and illegal illegal export export..

5.1.5.1. Oil Oil and and Gas Gas under under the the Control Control of of IS IS

ISIS controls controls the the main main oilfields oilfields in in Deir Deir ez ez Zor Zor province, province, such such as as Ward, Ward, Tank, Tank, Taim, Taim, Jafra, Jafra, and and Omar, Omar, whichwhich is is one one of of the the biggest fields fields with thethe bestbest qualityquality ofof extractedextracted oil oil in in Syria Syria [ 3[3,,1818].]. In In the the province province of ofHasaka, Hasaka, IS controlsIS controls the oilfieldsthe oilfields in southern in southern Hasaka Hasaka such as such Margada, as Margada, Al Jubaissah, Al Jubaissah, Gouna Tishreen, Gouna Tishreen,and Al Hol. and InAl Raqqa Hol. In province, Raqqa province, the militants the militants control control all the smallall the oilfields small oilfields found infound the area.in the IS area. also ISrecently also recently seized seized control control of a number of a number of oil of and oil and gas gas fields fields in central in central Syria Syria (Homs (Homs province), province), such such as asArak Arak Shahr, Shahr, Sokhna, Sokhna, and and Aldzl. Aldzl. In addition In addition to these to these fields, fields, the group the group also wrested also wrested control control of Kuniko of Kunikogas plant gas (20 plant km (20 east km of theeast city of the of Deircity of ez Deir Zor), ez Al Zor), Kharrata Al Kharrata oil station oil station (20 km (20 southwest km southwest of Deir of ez DeirZor), ez Derro Zor), oilDerro station oil station (40 km (40 northwest km northwest of Deir of ez Deir Zor), ez andZor), the and stations the stations T1 and T1 T2, and which T2, which lie along lie alongthe Iraqi the Iraqi oil line oil inline Syria in Syria [19]. [ Most19]. Most of these of these oilfields oilfields were were previously previously assets assets inthe in the portfolio portfolio of theof theAl-Furat Al-Furat Petroleum Petroleum Company, Company, a Royal a Royal Dutch Dutch Shell Shell affiliate affiliate (Table (Table1). The 1). crudeThe crude oil produced oil produced in these in theseoilfields oilfields is still is of still fairly of fairly good good quality quality because because of low of sulfur low sul concentration,fur concentration, which which makes makes it very it easy very to easyprocess to process [20]. [20].

Table 1. Oil production (b/d) under control of IS in summer 2015 [3,18,21–23].

Province Field Production (b/d) Deir ez Zor Omar 15,000 Tank 7000 Jafra 3000 Al Kharrata 1000

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Table 1. Oil production (b/d) under control of IS in summer 2015 [3,18,21–23].

Province Field Production (b/d) Deir ez Zor Omar 15,000 Tank 7000 Jafra 3000 Al Kharrata 1000 Derro 500 Ward, Ahmer, Akash, and Ratka 7000 Atallah 500 Tayyani, Maleh, Sijan, and Azraq 12,000 Thayyem 700 Other ﬁelds 1000 Hasaka Margada 3000 Al Jubaissah 3500 Gouna 1000 Tishreen 2000 Raqq Wahab, Habbari, Deilla, and Fadeh 2000 Homs Jazal–Heil 2500 61,700

In fact, IS presently controls about one-third of Syria and 80% of the oil and gas fields in the country. Before the conflict in 2011, the oilfields now controlled by IS were producing about 250,000 b/d (65% of Syria’s oil production). Recognizing the importance of energy assets as a reliable and sustainable revenue source, IS seeks to operate local oil infrastructure, underlining its desire to capture and utilize existing assets and expertise rather than destroy them. At present, there is no reliable data regarding oil production in IS-held areas. According to estimates, the total output of Syrian oilfields under IS control is between 50,000 b/d and 150,000 b/d. The Syrian government [18] estimated total oil production to be about 50,000 b/d in mid-2014, Butter [12] estimated that IS-controlled oilfields have the capacity to produce some 60,000 b/d, while Lister [24] approximated a production of 70,000 b/d, and Hammadeh and Albkri [3] put it at 90,000 b/d. According to Foreign Policy magazine [25], before the onset of US airstrikes in summer 2014, IS was estimated to be producing more than 80,000 b/d and selling it in the black market for about $1 million to $3 million per day. Based on data collected from activists in IS-held areas, oil production fell from 250,000 b/d in 2011 to some 62,000 b/d after the start of conflict. This is about 25% of production in comparison to the pre-conflict output of these fields in 2011. However, IS cannot effectively manage these assets due to lack of resources and technical capacities [20]. At the same time, it should be remembered that international companies have ceased work in Syria [3,20], and some oil and gas wells lie close to frontlines between the IS and Assad government or between the IS and Kurds. In addition, US airstrikes have targeted oil facilities in Syria because of their importance to IS financing. It has been estimated that US airstrikes destroyed about 50% of IS’s refining capacity by early October 2014 [20]. IS produced about 62,000 b/d of oil in 2015. It produced about 40,000 b/d from mature fields in Deir ez Zor in the Euphrates valley that had been earlier developed by the Syrian government in the 1980s and 1990s [7]. Other producers included Total (19,000 b/d), which operated in the fields in Margada, Al Jubaissah, Gouna, and Tishreen in Hasakeh province. The remainder produced about 3000 b/d from some oilfields in Raqqa and Homs provinces [3,7] (see also Table1 and Figure6). However, in spring 2016, the products of oil probably fell by half (30,000 b/d) because of Russian, American and Kurdish attacks. IS depends on pre-existing equipment to extract oil from the fields controlled by it and relies on primitive methods for refining the extracts. IS uses the incineration method, whereby crude oil is extracted from wells without freeing it from water and gas. It is then transferred to dirt digs for workers to wait for water to settle down at the bottom and gas to evaporate from the surface [22]. The oil is then placed in reservoirs, where it is burned directly in order to derive diesel, gas, and gasoline (see also Figure7). Workers can differentiate these items by changes in colour Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 9 of 16 and smell. Also, local investors bring in Chinese- and Turkish-made makeshift refineries via Turkey, some of which process 500–1000 b/d [18,19,22,23]. Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 9 of 16

Figure 7. The primitive metal kilns to refine crude oil from Manbij (province Aleppo) into a pit where Figure 7. The primitive metal kilns to refine crude oil from Manbij (province Aleppo) into a pit where it will be distilled. it will be distilled. When the international coalition began its operations against IS, though it targeted refineries in outfitWhen-controlled the international areas, it generally coalition avo beganided strikes its operations on oil wells against because IS, though of theit potential targeted impact refineries on incivilians outfit-controlled and also because areas, it it generally seeks to avoided preserve strikes key oil on infrastructure oil wells because for the of the post potential-conflict impactperiod, oncausing civilians IS to and resort also to becauseselling unrefined it seeks to crude preserve oil. For key this oil reason, infrastructure the citizens forthe were post-conflict forced to establish period, causingincinerators IS to resortand primitive to selling refineries.unrefined crude OMORAN oil. For [26] this estimate reason, thes that citizens there were are forced more to than establish 3500 incineratorsprimitive refineries and primitive in areas refineries. held by IS OMORAN and rebels. [26 ] estimates that there are more than 3500 primitive refineries in areas held by IS and rebels. The Sale of Oil and Gas and Smuggling by IS The Sale of Oil and Gas and Smuggling by IS Operating in large swathes of territory in eastern Syria and western and northern Iraq allows the ISOperating to control in numerous large swathes oilfields of territory from which in eastern it continues Syria and to western extract andoil for northern its own Iraq use, allows its own the ISrefining, to control and numerous for onward oilfields sale to fromor swap which in local it continues and regional to extract markets oil for [27]. its One own of use, the itsbiggest own refining,streams andof revenue for onward for the sale outfit to or swapis the in illegal local sale and regionalof oil obtained markets from [27]. the One oilfields of the biggest controlled streams by the of revenueorganization for the in outfitboth Syria is the and illegal Iraq. sale However, of oil obtained selling from oil is the technically oilfields controlled difficult for by the IS organization because it inlacks both traditional Syria and export Iraq. However, facilities sellingor access oil isto technicallythe open mark difficultet [1]. for As the a ISresult, because IS sells it lacks oil traditionalat a much exportlower price facilities than or prevailing access to global the open rates. market It has [1 been]. As reported a result, ISthat sells IS oil oil might at a much have lower been priceselling than for prevailingas little as $16 global per rates.barrel It at has a time been when reported Brent, that a world IS oil price might reference have been for selling crude foroil, aswas little selling as $16 at per$65 barrelper barrel. at a time The whenfall in Brent, world a oil world prices price is referencelikely to have for crude further oil, reduced was selling the atnet $65 price per barrel.received The by fall IS inleaders world for oil the prices oil they is likely sell. to have further reduced the net price received by IS leaders for the oil they sell.Gas, unlike oil, requires sophisticated equipment and special pipelines to be transferred. Most of Syria’sGas, unlikegas infrastruct oil, requiresure sophisticatedis oriented to equipmentdelivering andgas specialwestward, pipelines where to most be transferred. of the specialized Most of Syria’sprocessing gas and infrastructure electricity generation is oriented plants to delivering lie in areas gas under westward, the control where of mostpro-Assad of the forces specialized [28]. processingIS mostly and benefits electricity from generation using the plants crude lie oil in and areas oil under products the controlit controls of pro-Assad or by earning forces revenues [28]. by sellingIS mostly these benefits resources from to usinglocal customers. the crude oilIS tends and oil to products sell oil to it some controls traders or by in earning the eastern revenues parts byof Syria. selling Whoever these resources declares to loyalty local customers. to the militant IS tends grou top gets sell oilan toadvantage some traders for purchase. in the eastern In order parts to ofwin Syria. the loyalty Whoever of certain declares tribes, loyalty IS tohas the offered militant the group resources gets of an some advantage small foroil purchase.wells to them. In order The toorganization win the loyalty also produces of certain oil tribes, derivatives IS has offered that are the needed resources for ofself some-use, smallsuch as oil fuel wells for to its them. military The organizationand civilian vehicles, also produces municipal oil derivatives garages, thatsanitation, are needed agriculture, for self-use, Islamic such police as fuel vehicles for its militaryand mobile and civilianSharia’a vehicles, courts. The municipal production garages, of such sanitation, derivatives agriculture, is done in Islamic on-field police refineries. vehicles According and mobile toSharia’a sources courts.[21,22], The45% production of the refined of such fuel derivatives is used by isIS done vehicles in on-field and tanks. refineries. The remaining According portion to sources of [IS’s21,22 oil], revenue comes from sales via middlemen and smugglers, who trade and transport the illicit petroleum and petrol products for onward sale or swap in local and regional markets. In oilfields in eastern and northeastern Syria, trucks (Figure 8) line up daily to load cheap crude sold by IS militants Therefore, IS markets its produce within its own areas of control as well as sells part of the oil to the liberated areas, the Assad regime, and Kurdish-dominated areas in Syria and Iraq. In addition,

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 10 of 16

45% of the reﬁned fuel is used by IS vehicles and tanks. The remaining portion of IS’s oil revenue comes from sales via middlemen and smugglers, who trade and transport the illicit petroleum and petrol products for onward sale or swap in local and regional markets. In oilﬁelds in eastern and northeastern Syria, trucks (Figure8) line up daily to load cheap crude sold by IS militants Therefore, ISSoc. markets Sci. 2016, 5 its, 20 produce within its own areas of control as well as sells part of the oil to the liberated10 of 16 areas, the Assad regime, and Kurdish-dominated areas in Syria and Iraq. In addition, another portion isanother smuggled portion to Turkeyis smuggled and Iranto Turkey and then and toIran the and world then market.to the world Recent market. reports Recent suggest reports that suggest about 30,000that about b/d 30,000 of Iraqi b/d and of SyriaIraqi and oil were Syria being oil were smuggled being smuggled in the middle in the of middle 2014. Since of 2014. October Since 2014, October the governments2014, the governments of Turkey o andf Turkey Iraq’s and Kurdistan Iraq’s Kurdistan Region have Region also have reportedly also reportedly cracked cracked down on down the IS’s on crudethe IS’s oil crude racket oil [22 racket,23]. [22,23].

Figure 8. Tanker trucks for transport to fuel stations and customers. Figure 8. Tanker trucks for transport to fuel stations and customers.

The IS controls one processing plant located south of Deir ez Zor known as “Conoco”, named The IS controls one processing plant located south of Deir ez Zor known as “Conoco”, named after after the American company that built it. The plant is said to be still functioning despite US air strikes the American company that built it. The plant is said to be still functioning despite US air strikes in its in its vicinity since September 2014, albeit at a significantly reduced level due to damage and lack of vicinity since September 2014, albeit at a significantly reduced level due to damage and lack of routine routine operational maintenance. IS is believed to use the plant to extract liquefied petroleum gas operational maintenance. IS is believed to use the plant to extract liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from (LPG) from the propane/butane cut of natural gas in order to supply cooking gas canisters for the propane/butane cut of natural gas in order to supply cooking gas canisters for household purposes household purposes in areas under its control. However, the main production of the plant is dry gas, in areas under its control. However, the main production of the plant is dry gas, which was used to which was used to fuel the regime-controlled Jandar power station south of Homs, and the supply of fuel the regime-controlled Jandar power station south of Homs, and the supply of dry gas appears to dry gas appears to continue at least for now. continue at least for now. IS continues to supply gas from the eastern fields to regime power plants either for money or in IS continues to supply gas from the eastern fields to regime power plants either for money or in exchange for electricity. This sort of deal has allowed uninterrupted operation of the Euphrates dam exchange for electricity. This sort of deal has allowed uninterrupted operation of the Euphrates dam near Raqqa that is held by IS but maintained with technical assistance from the regime [29]. near Raqqa that is held by IS but maintained with technical assistance from the regime [29]. Gas, unlike oil, requires sophisticated equipment and special pipelines to be transferred. Most Gas, unlike oil, requires sophisticated equipment and special pipelines to be transferred. Most of of the country’s gas infrastructure is oriented towards delivering gas westward, where most of the the country’s gas infrastructure is oriented towards delivering gas westward, where most of the specialized processing and electricity generation plants are controlled by the Assad regime. Well over specialized processing and electricity generation plants are controlled by the Assad regime. Well over two months before capturing Palmyra, the IS captured the nearby gas fields at Hail—the largest in two months before capturing Palmyra, the IS captured the nearby gas fields at Hail—the largest in the Palmyra area—and Arak on 1 March 2015, triggering power cuts in Damascus. Arak, which came the Palmyra area—and Arak on 1 March 2015, triggering power cuts in Damascus. Arak, which came online in 1995, also contains a gathering plant that links the main gas flow from the Palmyra area to online in 1995, also contains a gathering plant that links the main gas flow from the Palmyra area to a central station in Homs, which in turn is connected to Banias on the Mediterranean coast. Regime a central station in Homs, which in turn is connected to Banias on the Mediterranean coast. Regime forces have subsequently regained these fields, but IS took conclusive control of them on 21 May, forces have subsequently regained these fields, but IS took conclusive control of them on 21 May, along along with the T3 pumping station to the east of Palmyra, which used to carry oil from Iraq en route with the T3 pumping station to the east of Palmyra, which used to carry oil from Iraq en route to the to the export terminal at Tartous on the Syrian coast [30]. export terminal at Tartous on the Syrian coast [30]. The following are the main groups and countries that sell IS oil and gas: The following are the main groups and countries that sell IS oil and gas: Assad regime: The Assad regime and IS, despite fighting each other, still exchange services and Assad regime: The Assad regime and IS, despite fighting each other, still exchange services and indulge in bargains. In a manner of speaking, the Assad regime is a business partner of IS, and this indulge in bargains. In a manner of speaking, the Assad regime is a business partner of IS, and this makes sense in terms of making more money. The organization cuts deals with local traders, buyers, and even businessmen who support the Assad regime, and some of its oil finds its way back to government buyers through a series of middlemen [31]. Crude oil, gasoline, and gas are smuggled into areas controlled by the Syrian government. Crude oil heads to the Homs refinery, gas to power plants, and gasoline directly reaches consumers in government-dominated areas through traders. The Assad regime currently import from IS almost all of the crude oil and oil derivatives, accounting for approximately 10,000–12,000 b/d [13]. IS has continued the practice of guarding some pipelines transporting crude pumped by Kurds in their

Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 11 of 16 makes sense in terms of making more money. The organization cuts deals with local traders, buyers, and even businessmen who support the Assad regime, and some of its oil finds its way back to government buyers through a series of middlemen [31]. Crude oil, gasoline, and gas are smuggled into areas controlled by the Syrian government. Crude oil heads to the Homs refinery, gas to power plants, and gasoline directly reaches consumers in government-dominated areas through traders. The Assad regime currently import from IS almost all of the crude oil and oil derivatives, accounting for approximately 10,000–12,000 b/d [13]. IS has continued the practice of guarding some pipelines transporting crude pumped by Kurds in their fields in northeast Syria to a government-run refinery in Homs in exchange for protection money and premium gasoline. However, diesel is not smuggled directly to consumers because it sells for the cheapest price in Syrian government areas. A litre of gasoline from the locally refined crude sells for around $0.50, a third of the price of good-quality gasoline sold in government-held areas. The Telegraph [32] published a detailed report on a gas facility jointly run by the regime and IS that supplies government-held areas. IS continues to supply gas from the eastern fields to the regime’s power plants in return for money or electricity. For example, Mr Haswani’s company, HESCO, operates a gas plant in Tabqa, a town in central Syria that was captured by IS August 2014. Officials believe this installation was being run jointly by IS and personnel from the regime. IS continues to supply the regime with gas to run electric power stations, including the Jandar power station in Homs which is supplied with gas from the Kuniko gas field in exchange for a monthly sum paid through intermediaries [8]. This is the sort of deal that has allowed the uninterrupted operation of the Euphrates dam near Raqqa that is held by the IS but maintained with technical assistance from the regime. Rebel areas: The rebel areas do not contain any oil wells. Moreover, the Syrian regime did not allow the delivery of petroleum products to the population in these areas. Only small amounts of very highly priced diesel and gasoline reach these people via mediators such as traders and warlords, leading to an acute fuel crisis. As a result, the population has only oil derivatives coming from IS. The only way to transport crude oil and its derivatives to consumers in rebel areas is through tankers or large cargo vehicles. These vehicles carry oil to the rebel areas and sell the fuel to oil brokers and traders for cash payments. This fuel is then sold to wholesalers and retailers in oil-trading hubs across several towns in rebel-held parts of northwestern and eastern Syria. Prices for diesel range from $80 to $90 per barrel, and gasoline sells for $120 to $130 per barrel, nearly three times the price of crude oil. The rebel areas currently consume almost all of the oil derivatives, accounting for approximately 6000–8000 b/d [21]. Turkey: Diesel smuggling is a thriving sector in Turkey, and truck drivers have been involved in the racket for a long time. The smuggled diesel is mainly used as fuel for trucks or for heating. However, gasoline is not smuggled because it is of poor quality. This phenomenon has escalated with the deterioration of the political situations in Iraq and Syria. The price of a litre of diesel coming from Syria is about $0.50 to $0.70. The price of diesel fuel in Turkey is about $2.70, and so there are huge profits in oil smuggling [3]. The trucks transport the diesel from primitive refineries to border areas with Turkey that are controlled by IS, Kurds, and rebels. During field trips by the authors to the Syrian-Turkish border in February 2014, it was revealed that smuggling occurs in two ways. In the first of these, diesel is filled in plastic cans (capacity of 30 litres each), which are then transferred to the Turkish side of the border by workers, or loaded on horses or mules Alternatively, diesel is carried across rivers on rafts or pumped through underground pipes, before the fuel finds its way to markets across southern Turkey. All this happens in connivance with border patrols, who exploit their privileged status to benefit from the racket. On the Turkish side, several minibuses and cars wait along small dirt tracks and then carry the smuggled diesel to different points on the border. The most important crossings for the smugglers are Harem district along the Orontes River (Harm), Otmh and Azaz in rebel-held areas, Tell Abied and Jarabulus in IS-dominated areas, and Afrien, Amuda Nusaybin in Kurdish areas albeit to a lesser degree. However, the IS recently lost the Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 12 of 16

Tell Abied crossing, an important conduit for the smuggling of oil and fighters with the IS having established numerous tunnels crossing into the Turkish side. Reports suggest that about 25,000 barrels of oil were smuggled daily in mid-2014. Following international pressure, the Turkish government has been pursuing multi-layered crackdowns on oil smuggling since October 2014. This has significantly disrupted the illicit trade, and some claim that oil sales now might have declined by 98%. The purchase of this oil has obviously been condemned by the international community, with the United Nations warning that the purchase of oil from IS violates international sanctions against the group. Iraq and Iran: IS sells crude oil and diesel to brokers and mediators in Iraq and Kurdistan, with the organization going about replacing gasoline. It sends crude oil to buyers, to oil refineries in northern Iraq, and to foreign buyers such as Turkey.

5.2. Oil and Gas under the Control of Kurds Hasakah province, which is densely populated by Kurds, is the richest area in Syria in terms of oil resources. The Rumailan, Souedieh, and Karatchuk oilfields in the province produce a heavy grade of oil and gas. In addition, there are 1322 oil wells and 25 gas wells. The fields are connected by pipelines to Syria’s Homs refinery. In 2012, the central government in Syria lost effective control of the country’s oilfields, which are located close to the border with Iraq and east of Homs. Rmailan fields used to produce about 170,000 barrels per day. These fields are currently out of the government’s control and run by the Kurdish units, which extract oil and sell part of [33]. The Kurdish Supreme Committee (Desteya Bilind a Kurd (DBK)) was established by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) as the governing body of Rojava in July 2012. The board comprises an equal number of PYD and KNC members. In November 2013, the PYD announced an interim government in Syria’s Kurdish regions, divided into three non-contiguous autonomous areas or cantons: Afrin, Jazira, and Kobani [34]. The interim government in Syria’s Kurdish-dominated regions (Rojava) managed to take over the oilfields in the area under their control, but the pipelines going from the fields in Jazire to the refineries were sabotaged, forcing the closure of 1300 wells in Rumailan. Later, Rojava decided to take matters into its own hands and cooperate with the Syrian government, restarting extraction at 150 wells and creating around 20 makeshift refineries. On its part, the Syrian government helped to get wells back into operation by providing raw materials such as oil for turbines, spare parts and also by continuing to pay the salaries of a handful of former government employees who have gone back to work in Rumailan [16,34]. In November 2013, the Movement for a Democratic Syria (TEV-DEM), which includes Kurdish civil society organizations and political parties, founded a company called Distribution of Al Jazeera Fuel, known as KSC. The company was established to exercise the same specialties that were carried out by the former state-owned company Sadcob after the latter stopped working with oil wells before permanently stopping production on 8 March 2013 [33,34]. The company was finally able to bring several refineries to Zero Cr/Tel Adas areas near Al Malikiyah in Syria’s far northeast. The company is now working to bring in more advanced electric refineries to enhance production [3,35]. The Kurdish operation in Rumailan produced around 15,000 b/d in mid-2014 [34,36] and the Swedish gas plant produced 2140 tcm per day in 2013 from the field in Souedieh [37]. At present, gas production has reached more than 25,000 b/d. About half the oil goes to Iraq and then to Turkey, while the other half is consumed in Syria, both in Rojava territories and the Assad regime.

5.3. Oil and Gas under the Control of Assad Regime The Assad regime’s control has declined to only about 8% of oilfields and 55% of gas fields after more than four years of ongoing war in Syria. The Syrian government’s control is limited to the oil and gas fields located in the provinces of Homs and Hama with some oil wells in Deir ez Zor province. The Assad regime now retains control over only Ar Rasm, Bilas Sharifah, al-Sha’ir, Elba, and Jazal. Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 13 of 16

In these fields, crude oil production decreased by 60% to 10,000 b/d and natural gas production by 40% to stand at 10 million cubic meters per day (3.56 bcm) in 2015 (shortly prior to the fall of Palmyra) from 25,000 b/d and 5 bcm in 2011. The decrease in crude oil and natural gas production is attributed to the suspension of activities by international oil companies, such as CNPC, Gulfsands, Shell, and Total, because of sanctions and the destruction of Syria’s oil infrastructure [3,16]. Gas production is also expected to decrease by more than 45% after IS snatched control of Palmyra and gas fields such as Arak, Al Hail, Najib Zubyyat, and Sukhnah. Palmyra offers IS greater opportunity to reap disproportionate rewards—compared to its limited investment in manpower for combat—and acquire strategic leverage. In 2013, over 90% of Syria’s natural gas production was used to generate electricity, according to government sources [30]. The Assad regime still retains the Homs and Banias refineries. The combined capacity of Syria’s two refineries has fallen to roughly half its pre-conflict output, resulting in supply shortage for refined petroleum products. It is likely that Iran and Algeria would continue to supply crude oil and refined products to Syria. Oil theft is also a problem, with Syrian officials claiming that hundreds of barrels of crude oil are being stolen and shipped to neighbouring countries each day [16]. With the exception of co-production between the Kurds and Assad regime, the Syrian government produced less than 10,000 b/d of crude oil in the first quarter of 2015 and 3.56 bcm of natural gas in 2014. The production of crude oil dipped by 97% to 164,000 b/d in 2012 from 327,000 b/d in 2011. Sources confirmed that 95% of the refined fuel is consumed by the regime for its vehicles and tanks [4,16].

6. Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Refineries and Transportation Oil extraction, primitive oil refineries, and transportation of fuel in tanks or pipelines lead to heavy pollution in the region and pose major health hazards for human communities living near the refineries as well as for marine and terrestrial ecosystems in the areas where they are located. Oil is extracted, refined, and transported without any precautions, protection and preventative measures. During oil extraction, neither Kurdish units nor militant factions pay attention to these preventive measures. This means that oil extraction sites and surrounding areas are exposed to all kinds of contamination risks, including radiation. Though there is no statistical data on the volume of pollution, it can be easily seen. Small-scale refining enterprises are set up in unstudied areas in terms of proximity to surface water, traffic or agricultural lands, potentially causing traffic accidents and damaging crops and water. These refineries emit smoke and fumes into the air, leading to further pollution and causing the formation of a black cloud over the eastern region of Syria, which will have disastrous results for the area’s residents, water sources, and agricultural land, leading to their inevitable desertion. One alarming concern is the high concentration of oil, heavy metals, and benzene in the waters of River Euphrates and the surrounding soil (see also Figure9). Regulations on work safety, emission standards, and environmental protection are absent. The primitive oil refineries were set up by individuals who did not possess the knowledge or understanding of the risks of working in such refineries. They deal with burning materials that evaporate automatically in the sun and cause health problems such as skin allergies, and even serious diseases like cancer and ailments of the respiratory system. In addition, explosions and fires have claimed the lives of dozens of those in charge of refining the oil [3]. Moreover, coalition airstrikes against IS-run oil refineries have increased the problem of pollution. The targeting of Syrian refineries may aggravate the indirect harm to the local communities and environment in oil-producing areas by encouraging the setting up of difficult-to-detect but high-polluting micro-refineries. The hazard to civilians and the environment varies depending on local environmental conditions, land use, and population density. Soil, surface water and groundwater contamination is likely, as is air pollution from persistent fires. Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 13 of 16

Syria’s natural gas production was used to generate electricity, according to government sources [30]. The Assad regime still retains the Homs and Banias refineries. The combined capacity of Syria’s two refineries has fallen to roughly half its pre-conflict output, resulting in supply shortage for refined petroleum products. It is likely that Iran and Algeria would continue to supply crude oil and refined products to Syria. Oil theft is also a problem, with Syrian officials claiming that hundreds of barrels of crude oil are being stolen and shipped to neighbouring countries each day [16]. With the exception of co-production between the Kurds and Assad regime, the Syrian government produced less than 10,000 b/d of crude oil in the first quarter of 2015 and 3.56 bcm of natural gas in 2014. The production of crude oil dipped by 97% to 164,000 b/d in 2012 from 327,000 b/d in 2011. Sources confirmed that 95% of the refined fuel is consumed by the regime for its vehicles and tanks [4,16].

6. Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Refineries and Transportation Oil extraction, primitive oil refineries, and transportation of fuel in tanks or pipelines lead to heavy pollution in the region and pose major health hazards for human communities living near the refineries as well as for marine and terrestrial ecosystems in the areas where they are located. Oil is extracted, refined, and transported without any precautions, protection and preventative measures. During oil extraction, neither Kurdish units nor militant factions pay attention to these preventive measures. This means that oil extraction sites and surrounding areas are exposed to all kinds of contamination risks, including radiation. Though there is no statistical data on the volume of pollution, it can be easily seen. Small-scale refining enterprises are set up in unstudied areas in terms of proximity to surface water, traffic or agricultural lands, potentially causing traffic accidents and damaging crops and water. These refineries emit smoke and fumes into the air, leading to further pollution and causing the formation of a black cloud over the eastern region of Syria, which will have disastrous results for the area’s residents, water sources, and agricultural land, leading to their inevitable desertion. One alarming concern is the high concentration of oil, heavy metals, and benzene in the waters of River Euphrates and the surrounding soil (see also Figure 9). Regulations on work safety, emission standards, and environmental protection are absent. The primitive oil refineries were set up by individuals who did not possess the knowledge or understanding of the risks of working in such refineries. They deal with burning materials that evaporate automatically in the sun and cause health problems such as Soc.skin Sci. allergies,2016, 5, 20 and even serious diseases like cancer and ailments of the respiratory system.14 of In 16 addition, explosions and fires have claimed the lives of dozens of those in charge of refining the oil [3].

Figure 9. Soil and air pollution from oil refining. Figure 9. Soil and air pollution from oil reﬁning.

7. Conclusions Since the discovery of oil in Syria, it has been more of a burden than a support to the Syrian people. It was used from the 1970s to the beginning 2000s to buy and assemble weapons by the Assad regime. These weapons have subsequently been used against the Syrian people since the first cry of freedom in 2011. The control over Syria’s oil and the black market trade of oil products has been a key element of this internal conflict. The black market network of traders is supported by smuggling networks that move oil internally and internationally, where many of the illicit micro-refineries are found. A war economy has emerged in which groups such as the IS and the Kurdish Force in the east and northeast have established autonomous economic spheres. Both are dependent on oil and gas resources as one of their main sources of funding. The US-led coalition achieved a decrease in oil production, but the military actions also caused a significant localized contamination—a risk to civilians as well as the environment. Unfortunately, the IS turned to diversifying its income sources through an increase in the looting of cultural heritage artifacts. Additionally, the IS changed certain punishments for disobeying IS rules from imprisonment to fines to generate more income. The dictatorship of Assad has created the current state of terrorism by torture, abuse, injustice and complete lack of freedom. He created the chaos that allowed the IS to rise in Syria. A form of collaboration between Assad and IS as he buys their illegally exploited oil and gas also exists. If the international community plans to stand up to terrorist organizations, then they have to confront the dictatorship in Syria. The campaign of terror has to stop, and not just with Assad: a cycle of ruthless organizations and dictators who will use the same method as the present regime when the people demand freedom and dignity will continue. In order to put an end to terrorism, dictatorship in Syria must be stopped. Injustice and tyranny breed terrorism not only in the countries of their existence, but also the world over. Only the permanent removal of dictatorship and terrorism will allow the Syrian people to invest its natural and human resources in a peaceful and orderly manner to achieve development instead of war.

Author Contributions: Both authors conceived and designed the study. Hussein Almohamad collected and analyzed the data as well as wrote the article; Andreas Dittmann supervised all steps and contributed to the writing of the paper. Soc. Sci. 2016, 5, 20 15 of 16

Conﬂicts of Interest: The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.

References and Notes

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