SALAH AL-DIN POST-FEBRUARY 22 EMERGENCY IDP MONITORING AND ASSESSMENTS NOVEMBER 16, 2006

Capital: Tikrit Districts: Al-Daur, Al-Shirqat, Baiji, Balad, Dujayl (Al Faris), Tikrit, Tooz, Samarra. Total post-Feb. 22 IDPs as of reporting date: 2,615 families Total IDP and IDP returnee pre-Feb. 22: 4,436 families

POST-FEBRUARY 22 EMERGENCY IDP MONITORI NG AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS: BACKGROUND

An alarming increase in displacement due to heightened tensions after the bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra on February 22, 2006 brought to light the need for comprehensive, thorough monitoring and assessments of the recently-displaced populations. IOM has been assessing IDPs displaced since February 22 in the central and lower 15 governorates in Iraq.

The monitors use IDP Rapid Assessment Templates for both IDP groups and individual IDP families. The IDP Rapid Assessment Template addresses a number of issues and needs, including food, health care, water and sanitation, documentation, and property. In addition, the templates outline the IDPs’ future intentions. Monitors visit IDP tribal and community leaders, local NGOs, local government bodies, and individual IDP families to gather information and complete the templates. Once the information is gathered, it is then entered into a database for analysis.

After the information from the templates is collected and analyzed, IOM returns to the governorates to gather additional information from the field. This additional information provides a more in-depth look at the situation and issues surrounding displacement in each governorate.

With this information, IOM is developing Governorate Needs Assessments for the 15 central and southern governorates in Iraq. These Governorate Needs Assessments will assist IOM and other agencies to prioritize areas of operation, plan emergency responses, and design long-term, durable solutions programs.

POST-FEBRUARY 22 IDP OVERVIEW

Background

The provincial capital of Salah al-Din is Tikrit, with the significant second large city of Samarra. The province is named after Saladin, the Islamic hero of the 12th century. Tikrit is the center of the governorate, located 140 kilometers northwest of Baghdad on the Tigris River. The Arab population constitutes the majority of the inhabitants in the governorate while Turkmen and Kurd populations are the two minorities, primarily residing in Tooz district.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION The former Iraqi government re-distributed some of the districts in the governorates in the past for political reasons, and as such Tooz district (which was originally part of Tameem/Kirkuk) was ‘transferred’ to the administration of Salah al-Din in 1976. Tooz is a complex district which has distinct sub-districts inhabited by 100% Kurds and others housing 100% Arabs. Few are mixed.

Salah al-Din experiences a high level of violence and tension, and IDP monitors had to temporarily cease activities in some areas due to conflict. Balad district experiences an especially high level of violence, including assassinations and abductions, resulting in displacement. Fighting between Iraqi National Forces/Multi-National Forces in Iraq and insurgents increases the instability. During the recent verdict of Saddam Hussain’s trail, a curfew was imposed on the entire governorate, and since February, curfews have been intermittantly imposed to reign in violences.

The following information provides an overview of the current situation, highlights needs, and suggested areas of intervention relating to recently-displaced IDPs in Salah al-Din. Information was gathered from a variety of sources: IDP representatives, the IDP host community, local authorities, partner NGOs and other NGOs working in these areas.

Despite increasing insecurity and instability throughout Iraq, IOM strives to stay abreast with updated and accurate information. Displacement is ongoing, however, and displacement information changes on a daily basis.

Total displaced:

As of the reporting date (November 16), 2,615 families were identified and assessed. Their current districts of displacement within Salah al-Din are Tikrit (870 families, 33% of the displaced), Balad (724, 28% of the displaced), Baiji (421 families, 16% of the displaced), Al-Daur (340 families, 13% of the displaced), Al-Shirqat (149 families, 6%), Samarra (82 families, 3%) and Tooz (29 families, 1%).

Ethnicity:

Many Iraqi governorates are comprised exclusively of Arab IDPs, but in Salah al-Din, there are also Turkmen IDPs who have been recently displaced. Arabs make up 98%, and Turkmen less than 1%. In addition, the IDPs represent both Shia Muslim (6%) and Sunni Muslim (93%). (1% also provided no answer to either question, possible due to fear of reprisal.)

While Salah al-Din experiences a high level of instability, it is safer than the other governorates with a strong Sunni presence, such as Anbar and Ninewa, so it is a popular destination for Sunni IDPs.

Places of Origin:

As with other governorates in the area, the majority of IDPs in Salah al-Din were displaced from Baghdad, although IDPs have fled from all over the country, many fleeing from as far away as Shia-dominated Basrah in the south.

The percentages from each of the governorates or origin are as follows:

Baghdad: 72% Basrah: 19% Salah al-Din: 3% (displaced within the governorate) Anbar: 2% Kirkuk: 1% Diyala: 1% Ninewa: less than 1% Babylon: less than 1% Qadissiya: less than 1% Thi-Qar: less than 1% Wassit: less than 1%

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IDPs' Place of origin (Salah Al-Din)

Anbar 2.03% Baghdad Wassit 71.72% 0.57%

Thi-Qar 0.84%

Ninewa 0.77%

Qadissiya 0.19%

Tameem 1.03%

Salah al-Din 2.53%

Basrah 18.60% Babylon 0.42% Dyiala 1.30%

Reasons for Displacement:

IDPs in Salah al-Din fled their homes for numerous reasons. These reasons included direct threats to their lives, such as threats of assignations and abductions (1,651 families, 63%); generalized violence (631 families, 24%); forced displacement (312 families, 12%); generalized fear (631 families, 7%); and armed conflict (2 families, 1%). (Those interviewed were allowed to provide multiple answers for their reasons for fleeing their homes.)

If the IDPs thought their group or family was targeted, almost all (98%) thought it was due to belonging to a certain religion or sect. Less than one percent also blamed it on belonging to a certain ethnic group. The majority of these IDPs are fleeing communities where they experienced the aforementioned threats and are heading to Sunni communities in Salah al-Din.

Of the Shia IDPs, 121 were from Baghdad, 7 from Basrah, and 21 from within Salah al-Din. They probably fled to areas where they felt more secure, although it is interesting that Shia families fled from Basrah, which is generally safer than Salah al-Din and is predominantly Shia. However, Basrah city is increasingly more unstable, which might explain their flight north.

All reported that they were displaced once since February 22 (except for 0.19%, who did not answer). None reported being displaced more than once. The majority left their place of origin in June. The breakdown is as follows:

February: 1% March: 17% April: 22% May: 15% June: 41% July: 3% August: less than 1% September: less than 1%

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Overview of IDP camps:

Salah-al-Din currently has no camps in the governorate. This is due to numerous factors, including high instability and security concerns within the governorate. Setting up a camp in a governorate with a high level of conflict and tension among the numerous ethnicities and religious sects could cause these IDPs to be targets. In addition, Salah-al-Din does not have as high a number of IDPs as other governorates, so there is less of a need for mass shelter.

Outline of Already-Existing IDP Population (pre-February 22, 2006)

There are currently 3,366 pre- and post-2003 conflict IDP families and 1,070 IDP Returnee families (for a total of 4,436 families) in Salah al-Din. The majority of the IDPs in Salah al-Din were displaced after the 2003 conflict.

The pre-February 2006 IDP population belongs to three ethnic groups: Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. The Arabs constitute a majority, around 75%. Most Arab families were displaced after 2003 from Tameem/Kirkuk Governorate due to forced recovery of property and ethnic discrimination. The remaining was displaced within Salah al-Din Governorate. The displaced Arabs are found in all the districts, though mainly are concentrated in Tikrit, Al Daur, Baiji and Al Shirqat. The other main caseload in the governorate is the Kurdish IDP Returnees who constitute 22% of the displaced population and are all located in Tooz district. The remaining 3% of the total IDP population is Turkmen, mainly refugee returnees.

IDP Population’s Relationship with the Host Community

In general, IDPs are moving from religiously and ethnically mixed communities to homogenous communities, so the host community often has the same background as the IDPs and good relations are maintained. Only 10 families, less than 1%, report that they were not well-received by the host community. However, the influx of IDPs, increase in competition for resources, and deteriorating security situation will all lead to an increase in tension between IDPs and the host community.

If humanitarian organizations are planning to assist IDPs in Salah al-Din, including the vulnerable in the host community will help maintain an accepting atmosphere and prevent animosity, since many in the host community suffer from some of the same issues as IDPs.

Intentions of post-February 22 IDPs:

The IDPs’ intentions will need to be factored into any long-term IDP assistance and durable solutions for recently-displaced.

The majority of IDPs in Salah al-Din plan on resettling in a third location. These 1,329 families, 51%, will choose not stay in Salah al-Din or return to their place of origin due to security reasons.

However, 27% do plan on returning to their place of origin, and 22% plan on locally integrating in their current location.

IDPs’ intentions and when they plan to implement these intentions hinge on the security situation. 90% have not made a decision on when they would like to implement the aforementioned plans, due to instability. Only 10 families (0.08%) will implement their intentions in 6-12 months; no one wants to make concrete plans before this.

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION The breakdown for intentions is as follows:

IDPs' Intentions (Salah Al-Din)

60.0%

50.0%

40.0% Resettle in a third location 51.4% 30.0%

Return to their place of 20.0% origin 26.6% Locally integrate in the current location 10.0% 22.0%

0.0% IDPs' Intentions

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT AND NEEDS

Security:

Almost all of the IDPs who have been displaced throughout Iraq report that they feel relatively safe in their current location. The IDPs’ current location, while most likely not entirely safe, is probably safer for them than the place from where they fled. However, relative to other governorates, a higher number of IDPs in Salah al-Din (180 families, or 7%) do not feel safe, probably due to generalized violence in the governorate.

No IDPs report that they have been detained, although 103 families, or 4%, said a family member was unaccounted for.

94% report no serious deaths or injuries. However, 32 people from the various families and groups have been killed by other citizens, 36 report “other deaths” and 22 report “other injuries”. No one reported that that group members have been killed by militants or by a mine accident.

Ten families (less than 1%) require authorization from the local authorities to move from their current location. No one reported that they had to pass through checkpoints for daily movement near their home; however, 23 families (1%) reported restrictions on their freedom of movement due to the security situation.

Shelter:

IDPs listed shelter as their number two priority in Salah al-Din, second to food. As is the case throughout Iraq, adequate shelter is scarce, and IDPs are finding that without an income, renting is not sustainable. In addition, many people are competing for housing, which is increasing rental prices. Newly-displaced families in Tikrit, for example, are experiencing an increase in rental fees, which they can not afford due to a lack of income. In Salah al-Din, 78% of IDPs are renting. For them, finding less expensive, more adequate shelter is essential.

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION Only 6% live with a host family or relative, suggesting that many IDPs who move to Salah al-Din are not doing so due to links to relatives or friends. For IDPs living with host families, sharing quarters that are already often crowded is not sustainable.

14% live in public buildings. These are often unoccupied or abandoned buildings that do not have electricity, proper facilities for cooking, and sanitation facilities. Collective towns or settlements, established spontaneously by IDPs or intentionally by local authorities, also suffer a lack of these basic services. 1% of IDPs in Salah al-Din live in collective towns or settlements.

No families reside in a former military camp, a tent in an established IDP camp, or in tents they erected near the house of a host family or relative. No IDPs live in a former military camp.

Luckily, 97% do not face any pressure to leave or a threat of eviction. However, 25 families (1%) face a court-ordered eviction, 34 families (1%) face pressure to leave from neighbours, and 27 families (1%) face eviction or pressure to leave from militants. Of those families living with family, none expressed pressure to leave from their relatives.

See Conclusions section for recommendations for housing assistance.

Property Issues in Place of Origin:

Some IDPs have property in their place of origin. Of those 87 individual families interviewed, 84 owned a house in their place of origin, 1 family had land for agriculture, and one family had a shop or small business. No families had an apartment or room or land for housing. (This question was not present in the Group Rapid Assessment Template, and many other IDPs most likely have property in their place of origin.)

Many IDPs, 82%, do not know if they can access their property. Less than 1% said their property was destroyed, and 17% said it is occupied by private citizens, meaning that someone illegally moved into their property after they fled. No one reported that their property was occupied by the government or currently in military use.

Numerous IDPs were able to take some items with them when they fled their homes. Winter clothing and tools were the most popular items with the IDPs. Following are the percentages of families who brought the listed items with them when they fled their homes:

Winter clothing: 88% Tools: 85% Food: 76% Car/transportation: 11% Other items: 1% Livestock: 1%

Vulnerabilities:

Vulnerabilities such as single parenthood, serious health issues, and mental and physical disabilities are exacerbated in an environment of displacement and are experienced by the IDPs in Salah al-Din. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated during displacement. A lack of food or water has a greater impact on the already vulnerable, such as a pregnant woman or an elderly person. Mental disabilities can be exacerbated by an unfamiliar environment experienced in displacement. Illnesses are also worsened by displacement.

Of those IDP groups and families interviewed, 66 individuals are female heads-of-household, 153 individuals are considered elderly, 114 women are pregnant, 5 families reported a member with a mental disability, one family had a member who had a serious illness, and 7 families report “other vulnerabilities”.

These individuals will face the most hardships as a result of the displacement and are at most risk for further suffering, especially in the coming winter months, if they do not have adequate shelter and health care. The vulnerable should be targeted first when providing assistance.

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Women and Children:

As mentioned, many IDP women in Salah al-Din are heads-of-households, elderly, or pregnant. The lack of economic opportunities and absence of a support system makes life especially difficult for women. Chronic poverty and lack to health care are also detrimental to women, especially the vulnerable.

To add to the difficulties and vulnerabilities, as violence continues, many women are becoming widows, left to care for the entire family. The strain and tension of conflict is also leading to an increase in divorce and domestic violence.

Displacement and violence has especially affected children in Salah al-Din. A lack of access to health services and vaccinations results in an increase in preventable diseases and infections, and lack of food is leading to malnutrition. Children’s education is disrupted when they are pulled from schools and displaced to other areas. Their needs are many. Finally and most alarming, the constant strain and tension due to insecurity and violence is causing long-term psychological issues for children. In addition to improvement in the aforementioned sectors, parents are more specifically requesting winter clothes for children for the upcoming winter months.

Food:

Food was ranked as the number one priority in Salah al-Din. Usually, shelter and access to work rank before the need for food for IDPs in Iraq, and sometimes food does not even make the top three. However, little access to food and a lack of income make this basic necessity inaccessible.

One explanation for the urgent need for food is the high percentage of families who do not have access to the Public Distribution System (PDS) rations. 24% report no access whatsoever. 69% blame this on food transportation routes being insecure. 3% blame a lack of transportation methods, and 2% think it is due to a delay in transferring their PDS ration cards from their place of origin. No one cites lack of documentation or a lack of food available for distribution. 8% simply are not sure why they are not receiving the food rations.

Only 16% can access PDS food rations always, and 60% report that they can “sometimes”. Of the few who receive PDS food rations recently, over half of the families said the ration was missing food items.

Aside from the PDS ration, 51% of families report that they do not receive any food assistance from other sources. 44% report that humanitarian organizations have provided food, 6% have received food from religious charities, and national authorities provided food to 4 families, less than 1%. No one received food assistance from regional authorities. 3% cited “other sources” as providing food. Usually these food distributions only last a couple of weeks.

Regarding the type of food they receive, most food, if provided, was in the form of dried food (received by 34%), fresh food (received by 23%), or intermediate food (16%).

See Conclusion section below for recommendations for food assistance.

Water/Sanitation:

All but 9% of IDPs in Salah al-Din have regular access to water. However, 9% of those interviewed represents 229 families, an alarming number of families without regular access to water. For those who do have access, 89% have access to municipal water underground pipes, 12% have access to public wells, 10% access rivers, streams, or lakes, 6% with open or broken pipes, 5% have access to water tanks or trucks, and 1% uses other sources.

The majority of the 91% who can access water sources can do so within 500 meters of where they live, but 2% must travel further than 500 meters.

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION In addition, 185 families (7%) of those interviewed reported that they do not have access to toilets, a problem not encountered as widely in other governorates. Not being able to access proper sanitation facilities means poor disposal of solid waste and causes the spread of disease and infection. Providing simple latrines for these families can easily improve their quality of life.

Fuel and Electricity:

IDPs in Salah al-Din fare a bit better with electricity. 77% have access to four or more hours a day, which is more than in most governorates. 21% have access to 1-3 hours a day, and only 1% has no access to electricity.

Unfortunately, accessing fuel is much more of a problem. 82% have no access to fuel. For those that can, 11% can access benzene, 15% can access propane, and less than 1% can access diesel. No one reports access to kerosene, which is necessary for cooking and heating. This will become especially problematic in the coming winter months.

Health Care:

The instability in Salah al-Din has negatively affected the health care sector. Medical staff have left the governorate due to threats and attacks, and some medical facilities have suffered damage from fighting. In addition, the influx of IDPs is putting a strain on already-limited services. Many IDPs simply are not receiving the health care they need.

13% (339 families) of IDPs in Salah al-Din do not have access to health care services. However, for children, IDPs with chronic illnesses, expecting mothers, elderly and other vulnerable IDPs, this lack of health care services is a grave problem. In addition, 15% of IDPs do not have access to the medications they need.

When asked why they could not access health care, 92 families say they cannot afford services, and 258 said they were not available. 1 family said the services were located too far from their location, and 10 families said they were denied services. No families blamed it on a lack of female staff or the area being too dangerous for accessing the services. Reports suggest that the increased number of IDPs in Salah al-Din is straining the health care system, and health care facilities require additional provisions for the increase in patients.

88% have not been visited by a health care worker in the last 30 days. For the 12% who were visited, the majority received vaccinations, and some families received medical examinations or consulting and health education. No one received medication and the majority were not visited.

For those IDPs who have been involved in vaccination campaigns, 32% have been 4-6 months ago, 24% 1-3 months ago, 2% last month, and 5% within the past week (from when interviewed). 37%, however, have not been involved in a vaccination campaign, and 4% of family or group members have suffered from any infections diseases/epidemics in the last 45 days.

Documentation:

IDPs in Salah al-Din were able to take documentation with them, although not as many IDPs hold documentation as IDPs in other governorates. 87% (2,299 families) have nationality certifications, 64% (1,668 families) have marriage documents, 91% (2,377 families) have identification cards, 2% (55 families) have passports, 49% (1,282 families) have birth certificates, and 3% (85 families) have death certifications.

Employment:

Access to work was the second priority need reported by IDPs in Salah al-Din, following food. When the IDPs fled their home, they oftentimes left behind their source of employment. Upon arriving in Salah al-Din, they must compete with other IDPs and local residents for jobs. In addition, the security situation is making locating jobs even more challenging in an already depressed economy. Throughout Iraq, economic collapse combined with high nation-wide unemployment has led to economic hardships in all communities.

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See Conclusion section below for additional recommendations for income-generation activities.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

Humanitarian assistance entities have not been as active in Salah al-Din as in other governorates, which is probably due to a high level of instability. Apart from food assistance, of those IDPs interviewed, 50% said that they have not received any type of humanitarian assistance since being displaced.

The Iraqi Red Crescent Society has provided the most humanitarian assistance, reaching 47% of the IDPs. 6% have received assistance from religious groups, 2% have received assistance from the host community, and less than 1% received assistance from relatives. NGOs, MoDM, and other Iraqi government bodies were not cited as providing assistance, although MoDM reports that it will soon be providing assistance through the branch office and it is coordinating with Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to include IDPs within the social security network.

AREAS IN NEED OF SPECIAL ASSISTANCE

Almost 50 IDP families were assessed in the village of Albo-Hassan in Dujayl district. These IDPs are living in mud houses without basic services. They have to walk more than 500 meters to obtain water from a canal. They brought very few items with them when they were displaced and are in need of food, school kits for the children, blankets and other non-food items (mattresses, kitchen sets, hygiene kits, etc.).

CONCLUSION

Information gathered from the emergency monitoring and needs assessments can provide an excellent base on which to develop assistance responses, establish locations of intervention, identify the most vulnerable populations, and provide responses that meet the IDPs’ identified needs.

IDPs in Salah al-Din listed their priority needs as 1) food, 2) shelter, and 3) access to work.

Food: Many IDPs in Salah al-Din do not have access to the PDS rations (623 of those families interviewed) and are not receiving it from other sources, so providing additional food assistance is essential. Food should target the IDPs’ needs, especially those nutritional needs of children and women.

In addition, since so many IDPs do not have access to the PDS rations, organizations can lobby the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and the local government to help bring food items to these populations.

Shelter: Many displaced persons live in inadequate shelter, cannot meet their monthly rental expenses, or are facing pressure and tension due to overcrowded conditions with family or friends.

One option for intervention is to expand host communities’ homes where IDPs are present, since this is a more cost-effective measure than building completely new homes, and this method will support both IDPs and host families.

Another option is to support the purchase of land and/or the construction of small cement homes. This would need to be closely coordinated with the relevant Iraqi Ministries in regards to land tenure and legal implications so that no future problems would arise from the purchase of land. The Iraqi government could also be encouraged to provide allocations of land to the displaced.

In severe cases, if immediate, short-term shelter is needed, another intervention is to purchase tents for temporary residence. This will be a provisional solution, as the use of tents can result 9

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION in the creation of informal camps, which can cause numerous problems, including the extremely high costs they entail, the security issues they pose and the dependence they create. Setting up a camp should be considered as a last resort.

Whatever shelter provided, or any other service, it should never be contingent on the IDPs’ ethnicity or religion. In addition, all shelter will need to have the appropriate sanitation facilities provided. Also, long-term, permanent shelter should focus on those IDPs planning to stay in Salah al-Din.

Employment: IDPs often must leave behind employment and income-generating activities when they are displaced, and access to work was third among IDPs’ priorities in Salah al-Din. For those IDPs who do have work, the series of curfews that the governorate has experienced has been especially difficult, since they cannot go to their day jobs.

Projects to improve water and sanitation infrastructure, build homes, or other construction projects could also employ IDPs while providing much-needed services. One suggestion by IDPs was the construction of health centers, which would create employment both through the construction phase and staffing the centers with health care professionals, and it would assuage IDPs’ problems accessing adequate health care.

Agencies can create vocational training programs in areas such as carpentry, masonry, metalwork, tailoring and the auto mechanic trade, or on-the-job training, where employees are paid to train the IDP for a certain amount of time and then agree to hire him or her after the training is complete.

In addition to food, shelter, and access to work, IDPs requested assistance accessing information about the property they left and the legal procedures to reclaim it if necessary.

Intentions: In addition to taking into consideration the IDPs’ priority needs, the IDPs’ intentions also need to be taken into consideration. In the case of Salah al-Din, 22% of IDPs plan on staying in the governorate and the rest plan on returning home or settling elsewhere. Therefore, long-term assistance should target those who plan to locally integrate, and more immediate assistance can focus on those IDPs who hope to soon return to their homes or move to another location.

Further Analysis: This report is by no means conclusive, and a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by obtaining a deeper understanding of what IDPs know, do and think, using tools such as matrix ranking, seasonal calendars and gender analysis.

This assessment tool has been developed to aid programming and to undertake integrated measures that aim to reduce the time between assessments and response to emergencies. It should however be noted overall that some aspects of the above assessments still require more technical descriptions at a higher level, and it is hoped that the agencies that will need such further technical information will be able to take this up at their own convenience. In addition, SPHERE minimum standards in disaster response should always be incorporated whenever providing humanitarian assistance.

For Updates on IOM’s humanitarian assistance response to recent displacement, please see the IOM Recent Displacement and Assessments updates. In addition, these governorate reports can be accessed at http://www.iom-iraq.net/idp.html.

As the situation unfolds, the characteristics and dynamics of the displacement will change. With collaboration and quick responses, the negative impact of displacement can be minimized with hope for a brighter future for the displaced.

For further information on IDP displacement in Iraq, please contact Martin Ocaga, IOM Iraq IDP Program Manager at [email protected] (+962 79 64 00581) or Dana Graber, IDP Monitoring and Reintegration Officer, at [email protected] (+962 79 611 1759). 10

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