DOCSLIB.ORG

The US Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The US Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned C O R P O R A T I O N The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned David E. Johnson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Brenna Allen, Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael Schwille, Jerry M. Sollinger, Sean M. Zeigler For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3076 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019940985 ISBN: 978-0-8330-9601-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Lessons Learned from 13 Years of Conflict: The Battle for Baghdad, 2003–2008, spon- sored by the Office of Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. Army. The project was intended to capture key lessons to help the U.S. Army and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) retain institutional knowledge and capabilities, as well as to serve as a history of the U.S. Army’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146863. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doc- trine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corpora- tion, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and com- plies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government. iii Contents Preface ................................................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...................................................................................vii Summary .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgments ................................................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ....................................................................................... xxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Study Approach ........................................................................................ 1 Organization of This Report ......................................................................... 2 CHAPTER TWO Prewar Planning ...................................................................................... 7 Civilian Prewar Planning ............................................................................. 9 Prewar Military Planning ........................................................................... 23 Lessons from This Era ............................................................................... 38 CHAPTER THREE Occupation ........................................................................................... 43 The Military Picture ................................................................................. 44 ORHA’s Short-Lived Tenure ........................................................................ 54 Coalition Provisional Authority and the American Attempt at Occupation ...................59 CPA Orders 1 and 2 ..................................................................................65 Rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces: An Orphaned Mission ...................................74 Lessons from This Era ................................................................................81 CHAPTER FOUR The Casey Period ....................................................................................89 Key Debates ............................................................................................89 Military Situation and Strategy: Actions on the Ground to Control Baghdad ................91 Embassy Challenges: Reconstruction in a War Zone ............................................ 99 v vi The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned Civilian Policy Views from Washington and Baghdad ......................................... 103 Efforts to Create Iraqi Security Forces and Defense Institutions .............................. 109 Lessons from This Era .............................................................................. 119 CHAPTER FIVE The Surge ............................................................................................ 123 Key Debates: The Surge Versus the Iraq Study Group Report ................................ 123 Military Situation and Operations ................................................................ 125 A Tough Seven Months ............................................................................ 126 Counterinsurgency and the Surge ................................................................. 130 Counterinsurgency Operations in Practice ...................................................... 131 Special Operations Command Ramps Up ....................................................... 136 Countering the Shia Element ...................................................................... 137 The Battle of Sadr City ............................................................................. 138 Civilians and the Surge: One Surge, Many Stories ............................................. 142 Civilians and the Surge ............................................................................. 149 Iraqi Security Forces Through 2008 ............................................................. 152 Creating an Enterprise in Security Force Assistance—Changing MNSTC-I .............. 154 Increased Training Efforts ........................................................................ 157 Problems with MOI—Police, Corruption, and Security ....................................... 159 Adviser Teams—Did the United States Get It Right? ......................................... 162 Did the Surge Work? ............................................................................... 163 Lessons from This Era .............................................................................. 168 CHAPTER SIX Withdrawal ......................................................................................... 171 The Military Story .................................................................................. 172 SOFA: Tried and Failed ............................................................................ 176 Politicization of the Iraqi Security Forces ........................................................ 188 Postmortem .......................................................................................... 191 Lessons from This Era .............................................................................. 194 CHAPTER SEVEN Overarching Lessons for the U.S. Army ....................................................... 197 The Nature of the Lessons from Iraq—and the Constraints on Learning ................... 198 Overarching Lessons from the Iraq War and Recommendations for the Army ............. 203 Final Thoughts ...................................................................................... 233 APPENDIX Timeline of Major Events in the Battle for Baghdad ........................................ 235 References ........................................................................................... 269 Figures and Tables Figures 5.1. Anbar Province, Iraq .................................................................. 127 5.2. Baghdad Belts .......................................................................... 134 5.3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Strike Assets Employed in the Battle of Sadr City................................................. 140 Tables 2.1. Timetable of Civilian Prewar Planning for Phase IV............................... 22 2.2. Phase IV Troop-to-Task Analysis, May 2003 ........................................35 7.1. Specific Lessons for the U.S. Army, by Chapter ..................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Overall Security in Iraq
    HOW DOES THIS END? Strategic Failures Overshadow Tactical Gains in Iraq Lawrence Korb, Brian Katulis, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul Center for American Progress April 2008 “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War “No one” in the U.S. and Iraqi governments “feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation.” General David Petraeus, March 13, 2008.1 www.americanprogress.org Center for American Progress Introduction and Summary .S. Army General David Petraeus understood the situation perfectly five years ago. As an indigenous insurgency began to form in the weeks following the U.S. Uinvasion of Iraq in 2003, then-Major Gen. Petraeus asked Washington Post report- er Rick Atkinson the fundamental question of the war: “Tell me, how does this end?” After spending nearly three-quarters of a trillion dollars, after more than 4,000 lost American lives alongside hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, this remains the central question of this war. Yet the answer to Gen. Petraeus’ question—a unified, independent, and stable Iraq that is an ally in the global war on terrorism—is more elusive today than it was when President Bush’s military escalation began in early 2007. Since the administration’s escalation began 15 months ago, the president and his con- servative allies in Congress have entangled the United States ever more deeply in Iraq’s multiple ethnic and sectarian conflicts. Some short-term security progress has been achieved in certain areas of Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • In the Early 2000S, the Music Industry Was Shocked When Internet Users Started Sharing Copyrighted Works Through Peer-To-Peer Networks Such As Napster
    In the early 2000s, the music industry was shocked when Internet users started sharing copyrighted works through peer-to-peer networks such as Napster. Software such as Napster made it very easy for people with digital copies of recorded music to share these digital copies with other users. The industry reacted by suing Napster and users of the software that allowed the digital sharing. While the industry’s lawsuits seemed like a reasonable reaction to this epidemic, it should have immediately established an online marketplace for digital music. Eventually, Apple did address the issue by releasing iTunes. Since the introduction of iTunes, the recording industry has seen a rise in profits. Users are willing to pay for digital music as long as the access to it is simple. However, these digital downloads from legal marketplaces are not actually sales; the purchases are actually licenses to the music. This means that a user who purchases a song cannot resale the song in a secondary marketplace because the first sale exception does not apply to licensed material. Courts have given the software and recording industry great power to control their copyrighted work, but it seems ridiculous that a user who purchases a song cannot sell their song when they no longer care to listen to it. The problem for the recording industry lies in the fact that the digital recording of the work is very easy to copy and transfer. If sales in the secondary market were allowed, one could easily make a digital copy then make then resale the original. It is very hard to track whether a copy of the work is still located on a hard drive, cloud, or other storage device.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Full Complaint
    Case 1:18-cv-01612-CKK Document 11 Filed 11/17/18 Page 1 of 602 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ESTATE OF ROBERT P. HARTWICK, § HALEY RUSSELL, HANNAH § HARTWICK, LINDA K. HARTWICK, § ROBERT A. HARTWICK, SHARON § SCHINETHA STALLWORTH, § ANDREW JOHN LENZ, ARAGORN § THOR WOLD, CATHERINE S. WOLD, § CORY ROBERT HOWARD, DALE M. § HINKLEY, MARK HOWARD BEYERS, § DENISE BEYERS, EARL ANTHONY § MCCRACKEN, JASON THOMAS § WOODLIFF, JIMMY OWEKA OCHAN, § JOHN WILLIAM FUHRMAN, JOSHUA § CRUTCHER, LARRY CRUTCHER, § JOSHUA MITCHELL ROUNTREE, § LEIGH ROUNTREE, KADE L. § PLAINTIFFS’ HINKHOUSE, RICHARD HINKHOUSE, § SECOND AMENDED SUSAN HINKHOUSE, BRANDON § COMPLAINT HINKHOUSE, CHAD HINKHOUSE, § LISA HILL BAZAN, LATHAN HILL, § LAURENCE HILL, CATHLEEN HOLY, § Case No.: 1:18-cv-01612-CKK EDWARD PULIDO, KAREN PULIDO, § K.P., A MINOR CHILD, MANUEL § Hon. Colleen Kollar-Kotelly PULIDO, ANGELITA PULIDO § RIVERA, MANUEL “MANNIE” § PULIDO, YADIRA HOLMES, § MATTHEW WALKER GOWIN, § AMANDA LYNN GOWIN, SHAUN D. § GARRY, S.D., A MINOR CHILD, SUSAN § GARRY, ROBERT GARRY, PATRICK § GARRY, MEGHAN GARRY, BRIDGET § GARRY, GILBERT MATTHEW § BOYNTON, SOFIA T. BOYNTON, § BRIAN MICHAEL YORK, JESSE D. § CORTRIGHT, JOSEPH CORTRIGHT, § DIANA HOTALING, HANNA § CORTRIGHT, MICHAELA § CORTRIGHT, LEONDRAE DEMORRIS § RICE, ESTATE OF NICHOLAS § WILLIAM BAART BLOEM, ALCIDES § ALEXANDER BLOEM, DEBRA LEIGH § BLOEM, ALCIDES NICHOLAS § BLOEM, JR., VICTORIA LETHA § Case 1:18-cv-01612-CKK Document 11 Filed 11/17/18 Page 2 of 602 BLOEM, FLORENCE ELIZABETH § BLOEM, CATHERINE GRACE § BLOEM, SARA ANTONIA BLOEM, § RACHEL GABRIELA BLOEM, S.R.B., A § MINOR CHILD, CHRISTINA JEWEL § CHARLSON, JULIANA JOY SMITH, § RANDALL JOSEPH BENNETT, II, § STACEY DARRELL RICE, BRENT § JASON WALKER, LELAND WALKER, § SUSAN WALKER, BENJAMIN § WALKER, KYLE WALKER, GARY § WHITE, VANESSA WHITE, ROYETTA § WHITE, A.W., A MINOR CHILD, § CHRISTOPHER F.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterinsurgency in the Iraq Surge
    A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE. A thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Western Carolina University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in US History. By Matthew T. Buchanan Director: Dr. Richard Starnes Associate Professor of History, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History, Dr. Alexander Macaulay, History. April, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations . iii Abstract . iv Introduction . 1 Chapter One: Perceptions of the Iraq War: Early Origins of the Surge . 17 Chapter Two: Winning the Iraq Home Front: The Political Strategy of the Surge. 38 Chapter Three: A Change in Approach: The Military Strategy of the Surge . 62 Conclusion . 82 Bibliography . 94 ii ABBREVIATIONS ACU - Army Combat Uniform ALICE - All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment BDU - Battle Dress Uniform BFV - Bradley Fighting Vehicle CENTCOM - Central Command COIN - Counterinsurgency COP - Combat Outpost CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority CROWS- Common Remote Operated Weapon System CRS- Congressional Research Service DBDU - Desert Battle Dress Uniform HMMWV - High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle ICAF - Industrial College of the Armed Forces IED - Improvised Explosive Device ISG - Iraq Study Group JSS - Joint Security Station MNC-I - Multi-National-Corps-Iraq MNF- I - Multi-National Force – Iraq Commander MOLLE - Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment MRAP - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) QRF - Quick Reaction Forces RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade SOI - Sons of Iraq UNICEF - United Nations International Children’s Fund VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device iii ABSTRACT A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE.
    [Show full text]
  • Table of Contents
    KUWAIT COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Harrison M. Symmes 1953-1955 Principal Officer, Kuwait City William A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1954-1956 Vice Consul, Kuwait City William D. Brewer 1955-1957 Principal Officer, Kuwait City Talcott W. Seelye 1956-1960 Consular-Economic Officer, Kuwait City Joan Seelye 1956-1960 Spouse of Consular-Economic Officer, Kuwait City James A. Placke 1959-1961 Economic Officer, Baghdad, Iraq Dayton S. Mak 1961-1963 Charge d’ Affaires, Kuwait City Nicholas Shapiro Lakas 1962-1964 Economic Officer, Kuwait City William A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1963 Charge d’ Affaires, Kuwait City Charles O. Cecil 1966-1968 Rotation Officer, Kuwait City James A. Placke 1966-1969 Economic Officer, Kuwait City William D. Wolle 1968-1970 Deputy Chief of Mission, Kuwait City George Quincey Lumsden 1969-1972 Economic Officer, Kuwait City 1972-1974 Desk Officer, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Washington, DC Walter M. McClelland 1970-1974 Deputy Chief Of Mission, Kuwait City François M. Dickman 1972-1976 State Department, Arabian Peninsula Desk, Washington, DC Richard W. Bogosian 1972-1976 Economic Officer, Kuwait City William A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1972-1976 Ambassador, Kuwait Richard E. Undeland 1974-1975 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Kuwait City 1 Frank E. Maestrone 1976-1979 Ambassador, Kuwait Richard C. Howland 1978 Office of the Inspector General, Washington, DC François M. Dickman 1979-1983 Ambassador, Kuwait Brooks Wrampelmeier 1980-1982 Deputy Chief Of Mission, Kuwait City James Larocco 1981-1983 Economic Officer, Kuwait City Anthony Quainton 1984-1987 Ambassador, Kuwait Kenneth A. Stammerman 1987-1989 Economic Counselor, Kuwait City 1989-1992 Consul General, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Douglas R.
    [Show full text]
  • In What Way Is the Rhetoric Used in Youtube Videos Altering the Perception of the LGBTQ+ Community for Both Its Members and Non-Members?
    In What Way Is the Rhetoric Used in YouTube Videos Altering the Perception of the LGBTQ+ Community for Both Its Members and Non-Members? NATALIE MAURER Produced in Thomas Wright’s Spring 2018 ENC 1102 Introduction The LBGTQ community has become a much more prevalent part of today's society. Over the past several years, the LGBTQ community has been recognized more equally in comparison to other groups in society. June 2015 was a huge turning point for the community due to the legalization of same sex marriage. The legalization of same sex marriage in June 2015 had a great impact on the LBGTQ community, as well as non-members. With an increase in new media platforms like YouTube, content on the LGBTQ community has become more accessible and more prevalent than decades ago. LGBTQ media has been represented in movies, television shows, short videos, and even books. The exposure of LQBTQ characters in a popular 2000s sitcom called Will & Grace paved the way for LGBTQ representation in media. A study conducted by Edward Schiappa and others concluded that exposure to LGBTQ communities through TV helped educate Americans, therefore reducing sexual prejudice. Unfortunately, the way the LBGTQ community is portrayed through online media such as YouTube has an effect on LGBTQ members and non-members, and it has yet to be studied. Most “young people's experiences are affected by the present context characterized by the rapidly increasing prevalence of new (online) media” because of their exposure to several media outlets (McInroy and Craig 32). This gap has led to the research question does the LGBTQ representation on YouTube negatively or positively represent this community to its members, and in what way is the community impacted by this representation as well as non- members? One positive way the LGBTQ community was represented through media was on the popular TV show Will & Grace.
    [Show full text]
  • 2021-2 Bio Book
    BBIIOOGGRRAAPPHHIICCAALL DDAATTAA BBOOOOKK Keystone Class 2021-2 7-18 June 2021 National Defense University NDU PRESIDENT Lieutenant General Mike Plehn is the 17th President of the National Defense University. As President of NDU, he oversees its five component colleges that offer graduate-level degrees and certifications in joint professional military education to over 2,000 U.S. military officers, civilian government officials, international military officers and industry partners annually. Raised in an Army family, he graduated from Miami Southridge Senior High School in 1983 and attended the U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy with Military Distinction and a degree in Astronautical Engineering in 1988. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School as well as the College of Naval Command and Staff, where he received a Master’s Degree with Highest Distinction in National Security and Strategic Studies. He also holds a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, as well as a Master of Aerospace Science degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Lt Gen Plehn has extensive experience in joint, interagency, and special operations, including: Middle East Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and four tours at the Combatant Command level to include U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and twice at U.S. Southern Command, where he was most recently the Military Deputy Commander. He also served on the Air Staff in Strategy and Policy and as the speechwriter to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
    [Show full text]
  • 2014-2015 Impact Report
    IMPACT REPORT 2014-2015 INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MEDIA FOUNDATION ABOUT THE IWMF Our mission is to unleash the potential of women journalists as champions of press freedom to transform the global news media. Our vision is for women journalists worldwide to be fully supported, protected, recognized and rewarded for their vital contributions at all levels of the news media. As a result, consumers will increase their demand for news with a diversity of voices, stories and perspectives as a cornerstone of democracy and free expression. Photo: IWMF Fellow Sonia Paul Reporting in Uganda 2 IWMF IMPACT REPORT 2014/2015 INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MEDIA FOUNDATION IWMF BOARD OF DIRECTORS Linda Mason, Co-Chair CBS News (retired) Dear Friends, Alexandra Trower, Co-Chair We are honored to lead the IWMF Board of Directors during this amazing period of growth and renewal for our The Estée Lauder Companies, Inc. Cindi Leive, Co-Vice Chair organization. This expansion is occurring at a time when journalists, under fire and threats in many parts of the Glamour world, need us most. We’re helping in myriad ways, including providing security training for reporting in conflict Bryan Monroe, Co-Vice Chair zones, conducting multifaceted initiatives in Africa and Latin America, and funding individual reporting projects Temple University that are being communicated through the full spectrum of media. Eric Harris, Treasurer Cheddar We couldn’t be more proud of how the IWMF has prioritized smart and strategic growth to maximize our award George A. Lehner, Legal Counsel and fellowship opportunities for women journalists. Through training, support, and opportunities like the Courage Pepper Hamilton LLP in Journalism Awards, the IWMF celebrates the perseverance and commitment of female journalists worldwide.
    [Show full text]
  • Speaker Bios
    Intelligence Reform and Counterterrorism after a Decade: Are We Smarter and Safer? October 16 – 18, 2014 University of Texas at Austin THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16 Blanton Museum, UT Campus 4:00-5:00pm Welcome Remarks and Discussion: Admiral William McRaven (ret.) Admiral McRaven is the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide. McRaven served from June 2008 to June 2011 as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics. He served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of all NATO Special Operations Forces. McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; commander of SEAL Team Three; task group commander in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; task unit commander during Desert Storm and Desert Shield; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group; and SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team Four. His diverse staff and interagency experience includes assignments as the director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff; assessment director at USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare Group One.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Situation in Iraq and Syria: Us Policy Options and Implications for the Region Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
    i [H.A.S.C. No. 113–123] SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ AND SYRIA: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARING HELD JULY 29, 2014 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 89–516 WASHINGTON : 2015 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii DUNCAN HUNTER, California JACKIE SPEIER, California JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana RON BARBER, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado ANDRE´ CARSON, Indiana E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DEREK KILMER, Washington JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JON RUNYAN, New Jersey TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SCOTT H.
    [Show full text]
  • US Foreign Policy from Baghdad to Tehran: US Fears of Nuclear Proliferation May Lead to Anticipatory Defence Measures Against Iran
    US foreign policy from Baghdad to Tehran: US fears of nuclear proliferation may lead to anticipatory defence measures against Iran Lynne O’Sullivan & Ian Davis Basic Notes, 16 June 2003 Introduction Since the release of the Bush administration’s “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” in December 2002, US foreign policy has been focused on Iraq. In recent weeks, however, the US-led military intervention in Iraq and the subsequent search for Weapons of Mass Destruction to justify this invasion have been overshadowed by the new focal point of the Bush administration - Iran. When President Bush spoke of the US ‘War on Terror’ in January 2002, he labelled Iran as part of “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world”[i]. Lately, a volley of accusations by Washington against Iran has increased the pressure on the Iranian regime to declare its political intentions and military capabilities. There are four main issues under discussion: • the alleged sanctuary given to al-Queda operatives in Iran; • the potential influence of Iranian clerics in the new Iraqi regime; • the strategic and economic value of Iran; and • Iran’s suspected nuclear programme. The latter is the main focus of this Note, which begins with a brief overview of the other three issues of contention in US-Iranian relations. Iran and Terrorism The relationship between the US and Iran has been increasingly acrimonious since the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis in 1979. The conservative religious elements within Iran have referred to the US as ‘The Great Satan’ and have tacitly condoned the actions of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
    [Show full text]