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Introduction NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2006: 409–20. 6. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.1, Winter 1990/91: 23–33. 192 Notes 7. These regions were codified in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance document, written by Paul Wolfowitz, Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad. See exten- sive excerpts in “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’ ” New York Times (henceforth NYT), 8 March 1992. 8. See note 5. 9. For example, although Halper and Clarke’s America Alone includes one chapter on the neocons in the 1990s, seven of its ten chapters are about the Bush administration. Ira Chernus’ Monsters to Destroy has only one chapter out of fourteen on the Clinton years. Dorrien’s Imperial Designs has two out of six, while Fukuyama’s After the Neocons has less than half a chapter (in a book of seven chapters) on the neocons’ development in the 1990s specifically. The tendency has been to focus more on the Bush administration than the origins of its policies in the Clinton years. 10. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke have labeled the neocons “liberal imperialists” who “elevat[e] human rights to centre stage” and are on “a democratic crusade.” One of the determining criteria for intervention is to “challeng[e] the evildoers who defy American values.” America Alone: 18, 19, 22, 76, 80, 101. Gary Dorrien states that most neocons were “democratic globalists who believe in creating and/or imposing pro- American democracies throughout the world.” Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004): 5–6. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay designate them “democratic imperialists” in America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003): 15. For similar comments, see G. John Ikenberry, “The End of the Neoconservative Moment,” Survival, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2004: 7, 10; Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Neoconservative Journey” in Peter Berkowitz ed. Varieties of Conservatism in America, (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California 2004): 105, 109, 124, 126; Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2004): 63–64, 68; Steven Hurst “Myths of Neoconservatism: George W. Bush’s ‘Neoconservative’ Foreign Policy Revisited,” International Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2005: 81; Mario Del Pero, “‘A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom’: The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neoconservative Persuasion,” European University Institute Working Paper, RSCAS No. 2005/22, http://www.iue. it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/05_22.pdf (11 December 2009). Oliver Kamm and Douglas Murray both conflate neoconservatism with liberal intervention- ism. See Douglas Murray Neoconservatism: Why We Need It (Social Affairs Unit, London, 2005): 79–82, 146 and Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case For a Neoconservative Foreign Policy (Social Affairs Unit, London, 2005): 23, 69, 102, 106, 107–10. 11. Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2004). Thomas Cushman ed. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq (University of California Press, Berkeley, Notes 193 Los Angeles, London, 2005). The prowar writings of Christopher Hitchens are collected in Simon Cottee and Thomas Cushman eds. Christopher Hitchens and His Critics: Terror, Iraq and the Left (New York University Press, New York, 2008). Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2004). 12. On Muravchik’s tepid attitude to humanitarian interventions, see for example, Joshua Muravchik, “Beyond Self-Defense,” Commentary, Vol. 96 (3) December 1993: 22. For his 2003 claim, see Joshua Muravchik, “The Neoconservative Cabal,” in Irwin Stelzer, ed., The Neocon Reader (Grove Press, New York, 2004): 254–55. 13. Fukuyama, After the Neocons: 43. For Fukuyama’s original lack of sup- port for intervention in Bosnia, see Abrams et al. “Letters from Readers: ‘Global Activism’,” Commentary, December 1994: 8. 14. See also Max Boot, “Myths about Neoconservatism,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2004: 20–28; Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives,” in Stelzer ed. Neocon Reader: 226–27; Irwin Stelzer, “Neoconservatives and Their Critics,” in ibid.: 8–13; Robert Kagan “How the U.S. distorts its self-image,” Financial Times, 5 December 2006. See Charles Krauthammer’s 2006 claim that the United States needed to “chang[e] the internal structure of Arab regimes” in his speech to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Past the Apogee: America Under Pressure,” 14 November 2006, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20061213. krauthammer.pastapogee.html (15 January 2009). Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2003). 15. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, July/August 1996: 29–32. 16. Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism (AEI Press, Washington D.C., 1996): 163. 17. Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900 (University of Chicago, Chicago and London, 1999). See also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparisons of Ends and Means in Their Foreign Policies,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 30, No. 3, June 2006): 509–43. 18. Gary Dorrien points to this convergence but argues that the neo- cons are also motivated by something extra: the additional desire to promote democracy by military force. See Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 5–6. 19. Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2006): 44. 20. Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (Yale University Press, New Haven; London, 2004); Kenneth Weinstein, “Philosophic Roots, the Role of Leo Strauss and the War in Iraq,” in Stelzer ed. Neocon Reader: 203–12; Douglas Murray, Neoconservatism: Why We Need It (Social Affairs Unit, London, 2005): 25–35, 52. 194 Notes 21. Gilles Kepel argues that the neoconservative project has only two objec- tives: to protect oil supplies and to protect Israeli security. Kepel, War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Harvard, Belknapp Press, 2006): 63. 22. See Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2005: 395–413; Anna Kasten Nelson, “Continuity and Change in an Age of Unlimited Power,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2005: 437–39. 23. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 2005); Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (PublicAffairs, New York, 2004); Joseph Nye The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003); Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order (Routledge, London and New York, 2003): 108–35. 24. Those arguing that it was a radical break include: Halper and Clarke, America Alone: 7, 9, 10, 139; G. John Ikenberry, “The End of the Neoconservative Moment” Survival, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2004: 7, 10; John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 2004): 90; Douglas T. Stuart, “The neoconservatives as a continua- tion and an aberration in American Foreign Policy,” in Sergio Fabbrini ed. The United States
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