INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Contents Executive Summary...... 4 Ninewa’s governors and their Seizing the Balad farmers’ market...... 50 Al-Huwaish: A secret no one knew...... 51 relationships with the PMF...... 35 Introduction ...... 6 Fishing on Al-Tharthar Lake ...... 50 Entry to Tikrit...... 51 The PMF’s economic offices in Ninewa ...... 38 Imposing fees on returnees...... 50 Background ...... 8 Hampering business in Samarra...... 52 Differences between the Sunni tribal Plundering of Tikrit and Aldor...... 50 Frictions Within the PMF Commission...... 9 and Shiite PMF groups ...... 39 Appointments in Baiji...... 52 Conduct of the PMF and Reasons for the Disagreement...... 10 PMF interventions in education...... 40 the Peace Brigades...... 50 Reclassifying ancient ruins...... 52 Obstacles to Reform ...... 11 Prominent actions of the PMF in Ninewa. . . . . 41 The killing of the commander Albu Ajeel and the parliament elections. . . . 52 Suggestions for Change ...... 11 Basra: An Easy Relationship ...... 42 of the prime minister’s bodyguard ...... 50 The seizure of residences...... 52 The International Coalition Factions of the PMF present Attempt at demographic change ...... 50 and the IRGC-Linked Factions ...... 12 in Basra province...... 42 Threatening journalists in the province. . . . . 51 Overlapping of authority ...... 52 Prominent figures with ties to the PMF...... 43 U .S . Actions Against High-level Figures...... 14 Scores of people taken from Influence over security...... 53 IRGC Loyalists and the Iraqi Government. . . . . 14 The governor’s relationship the town of Aldor ...... 51 Establishing the ‘Youth of Reform’...... 53 with the PMF...... 43 Scores of Al Sallo tribe Confronting the IRGC-Linked Hybrid Factions . . . . 14 members disappeared...... 51 Provincial and municipal councils A Deeply Entrenched Problem ...... 53 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014) . . . . 15 and the PMF...... 44 Killing of the commander of the Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi (2014-2018) . . . 16 PMF leaders or members and 4th Division of the federal police ...... 51 Appendix of Tables and Maps...... 54-95 Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi (2018-2020) . . 16 participation on local councils ...... 44 Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi (2020-) . . . . 17 PMF leaders and members in local government positions ...... 45 In sum, Iraq’s PMF problem – the tensions over monopolizing The Militias’ Economic Activities “ in Baghdad and Ninewa Province ...... 17 Provincial council members’ violence and rule of law – has become largely an extension of connections with PMF...... 45 Security Checkpoints in Baghdad...... 17 Salah al-Din: Between State and Non-State. . . . 45 the Iran problem. Activities in Ninewa...... 19 ” The map of the PMF ...... 46 The PMF in Ninewa, Basra, and Salah al-Din. . . . . 24 Provincial officials ...... 49 Ninewa: A PMF Haven...... 24 PMF economic activity in Salah al-Din ...... 49 PMF factions in Ninewa and their relations with Shiite political elites ...... 24 The PMF’s economic committee ...... 49 Pro-PMF members of the Oil sales...... 49 Ninewa Provincial Council ...... 28 Municipal projects...... 49 PMF leaders’ positions in Ninewa province . . . . 30 ‘Taxes’ and checkpoints...... 50

COVER PHOTOS (Clockwise from top left): Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (left) and Qassem Soleimani are shown at Soleimani’s father’s funeral in December 2017. (HOSSEIN VELAYATI / Creative Commons) Shiite pilgrims stop at a tent adorned with portraits of al-Muhandis (right) and Soleimani (center) in the Al-Dora area of Baghdad in October 2020. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / Getty Images) Fighters from a Shiite militia within the Popular Mobilization Forces at the front line in the Iraqi village of Zargo, southwest of Mosul. (SEBASTIAN BACKHAUS / Getty Images) An Iraqi flag flutters above an armored vehicle as troops, supported by the Popular Mobilization Forces, advance south of Mosul, after a Popular Mobilization Forces fighters on infantry-fighting vehicles during an advance toward villages between the north- February 2017 offensive to retake the area from Islamic State fighters. ern Iraqi cities of Hawija and Kirkuk on Oct. 6, 2017, after the Iraqi forces retook Hawija from Islamic State fighters a day (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / Getty Images) before. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / Getty Images)

May 2021 2 3 May 2021 Intelligence Briefing:

■ Local and provincial politicians A Thousand Hezbollahs: cooperate with some of the militias out of their own interests, courting the PMF for political Iraq’s Emerging Militia State and financial support.

■ Frictions have Executive Summary escalated among the militias: This intelligence briefing provides extensive, the militias. These villages on the outskirts between the never before reported details on how Iran- of Mosul were predominantly Christian. ISIS militias loyal linked Iraqi militias are creating a new order to seized them in 2014. After security forces to Iran and dominate a strategic region of the country that retook the villages, militias seized the lands those loyal to connects Iraq and Syria. Iranian-linked militia in Bartella, Hamdaniya, and other areas, the Iraqi shrines, groups are taking advantage of the vacuum preventing many Christians from returning. and between the caused by the collapse of ISIS’s caliphate Militia fighters from central and southern Iraq Shiite militias and the Sunni to begin building security, social, political, have registered as residents of Ninewa Plain and tribal militias, who receive and economic structures to dominate this and Mosul in order to legitimize the seizure of fewer positions of authority and less- strategic area of Iraq. property there. effective weaponry and equipment than their Shiite counterparts. Among the findings in this briefing are: ■ The Shiite religious endowments incorporated 17 religious sites and shrines in The conclusion of the counter-ISIS campaign, ■ The militias' infiltration into police and the old city in Mosul. When such moves were far from stabilizing Iraq, is creating the security forces has allowed militias to control contested, Shiite militias sent a show of force context for future conflict and disorder that Iraqi citizens’ movements, trade, occupation, to local authorities to establish ownership of will have regional consequences and create and other aspects of private life. Some factions Sunni sites and endowments. complications for the United States. A key really after ISIS was able to establish its threaten journalists, block roads to important unintended consequence of the U.S. move to commercial areas to hamper business, and ■ The militias took control of more than 72 oil effect regime change in Iraq is that the country caliphate in 2014, that the Iranian-aligned even take scores of residents from villages to fields in the Qayyarah area south of Mosul that fell into Iran’s geopolitical orbit. Tehran was able Iraqi Shiite militias became visible as a major unknown locations. ISIS had previously controlled, and the factions to place its political proxies – largely among force. Through the critical role it played in the pilfer around 100 tanker trucks of crude oil daily. elements of Iraq’s Shiite majority community – dismantling of the ISIS caliphate in Iraq, the ■ Militias have used threats and acts of in the new political system built by the United Shiite militia coalition known as the Popular violence to get their preferred academics put in ■ The militias make hundreds of thousands of States. However, the nascent state was Mobilization Forces (PMF) established itself as charge of some of the more important colleges dollars every day through extortion at going to be weak and thus insufficient for a major force. By 2017, and as a consequence in provinces where the militias are flourishing. illegal checkpoints they have set up across the Islamic Republic’s efforts to dominate its of its heavy involvement in the liberation of They have also established schools that do not the country. western neighbor. For this reason, Iran moved areas that had been taken over by ISIS, the follow local or federal norms and rules. to cultivate Shiite militias as a key instrument Shiite militia alliance emerged as a power ■ The militias demand protection money of through which it could transform a state that center rivaling Baghdad and a threat to human ■ Following the liberation of Mosul and the rest $1,000 to $3,000 monthly on larger restaurants. represented a threat into a one that is weak and security in the country. Not only did these of Ninewa province from ISIS, the militias began Owners who fail to pay could have their subordinate to its wishes. militias in an unprecedented manner seize manipulating land ownership to engage in restaurants blown up, and other parties, control over largely Sunni areas of the country, demographic engineering. Agricultural lands in including the Iraqi army, would falsely attribute It was not until well after the 2011 U.S. but they also posed a major challenge to the the Ninewa Plain area were distributed among the explosion to ISIS. military departure from the country, and writ of the Iraqi state.

May 2021 4 5 May 2021 In this briefing, we offer granular details of the commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani – the extent to which Shiite militias have embedded architect of the Iran’s Iraqi Shiite proxy network themselves into the political economy of areas – did strike a major blow to these militias but that they took from ISIS. While attempts to bring also emboldened them, and as a result they these militias within the fold of the Iraqi state remain deeply rooted in the country. have been unsuccessful, this report shows how These militias represent a major challenge for these nonstate actors have become a parallel U.S. efforts to work with the Iraqi government state by creating their own political economy, and counter Iran’s influence in the country. which is riddled with corruption. Additionally, More recently, these militias have also these Shiite militias have coerced their way begun to threaten Turkish forces trying to into Iraq’s national security apparatus and have project influence into northern Iraq. This Iraqi Shiite fighters from the Popular Mobilization Forces militias advance south of Tal Afar on Nov. 29, 2016. been recipients of official state funds since the report highlights how these Shiite Islamist (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images) prime minister at the time, Haydar al-Abadi, armed nonstate actors are controlling key moved in 2018 to try to incorporate them into sectors beyond security, such as real estate, undermine the fragile Iraqi state. At the same for Shiite settlements in historically Sunni- the state security system. The writ of the federal construction, infrastructure, and education. time, various Iraqi leaders have attempted to majority territories. government in Baghdad is being weakened in In this way, they are consolidating their grip do this to differing degrees rather than let the the process. The January 2020 U.S. decision in northwestern Iraq and are enabling Iran’s entrenchment deepen, raising the prospect of The report’s focus on Ninewa presents a to assassinate a top leader of the PMF, Abu broader regional strategy extending through the escalation between different stakeholders within detailed case study of arguably the most Mahdi al-Muhandis, along with the top Iranian Levant to the Mediterranean. the state as both sides’ options narrow. critical area systematically targeted by these militias. It highlights how the Shiite militias Research for this report was cut short, resulting exploited the war against the ISIS caliphate to Introduction in what appears to be an incomplete study (it dominate a very diverse region that has been This intelligence briefing reveals, to an dominated by Shiite actors with close ties to should be noted that the graphics in this report the home of minority Sunni, Kurdish, Christian, unprecedented degree, the sheer breadth Tehran. The PMF enjoys this deep penetration cover details not mentioned in the text). and Yazidi communities. The details show the and depth of the penetration of Iraq by the of the Iraqi state and society because the Shiite groups’ strategic moves to dominate Shiite-dominated militia confederation known post-2003 republic that the United States This report has extensive details on a region that connects Iraq to Syria and is as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). helped establish has been heavily shaped Ninewa province. There is a reason for this part of Iran’s effort to consolidate its sphere Independent investigation and communication by Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite factions. This disproportionate focus: Ninewa is the province of influence from Mesopotamia through the with well-placed Iraqi sources reveal an Iraq in militia encroachment on, and exploitation of, where these militias are most active well beyond Levant to the Mediterranean. The Iraqi Shiite which widespread public and private institutions various spheres of life in Iraq is not limited their Shiite core turf in central and southern takeover of Ninewa also helps the Iranians and are thoroughly infiltrated, dominated, co-opted, to institutions but extends to the daily lives Iraq, because of the fight to liberate Mosul and their Iraqi allies to prevent the emergence of a or otherwise compromised by PMF elements. of vast numbers of Iraqis and their quotidian other areas from the Islamic State. They filled cross-border Sunni majority region (formerly Significantly, the PMF factions most implicated matters. In the aggregate, this creates new the vacuum left by ISIS, which has allowed them under ISIS control). with the undermining of the Iraqi state are elites complicit and invested in a circle of to pervade the daily lives of the locals, including the ones closest to the Islamic Republic of militarized corruption. extortion of restaurants and demographic This report is based on extensive field research Iran and/or its allied Iraqi political principals, re-engineering (taking over Christian parts of involving lengthy and detailed conversations such as the Fatah alliance and the Sanad This intelligence briefing highlights the growing the region, much as ISIS did). This is also where and interviews with intelligence officers, local parliamentary bloc. dilemma facing nationally minded Iraqis in the militiamen from the Shiite south were given government officials, local residents, business and out of government, as it has become official domicile and were able to own land, owners, truck drivers, militias, and government The PMF’s influence and control over the increasingly difficult to conceive of a way appropriate businesses, and prevent displaced officials in Baghdad. Iraqi state is the most obvious aspect of the to rein in much of the PMF or to weaken it families from returning in order to make way — Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy broader reality that the post-Baathist regime is without a destructive confrontation that would

May 2021 6 7 May 2021 Background The PMF Commission gained Al-Mohammadawi was put on Frictions Within the and the religious authorities there legitimacy with Iraq’s Law 40, a U.S. Treasury sanctions list … the IRGC-aligned as represented by Khamenei. raq’s PMF, known formally as the passed in 2016, and adopted in January 2021. PMF Commission “ PMF Commission (also known an organizational framework factions calling In response to al-Muhandis’ 2 . Mid-level positions: five There are tensions between as Popular Mobilization Units or established by executive orders dealings with the al-Abbas I assistant to the chief of staff the two different clerical trends themselves the Division, the trustee of the the Hashd al-Shaabi), has strong 237, 328, and 331, issued in positions, three assistant offices inside the PMF: the factions loyal ties to Shiite religious authorities. 2019. The framework of the ‘Islamic Resistance’ religious authorities in Najaf, under IRGC loyalist leadership, to Iran’s Khamenei, previously The PMF originally consisted of 67 Popular Mobilization Forces Sayyid Ahmad al-Safi, said in and two other assistant offices led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, incorporate factions Shiite factions, 43 Sunni factions, Commission, in accordance with a speech from Karbala: “The consisting of retired leaderships and the movement that follows the executive orders issued in that were established affiliation to the al-Abbas Combat and nine factions belonging to or mandated military and security the supreme Shiite cleric in 2019, organized the PMF militias Division must have a price, the minorities in the areas south leaderships who are chosen by Najaf, al-Sistani. In particular, the into 64 brigades distributed over before al-Sistani’s and part of that price is to be of the Kurdistan region. The 67 political parties close to the IRGC al-Abbas Combat Division, which eight operational commands. patient and not compromise Shiite factions were divided in loyalist leaders. fatwa in 2014 that The brigades are not allowed to is affiliated with the al-Abbas on our principles and our terms of ties to different clerics. Shrine religious establishment in established the PMF. use their own banners or faction 3 . Mid-level administration and identity and values, despite the Forty-four factions (known as the Karbala, which follows al-Sistani, ” names; they are only allowed to logistical command positions: presence of open choices.” This Hashd al-Wala’i, or “loyal factions”) has been at odds with the Iran- use brigade numbers and official around 10 directorates, seven of speech confirmed the depth followed Iranian Supreme Leader linked militia leadership. PMF banners. Executive Order 237 which are for the administration of the disagreement between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and were 2017 to formally connect an was meant to lay the groundwork belonging to the militias loyal to the two sides. directly linked to Iran’s Islamic These groups, though entire regiment of the al-Abbas to break the connection of the Iran and three administrations for Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). connected centrally with the Division to the Defense Ministry. In a previous press conference, PMF militias with the political and civilians who were elected with Seventeen factions were linked government, differ in terms of Observers and military personnel one of the commanders of the religious parties and entities, while the recommendation of political to Iraq’s shrines and followed the financing, modus operandi, and described the move as “a positive Imam Ali Battalions affiliated Executive Order 328 subordinated parties close to the IRGC-aligned powerful Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand ideologies. The IRGC-aligned transformation of the PMF, and with al-Sistani, Sabah al-Azirjawi, the PMF to the joint command for militia leaders. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and the factions calling themselves the Iraqi armed forces. Executive including it into the ranks of the revealed disagreements between remaining Shiite factions followed the “Islamic Resistance” Order 331 established an 4 . Field administration positions: regular forces.” But the IRGC the factions affiliated with other Shiite religious authorities incorporate groups that were organizational and administrative approximately 50 directorates, with loyalist militia leaders in the Najaf and the holy shrines and inside and outside of Iraq. established before al-Sistani’s framework composed of: a portion connected to offices of PMF Commission were alarmed their counterparts in the PMF. assistants to the chief of staff of fatwa in 2014 that established by this changing relationship He said the disagreements The total manpower for the PMF 1 . Four top leadership positions the PMF Commission. Thirty-two the PMF to combat ISIS in between the government and a involved logistics, thought, and is approximately 164,000 affiliated for the Shiite political house are affiliated with the IRGC loyalist Iraq. The “Resistance” factions faction loyal to al-Sistani. ideology. Al-Azirjawi noted that personnel and members in combat close to the leadership of the factions, and 18 are elected or – like the Badr Organization, “… there are Iraqi fighters with and logistics. Rough estimates put PMF factions loyal to Iran, known delegated by political parties close Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib In January 2018, al-Muhandis the regime in Syria, and a great the manpower of the PMF's Shiite as wala’i factions: head of the to the leaders of the IRGC loyalists. Hezbollah of Iraq – consider decided to break the al-Abbas many of them have returned component at around 110,000 commission, office of head of the This quick survey indicates that themselves more entitled than Division’s link to the al-Abbas recently. As for others, and they members, the Sunni component commission, secretary-general, the organizational leadership and the others to financing and shrine and incorporate it fully are some thousands, they are around 45,000, and the minorities and chief of staff for the IRGC administrative framework for the honors, since they fought the into the PMF forces command present and I do not know from around 10,000. Of the Shiite loyalists (the groupings of PMF Commission is administered U.S. presence after 2003 and in the Middle Euphrates, under where they obtain their money, factions, the IRGC loyalists consist Shiite militias loyal to the IRGC). at a proportion of 80% through represent a core of Iran’s military the authority of the al-Muhandis frankly.” This was in reference of approximately 70,000 personnel, Currently Abu Fadak Abd al-Aziz al- leadership and administrations influence inside Iraq. appointee retired Brig. Gen. Ali to al-Nujaba’, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the militias who follow other Mohammadawi is considered the affiliated with the Iranian religious al-Hamdani. This angered the Badr, and al-Khorasani forces, religious authorities, including the supreme executive and practical authorities, while the groups The tensions between the commander of the al-Abbas which have been fighting for Peace Brigades (Saraya al-Salam) leader, connected to five assistant affiliated with al-Sistani and the factions that follow al-Sistani Division, Maytham al-Zaidi, years in the areas of Syria with affiliated with maverick Iraqi Shiite offices to the chief of staff and Sunni and minority PMF groups and those loyal to Khamenei who launched a campaign of Iranian financing and support leader Muqtada al-Sadr, have eight operations commands of do not hold high or mid-level began after Iraq’s prime minister, statements against al-Muhandis, from the Syrian regime, and the approximately 40,000 members. the PMF Commission forces. leadership positions. Haydar al-Abadi, agreed in July criticizing his loyalty to Tehran exploitation of the wealth of the

May 2021 8 9 May 2021 PMF in Iraq for the interest of rejected it on the grounds that decisions that have been taken. militias are extensions of political 2. Subordinating the factions those factions. the holy shrines are not political The rest of the brigade leaders These militias [IRGC- parties, enjoy representation in to state control, in addition to parties or movements striving are thus unaware of the issues “ the Iraqi state, and have seats the problems of military rank, The friction between the two for authority and participating under discussion. linked brigades] on the PMF Commission, all age, educational attainment, sides grew in February 2018 to in the elections, but rather they are extensions of while being connected to Iran’s and logistical and combat the degree that al-Muhandis, are institutions affiliated with The lack of equal participation transnational, pan-Shiite project. military classification. This could the deputy head of the PMF the state, describing Muhandis’ in PMF Commission decision political parties, enjoy transform the PMF Commission Commission at the time, issued condition that it is an attempt making – especially about the In light of these issues, into a theater for long and a series of decisions to put a to continue in the marginalizing commission’s framework and representation in the the necessity of modifying arduous bureaucratic discussions financial and administrative and sidelining the factions loyal the election of al-Mohammadawi Iraqi state... Executive Order 331 is obvious. that undercut the need for quick stranglehold on the Iraq-oriented to the supreme marja’iya in Najaf as al-Muhandis’ successor – ” The armed forces general decisions on critical issues. armed factions connected for reasons of their wholesale undermines the ability of the commander should be able with the shrines and al-Sistani. disagreement with the views of nationalist brigades to influence to impose his authority and 3. The leaders of the militias By March 2018, the tensions al-Muhandis, which he saw as in the pro-IRGC leadership’s not deeply tied to Iran by giving exercise oversight of the actions linked to al-Sistani and Iraq’s between the two groups were at conflict with Baghdad and Najaf. decisions. This marginalization their leaders a central role. Iraqi of the PMF Commission’s shrines and the al-Abbas the point where a senior source of the pro-Sistani leaders has Shiite religious personalities such supreme leadership. Division’s al-Zaidi have no choice told the newspaper Al-Aalem Reasons for the led to their militias’ separation as al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Safi and but to deal with the leaders of the al-Jadid that: Disagreement from the PMF Commission. In Sheikh Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbala’i Obstacles to Reform IRGC-aligned brigades and al- April 2020, the factions loyal to have demanded a fundamental Mohammadawi, and vice versa. … a meeting was held at the The division of power and al-Sistani administratively and correction in the organizational The lack of internal agreements The pro-Sistani factions currently start of last week that included resources between the militias operationally came under the framework for the PMF on a new framework for the PMF depend on the Iran-linked groups leaders of the PMF to discuss linked to the IRGC and the other direct command of the office of Commission that would improve Commission constitutes a real and their resources for leadership, the law presented by the prime PMF factions has given the the general commander of the representation. challenge to the modification of operations, security, political minister Haydar al-Abadi and brigades loyal to Iran’s Khamenei Iraqi armed forces. Executive Order 331. Suggestions relationships, special forces, connected with the reorganizing an advantage. The imbalance has The leadership of the pro-Sistani from pro-Sistani factions and and military manufacturing. of the framework of the PMF. created financial and logistical Other PMF groups not aligned brigades and the Peace Brigades al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades to divide However, the Iran-linked groups And during the meeting Abu problems for the militia leaders with the IRGC have approached loyal to al-Sadr have criticized the positions and finances in also need the pro-Sistani militia Mahdi asked the commander of associated with Iraq’s shrines the al-Sistani loyalists about the number of economic offices the commission more fairly and groups for religious justification the al-Abbas Combat Division and religious authorities, who feel joining them, perhaps in an supporting the factions loyal to encourage more comprehensive of the existence of the PMF Maytham al-Zaidi – and he thwarted and marginalized by the entirely new organization that Khamenei and have repeatedly joint participation were met with Commission. The commission’s is one of the members of the PMF leadership. would have the same legal asked for financial accountability. rejection. The most prominent establishment is linked with the committee entrusted with and financial cover as the PMF The pro-IRGC militia leaders obstacles will be: fatwa of June 13, 2014, issued reorganizing the PMF according Additionally, the PMF Commission, because they – justify the lack of oversight by the religious authorities in to the new government law – to Commission leaders have made particularly the pro-al-Sadr Peace for those economic offices 1. The problematic independence al-Najaf, known as the fatwa of break the connection of his decisions without transparency, Brigades and the Sunni factions on the grounds that they are of the PMF militias that have “collective defense.” Media linked division and the rest of the holy depriving the leaders of the – see no future for themselves political, and thus not subject internal and external political to the IRGC loyalist militias have shrine factions affiliated with the pro-Sistani factions the chance within the PMF. It is not possible to the oversight of the PMF and military connections. This revealed over the past six years religious marja’iya [authorities] to participate in decision for the small and medium-sized Commission. The two main could lead to inertia for the PMF that the leaders of the Iran-linked from those shrines, following making, share their opinions, and PMF factions to make their issues are the setting of salaries Commission because of the militias use the Iraqi fatwa the example of the factions that propose solutions to problems voices heard – a violation of the for PMF Commission forces and increased likelihood of conflicts to give their combat policies broke their link with their political the PMF encounters. The PMF principle of balance within the that militias loyal to Iran and not of interest with the increased religious legitimacy. parties and movements like Commission decisions are often PMF Commission. The leaders of affiliated with the commission proportion of positions for Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr not revealed until the office of the brigades linked to Iraq’s shrines brigades are using commission the pro-IRGC militia leaders Suggestions for Change organization [sic] and others, deputy head of the commission, and al-Sistani have demanded resources. Moreover, the IRGC- and actions they could take to but this suggestion aroused the or the commission’s chief of that the PMF Commission correct linked brigades are hybrids in that preserve their interests and those It is clear that the current anger of al-Zaidi, as he absolutely staff, releases reports about the this imbalance for the factions they have dual loyalties. These of their allies. framework of the PMF

May 2021 10 11 May 2021 Commission is not in agreement that these statements lack truth. the raids but that even if it were Katyusha cells have called for with the political system. More The commission The former Iraqi premier also Israel, the attacks were justified. Turkey to withdraw its forces. [These organizations people oppose the commission’s “ said that they do not concern the “ framework today than when should also receive Iraqi battlespace and described The IRGC-linked factions have According to statements believe] arms alone dealt with the U.S. military published on social media it was established. The governmental and them as excerpts from cinematic are what will lead to commission is experiencing films that are not appropriate as presence in Iraq through the use accounts belonging to those many problems, and Western and parliamentary evidence. The reports published of “Katyusha cells” – groups organizations, including a slogan the withdrawal of the using Katyusha rockets – of borne in the name of the “Islamic Arab states are encouraging Iraq oversight to by research centers and Western to dissolve or downsize the PMF, papers affirmed that some unknown origins. So just as the Resistance” and Qur’anic texts, U.S. forces and the reduce the factions’ manpower, prevent illegitimate of the IRGC-affiliated groups United States says it has no the organizations explained international coalition. merge the groups with Iraq’s have lit the fuse of provocation knowledge of who targets the their positions in different ways regular forces, or consider the decisions that without specific aims in IRGC-aligned militias’ bases, the but with one meaning: Arms Politics will only result factions as reserve forces to contravene Iraqi law. directing unproven accusations Iran-linked militias say they bear alone are what will lead to the in a larger presence be summoned as needed and ” unsupported by credible no responsibility for or knowledge withdrawal of the U.S. forces with fair retirement salaries. The evidence. Those accusations of who launched the Katyushas. and the international coalition. of these current PMF framework does grew more common after the U.S. Politics will only result in a larger Between October 2019 and foreign forces. not align with Iraq’s ongoing announcement in May 2018 of its presence of these foreign forces. ” The International April 2021, the Katyusha cells dramatic political and economic economic sanctions on Iran. increased the number of their The international coalition, via changes and multiple crises, Coalition and the operations, conducting more direct discussions with the Iraqi such as terrorism, international IRGC-Linked Factions Meanwhile, the U.S. deployment The Katyusha cells, according than 65 attacks that targeted the leadership, coordinated the conflicts, and increasing poverty. of forces in Syria, particularly U.S. and international coalition withdrawal of forces from nine to analyses of the media from All of these factors further add Since March 2015, official in the eastern areas, threatens military and civilian presence in camps and joint Iraqi bases. Iranian-linked factions, have to the need to reorganize the sources from the IRGC-aligned lines of communication announced their victory in factions like Kata’ib Hezbollah, between Tehran and its allies in Iraq. Then three organizations The coalition is also redeploying commission framework. compelling the international al-Nujaba’, Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Syria – particularly the Iraqi and of unknown factional affiliation and concentrating its forces in coalition to withdraw and mocked In the end, there must be clearly and Jund al-Imam have Lebanese factions – while also claimed the bombings of the three bases, while activating the ties between the withdrawal defined criteria for the positions been publishing statements, facilitating or tolerating Israeli al-Taji camp and the Basmaya two Patriot missile systems and procedures to limit the of the PMF Commission; use of condemnations, and some air strikes on Iranian assets. The camp. They also claimed drone – one in Anbar and another spread of COVID-19. While Iran military law against renegades; videos and photos regarding U.S. strikes have targeted personnel reconnaissance operations to in Erbil – in order to resist the has not been able to use Iraqi active roles for security; and targeting – directly or indirectly as well as Iran-linked militia bases photograph the U.S. Embassy in Iranian ballistic missiles. The skies to threaten Israel, the recent legalism. The commission needs – of their fighters. These groups’ and storage facilities in Iraq. The Baghdad, the Ain al-Assad base in Iraqi government has deployed to close the economic offices and main grievance is that the U.S. most intense of these attacks Anbar, and the Ali al-Salim base in the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, drone activity by the IRGC loyalist forbid political and party activity appears to be intentionally targeted the military camps of Kuwait. These organizations are Artillery, and Mortar) air defense groups has targeted Saudi Arabia. Usbat al-Thaireen, Ashab al-Kahf, so that the PMF can play its role surpassing the confines of its Amerli, south Baghdad, Balad, system to counter Katyusha and Qubdat al-Hoda. Another rockets and mortars. Government During the last two years of the inside the body of the Iraqi state mission to counter ISIS in Iraq and al-Qa’im between July 2019 new armed organization named forces are in an area with a Trump administration, pro-IRGC and in harmony with the laws and with a perceived offensive on and September 2019. Saraya Awliyat Al Dam claimed 50- to 70-kilometer buffer zone militias lost their freedom to constitution of Iraq. Iran-aligned PMF militias. Those Israeli raids pushed the responsibility for a rocket attack to prevent IRGC-linked militias establish camps and weapons It is also necessary to subject Most of those statements and pro-IRGC militia leaders and in the center of Erbil in Iraqi from approaching coalition storage facilities. In addition, the commission’s actions to documents issued via the Iraqi the Shiite political parties to Kurdistan on Feb. 15, 2021 – an facilities. Pro-IRGC militiamen their manufacturing capabilities financial and administrative media have been subject to hold the United States and the unprecedented escalation in will be subject to deadly force if were weakened, their activities oversight. The commission special technical and military international coalition completely how these groups operated. they attempt to approach these and movements have become should also receive governmental investigations. Al-Abadi responsible, since they have They all claim that they are in a positions, especially in the area restricted, and their leaders have and parliamentary oversight to announced more than once, the greatest influence over the war with the United States and surrounding Ain al-Assad airbase been placed under economic prevent illegitimate decisions that in his capacity as the general Iraqi skies. Washington said it international coalition forces in in west Anbar. sanctions and on terrorism lists. contravene Iraqi law. commander for the armed forces, does not know who carried out Iraq. Since the attack on Erbil, the The leaders suffered from the

May 2021 12 13 May 2021 restrictions on their movement, Washington to hand over wanted However, there have been influence of armed factions targeting the economic interests particularly after the Jan. 3, individuals. However, Kawtharani political divisions among pro- through dealings with their Their governmental of the militias and their leaders 2020, killing of IRGC-Quds Force perhaps will consider changing IRGC factions. After Mustafa political principals and without “ while engaging in dialogue with commander Qassem Soleimani the level of personal security he al-Kadhimi’s selection as a prime resorting to violent clashes. cover gives their political branches and the and PMF deputy chief Abu has and will be more discreet in ministerial candidate, Kata’ib The gradual approach involves them protection religious offices that supported Mahdi al-Muhandis. his visits to Iraq. Hezbollah and Kata’ib Sayyid disbanding the armed factions them. The government also al-Shuhada’ violated the Shiite and their transformation into from pursuit pursued individuals involved Previously, the United States U.S. Actions Against political consensus and likewise parties engaged in a national by the judiciary in armed operations against High-level Figures imposed sanctions on Ahmad al- almost the consensus of the legal dialogue. That said, those Iraqi citizens – actions that Hamidawi, the secretary general IRGC loyalists in accepting his armed factions that resist or the security classified the militias’ most of Kata’ib Hezbollah, who is nomination. (Previously, these disarmament will have to be prominent leaders as terrorists Before the assassination of establishment. Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the close to the IRGC. The sanctions groups fell out of sync with the dealt with using the state’s ” under Iraqi law. assumption was that the United aimed to intensify pressure on PMF Commission presidency, the coercive apparatuses. States would not dare target top Tehran, weaken its ability to al-Sistani loyalist brigades, and Al-Maliki’s government also PMF leaders. This means they threaten Western interests in the Peace Brigades leadership.) The Iraqi political experience but with more experience and worked to sow divisions within were not that concerned about Iraq, and keep it from avoiding This division among the Iranian- since 2007 shows the process for greater effectiveness. the militias and to arm dissident their personal security. the economic sanctions with the linked militias is between two dealing with armed Shiite factions fighters and citizens groups help of its Iraqi allies. The United groups: one that considers if the state is unable to influence The way the Iraqi state has dealt called “tribal support councils” The United States offered a $10 States also imposed sanctions fighting to be the solution their behavior and the influence with armed groups has differed to support the government in million reward for information on Adnan Yunis al-Hamidawi, because there is no more time of these factions threatens the from one government to another its military operations against about Muhammad Kawtharani, the special ops commander in for politics or diplomacy to expel state’s institutions, constitution, and from one faction to another. the rebellious militias. The the political coordinator between Kata’ib Hezbollah. However, these foreign forces from Iraq, and one economy, law, and sovereignty. In dealing with hybrid or mixed government then merged Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi sanctions have not harmed the that favors using diplomatic and The state could resort to seeking groups after 2007, four different the support councils with the political parties. Kawtharani’s IRGC-linked factions’ economic legal means before deciding to help from outside powers – a prime ministers used four official security apparatus, thus mission in Iraq included playing resources. The militias’ activities wage an armed conflict. decision that could be affected different methods: avoiding direct confrontation a large role in implementing have not been deeply affected by the growing role of the hybrid with the rebellious factions. This reconciliation between Sunni and by either the sanctions or the Confronting the factions – in order to prevent Prime Minister Nouri is what happened in Basra and Shiite political forces. Washington foreign airstrikes. the militias getting entangled al-Maliki (2006-2014) Baghdad in 2008. may have information that he has IRGC-Linked with state organs. carried out hostile acts, and it IRGC Loyalists and Hybrid Factions Al-Maliki’s government did not This approach carries great could be that he participated with the Iraqi Government The consequences of adopting resort to the use of force as the risks and entails great caution. It armed groups in suppressing The state’s ability to monopolize purely coercive means and first option to counter rebellious also requires authorities to have the demonstrations of 2019, or The militias loyal to Iran’s violence is directly related to approaches, which are a Shiite groups. Al-Maliki used the will and control to end the that he has recently filled the supreme leader gradually limiting the spread of weapons combination of soft and force only after attempts at confrontation at a given time and gap that Iran’s Soleimani left gained influence in the Adil Abd and neutralizing the warlike hard power, disrupted the reconciliation, disarmament, and to be able to manage splinter in Iraq. He also has strong ties al-Mahdi government. They had attitude of the factions that have effectiveness of some of integration failed. What motivated groups. Since 2011, such groups to the Iran-linked militias. It is unrestricted media access, a joint put themselves in the gray area of the hybrid factions but didn’t al-Maliki’s government to employ have grown large enough to well-known that he is not very political wing in the parliament, having a political party ensconced eliminate them. Instead, it has force was the militias engaging create their own parallel state. concerned about his personal important governmental in the legislature and the broader shifted them from confrontations in violence after the government Thus, this method could lead to security when he is in Iraq, and positions, and the ability to political system along with an with the government to threatened their military and an intra-Shiite war if loyalists from he may be easier to target by self-finance, plus access to a ideological armed wing operating conflicts with the locals and economic power. drones. The Iraqi government network of internal and external parallel to the state. security forces. Moreover, these both the government and militias’ has no intention of handing him investments. Their governmental factions are smaller offshoots The al-Maliki administration side of the conflict were involved. over to the United States if he cover gives them protection from The state’s capacity to impose of larger groups with the same launched Operation “Sawlat Al- Moreover, the government failed enters Iraqi territory; Baghdad pursuit by the judiciary or the its writ is mainly a function of ideology and methodology Forsan” (Charge of the Knights) in to keep weapons in the hands has no bilateral agreement with security establishment. its ability to gradually limit the coordination with U.S. forces, first of its forces and the forces it

May 2021 14 15 May 2021 backed, leading to a proliferation hybrid factions to administrate Al-Mahdi’s government failed to thus restricting the militias and al-Kadhimi in a situation similar of arms in several regions that … al-Abadi’s the Sunni and minority cities reach a true understanding with influencing their violent behavior. to al-Mahdi’s, especially if the has created a lasting threat to the “ according to a specific timeline the militias, and this methodology rebellious factions felt that the stability of the state. government allowed that did not allow them to be part was the reason why many PMF The way al-Kadhimi’s government government’s actions could dealt with the Albu Eitha hybrid factions to of the coming elections. However, groups became hybrid factions. threaten their very existence. Prime Minister Haydar they could still impose their The al-Mahdi government lacked incident south of Baghdad They have political, military, al-Abadi (2014-2018) administrate the favored candidates. the firmness, control, and respect on June 26, 2020 – in which economic, and media power for partnership with the armed the PMF headquarters was which enables them to fight back Al-Abadi’s government promoted Sunni and minority In March 2018, al-Abadi issued factions for this methodology raided – could be considered against anyone that threatens the integration of hybrid factions cities according to precise instructions that paved to work. Partnerships require a rushed application of this their interests, and they are into the political arena by the way for the involvement concessions from both parties methodology. Fourteen militia capable of making al-Kadhimi enacting Law No. 40 of 2016 a specific timeline of hybrid militias within the to reach a common ground and members accused of attacking accept a balance of power. of the Popular Mobilization which did not allow national defense system. not the imposition of unrealistic the U.S. Embassy were arrested Authority, which separates These instructions were meant red lines, such as those not met in the raid. Though there was The Militias’ Economic them to be part of the to facilitate his interactions during several incidents between popular and judicial cover – the armed action and political Activities in Baghdad action. Al-Abadi’s methodology coming elections. with them based on the law of mid-2019 and mid-2020. government had indicting stemmed from the deepening ” military discipline, which includes evidence – the government and Ninewa Province of the involvement of the hybrid the disclosure of the militias’ Prime Minister Mustafa backed off and released all factions in political life, their networks of economic resources. al-Kadhimi (2020-) of those arrested. The quick Security Checkpoints preoccupation with government method on al-Abadi because the However, al-Abadi’s instructions move back to dialogue from in Baghdad issues and legislation, and their militias earned their legitimacy created a rough relationship The current government is using prosecution shows that the demilitarization outside the PMF. from their perceived sacrifices in between the prime minister and a blend of soft power and hard government had not fully 1. Al-Sayafiya checkpoint – the battles to liberate parts of Iraq the leaders of the hybrid militias, power, targeting the militias’ gamed out the plan before Albu Sayfi: Located on the The logic in using this method from ISIS and the government’s which resulted in al-Abadi’s failure interests, classifying them pulling the trigger. international route connecting was that it would create some failure to openly reject their to win a second term. according to how closely they Baghdad and the provinces This retreat may halt the state’s kind of moderation in the growing influence. adhere to the national standard of the mid-Euphrates. The attempts to use force to limit the leaders of the hybrid factions; Prime Minister Adil Abd for the PMF, and working to checkpoint was set up in 2015 influence of the hybrid factions. they would become less radical, During the liberation, when al-Mahdi (2018-2020) stop them from infiltrating under the supervision of Baghdad Instead, the state could return more pragmatic, and more able al-Muhandis was the top governmental bodies. operations. Division 17 of the to pursuing dialogue and using to switch from the doctrine of commander of the militias, the Al-Mahdi’s methodology enabled Iraqi army and a force of Kata’ib cautious containment to restrict armed solutions to the doctrine groups’ activities changed to the hybrid factions and their Al-Kadhimi’s government realizes Sayyid al-Shuhada’ Brigade 14 the militias’ expansion and the of solutions through dialogue. focus more on providing essential parties to participate in the that it is too early to start a participates with them, as do pan-Shiite resistance aspect of They would also become willing needs and public services the government’s executive and bone-breaking battle with the Kata’ib Hezbollah Brigade 46 the IRGC-linked factions. to spend time building alliances government had been unable legislative authorities. The hybrid factions. The current and Saraya al-Khorasani Brigade in order to obtain their share to provide the citizenry, and logic behind this was that the administration realizes that any 18. The militias collect between Al-Kadhimi’s team has realized of ministries and agencies, on preserving security and government typically fails to attempt to impose the law on the $5,000 and $10,000 each day, that there must be a strong state even with parties that differ stability. This made the citizens dismantle or control the militias, militias could become a complex illegally, from the movement of in order to implement the smart ideologically and systematically trust the militias and forced the so it would be better to bring misadventure and that it may be goods and trucks. power methodology to limit the from them, including government to accept that the them in as partners. Al-Mahdi difficult for the hybrid factions size of these factions and their their opponents. groups would need to be involved gave the factions every reason to accept integration into the 2 . Diyala Bridge checkpoint: involvement in the government in preserving the security of the to participate and was good to state or to negotiate. This means Located south of Baghdad bodies. The failure in Albu Eitha Al-Abadi did not really choose liberated areas, especially where the groups, yet they treated him the government could target at its entrance from the side forced the government to accept this methodology; pressure other authorities felt powerless. badly. He left his position early the official positions the militias of al-Mada’in, set up in 2014, that the state will need to balance stemming from liberation because of the October 2019 have acquired illegally and strip and under the supervision of its power with the militias’. Taking operations imposed this option As part of this approach, protests and the Shiite religious them of economic offices that the Baghdad operations and another rushed step could put upon him. The PMF forced this al-Abadi’s government allowed authorities’ demands. control wealth and public funds, the federal police command.

May 2021 16 17 May 2021 Brigade 6 of the Popular to address the special treatment in 2016, the checkpoint is under through the old Baghdad-Fallujah provincial budget to support the Mobilization Forces Kata’ib that certain vehicles receive at joint supervision between the The checkpoint route. The Badr Organization PMF under the recommendation Jund al-Imam and Brigade 18 the checkpoint (vehicles linked Salah al-Din and Baghdad “ collects a sum of $10,000 daily of the Marji’yah in Najaf. Al-Akoub Saraya al-Khorasani participate to certain political parties or security forces. Participating prevents Sunni citizens from illegal taxes on trucks and gave official statements to the in the administration of the influential individuals). Most in the supervision are forces goods, according to a source who media praising the PMF’s heroism checkpoint unofficially. They were of these vehicles are used for from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Brigade from crossing toward works for the local government. and saying the clothes were a represented by Maytham al-Akili smuggling. They also become a 43, which has economic and Baghdad unless they part of a duty paid to them in the (Editor’s note: al-Akili, who had source of bribery for the soldiers security connections with Asa’ib 7 . Khan Bani Sa’ad checkpoint: name of Ninewa province. After been arrested in May 2020, was at the checkpoint. The inspector commander Jawad al-Talaibawi. pay $10 for each Located on the old route between Iraqi security forces liberated sentenced to death by an Iraqi demanded documentation of The checkpoint prevents Sunni person and $100 Baghdad and Baqubah, this Sunni-majority provinces from court in September for extorting any instances of exploitation citizens from crossing toward checkpoint is controlled by ISIS, PMF-aligned officials and contractors in the Mada’in area.) that allow these vehicles to carry Baghdad unless they pay $10 for for each truck. Saraya al-Khorasani Brigade other influential people started This checkpoint is along the old unsanctioned goods and to take each person and $100 for each ” 18. Reactivated in 2015, the using phrases like “Sunnis are route between Baghdad and the measures against those who truck. Citizens have mentioned checkpoint provides $5,000- grateful” or “Sunnis are indebted” southern provinces. The PMF commit these violations. He also that the ban applies to women, $7,000 daily from illegal taxes to the Shiite militias, casting a personnel have collected illegal asked for a rotation of personnel men, children, and the infirm. Diyala, this is considered the imposed on farmers’ goods. sectarian light on the whole Iraqi funds from the Diyala Bridge at checkpoints and the prioritizing Travelers have mentioned rough main checkpoint for the eastern security apparatus. Rejecting since 2014, and their daily take of cargo vehicles carrying treatment from the soldiers entrance to Baghdad. Established 8 . Dira’ Dijla checkpoint: Located the idea would be considered exceeds $100,000, according to perishable goods such as food by overseeing the checkpoint, in the 1980s and reactivated in on the road connecting northwest controversial or sectarian, as it an officer in the federal police giving them a special route. which is considered the gate 2004, this checkpoint is affiliated Baghdad and Fallujah, this could be seen as a denial of the intelligence. A former Interior to enter Baghdad from Salah with the Baghdad security checkpoint was established in Shiite role in military operations. Ministry inspector visited The inspector added that some al-Din province. The checkpoint forces. Administration is a joint 2011 and is under the control Therefore, no one could the Diyala Bridge checkpoint parties have violated regulations collects $30,000 daily for effort between Division 11 of of Baghdad security forces and question al-Akoub’s decisions on the route connecting the and have let cargo cars pass Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. the Iraqi army and the federal Division 6 of the Iraqi army. The to reward the PMF with the provinces of Baghdad and through the checkpoints without police. In 2014 the PMF began to now-defunct Brigade 99 PMF province’s funds. Wasit. The inspector met with stopping or lining up. Some 4 . Iskaniya-Awirij checkpoint: participate in its administration Jaysh al-Mu’ammal, affiliated with the checkpoint commander vehicles loaded with scrap metal Located south of Baghdad on the in an illegal sense: A force from Sa’ad Sawar, also participated in 2 . Agricultural lands: After the and a number of the officers, in would stop a significant distance Baghdad-Babil road. Established Brigade 42 Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq supervising the checkpoint, which liberation of Mosul and the addition to several truck drivers before certain checkpoints while in the 1980s, this checkpoint has accumulates a daily sum of collected an estimated $1,000 rest of Ninewa province from at the checkpoint, in order to they awaited a “special permit” been under the administration of $10,000-$20,000 from illegal daily from the movement of ISIS, agricultural lands in the verify claims that truck and that would allow them entrance. Baghdad operations command taxes taken for the passage of people and agricultural products, Ninewa Plain area – about 74 car drivers were subjected to Each permit would then allow since 2012. It is supervised by goods and trucks. according to an Iraqi army acres – were distributed among extortion. Some car drivers the passage of many cargo Division 17 of the Iraqi army, and intelligence officer. the militias. These villages on have encountered extortion cars without having to stop in 2014 a force from Brigade 46 6 . Al-Tahaddi checkpoint at the outskirts of Mosul were at the checkpoint, where for inspection. Kata’ib Hezbollah and a force al-Karmah: In 2016 the security Activities in Ninewa predominantly Christian. ISIS traffic personnel and the PMF from Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ forces opened the al-Tahaddi seized them in 2014, and after 1 . Clothes and food: Former allow them to pass directly in Since al-Akili’s arrest, control Brigade 14 began participating checkpoint east of Fallujah four security forces retook the villages provincial governor Nofal exchange for money. of the checkpoint is no longer in the checkpoint’s supervision years after the checkpoint’s PMF factions seized the lands administrated by PMF’s Brigade 6, illegally. This checkpoint gives closure, in order to reduce the al-Akoub was supplying the in Bartella, al-Hamdaniya, and The inspector demanded that but it remains unclear if all the brigades around $100,000 a traffic going through the al-Suqur PMF under al-Muhandis’ other areas, preventing many the checkpoint be relocated to extortion operations have ended. day, according to an intelligence checkpoint. The Anbar security command with clothes and Christians from returning. a less-congested area and that officer from the Iraqi army. forces supervise this checkpoint, military necessities in addition This is part of a campaign the sandy road that leads to the 3 . Al-Abayaji checkpoint: with participation from Brigade to comestibles designated for of demographic change that checkpoint’s truck sensors be Located between north Baghdad 5 . Al-Ghalibiya checkpoint: 27 PMF affiliated with the Badr cooking. In one of his deals, seeks to move Shiites into these paved. He also called for the and south Salah al-Din on the Located east of Baghdad on the Organization. This checkpoint al-Akoub used more than areas. There have also been Interior Ministry to take measures international route. Established route connecting Baghdad and connects Baghdad and Anbar $250,000 from the Ninewa systematic and legal moves

May 2021 18 19 May 2021 to consolidate this process allegedly have the tombs of Sunni Waqf documents. The an official capacity but under of demographic engineering. Brigade 30 ‘Shabak Regiment’ takes $400 from several descendants of the PMF has acted in cooperation dubious legal cover. Additionally, fighters who came “ Imams who are revered in both with the former director of the from central and southern Iraq restaurant owners and $200 from café owners Shiite and Sunni Islam. Instead investment commission, Abd 10 . Real estate: PMF factions of utilizing the shrines to serve al-Kareem Muhammad Hassan, have registered as residents monthly, collecting around $120,000 a month. are involved in selling and buying of Ninewa Plain and Mosul in ” concepts of unity and tolerance, the husband of the Ninewa houses and real estate, especially order to legitimize the seizure of they have been politicized to provincial councilmember Khalida properties in the important this property. This occurred as further the militia domination of al-Ma’amari from the Sanad Bloc, and vital economic areas in a result of pressure from Hadi have seized prized portions 6 . Fees from restaurants and Mosul. The director of the Shiite which is affiliated with former the province. For instance, the Waqf in Ninewa, Basim al-Bayati, PMF Commission spokesman al-Amiri (who leads both the of commercial property at cafes: Brigade 30 “Shabak factions are involved in home Badr Organization militia and has tried to send official letters Ahmad al-Asadi. There have the intersection of the al-Bakr, Regiment” takes $400 from and land sales in the old city the Fatah Alliance parliamentary accompanied by a force affiliated been intensive meetings with al-Nour, and al-Sina’a regions restaurant owners and $200 in Mosul, where the real estate bloc) and al-Muhandis. from cafe owners monthly, with the PMF with equipment, the director of the investment and the fourth bridge on the weapons, and military vehicles. commission and commanders trade is growing. The lack of collecting around $120,000 a 3 . Dealing in land: The PMF east side of Mosul, in addition All these activities to establish from the PMF to transfer basic goods and services has month from more than 900 factions in Mosul are working to the al-Karama industrial area ownership for the interest of ownership of the lands through contributed to the increase of restaurants and cafes in the with the help of directors in and the al-Khansaa’ hospital. the Shiite Waqf have been in official means from the Ninewa sales, as have the deteriorated Ninewa Plain area as protection some of the land registry All of these properties have coordination with the former provincial council. living and economic conditions money. This is an unofficial offices to seize large tracts of been converted into business head of the security committee and the fear of explosive devices arrangement but has been land in Ninewa, particularly in buildings through which PMF in the Ninewa provincial council, 9 . Oil tanker trucks: Militias took left by ISIS. The sales are conducted with the knowledge Mosul. The PMF factions have Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati. control of more than 72 oil fields factions obtain dozens of of the Ninewa provincial council encouraged by the government’s seized approximately 200 strips He is affiliated with the al-Hikma in the Qayyarah area south of millions of dinars monthly. under the supervision of the motivation to turn the city over of residential, business, and movement led by the prominent Mosul that ISIS had previously Some of these properties were former director of the municipal to investment companies for agricultural land, with some of Shiite clerical al-Hakim family, controlled. After the liberation of designated for public services, rebuilding. As a result, dozens these fields being close to 40 offices of Ninewa, Abd al-Qadir which played a key role in the Mosul from ISIS, the smuggling but the greed of the municipal of residential blocks that were acres. The PMF, with the help Ahmad Hassan al-Dakheel, who is moves to topple the Baathist operations have continued under designated for governmental of the current director of the directors has deprived the city of affiliated with the Peace Brigades regime and its replacement with the supervision of factions municipal offices of Ninewa, this real estate. and who imposes taxes and fees the current political system. affiliated with the PMF and projects like health centers and seized a piece of agricultural and distributes them to the Shiite with the knowledge of the local schools in the neighborhoods land in the al-Shalalat region 5 . Base renovations: Al-Akoub PMF groups in Ninewa province. 8 . Commercial properties: The authorities. Daily, the factions of al-Muhandiseen, al-Zirai’i, and northwest of Mosul, obtaining renovated the base of the Kata’ib Shiite Waqf is trying to get its steal around 100 tanker trucks al-Wuzara’, along with farms and agreements illegitimately to Sayyid al-Shuhada’ faction, 7 . Religious sites: According hands on properties of the Sunni of crude oil and sell the oil. The properties in other areas, have convert the land to a residential located near the Ninewa Awbarwi to official documents issued Waqf in the areas of Nabi Sheet, local council in Ninewa province been sold at moderate prices by by the Sunni Waqf (charitable area. The land has been divided hotel. He took the renovation al-Dawasa, Bab al-Toub, Bab al- does not speak about the oil the municipal office to influential foundation) and the investment up and sold to citizens at prices budget from a portion of the Sari, and the al-Sayagh market in portfolio at all because there is an people in Ninewa, including its property commission of the Sunni reaching 40,000,000 Iraqi dinars profits from the investment old Mosul, after it seized the waqf agreement between the current council members and officials. Waqf in Ninewa, the Shiite Waqf belonging to the mosque of Nabi governor, Najim al-Jubouri, and ($33,500) for every 200 square projects that he implements The investment projects and the continues to try to incorporate 17 Yunis in the city’s east. The Shiite the PMF Commission in Ninewa meters (about 0.05 acres). in western Mosul, including lands seized in Ninewa are valued Note that the price of the entire religious sites in the old city in the Waqf has tried to seize properties stipulating that the oil portfolio contracting and reconstruction, at around $35 million. These piece of land did not exceed heart of Mosul. The shrines have belonging to the mosque of in the districts and subdistricts as he has imposed a “tax” on the operations are done through 4 billion dinars ($3.3 million) cultural and spiritual significance the daughters of al-Hassan in should belong to the PMF as contractors and companies. The official ownership transfers of when it was divided into more in the city. The takeover of the al-Sayagh market, a mosque built payment for sacrifices during the than 900 parcels. renovation was meant to win shrines by the Shiite Waqf is seen by the Shaheedos, a well-known liberation of Mosul, in addition residential blocks by al-Dakheel, the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ as a violation by the population Mosul family. The mosque has to the protection that the PMF who divided the areas among the 4 . Investment in commercial faction’s approval and help al- and could risk increasing been operated by Shaheedos forces offer in those areas. Shiite PMF groups affiliated with properties: PMF factions Akoub to remain in office. sectarian tensions. The shrines for many generations as per These operations continue in the commission.

May 2021 20 21 May 2021 11 . Real estate in major/ PMF contracts). Al-Dakheel disbursements were for prominently the Peace Brigades, blood money to the families of traditional marketplaces: Many The economic participates in this process; he projects in the old city, which Brigade 30, Lalish, and Izidkhan the drowned and the survivors, properties in the area of al-Nabi “ is the one who chooses the bids was controlled by Kata’ib – divide the money among reckoned at 10,000,000 Iraqi Yunis, the market of Bab al-Sari, offices controlled by and refers them to the PMF Babiliyun, and other areas in the themselves according to the dinars (almost $8,400), with the have been transformed into and obtains a financial share, in al-Hadhr area, such as Nimrud, agreement with the local council continuation of the agreement shops and sold and rented out the militias impose addition to other shares for the Tal Abta, and Tal Afar, which under the advisement of the between Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and to the inhabitants of the city, fees and taxes on the director of the water office and were controlled by PMF groups parliamentary committee of the owners of the project. The although the land belongs to the the director of the sewage office affiliated with Harakat al-Nujaba’, migration and displacement. director of investment and the Sunni Waqf, and its endowment owners of businesses, in Ninewa. This office is linked Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib al-Imam The committee has counted former director of the municipal has been operating for more restaurants, to the Fatah Alliance (the largest Ali, and Sayyid al-Shuhada’. The 13 camps in the Ninewa area offices in the province of Ninewa than 30 years. The PMF has bloc in parliament representing contracts connected with bridges with a population that reached participated in this deal. obtained all the necessary companies, public PMF factions) and the MP of and some of the service offices 700,000 IDPs between 2014 documents without recourse for transportation, cars, Tal Afar, Mukhtar Mahmoud are transferred to the municipal and now. Meanwhile, the armed 18 . Stationery and teaching the Sunni Waqf. Yusuf Salman al-Mousawi, who directorate in Ninewa, which PMF groups obtain a portion of necessities: Khalid Taha Sa’id, and car park squares, facilitates the works from his refers them to the engineering protection payment from the the general director of the 12 . Taxes and rents from and those who do not position as a parliament member offices affiliated with the PMF Iraqi Ministry of Displacement Ninewa education directorate, parking garages for cars and and maintains ties with the PMF. groups, compares the biddings and Migration – 15% of the distributes lucrative financial transport and truck companies: pay are extorted. to determine preference, and funds allocated by the ministry contracts connected with The economic offices controlled ” 14 . Larger restaurants: The divides the projects among the for the camps. The money necessities for government by the militias impose fees PMF imposes taxes of $1,000 armed factions as a donation in coming from European states schools – stationery and paper and taxes on the owners to $3,000 on the pretext of a legal sense without exposure to support the IDPs is divided goods, clothes, books, and school of businesses, restaurants, protection on larger restaurants, to accountability. Some of among the factions. maintenance – and distributes PMF factions, who then divide companies, public transportation, and those who do not pay are the projects have failed or about 25% of the expenditure the tax money up according cars, and car park squares, subject to extortion and attacks, slowed, like the al-Suwais and 17 . Tourist projects: The owner money to PMF factions. He does to agreements among them. and those who do not pay are such as the explosion that al-Muthanna bridges. At the of the al-Jazeera Umm Rabaen this to preserve his position and No investigation has been extorted. Several businesses targeted the well-known Abu same time, previous contractors tourist project in Mosul signed close corruption files against opened because the garages have been victims of grenade Layla restaurant in the middle of – owners of engineering and an agreement with Asa’ib Ahl him. The most prominent PMF and transportation of goods are and IED attacks. Targets have Mosul in November 2018. The building companies – are not al-Haq giving the group 20% of group taking a portion from included a restaurant, a trucking connected exclusively to the PMF. explosion was not a terrorist awarded the contracts, even the project’s profits in exchange the education directorate is the company in Mosul, and three attack carried out by ISIS, as though they have expertise and for protection, lower taxes, and Badr Organization, affiliated with 13 . Water and sewage: The other businesses. In each case, announced by the Iraqi army, but reputations in Ninewa province. easier municipal procedures. Hadi al-Amiri. PMF is involved in most projects the business owner refused to came a day after a threat to the The contracts have been valued This was implemented until a connected with extending water pay the armed factions in charge restaurant owner who refused to at more than $59 million, which ferry transporting families to a 19 . Salaries of martyrs of the pipes and sewage, and others of the economic offices in the give a $2,500 monthly fee to one the PMF factions have divided tourist area on the Umm Rabaen PMF: The Martyrs Foundation within reconstruction projects, city. This indicates that these of the economic offices, as he among themselves, with some island in the Tigris sank in March specifies salaries for the sons investment projects, building offices are a tool for Iran and its had already paid a similar sum to going to influential officials and 2019, killing more than 57 people of the PMF as a part of the proxies that refused to withdraw of residential complexes, and another office. These extortions building companies. and leaving more than 45 other donations and government from Mosul after liberation on extension of water lines to the occur under the watch of the people, including women and support. The foundation is the pretext of preventing ISIS’s villages and countryside areas. mayor of Mosul, Zuhair al-Araji. 16 . IDP (Internally Displaced children, missing. It is believed reorganizing its structure. A return. The former director of This is done in cooperation with Persons) camps: International that the ferry owner worked extra number of contingents have the municipal offices in Ninewa the director of the water office 15 . Contracting and NGOs do not grant the PMF hours, including during high tides, joined it, like victims of terrorist province, Abd al-Qadir Ahmad in Ninewa and the director of reconstruction projects: The forces money, but they pay and overloaded the ferry in order operations and their wounded, Hassan al-Dakheel, is the one the sewages of Ninewa. Bids central government in Baghdad taxes to the Ninewa provincial to pay the 20% fee. A few months and martyrs of the PMF and who transferred taxes of public are accepted from companies has disbursed nearly $336 council and other taxes on social ago, however, an agreement their wounded, in addition to the properties and rents belonging linked to the PMF (businessmen million for the reconstruction security and health insurance. was reached to reopen the martyrs of the past regime, which to the province to the Shiite act as fronts and facilitate the of Mosul. The most prominent The Shiite PMF groups – most project after a payment of necessitates a reconsideration of

May 2021 22 23 May 2021 the framework of the foundation. PMF factions in Ninewa 2 . Babiliyun Battalions (Brigade incorporated into the PMF – first 11 . Suqour al-Jazeera: A Sunni The salaries of the PMF martyrs and their relations with 50): A Christian regiment, as the al-Nasr al-Mubin regiment The explosion was regiment headed by Nayef offered to their families can reach Shiite political elites considered one of the most and then as Regiment 80. “ al-Shammari, an MP in the Iraqi 875,000 dinars (about $733) per important factions of the PMF not a terrorist attack parliament for Ninewa province 6 . Lalish Regiment (Brigade 36): family per month. There are more than 30,000 in Ninewa province, headed by carried out by ISIS, with connections to Hadi al-Amiri. PMF fighters spread throughout Rayan al-Kaldani and supported A regiment of Yazidis headed Al-Shammari supports al-Amiri by Al-Khal Ali and Khadida Ninewa and trained in the camps directly by Da’wa Party Secretary as announced by the in parliament and supplies the The PMF in Ninewa, Kojo, considered one of the of Makhmour east of Mosul General Nouri al-Maliki. The group militia with equipment and most extreme PMF groups as Iraqi army, but came Basra, and Salah al-Din and Aweinat to the west, and originated in Brigade 30. weapons. This faction is present it commits violations against at the Qayyarah base to the a day after a threat to in the Tal Afar subdistrict area, 3 . Imam Ali Battalions: A both Muslims and Christians in Ninewa: A PMF Haven south. Indeed, the PMF has its controls the Tal Afar airport, and own operations command in regiment headed by Shabal al- Mount Sinjar and al-Qayrwan. It the restaurant owner is considered one of the largest Ninewa is emerging as an Ninewa province. One should in Zaidi and Abu Azra’il. Its military has created many problems and who refused to give PMF groups. It is in contact important crossroads of military general distinguish between the advance began in Salah al-Din seized other sects’ agricultural with the provincial council escalation and confrontation larger PMF formations that are province, then reached Ninewa lands. The group originated in a $2,500 monthly through the militia’s female between Turkish forces and registered as brigades on the province (al-Qayrwan, al-Hadhar Brigade 53 of the PMF, affiliated fee to one of the candidate, Aseen Hamza. allied peshmerga fighters, PMF Commission and the smaller and Tal Abta), with support with the Badr Organization. from the former governor Nofal Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) tribal PMF groups that have economic offices, as al-Akoub, who lives in al-Hadhar 7 . Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ 12 . Al-Nawader Regiment elements, and Iran-aligned PMF regiment numbers. Many of the he had already paid district. Abu Ali al-Karwi, a military (Brigade 14): A Shiite regiment (Regiments 69 and 70): A Sunni militias. The PMF’s expanding tribal groups work closely with official in the group, serves as the headed by Abu Ala al-Wala’i, a similar sum to regiment headed by MP Abd influence in Ninewa province the Iraqi army divisions stationed deputy commander of the PMF’s deputy of the PMF Commission al-Raheem al-Shammari. He has in Ninewa. Their training has been indicates a long-term objective of Ninewa operations command. who succeeded al-Muhandis. another office. a direct effect on the formation supervised by Maj. Gen. Karim ” increased presence and control He has strong connections of general opinion inside the al-Shuwaili, who has served in northern Iraq. 4 . Al-Hussein Brigade (Brigade with the most prominent of the Ninewa provincial council, and as deputy commander of the 53): A group recruited primarily commanders of the Ninewa he has close connections with The PMF has influential political Ninewa operations command from Shiite Turkmen of the Tal operations, and he is considered has an office for economic affairs the command of the Iraqi special representation in the Ninewa of the Iraqi army and as general Afar area. It is tied to the Badr the most powerful personality on the west side of Mosul, and it forces known as SWAT forces. provincial council through overseer of the PMF in Ninewa. Organization, whose Ninewa in coordinating the movements members loyal to the forces, just branch is headed by Abu Zainab of the PMF in the districts and controls the Badush area. Al- 1 . Shabak Regiment-Brigade 13 . Lions of the Tigris Force as the province currently has al-Ta’i. The original commander of subdistricts of Ninewa province. Sabbar has direct relations with (Regiment 36): A Sunni regiment 30, also called the Ninewa Plain this brigade, Mukhtar al-Mousawi, the greatest number of Shiite the PMF’s intelligence apparatus headed by Muhammad Ahmad Forces: A regiment of the Shiite subsequently became al-Fatah 8 . Al-Asa’ib Regiment (Brigades PMF fighters deployed after the and the commander of the Ninth Saleh al-Jubouri, one of the Shabak component, considered Alliance MP for Tal Afar. 41, 42, and 43): A Shiite regiment liberation operations in 2017. Emergency Police Regiment. most important sheikhs of the one of the most powerful factions headed by Abu Baqir al-Jubouri, The PMF also has a strong al-Jubour tribes. He has ties with of the PMF in the Ninewa Plain, 5 . Asayish Izidkhan and Sinjar who is also the director of the connection with the country’s 10 . Al-Luhaib Regiment previously headed by Wa’ad Resistance Units: Yazidi groups office of Asa’ib al-Haq chief Qais Ahmad al-Jubouri (also known as National Security Council al-Qaddo, brother of Hanin linked to the YPG (People’s al-Khaz’ali. This PMF faction (Regiment 44): A Sunni regiment Abu Mazen), and his forces are (NSC). Below is an explanation al-Qaddo, the deputy for the Protection Units) in Syria and the has an economic arm based on headed by Marwan al-Zaidan, present in south and west Mosul. of the most prominent PMF Shabak component in the Iraqi PKK. These groups are part of the west side of Mosul, which member of the Ninewa provincial representatives in Ninewa, the parliament for Ninewa province. 14 . South Mosul Regiment an “autonomous administration” extorts fees from owners of council and brother of the MP PMF’s most prominent political Hanin al-Qaddo was nominated project in Sinjar similar to the (Regiment 31): A Sunni regiment factories and workshops. Faleh al-Zaidan. This PMF faction and security relationships in the as a candidate under the Fatah project in the areas held by the headed by Nazhan al-Sakhr province, and the connections Alliance parliamentary bloc. YPG/Syrian Democratic Forces 9 . Saraya al-Khorasani (Brigade uses its fighters to pressure al-Lahibi, who is connected with between provincial officials and The brigade’s origins lie in the in Syria. Parts of the Sinjar 18): A Shiite regiment headed by members of their tribe to vote for the MP Falah al-Zaidan from the the PMF Commission. Badr Organization. Resistance Units have been Khudhair Alaiwi al-Sabbar that them in elections. al-Lahib tribe.

May 2021 24 25 May 2021 15 . Al-Tahaddi Regiment 19 . Rabi’a Regiment: A Sunni 25 . Lions of Ninewa Regiment ties with other regiments, in al-Sabah al-Jubouri, who formed 39 . Bayariq al-Iraq Regiment (Regiment 34): A Sunni regiment regiment led by Fawaz Dhiyab al- (Regiment 64): A Sunni regiment particular Brigade 30. the regiment in the Nimrud area. (Regiment 38): A Sunni regiment headed by Watban al-Ramah, one Jarba, one of the most prominent led by MP Ahmad Madlul al-Jarba It has close connections with led by Meqdad al-Sheikh Faris of the most prominent sheikhs of leaders upon whom the Shammar of the Arab Project bloc. It has 30 . Al-Karar Regiment (Regiment Rayan al-Kaldani, the leader of Abdullah al-Sab’awi. The regiment the Shammar tribe in the Rabi’a tribe relies in its relations with the direct relations with prominent 41): A Shiite regiment led by Iraq Kata’ib Babiliyun. is affiliated with the al-Sab’aween army officer veteran Muhammad area. He has close connections government in Baghdad. Shiite political figure and tribe present in the area of al-Waka’, who is a native of the with prominent parliamentarian militia leader Hadi al-Amiri and 35 . Shield of the Hunchback Bu’waiza and al-Rashidiya. south Mosul area and a member Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari. 20 . Ninewa Guard (Brigade 57): participates in the distribution of Regiment (Regiment 15): A Sunni A Sunni regiment present in the agricultural lands for the PMF. of the al-Jubouri tribe. The group regiment led by Ahmad Mahmoud 40 . Al-Akoub Regiment operates in the Tal Afar district (Regiment 17): A Sunni regiment 16 . Al-Jubour Tribe Regiment: Badush area, it is considered al-Warshan, comprising fighters and al-Ayadhiya subdistrict, led by Mazahem Ghazi, one of the A Sunni regiment headed by among the largest factions. 26 . Regiment 54 al-Tanaya 1: affiliated with the al-Hadidin tribe comprises Turkmen fighters, and relatives of the former Ninewa Muhammad al-Sabah, one of the Its commander is Maj. Gen. A Sunni regiment led by Faysal in Ninewa province. It has close has close connections with the governor al-Akoub. It extorted most important sheikhs of the Muhammad Yahya al-Talib. Watan al-Jarba. He had close ties connections with the head of the Fatah Bloc led by Hadi al-Amiri. the families and inhabitants to tribes supporting former Ninewa with al-Muhandis and controls joint center for intelligence and vote for al-Akoub in order to avoid governor Mansour al-Mar’id. They 21 . Al-Qayyara Martyrs farms for wheat and barley in 31 . Al-Hadhr Regiment: A Sunni security of Ninewa, Maj. Gen. Abd investigation of the investment are present in the al-Ba’aj district. (Regiment 32): A Sunni Rabi’a on the Iraqi-Syrian border. regiment led by Hawad al- al-Khaliq al-Khayqani. deals connected with the ruins in Al-Sabah had an important regiment led by Muhammad 27 . Al-Jazeera Shield Regiment Ahmadi. It has close connections the al-Hadhr area. role in convincing a great al-Mar’id, brother of the 36 . Heroes of Sinjar Regiment: (Regiment 52): A Sunni regiment with the PMF through the former portion of the al-Jubour tribe to previous governor of Ninewa, A Sunni regiment led by Aamer 41 . Ramah al-Mosul Regiment led by Safuk Mani’ al-Yawar. This governor, Nofal al-Akoub. It is vote for al-Mar’id. Mansour al-Mar’id. He has close present in the al-Hadhr area and al-Sinjari, cooperating with (Regiments 23 and 24): A Sunni regiment is located in the area of connections with the NSC. controls the most important the Yazidi Izidkhan and Lalish regiment led by Yusuf al-Ramah al-Jazeera and al-Khalidiya and 17 . Al-Arabi Neighborhood archaeological sites in al-Hadhr. regiments and coordinating and Abu Ramah al-Siyab and is in contact with the Ninewa Regiment (Regiment 14): A 22 . Shammar forces regiment: control of the Sinjar area, closely connected with MP operations command through Sunni regiment headed by Omar A Sunni regiment led by Abd 32 . Talul al-Baaj Regiment setting up checkpoints in for Ninewa Muhammad Iqbal a group of army officers, the al-Alaf. He has ties with the al-Kareem Madlul al-Jarba. (Regiment 51): A Sunni regiment Sunni Arab areas of the al-Saydali, who formed the most prominent of whom is Col. former deputy for the Ninewa It participated in the most led by Ahmad Mahaidi Saleh community. The regiment has regiment. It obtained votes for Mazhar al-Gharkan al-Bailawi. provincial council, Hassan al-Alaf. important battles in confronting al-Shammari. It has close ties with the Patriotic Union of al-Saydali in 2018. This regiment is present in the ISIS in the al-Ba’aj area. It has connections with the former Kurdistan (PUK) party. 28 . Al-Jawa’ina Regiment 42 . Al-Jubouri Commandos al-Arabi neighborhood on the east huge popular support among Ninewa operations commander (Regiment 37): Led by Sunni Regiment (Regiment 39): A side of Mosul. This is considered the Shammar tribe. and the current governor, 37 . Regiment 11 al-Hamdani: A tribal sheikh Hamdi al-Jaw’ani. Sunni regiment led by MP for a strategic area between Dahuk Najim al-Jubouri. Sunni regiment led by Hisham Its base lies in the al-Sada al- Ninewa province Muhammad in the northern autonomous 23 . Mosul Shield Regiment: A al-Hamdani. It has close ties Jawa’ina tribe in south Ninewa 33 . Hamam al-Alil Regiment: Nouri al-Abd Rabbah. He has Kurdistan region and Mosul. Sunni regiment led by Dhiyab with the PMF leader Abd al- province. It works with the Iraqi A Sunni regiment led by Naseef direct contact with the current Makif al-Shammari, one of the Karim al-Shuwaili. army’s 16th division. It has close al-Ameed Ibrahim al-Marsoumi. governor, al-Jubouri. 18 . Lions of Al-Jaghyafa sheikhs of the Shammar tribe connections with the Kurdistan It has close connections with Regiment (Regiment 60): A 38 . Knights of al-Jubour who can influence members of Regional Government through oil the former head of the Iraqi 43 . Regiment 63 al-Safuk: A Sunni regiment led by Nawar (Regiment 48): A Sunni regiment the Ninewa Provincial Council. projects in Ninewa province. army’s Ninewa operations Sunni regiment led by Fanar Nayef al-Afin, who resisted the led by Ahmad al-Jubouri, the commander and the current Ahmad al-Safuk. The regiment is 24 . Regiment 60 al-Tanaya 2: A strongest of the ISIS attacks in 29 . Regiment 65 al-Luwaizi: governor, al-Jubouri. MP for Ninewa province. This present in the al-Ayadhiya area in the area of Rabi’a and al-Ba’aj. Sunni regiment led by Abdullah A Sunni regiment led by Munif regiment participated in directing Tal Afar and closely connected He cooperates closely with the As’ad al-Basha that is present in al-Ali al-Luwaizi and connected 34 . Al-Nimrud Regiment: A a great portion of the al-Jubouri with Hadi al-Amiri. The group Iraqi military’s Ninewa operations the area of Rabi’a and al-Ba’aj. with the MP for Ninewa province Sunni regiment led by Ahmad tribe in al-Qayara and al-Ba’aj also has important information command and therefore has Al-Basha has ties with the Abd al-Rahman al-Luwaizi. al-Jawari and closely connected to vote for al-Jubouri in the about the Sunni component in the large quantities of weapons. federal police. This regiment has close with tribal chief Sheikh Khalid 2018 elections. Tal Afar district.

May 2021 26 27 May 2021 44 . Badush Regiment: A Sunni He is the most important source the key person connecting all the with the KDP. He has served as regiment led by Radwan Nafi’ of intelligence on PMF operations building projects and contractors head of the Energy Committee Muhammad and present in in the province. with the security committee. He “ (Al-Bayati) possesses important information there and deputy head of the Badush in Ninewa province. The gives the PMF about 15-25% and has influence, and he uses extortion Security Committee in the regiment is closely connected He had direct relations with of the profits, depending on province. He has direct ties with with Sheikh Emad al-Saylaiwi, the previous governor, Nofal the number of projects and the against all who oppose the presence of the PMF the governor, Najim al-Jubouri, who established the PMF and al-Akoub, who became governor extent of financial grants from the in Ninewa province. and the PMF. The oil wells in commands Division 15. The with the support of the NSC. foreign states. ” Ninewa are divided between the group also has direct contact with Al-Bayati heads the security PMF and the KDP, and al- 71st Brigade commander Brig. committee. He accompanied 2 . Dawoud Jundi Suleiman Barifkani is the key link between Gen. Moayed Muhammad. al-Akoub in all his field tours Sheikh Kalo: Council member the two sides. Oil business and attended the security for the PUK, close to the PKK incorporation of the Sinjar district 4 . Daldar Abdullah Ahmad deals are done through him, 45 . Al-Matyutiya Regiment meetings with the Ninewa forces in the Sinjar area. The to the region, and the rejection al-Zibari: He has close ties to especially those involving (Regiment 19): A Sunni security forces command, the PKK has strong ties with the of holding a referendum on the the PUK and stands against the Safiya oil field, which regiment led by Ali Jasim intelligence apparatus, and the PMF, by virtue of the PUK’s fate of Kurdistan. the policy of the KDP because since 2019 has been under al-Matyuti, closely connected PMF Commission. Therefore he connection with Iran, and their of old tribal disagreements. He the control of the Kurdistan with the directorate of the possesses important information continuing disagreements Regional Government. 3 . Balqis Taha Hussein Shanin, has a party called Development Ninewa emergency regiment and has influence, and he uses with the Kurdistan Democratic Huda Zaki al-Wazan, Khalida and Justice, and he has and present in the areas of Tal extortion against all who oppose Party (KDP), which rules Iraq’s 6 . Asin Hamza Khalil Amin: Ismail Mahaimid al-Ma’amari, longstanding relations with the the presence of the PMF in autonomous Kurdistan region. Council member for the Abta and al-Ba’aj. and Kamila Nashmi al-Matyuti: Ninewa province. Also, al-Bayati Kalo also has ties to the Yazidis Iraqi government. He participated Fatah Alliance and a Shiite Provincial council members for 46 . Al-Khafaja Regiment meets weekly with the PMF and Kurdish nationalists in the in intensive meetings in Baghdad Turkmen. She has close political the Sanad Bloc. Sanad was not (Regiment 46): A Sunni regiment forces affiliated with the Shiite Sinjar mountain area. with former IRGC-Quds Force connections with Fatah chief on the list of blocs participating led by Shahadha Jasim Azzawi component, like Kata’ib Sayyid commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Hadi al-Amiri. Amin is the most in Ninewa’s provincial council al-Khafaji, closely connected with al-Shuhada’. Al-Bayati coordinates The PMF and the PKK struck an Soleimani. His paternal uncle is prominent candidate for Fatah elections in 2013 and had no the former commander of the all the activities of the current agreement shortly before the Arshad Zibari, a delegate minister in Ninewa, as she announced political role in Ninewa. But after PMF in Ninewa, Maj. Gen. Karim governor, Najim al-Jubouri, and battle to regain Mosul on Oct. in the time of Saddam Hussein her intention to run in the Iraqi ISIS seized Ninewa in 2014, the al-Shuwaili, who was responsible he gives security agreements for 17, 2016, that gave the party’s and the official responsible for the parliament elections for the council was dissolved, and after for overseeing and training NGOs, foundations, and all the fighters weapons and allowed the National Defense Units al-Fursan fourth session in 2020. She the liberation operations in 2016, Ninewa’s tribal PMF factions. It is news and press agencies. Kurds’ distribution among PMF at that time (al-Fursan’s mission entered the Ninewa Provincial based in the south Ninewa region. factions in order to fight ISIS. the PMF entered Ninewa among was to recruit Kurdish fighters Council with support from Al-Bayati has direct ties with The PMF leadership coordinates various Iraqi forces and remained to pursue and kill some of the al-Amiri as a step toward Pro-PMF members of the the director of the investment almost continual meetings there, cementing its control sheikhs of the tribes affiliated entering the Iraqi parliament. Ninewa Provincial Council committee in the province, Abd between leaders in the IRGC and over large areas of Ninewa with al-Barzani’s forces). Al-Zibari Amin supports the PMF openly al-Kareem Muhamad Hassan, the PKK to discuss the provision province, including the Ninewa is considered the chief PUK in her speeches and was very 1 . Muhammad Ibrahim Ali and he does not give security of military aid to reinforce the Plain and Tal Afar. The relatively official coordinating the party’s close to Gen. Najim al-Jubouri al-Bayati (Abu Haydar): A Shiite agreements to investors’ projects party’s fighters in coordination young Sanad Bloc is led by MP security and political relations when he was in the anti-ISIS Turkmen from the al-Hikma unless there are financial with the PMF, in order to secure Ahmad al-Asadi, who served with both the PMF and the PKK. Crisis Committee. She was the National Movement headed by payments, the biggest portion the land route connecting the as a spokesman for the official The PMF supports al-Zibari legal adviser who investigated Ammar al-Hakeem. Al-Bayati is of which goes to the PMF on western borders of Iran and PMF Commission and is tied with money and influence and corruption charges and was on the de facto head of the Shiite the pretext of protecting the Syria through the town of Sinjar. to Kata’ib Jund al-Imam (PMF pressured officials to appoint him the investigation committee for lobby in the Ninewa Provincial investments. He is closely And the PKK adopts the official Brigade 6). These four women as deputy governor of Ninewa in the ferry incident in Mosul. Council. He is the former head connected as well with the former Iranian and Iraqi positions, as well were convinced to join the Sanad the prior session. of the security committee, and director of the municipal offices as those of the PMF leadership, Bloc with offers of more than 7 . Ali Khudair al-Jubouri: he controls the Shiite council of Ninewa province, Abd al-Qadir in opposing the independence $30,000 each, with houses and 5 . Hashim Muhammad Ali Taha Council member representing members and directs their votes. al-Dakheel, who is considered of the Kurdistan region, the 2019 Land Cruisers. al-Barifkani: He is affiliated the Iraqiyat Ninewa bloc led

May 2021 28 29 May 2021 PMF leaders’ positions Education Directorate announced to establish very large quarries bribes that reached $6,000 for the appointment of Yusuf Faraj for stone and cement. This each contract. Afterwards, some Al-Dakheel is the in Ninewa province … Nofal al-Akoub “ al-Sab’awi as his successor. “ assortment of political relations of the contracts became official official responsible for 1 . Khalid Taha Sa’id: Former submitted (al-Jubouri) strengthened the relationship appointments and the bribes general director of education 2 . Zuhair Mohsen al-Araji: Mayor for trial on accusations between the PMF and al-Araji. reached $10,000 per contract the fund that receives in Ninewa and Sanad Bloc of the Mosul district, whose real Moreover, al-Araji is considered in exchange for cementing the international grants to candidate. His appointment as name is Zuhair al-Bakdashi. He of corruption and one of the most prominent contract and transferring it to an general director for education hails from the area of Sadat supporters of al-Jubouri as official appointment. rebuild the hospitals, in Ninewa came after he used Bu’wayza. Al-Araji was mayor of connections with governor of Mosul, a position that bridges, roads, and guards from among the PMF to Mosul district in 2006 and was terrorism … But the reports to the Americans and Al-Dakheel has been responsible attack the directorate building. elected to the Iraqi parliament KDP in addition to complying with for the signing of financial grants schools, and no deal The previous director, Khalid in 2010, then he became mayor trial was canceled the agreement with the PMF. to contractors from among the is finalized without Jum’a Shaheen, received death of Mosul district again in 2018. because of his close senior personalities in the PMF, threats, including an envelope He is a KDP candidate and is 3 . Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Hassan especially the reconstruction his signature. containing a bullet and a letter considered the most prominent relations with the al-Dakheel: Former director of projects in the old city of the ” telling him to abandon his person who used to accompany PMF and the National the municipal offices of Ninewa Mosul district and investment position. Shaheen found the Nofal al-Akoub in all his province and coordinator projects in the Telkeppe district. letter on the door of his house investment tours. He connected Security Apparatus. between the PMF and the local ” He obtained about $4 million by Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker after the education directorate the PMF with the KDP through council. He also has an influential from one of the Danish NGOs removed the previous director, a series of intensive meetings. relationship with current governor Muhammad al-Halbousi. to renovate the infrastructure in Aseel al-Abadi. Shaheen opposed He lives in Erbil and has close Najim al-Jubouri. Al-Dakheel is Al-Jubouri is considered to Mosul connected with the bridges Sa’id’s aggressive means and connections with the intelligence from the Sa’irun alliance led by be among the members who the municipal office conducting and roads, but only a very small threats, and he refused to apparatus of the Kurdistan Muqtada al-Sadr and supported benefit most from the PMF’s any financial or legal tracking. portion of the grant – about hand his position over to Sa’id Regional Government and the by the PMF. He is the negotiator That director, Abd al-Sattar 10% – was disbursed, and it was investment deals in Ninewa. without an official order from Asayish security forces. who works with the PMF and al-Habbo, received threats from spent on the victory bridge that The former governor, Nofal the Education Ministry. The the contractors who work on the PMF because it had half of connects the two sides of Mosul. al-Akoub, submitted him for trial competition for the general Al-Araji is considered the most the reconstruction portfolio. the disbursement. on accusations of corruption and director position came after 7,000 prominent person overseeing the Al-Dakheel has been responsible 4 . Abd al-Kareem Muhammad job appointments were made for interests of the KDP in Ninewa for the fund that receives connections with terrorism by Al-Araji had close connections Hassan: Former director of the inhabitants of Ninewa. This province. Therefore, he was international grants to rebuild virtue of his benefiting from his with the Da’wa party’s political the investment commission competition led the Sanad Bloc, not subject to questioning or the hospitals, bridges, roads, and brothers, who were ISIS leaders. wing, particularly with former in Ninewa and husband of supported by the PMF, to come to accountability when al-Akoub was schools, and no deal is finalized But the trial was canceled premier Nouri al-Maliki, and provincial council member Sa’id’s aid before the employment removed. Note that he supervised without his signature. He does because of his close relations was made a member of the Khalida al-Ma’amari, who appointments could be assigned. the investment projects that not appear much in the media, consulting commission in the is affiliated with the Sanad with the PMF and the NSC, In the end, the Education Ministry al-Akoub obtained from foreign but he is the most powerful Mosul liberation operations room Bloc. Hassan was head of the and he was thus exonerated of issued an order to appoint Sa’id companies. The most prominent personality in terms of business in 2016, on the recommendation corruption charges. Al-Jubouri is as general director of education of his agreements was when connections and investment investment commission in 2014, of the KDP. This strengthened but investment work stopped considered among the strongest as a candidate nominated by the he obtained $4 million from contracts, as he directs the his position after the liberation during the ISIS occupation. When of al-Akoub’s competitors. Sanad Bloc and recommended the United States to pave the portfolio of the economic streets of Mosul. The money operations and earned him the work resumed in 2018, the Both men deal with the PMF, by the province’s governor, Najim offices in Ninewa. al-Jubouri, who rejected the idea was disbursed to him by the protection of the PMF that council reappointed him – per a so their relationship has been of investigating Sa’id’s attack on recommendation of some parties controls the area of Sadat One of al-Dakheel’s suspected deal between the PUK and the tense, as they have competed the directorate on the pretext working in the Kurdistan region. Bu’wayza, which is inhabited by deals is the certification of PMF – instead of the Islamic for investment projects for the of avoiding political conflicts. However, only 10% of the sum a Shiite majority from the Araji contract employment for 2,500 Party candidate Muhammad PMF in the Ninewa Plain and the In April 2020, however, Sa’id was distributed; the rest was tribes. In addition to that, al-Araji daily wage workers in the Aboudi, who was the original business markets in the old city. was arrested and the Ninewa stolen without the director of gave investment deals to the PMF municipal office, as it guaranteed choice for the position.

May 2021 30 31 May 2021 Hassan, an engineer, is of the college of administration economics fulfilled the PMF’s works under the command considered the person closest The previous director, Khalid Jum’a Shaheen, and economics. But al-Ahmadi wishes of having a loyalist head of the PMF and guarantees to Abd al-Qadir al-Dakheel, the “ rejected the demand and said of one of the most important salaries for relatives of martyrs former director of the municipal received death threats, including an envelope al-Ibrahimi appeared to be colleges at the university. of the PMF, particularly the Shiite offices of Ninewa, by virtue of the involved in corruption and had However, his appointment was factions in Ninewa. connection between the funds containing a bullet and a letter telling him to cooperated with ISIS in 2014. temporary; he was replaced by disbursed for the purpose of abandon his position. (Documents leaked from the Tha’ir Ahmad Sa’adoun al-Saman 9 . Nabil al-Hakam: Assistant building and funds designated ” Higher Education and Scientific in December 2019. adviser to the governor of Ninewa for investment. The two offices Research Ministry revealed for investment affairs. Al-Hakam are known to divide financial cases of corruption and suspect 7 . Hayder Hajim Khalaf: Official was considered one of the most in the office of security permits important advisers to former grants from international NGOs 5 . Numan Abd Najm al-Zoba’i: by the U.S. Treasury Department. relations indicting al-Ibrahimi. He in Ninewa, adviser in the National Ninewa governor Nofal al-Akoub between themselves and also Former head of the Iraqi army’s Al-Ibrahimi is from the Shabak was involved in corruption deals Security Apparatus, affiliated and he continues to be a member among the financial offices Ninewa operations command, in ethnic group from Ninewa Plain. involving more than $1.2 million directly connected with the and had suspected ties to ISIS with former NSC Chairman of the provincial council. He succession to Najim al-Jubouri, Al-Qaddo summoned al-Ahmadi investment commission. Hassan during the organization’s control Faleh al-Fayadh, officer of the obtained this advisory position who was referred for retirement to the Ninewa Plain to meet and al-Dakheel’s positions were of Mosul.) At that point, al-Qaddo rank of lieutenant colonel. He as a result of giving the PMF with the aim of focusing on the with him regarding employee protected by Muhammad Ibrahim threatened to fabricate terrorism is considered one of the most Commission investment projects position of Ninewa governor. changes and senior positions al-Bayati, who was then the head and corruption cases against important security commanders in important business areas in Al-Zoba’i was the commander at the university. Al-Ahmadi was of Ninewa provincial council al-Ahmadi if he did not reverse loyal to the PMF, and he has close Mosul, especially the areas of of the 7th infantry division, and accompanied by a force to the security committee and who his decision. Al-Ahmadi rejected connections with Muhammad the Jazeera neighborhood and al-Jubouri vouched for him to base of Brigade 30 in Bartella coordinated all the operations Brigade 30’s demands regarding al-Bayati. The two men have a al-Nabi Yunis. He has given become commander of the in the Ninewa Plain region. and activities of the PMF and is al-Ibrahimi at a time when other mutual understanding on issuing contracts in the Ninewa Plain province’s security forces. Al- Al-Ahmadi was threatened the most important intelligence university heads submitted to security permits for the Shiite area to senior contractors Zoba’i’s appointment occurred and extorted, and Brigade 30 source in Ninewa. similar demands, including al- factions and commanders that loyal to the PMF. demanded that he appoint four in cooperation with Parliament Hamdaniya, Tal Afar, and Ninewa. come from Baghdad to Ninewa. Hassan announced the launch Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi deans of various colleges from He also had direct contact with 10 . Abd al-Sattar al-Habo: of a project financed by foreign and Ahmad al-Jubouri in among personalities loyal to the In the end, al-Ahmadi faced more al-Muhandis, who mandated his Former director of the investors, including international agreement with the PMF, in order PMF. Employees were removed threats and growing pressure, appointment in the province after municipal office of Mosul who NGOs, with the aim of building to coordinate work between from the office of the university’s but the decision was finalized by the liberation of Mosul. was succeeded by Radwan 1 million housing units. Due them. Al-Zoba’i had close president and replaced with the Minister of Higher Education al-Shahwani. Al-Habo, however, to military pressure from the connections with Abu Mahdi others close to the PMF. But and Scientific Research Dr. 8 . Muhammad Ali Askar continues as technical adviser PMF, Shiite contractors received al-Muhandis and had direct al-Ahmadi rejected the order Qusay al-Suhail, who issued a al-Shaquli: Director of the Ninewa to the provincial council and has the biggest portion of the contact with the former head of on the basis that the selection document from the ministry’s martyrs directorate, responsible direct connections with the PMF contracts for the project. The the security committee in the of deans should be based on Department of Legal Affairs/ for registering and tracking the groups, especially Kata’ib Sayyid residential complexes are under provincial council, Muhammad strong criteria and the candidates Branch of Legal Consultations. names of the martyrs who were al-Shuhada’. He gave some of construction. Hassan also agreed Ibrahim al-Bayati. must be assessed. The document specified killed because of the war against these groups many plots of land to license the PMF to build shops ending the appointments of the terrorism or during an attack or in the Shabak, Kokjali, and other in the most important areas in 6 . Waheed Mahmoud Ramo Before his appointment as general directors and deans bombing. He is also considered areas. Al-Habo also coordinated Mosul – the Jazeera area, al-Nabi al-Ibrahimi: Dean of the dean of the administration and of the colleges and institutes, the official responsible for with Abd al-Qadir al-Dakheel Yunis, and al-Darkazliya, which administration and economics economics college, al-Ibrahimi and stated that temporary obtaining compensation for to specify a portion of the are considered vital business college, appointed in November was dean of the college of directors and deans were to be the relatives of the martyrs. He profits to the PMF. centers. The PMF opened the 2019. He was given this position sciences and tourism. Brigade relieved from their posts and took his assignments after the shops without buying land from after the University of Mosul 30 demanded that he be replaced by senior academics Mosul liberation operations in 11 . Faris al-Bagoo’: Member the local government because head, Qusay al-Ahmadi, was appointed as assistant head from the colleges. Al-Ibrahimi’s 2017, supported directly by al- of the legal committee in the it obtained the license and threatened by Brigade 30, whose of the University of Mosul for appointment as the dean of the Muhandis, under the guarantee of accountability and justice began the work. leader Wa’ad al-Qaddo is wanted administrative affairs and dean college of administration and the PMF Commission. Al-Shaquli commission in Baghdad.

May 2021 32 33 May 2021 Some 25 such cell members and Yar Allah accompanied Prime Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati But al-Ahmadi rejected the demand and said al-Ibrahimi appeared to be more prominent youth activists Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi in played an important role in “ in Mosul have been summoned his meetings with the Kurdistan implementing investment involved in corruption and had cooperated with ISIS in 2014. repeatedly to the NSC for Regional Government and his projects with al-Akoub and ” criticizing the PMF or expressing inspection tours of PMF factions some of the PUK members, political opinions on social media in Ninewa and Salah al-Din. He particularly Hashim al-Barifkani about keeping weapons in the works very closely with al-Fayadh, and Ali Khudayr, in deals with the Al-Bagoo’ is an important and al-Talib and al-Wala’i’s relationship of being one of the influential state’s hands and controlling especially regarding Ninewa’s PMF to strengthen al-Akoub’s active personality who was with Abdullah al-Nujaifi. Al-Talib individuals in the Ninewa security armed factions affiliated with affairs and the PMF. political position and support nominated inside the provincial and the PMF cooperate in forces command. the PMF. These actions were him in security matters. Al-Akoub council as the representative for controlling the Badush area and taken against the activists Ninewa’s governors gave al-Muhandis a payment both former governor Mansour have divided the agricultural lands 14 . Oday Asmat Sabir: A in cooperation with Numan and their relationships of $2 million in exchange for brigadier general who is the al-Zoba’i, the current Ninewa al-Mar’id and current governor there between them. with the PMF his support and protection, Najim al-Jubouri under the director of the Ninewa police operations commander. including shielding him from authority of the NSC. He has 13 . Maj . Gen . Karim al-Shuwaili: regiments command. Sabir has 1 . Nofal Hamadi Sultan al- documented corruption 16 . Abd al-Khaliq al-Khaykani: longstanding relations with the Former deputy commander close and direct connections with activities. Were it not for the Holds the rank of major general Akoub: Al-Akoub acknowledged Shiite PMF groups. Al-Bagoo’ of the Ninewa operations and the PMF of al-Khorasani through Mosul ferry incident in 2019, and is head of the joint center more than once that he is attended intensive meetings in former general overseer of Khudair Alaiwi al-Sabbar, the no one would have been able for intelligence and security for supported by the PMF militias, Baghdad with al-Muhandis in the PMF in Ninewa. He was former director of the Vanguard to remove al-Akoub (attempts Ninewa. He oversees all the and al-Muhandis in particular, and order to give him accountability replaced in August 2019 by Party office that represents the by the council to remove him information connected with the that all the works he undertook commission reports concerning Muhammad al-Shabaki. The political wing of the PMF of al- were met with extortion and tribal PMF groups in Ninewa and after the liberation of eastern the most important personalities first official responsible for all Khorasani in Ninewa (the current threats from the PMF). coordinates all the intelligence Mosul were in agreement with who worked with the prior regime. the military movements in the director is Faysal Al Badran al- data and cooperation with the al-Muhandis, whose protection He has been the key liaison PMF, al-Shuwaili was one of the Mousawi). Sabir oversees police Al-Akoub is considered the PMF security in the province. shielded him from accountability. between the accountability and most prominent personalities activities in western Mosul and most prominent figure who has in the PMF security directorate For instance, money designated justice commission and any is the official responsible for the 17 . Ali al-Husseini: Relations helped the PMF gain a foothold of intelligence in Ninewa and for IDPs in the province has been Sunni official on the issue of de- PMF group activities in the west official of the PMF Commission in Ninewa. He has also helped developed particularly close divided among corrupt people Baathification. While professing side and in particular the old city. in all areas north of Taji, including PMF factions open 60 economic relations with the tribal PMF since 2014, but after 2017 it was loyalty to Osama al-Nujaifi, he Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din offices in Ninewa’s villages, on regiments. He was appointed 15 . Shaheen al-Jaf: Al-Jaf is done systematically. serves the interests of the PMF. provinces. Al-Husseini had the pretext of protecting the the son of the sister of Wa’ad by al-Fayadh, who was NSC close ties with al-Muhandis and Shiite minority. al-Qaddo, who headed Brigade Al-Akoub participated in the 12 . Muhammad Yahya al-Talib: chairman at the time and continues to coordinate relations 30. Al-Jaf holds the rank of major Mosul liberation operations in Al-Akoub had the largest role in Major general and commander who also heads the PMF with all of the Sunni factions of the 4,000-strong Ninewa Commission. Al-Shuwaili looks in the NSC and an official position 2017 in the al-Hadhr district and distributing lands belonging to the and peshmerga forces. He also set up a militia he called the Guards. This faction is affiliated after military training for the in the youth portfolio in Ninewa has close political ties with state to PMF leaders, just as he regiment of al-Akoub with the with the former governor Atheel PMF forces in Ninewa province province. Maj. al-Jaf organizes representatives of the Sanad Bloc granted investment opportunities designation Regiment 17 under al-Nujaifi and is led by his son, and oversees the support for youth gatherings and forums like on the Ninewa provincial council. to contractors loyal to the PMF Abdullah Atheel al-Nujaifi. Al-Talib the Sunni tribal PMF groups “Badayna” to recruit youths as the leadership of his cousin, concerning the reconstruction had close connections and held with salaries and equipment. informants within an organization 18 . Abd al-Amir Yar Allah: Mazahem Ghazi. This gave him of Mosul. He distributed money secret visits with al-Muhandis. He enjoyed a solid relationship called “Youth of Ninewa Cell.” Lieutenant general and chief the opportunity to be governor to the PMF and the council His relationship with Abu Ala with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis This organization operates of staff of the Iraqi army of Ninewa in succession to members from the Fatah Alliance al-Wala’i, the commander of and used to accompany him under the aegis of the NSC, but and a senior member of the Atheel al-Nujaifi. He also gave the and the Sanad Bloc, as the wealth Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ and on inspection tours of the its members receive salaries NSC. Previously served as PMF many reassurances in the designated for the rebuilding of current deputy head of the PMF PMF camps. Gen. Shuwaili from the PMF Commission as deputy commander of joint event he should be appointed as Mosul was distributed to political Commission, continues, as does has thus earned the reputation civilian employees. PMF-Peshmerga operations. governor of Ninewa. factions to guarantee their

May 2021 34 35 May 2021 support in order to maintain his a parliament member from the structure of the PMF months earlier. Al-Fayadh requested position longer. Al-Khanjar bought the votes of some council al-Ata’ movement, which is under Al-Akoub is “ the banner of the Victory Alliance “ a deadline of two months to After corruption charges against members — $300,000 for one vote — and promised led by former premier Haydar al- considered the Ninewa implement this framework amid al-Akoub were leaked, the Abadi. The dissenting members sharp disagreements between every member an armored car valued at $200,000 governor who gave PMF became implicated in his supported the nomination himself and al-Muhandis. Those activities. Hundreds of journalists after the new governor was chosen. of council member Hussam the most perks to disagreements necessitated ” al-Din al-Abbar, but a political a visit by the head of IRGC’s and activists from Mosul called the PMF and the for his resignation or arrest. agreement led to the choice of Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Al-Muhandis arrived in Mosul and al-Mar’id. The pact was arranged governor who served Soleimani, to resolve the conflict. met with al-Akoub, praising his The PMF tried to provide is the candidate of the Shiite by Khamis al-Khanjar, the leader the armed Al-Muhandis rejected the new role in administering the province. sufficient political protection religious authorities in Najaf. He of the Arab Project, which was structure that divides the The meeting was a clear show for al-Akoub to prevent his stepped aside in his last public incorporated in the National Axis factions most. alliance, the biggest Sunni bloc in PMF into eight regions in the of support and a warning that removal, but it failed after the address only in response to the ” extent of Sunni anger against request of the Najaf religious the Iraqi parliament. north, south, middle, and west, al-Akoub was not to be touched. him became clear. In addition to authorities after he withstood all in addition to replacing the Al-Muhandis’ visit also served to Al-Mar’id played a major role in position of deputy head of the that, al-Akoub was confronted the popular pressures in Mosul. from the same al-Jubour tribe. In give legitimacy to the economic the liberation of Mosul, especially commission with a chief of by a wave of anger from the exchange for this, al-Mar’id gave offices held by the PMF and 2 . Mansour al-Mar’id: Al-Mar’id after he set up the Martyrs of staff. He also felt that he would public, especially young activists, al-Jubouri investment projects to warn against criticizing or journalists, and NGOs. Journalists was supported by then-chairman Qayyarah Brigade of al-Jubour, not be welcome in the PMF in the province. opposing the PMF officials in revealed documents containing of the NSC, Faleh al-Fayadh, and led by his brother Muhammad Commission, as the position of charge of those offices. al-Mar’id, in the Qayyarah district accusations against al-Akoub was from the al-Ata’ Bloc. Al- When the disagreement began chief of staff requires a high rank Mar’id reached an understanding south of Mosul. Because of of shortcomings and corruption between al-Muhandis and and did not suit al-Muhandis. Members of the provincial council with the Shiite members of these actions, he was able to and of wasting of public money, al-Fayadh regarding investment tried many times to prevent the provincial council from the mobilize the area’s residents to The decision to reorganize the and the inhabitants of Mosul deals in Ninewa province, the al-Akoub’s removal, hoping to considered him an ally to political Sanad Bloc via deals and bribes support him and defend him structure of the PMF Commission shares of the reconstruction keep him in office to protect forces close to Iran. Moreover, that reached up to $20,000. He continuously in the media. Al- in Iraq targeted al-Muhandis and funds, and the oil-producing areas their economic interests and the Iraqi Impartiality Commission also struck an arrangement Khanjar bought the votes of some was tantamount to restoring the PMF controlled, a fissure ensure the presence of tribal investigated the loss of around with the KDP (again through council members – $300,000 authority to the Iraqi state over occurred in the Sunni regions. PMF groups in their areas to $60 million from Ninewa’s al-Fayadh) to keep the Kurdish for one vote – and promised the different types of its military The political disagreements over pressure voters during local provincial budget, stolen by peshmerga forces in the Sinjar every member an armored car forces in the country. Meanwhile, Ninewa led to a conflict inside elections. The PMF tried to employees close to al-Akoub. region after the members of valued at $200,000 after the new the political conflict between the PMF over the organization’s restore al-Akoub as governor the KDP thoroughly rejected governor was chosen. He made al-Fayadh and al-Muhandis Al-Akoub is considered the structure and security framework. after his removal from the office the appointment of al-Mar’id as good on his promise. intensified as they issued Ninewa governor who gave governor. This understanding conflicting orders to the different after the deadly ferry incident. The PMF announced a new the most perks to the PMF was mediated by al-Fayadh in Al-Mar’id received his orders PMF factions. This put the Iraqi Leaked documents indicate framework that Prime Minister and served the armed factions accordance with an agreement from al-Fayadh directly, and he armed forces commander in an the existence of an agreement most. If not for the ferry incident, between the PMF and the had a close connection with Adil Abd al-Mahdi agreed to, awkward position regarding the between the Asa’ib al-Haq militia, after which the U.S. Treasury peshmerga forces. But the secret informants affiliated with which included granting then-NSC PMF Commission. the ferry owner, and the owner of Department put al-Akoub on the dispute remains about the vote of the NSC, in addition to his close Chairman and PMF Commission the tourist island where the ferry list of sanctioned individuals the provincial council to remove relationship with the head of the head al-Fayadh the authority Al-Mahdi issued Order No. 331, in sank, who himself announced based on accusations of al-Akoub and nominate al-Mar’id. Patriotic Masses party and the to appoint by proxy and cancel which he first decided to certify on Iraqi news channels his corruption and human rights former governor of Salah al-Din, the position of the deputy head the organizational structure opposition to extortion and violations, the Iraqi parliament The Ninewa provincial council’s Ahmad al-Jubouri. Al-Jubouri of the PMF Commission that for the PMF Commission and demands for protection money would not have been able to vote to appoint al-Mar’id took supported al-Mar’id politically al-Muhandis occupied. Al-Mahdi canceled titles and positions by PMF factions. remove al-Akoub because he place in May 2019. Al-Mar’id was and tribally by virtue of being had issued an order on the that conflict with the titles that

May 2021 36 37 May 2021 came with the new framework. 3 . Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri: same time, al-Jubouri obtained important role in seizing large Differences between Al-Muhandis considered this a Retired general and the current the support of the KDP because … most tribal properties in old Mosul and the Sunni tribal and setback to all his efforts during governor of Ninewa who has very he entrusted assignments and “ al-Najafi street and the Nabi Shiite PMF groups the prior years. close ties to the United States. gave broad authority to the first PMF fighters do Yunis area, as it has begun Many of the Sunni MPs from The most prominent Sunni deputy governor of Ninewa, Sirin not have weapons to alter the land to establish The ongoing conflict between leaders in the Iraqi parliament al-Ruzbayani, who approves all factories and very large business Ninewa have accused the al-Fayadh and al-Muhandis – al-Halbousi, al-Jubouri, and NGOs active in Ninewa, oversees and do not receive malls in the city. federal authorities in Baghdad led the latter to cooperate with al-Karbouli – support him. the investment projects, and of neglecting the al-Jazeera the National Axis bloc led by coordinates the relationship salaries, and The economic and security areas (the western areas) in the Muhammad al-Halbousi, Ahmad Al-Jubouri has been able to between Erbil and Ninewa. until recently situation in Ninewa province is province for a long time. They al-Jubouri, and Muhammad bring agreement between the very bad, especially in terms of maintain that this neglect has al-Karbouli from one side and Sunnis and the Shiites with In exchange for his appointment no vehicles were the PMF economic offices and led to greater ISIS influence, Khamis al-Khanjar from another. U.S. counsel and with political as governor, Najim al-Jubouri available for them. the theft of oil and smuggling especially in the part of the This led to the division of the help from the KDP. Likewise, he ensured that investment ” from Sinjar district, and likewise al-Jazeera extending between Sunni National Axis bloc, with al- convinced all the sides to appoint apportionment and government the presence of the PKK in the Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, Muhandis pressuring al-Halbousi, him as governor of Ninewa. His positions were given to al-Jubouri Sinjar district. The economic reaching to the borders with al-Jubouri, and al-Karbouli to military connections, including and al-Halbousi and to the offices are involved in selling Syria. This has led to a great 2018 explosion that targeted resign. Al-Karbouli was also an ties with former Ninewa security PMF and the KDP. land belonging to the families of number of casualties among Mosul’s Abu Layla restaurant). ally of al-Fayadh, who supported forces commander Numan those involved with ISIS and the the Sunni tribal PMF groups and The position of Ninewa governor Mansour al-Mar’id. al-Zoba’i, and this political and land and farms of Christians and more intense battles, bombings is considered an attractive one The financial offices serve as security assurance granted Yazidis who left Iraq. Even though of houses, and destruction of Al-Mar’id had offered a written because of the esteem that the bases for more than 20 factions, him the opportunity to become some Christians and Yazidis schools and shops. The Sunni resignation without a date to governor of Ninewa. governor enjoys and because the and they are spread throughout tribal PMF factions suffer from returned after the liberation Ahmad al-Jubouri before the province’s yearly budget reaches different areas of Mosul. They are a clear deficiency in arms and operations, PMF forces refused to provincial council could vote Al-Jubouri agreed with the PMF up to $800 million and attracts by nature different from the bases heavy equipment, unlike the give up the farms on the pretext al-Mar’id out as governor. After leadership on his administration many foreign investments or military barracks for these Shiite factions. of using them to combat ISIS that there were disagreements of the Mosul city center from to help the province develop militias that are also present cells. Some of the economic because of investment projects the political and security and and build. The financial gains inside the city, sometimes using ISIS has threatened the areas of offices impose fees on some that al-Mar’id had promised to economic angle, and he agreed associated with the governorship citizens’ houses. The offices western Ninewa and in particular humanitarian NGOs that engage al-Jubouri, and al-Jubouri leaked to allow the PMF to administer is what made the post the compete among each other in the areas south of al-Ba’aj toward in various activities to help the the resignation to the council. the other areas outside subject of a rivalry that led to imposing “taxes” on restaurants, the Syrian border, the south of the the city center. This helped the changing of three Ninewa businesses, public transportation inhabitants. The NGOs designate subdistrict of Tal Abta, and the Muhammad al-Halbousi, Ahmad complete the deal and satisfied governors in one year. vehicles, trucks delivering goods, a portion of in-kind assistance to district of al-Hadhr. These areas al-Jubouri, and Muhammad al- al-Muhandis, who strongly and the sale of oil derivatives the offices or grant them money lack permanent security forces, Karbouli called on their members supported al-Jubouri. The PMF’s economic in the province. in exchange for facilitating their and many IDPs from these areas in the Ninewa provincial council offices in Ninewa activity in Mosul. have not yet returned since they to vote on the removal of Najim al-Jubouri participated in The financial offices in Ninewa were displaced during liberation Mansour al-Mar’id with support the liberation of Mosul when he The economic offices engage have also been able to seize Among the most important operations in June 2017. The from al-Muhandis and a directive was commander of Ninewa’s in their activities by imposing lands affiliated with the local economic offices operating in security of Mosul and Iraq in to nominate Najim al-Jubouri security forces. Then he gave fees and wealth taxes on owners government and have opened Mosul are those affiliated with the general is in danger if the federal as his successor. the security agreement to of businesses, restaurants, businesses in economically PMF groups of the Asa’ib, Badr, government does not come up the PMF and facilitated their companies, public transportation important areas in Mosul. The Nujaba’, Khorasani, Hezbollah with long-term solutions for President Barham Salih signed a positions in different areas of vehicles, and parking spaces. most important of the shops and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali. These the security weaknesses in the presidential order indicating that the province. Al-Muhandis did Those who do not pay are subject are located in the Jazeera offices are not engaged in military areas of west Ninewa. A great Najim al-Jubouri was appointed not forget this and supported to extortion, threats, and possibly neighborhood and Nabi Yunis. operations; they are confined to number of fighters in the tribal as the new governor of Ninewa. al-Jubouri as governor. At the attacks (such as the November Also, the Shiite Waqf has an economic activity in Ninewa. PMF factions were wounded

May 2021 38 39 May 2021 during liberation operations, and PMF Commission has made 1,200 fighters south of Mosul, under the names of foreign states stranglehold on another Shabak hundreds of the personnel of the very few cars available to the waging battles against ISIS. The financial offices following sectarian ideologies. party called the Free Shabak tribal PMF have been martyred. fighters; in most instances they “ This will lead to sectarian feuds Movement that is linked to the The daily military statements use cars belonging to families PMF interventions in Ninewa have also and quarrels between the other KDP. Brigade 30 has prevented did not mention this, but in education them from opening party bases in the tribe. The tribal factions been able to seize lands groups in the Ninewa Plain. compensations for the families of (al-Lahib, al-Jubouri, al-Sab’awiin) and having organizational martyrs have not been paid out, have been present in south Mosul The PMF, acting via Brigade 30 affiliated with the The PMF also established the al- meetings and has hampered the unlike payments for the families of the Shabak that was led by Sadiq preparatory school (grades movement’s political, social, and since last March; they fought ISIS local government and of martyrs from the Shiite on the Makhmour and Qayyarah Wa’ad al-Qaddo, takes 20% of 10-12) for Islamic studies, cultural activities. PMF factions factions, which come monthly. fronts with intermittent salaries the profits from al-Nour College, have opened business without condition or qualification have even threatened voters to and weapons donated by tribal the civilian university in Bartella and with exemptions from age not cast their votes. They also During the liberation of Mosul in the Ninewa Plain. It also used in economically sheikhs and some of the Sunni and average grade requirements. reject coordinating on security in 2017, the tribal PMF groups threats to appoint the dean of MPs in Ninewa province. They important This school’s task is to reinforce matters with the local police and were a frontline force. The plan the college of administration and Shiite interpretations and to have also gathered donations army, and they interfere with the to liberate the left bank did not economics in Mosul University areas in Mosul. recruit students and appoint them and weapons for tribe members traffic police. include the tribal forces; the and appointed three deans in the ” in institutions of the state illegally to protect their areas from counterterrorism service, the universities of al-Hamdaniya, Tal and with falsified qualifications, Some time ago, PMF forces intermittent ISIS attacks. In army, and the federal police Afar, and Ninewa. according to an employee in the kidnapped some businessmen, contrast, the Shiite PMF groups divided the fighting among Qusay al-Suhail issued an order Education Ministry. the most prominent of whom was possess heavy equipment and The PMF has tried to control themselves. However, the tribal on Sept. 3, 2019, to rescind her well-known oil merchant Abeed weapons to protect their areas. the position of general director PMF factions fought elsewhere appointment because she did not Prominent actions al-Anaz al-Ma’amari, who refused in the city in difficult operations of education in Ninewa since of the PMF in Ninewa to give the PMF a share of his The tribal PMF groups work at meet the criteria for the position; during which many fighters Aseel al-Abadi – a Shiite from the oil profits. He was kidnapped security checkpoints to identify the director of education should were lost. Despite that, the Iraqi Sanad Bloc, which is part of the PMF factions have extorted in July 2019 and was released people, as the national security have no less than 15 years of government’s military statements Fatah Alliance – held the position. families of ISIS members. More after a ransom of $20,000 and intelligence databases do experience in education work. ignore the participation of the After the PMF entered Ninewa importantly, they have been was paid. Livestock merchant not have the names of all ISIS In the end, the position returned tribal factions, so the inhabitants during liberation operations and politically leveraging the ISIS Mani’ Idbas al-Shammari also personnel. This is the most to the PMF through Sa’id’s of Ninewa and the international the Fatah Alliance won 47 seats phenomenon by threatening refused to pay the PMF a share appointment as new general community do not know about important task the Sunni tribal in 2018 parliamentary elections, and blackmailing families in of his profits from livestock director of education in Ninewa. the sacrifices the tribal militias PMF groups undertake, but the the education directorate was general with accusations of feed, meats, and eggs. He was made while liberating many Iraqi government does not mention given to the Sanad Bloc, who being pro-ISIS and potential kidnapped and then released with The PMF has also built the al- towns from ISIS. this and does not share data gave al-Abadi her position. Her prosecution for their alleged a ransom of $40,000. Khomeini primary school in the with the tribal PMF factions. This bodyguards were from the PMF, ties to the transnational jihadist Ninewa Plain without an official Moreover, most tribal PMF makes it difficult for the Sunni and she declared in speeches group. These are scare tactics After the liberation of Mosul, the registration document from fighters do not have weapons groups to preserve security in the that she was a daughter of PMF meant to dissuade families from people respected the army, police, the Education Ministry. Then it and do not receive salaries, and areas they protect. and supports it and that she talking to the media about the and PMF groups and held them until recently no vehicles were accepts her orders from the PMF. threatened the former minister seizure of lands and homes in high regard. Those sentiments available for them. This has led The numbers of Sunni tribal of education, Muhammad Iqbal, for PMF commanders that the have changed considerably, many tribal PMF members to fighters in Ninewa have not Al-Abadi was the assistant until he registered the primary fighters took when people fled however. PMF factions have withdraw because they feel the exceeded 10,000, contrary to director of a high school with school. The PMF also demanded in 2014 and 2015. begun taking 20% of contract government is neglecting them what the PMF Commission has nine years of experience. She of the Education Ministry that costs and/or gross profits from and does not value their lives. announced. The commission has was officially appointed as entitlements for the teachers The PMF has also used Brigade contractors, investors, and The tribal PMF factions in Ninewa said there were 15,000 tribal PMF general director of education on should be disbursed, despite the 30, the military wing for the businessmen, just as ISIS used to are not allowed to possess more fighters in Ninewa. Months before Aug. 28, 2019, by special order calls from the area’s residents Democratic Shabak Gathering take 10% as taxes and protection than a Kalashnikov rifle, and in the launching of the Ninewa from the Education Ministry. – including Christians and Party (which is tied to the money. Those who do not pay some instances PKM rifles. The liberation operation there were However, Minister of Education Yazidis – to not establish schools Badr Organization), to put a could end up with a grenade

May 2021 40 41 May 2021 thrown into their businesses, 5 . Quwat Wa’ad Allah (Brigade 15 . Saraya al-Jihad (Brigade released. He participated in the to award projects to companies threatening messages sent to PMF factions have 33) has an agency office in 18) has an office in the area of Iraqi parliament elections in 2017 that represent the factions or their homes, or street closures on “ al-Basra, in the al-Jam’iyat area. al-Mashraq al-Jadid. and served as an MP for the are affiliated with them, along the routes to their businesses. even threatened Sa’irun Bloc. MP Faleh al-Khaz’ali with contracts and investments 6 . Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Brigades 16 . Harakat Ansar Allah al- is the deputy secretary general in oil companies. Most of the The PMF have committed voters to not 41, 42, and 43) has a number Awfiya’ (Brigade 19) has an for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, security companies working in wrongdoings in the Sinjar area. cast their votes. of offices in the province: in office in the al-Janina area. and MP Uday Awad is affiliated the oil fields are affiliated with the The most important of the PMF ” al-Qarna, the City, Shatt al-Arab, with the Asa’ib. PMF and their respective political groups in that area is the Lalish Abu al-Khaseeb, the al-Deir and 17 . Quwat al-Muntadhir parties. At the ports and border Regiment, which has seized al-Zubair districts, as well as in (Brigade 7) has an office in the The governor’s relationship crossings, importers who deal lands of the Sunni tribes in the al-Zubair district. stronger than the state security the Bariha area. with the PMF with the PMF have an easier time areas of al-Qayrwan and Sinjar. organs, which lack the power and are exempted from routine The sheikhs of these tribes have All the PMF factions in Basra The political and administrative to obstruct the PMF in Basra; 7 . Saraya al-Khorasani (Brigade procedures and impediments. informed the PMF Commission, have offices that are considered duties of a provincial governor indeed, the province has seen no 18): This group has an agency PMF officials also get appointed but it has paid no attention and agencies, not military bases. require him to build bridges and attempts by security forces to office in the al-Jabaliya area. to public offices in the province. offered no intervention. The only military base is the balance relationships with all All of this cooperation between oppose the PMF. 8 . Al-Nujaba’ (Brigade 12): This one where the PMF operations the groups that affect security the governor and the PMF has Basra: An Easy command is located. These and stability. As head of the The Badr Organization has offices faction has an agency office in been instrumental in preventing offices play roles in mobilization province’s security committee, Relationship spread around the province, with the Manawi Lajm area. confrontation between the and logistical support, in addition Basra’s governor, Asa’ad al-Eidani, a presence in the Abu al-Khaseeb, provincial government and the Factions of the PMF 9 . Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda to ideological and development has given the PMF Commission al-Qarna, al-Madina, Shatt al-Arab, militia alliance. present in Basra province (Brigade 28): This faction has an training in Iran and military presidential palace sites al-Zubair, and al-Faw districts; the office in the al-Jam’iyat area. training courses for youths. consisting of numerous buildings During anti-government 1 . Forces of Badr (e .g ., Brigades al-Basra center; Lebanon Casino from which to operate. There is demonstrations, the PMF 1, 4, 5, etc .): Present in the PMF Street; and the Safwan and Umm 10 . Saraya Ashura’ (Brigade The headquarters of the PMF no friction between the security actively supported the governor operations command base. The Qasr subdistricts. 8) has an agency office Commission is in the presidential forces and the PMF in Basra and security leaders in the main camp in Basra is located in the province. palaces, located in the al- because the relationship between province; the Asa’ib in particular 2 . Saraya al-Salam (the Peace in the al-Deir district (previously Barad’iya area. This headquarters the governor and the PMF has used tough measures to the base of the Iraqi army’s 3rd Brigades), Brigades 313, 314, 11 . Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr houses PMF personnel been good and the PMF factions suppress the protests in Basra. Corps) which includes Brigades and 315: This group has a al-Awal (Da’wa Party) (Brigade from intelligence, security, have a great deal of resources In response to the brutality, 1, 4, 5, and the naval regiment. base in the al-Tuwaisa area 15) has an agency office administration, and the office of and influence. The Peace demonstrators burned the PMF The leader of the PMF operations and another in the al-Zubair in the province. the head of the PMF in Basra, Brigades, Asa’ib, Badr, Kata’ib Commission’s headquarters in is called Abu Jinan al-Basiri, and district. The Peace Brigades Ammar Faris, along with those of Sayyid al-Shuhada’, and Kata’ib the presidential palaces. he also commands Brigade 1. play no security role inside the 12 . Imam Ali Division (Brigade some of the factions. Hezbollah are the ones closest Brigade 4 is led by Abu Hanan province, focusing instead on 2) has an agency office to the governor. Al-Eidani has been successful al-Kan’ani (his affiliation switched mobilization and support for the in the province. Note that most of the offices of in distributing financial from Badr to Kata’ib Hezbollah, brigades connected with them the agencies and parties have In order to keep the PMF out resources, projects, and but after he was targeted in outside the province. 13 . Al-Abbas Division (Brigade been closed since the beginning of political matters in Basra shares of appointments, and in an assassination attempt he 26) has an agency office of the October protests. province other than supporting balancing between the factions remained loyal to al-Muhandis). 3 . Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ in the province. the governor, al-Eidani offers in terms of influence. He has This base is the only one in (Brigade 14) has a base in the Prominent figures the factions benefits from the avoided conflict with the PMF the province, and although the al-Hakimiya area. 14 . Saraya al-Difa’ al-Shaabi with ties to the PMF province’s finances and natural and emerged unscathed from factions play no role in security (Brigades 46 and 47), which is resources such as oil and gas, the demonstrations. However, activities inside the province their 4 . Kata’ib Hezbollah (Brigade loyal to Hezbollah, has a base One of the Jaysh al-Mahdi along with benefits from the ports the offices of parliament and weapons are present and can 45) has a base in the in the naval academy in the commanders in Basra, Mudhaffar and border crossings with Iran provincial council members, be used when needed. They are al-Hakimiya area. al-Najibiya area. Ismail al-Fadl, was arrested and and Kuwait. Al-Eidani has offered along with provincial buildings,

May 2021 42 43 May 2021 the Iranian consulate in Basra, interact with citizens directly. cannot match. The matter was elections last occurred. However, PMF because of relationships any formal membership in any and the facilities of many PMF They have no influential role in resolved through directives most PMF members have some or common interests. For of the PMF factions, they do factions were burned. The the PMF, which has no need to PMF members to not take kind of party and/or ideological instance, the Badr Organization have partisan, organizational, governor was able to move into a to interact with the municipal weapons with them when they go affiliation, and members of the controls most of the local police and ideological connections. new provincial building and quell councils. However, members of to those areas to visit family. The councils have played important commanders because the One provincial council member, the demonstrations by making the councils have worked with the directives went a long way toward roles in offering logistical support minister in charge of the police, al-Solaiti, was entrusted with the employment opportunities PMF, offering logistical support resolving the problem. to the PMF fighters. Muhammad al-Ghabban, merged title of deputy head of the PMF available for youths and providing and gathering in-kind donations many PMF fighters into the force. committee on the provincial more work for the people of and food and sending them There was friction between Some PMF factions existed Asa’ib controls officers in Basra council. Several provincial council Basra, particularly with the foreign to the PMF forces fighting in two PMF factions in 2018 in before al-Sistani’s fatwa – for through proxies. members have provided logistical companies working in the oil different theaters. Basra: Badr Organization, led example, Hezbollah, Asa’ib, support to the PMF. Nadhem sector. However, his requirement by al-Amiri, and al-Muhandis’ Badr, and Jaysh al-Mahdi. Of course, most administrative Nimr Abd and Mortadha Karim that the foreign oil companies The political and economic Kata’ib Hezbollah. The reason These factions are largely appointees in Basra province Khaz’al al-Shahmani are the replace foreign workers with relationship between the PMF was the formation of a ministerial military in nature, and none of have the support of parties two provincial council members local workers did not provide and the provincial council is committee from Baghdad, their military leaders have been or factions. The education with party and sect links, but very many jobs compared to the clear. The council approves the led by al-Amiri, to organize nominated as candidates for the director is loyal to Badr, and no military connection, to the number of unemployed residents annual budget for the entire security for the oil fields, energy Basra provincial council or the the investment office head is Badr Organization. of Basra. Al-Eidani only faced one province and is instrumental companies, and exports, and municipal councils. However, a affiliated with the Virtue Party political challenge – from the in granting massive projects to ensure demonstrators did member of the Basra provincial (part of the National Program Salah al-Din: Between al-Hikma Bloc in the provincial to companies affiliated with not disrupt crude exports. council, Sheikh Ahmad al-Solaiti, bloc). Oil has joint participation State and Non-State council – but the other blocs PMF factions. Some provincial Al-Amiri wanted to redeploy served as deputy head of the between al-Hikma, Da’wa, and maintained their support for the council members, because of Badr fighters, but al-Muhandis, PMF committee in the provincial the Supreme Council at the Every area in Salah al-Din has its governor, and he was able to their ideological leanings, have al-Eidani, and the majority of council after the formation of the administrative level and Kata’ib own culture, whether in terms remain in his position. Note that provided logistical support the members of the provincial PMF. Al-Solaiti’s party affiliation Sayyid al-Shuhada’ and Hezbollah of tribal makeup or religious this was a political challenge, not for the PMF. Meanwhile, the council blocked the move. As changed from the Supreme on the operations level. The affiliation or in terms of the one from the PMF. militia alliance has contributed a result, al-Amiri returned to Council to the Badr Organization ports and industry offices feature intent behind militias’ desire to projects like building dams Baghdad and al-Muhandis’ forces before the fatwa was issued. joint participation between the to control it. Every faction in Provincial and municipal and protecting the oil fields in remained the strongest and most Asa’ib, Sa’irun, and Da’wa Party the PMF has an intelligence councils and the PMF northern Basra from flooding. influential in Basra. PMF leaders and in their administration. As for and security committee, a The PMF and the provincial members in local government the judiciary, it is controlled by public relations and media The relationship between the government closely coordinate PMF leaders or members and positions the Da’wa Party, and some of committee, and an economic and PMF and the provincial council is with one another on these issues. participation on local councils the sectors are affiliated with financial committee. fairly strong. There are members No PMF leaders have assumed the Virtue Party. connected in thought, ideology, Field research did not reveal The PMF is a product of al- administrative or security The PMF presence in Salah and organization with some any type of ill feelings between Sistani’s 2014 fatwa. Provincial leadership positions, nor No relatives of PMF members al-Din can be divided into two of the factions of the PMF, but the Basra government and the council elections occurred have they been entrusted or leaders appear to be in local classifications. no members of the provincial PMF. While the two enjoy a great in 2013, and the elections of with any administrative and positions of power, either; council have any military degree of mutual understanding, municipal councils took place security positions outside the loyalty to a faction is considered First, there are tribal PMF affiliation with the PMF. a problem occurred between in al-Zubair in 2005 and in Abu organizational framework of greater than kinship. factions in areas that are not the PMF and the head of the al-Khaseeb in 2010, and there the PMF. However, those who considered strategic in terms of In Basra, the municipal councils in provincial council because of the have not been any local council have assumed responsibility Provincial council religious affiliation, security, or al-Zubair and Abu al-Khaseeb — proliferation of weapons among elections in any other district of in those positions are affiliated members’ connections economy, like al-Shirqat, al-Alam, currently the only two areas with the tribes in northern Basra Basra. Thus, members of the ideologically with the armed with PMF and Aldor. Tribal PMF fighters elected local legislatures — share that use weaponry belonging to PMF have not had an opportunity movements, and some people can also be found in frontline a building as their headquarters the PMF and constitute a large to run for election because the who have assumed these Though none of the members resistance areas that constitute a from which they operate and force that the local government PMF was formed after these offices receive support from the of the provincial council have security risk.

May 2021 44 45 May 2021 Second are the PMF and the Arabs. The Turkmen are divided intelligence is Ahmed al-Zarkani, Peace Brigades operating in The governor has into Shiites and Sunnis and who obtained his post due to his areas of religious, strategic, “ distributed among districts and close ties to Hadi al-Amiri. security, and economic offered to award subdistricts. In the sub-district significance, such as Baiji, where of Amerli are the PMF factions 4 . Baiji: Located north of Tikrit on there are oil refineries controlled projects to companies of the Shiite Turkmen, Brigade the connecting route to Mosul. by Asa’ib commanders. East that represent the 16, and Brigade 52, both tied to A number of tribes inhabit the Tikrit has the Alas and Ajeel the Badr Organization. Quwat city; the most prominent are oil wells, and Samarra has in factions or are al-Shaheed al-Sadr (Brigade 15), al-Qaissin (al-Jisat), al-Jubour, it the religious tourism and affiliated with them, the Asa’ib al-Haq and Kata’ib al-Jawariyeen, and al-Janabiyeen shrines of the imams, plus the Hezbollah also have a presence in in the al-Siniya area west of Baiji. lake and agricultural crops. along with contracts Tuz Khurmato. The mayor of the Baiji has the biggest refineries in Additionally, Samarra is the heart and investments in town is Hassan Zain al-Abideen, Iraq and a petrochemical fertilizer of the province. who was appointed in January factory, and its Neighborhood oil companies. 2018 and is affiliated with Badr. 600 is part of the refineries. The provincial administration ” The Kurdish areas in and around Baiji is also within the area of manages its relationship with the Tuz Khurmato have been under responsibility of Brigade 51. Most PMF based on interests, though the control of the local police and of the tribal PMF personalities the administration realizes the starts at the southern border of the emergency response forces there are affiliated with the short- and long-term danger Ninewa province and stretches to affiliated with the Interior Ministry. Shuwaish and al-Hanishi clans, and has reservations about both the Makhoul mountains. Affiliated which fall under Hajji Kamil al- 3 . Tikrit: Located in the center the militias’ presence and the with this brigade is Regiment 51, Farin al-Jumaili, who is affiliated doctrine the Muslim messianic the shrine is now a PMF official of Salah al-Din province, the city soft efforts to remove them. commanded by Ahmad al-Mahdi with Brigade 51. The regiment figure, Mahdi, will come from in Salah al-Din. contains various tribes in addition The relationship between the in the area of Talul al-Baaj and of Maysam al-Hijab al-Qaisi is Samarra. The city used to be to many newcomers from other Samarra has been controlled PMF and the provincial security al-Mujam’at. Members of this affiliated with Asham. considered a commercial area, apparatuses is akin to the one districts and provinces because since 2014 by the Peace regiment are from the Bedouin and the district had agricultural between the commander and of employment and other Inside Baiji, Omar al-Thamer Brigades, which are affiliated with Shammar tribe. On the west side and fishing areas. All of these the commanded. The PMF opportunities, including Tikrit al-Sultan is responsible for resources were destroyed after Muqtada al-Sadr. The leader of of the town of Shirqat is Regiment the brigades in Samarra and the factions have full control over University. Its most prominent several PMF groups comprising regime change in 2003, the 36, Lions of the Tigris, affiliated sub-districts are al-Alam, Samarra operations command is sensitive sites. 200 people. Al-Sultan has ties jihadist insurgency in 2006, and with the Defense Ministry. inhabited by the al-Jubour tribe; with Risaliyoun (Brigade 31), and Abu Hassan al-Halfi. The brigades when ISIS declared its caliphate The map of the PMF Yazan Mash’an al-Jubouri, son Albu Ajeel, inhabited by a tribe groups affiliated with him hold took charge after they removed in 2014. As for the southern part of MP Mishaan al-Jubouri who of the same name; and Al-Awja the resistance line between Baiji al-Nujaba’, which controlled the of Samarra, the river is held by 1 . Shirqat: This is a town allegedly led Sunni militias in subdistrict, hometown of former and Haditha west of the town. western side of the city. Early on, Quwat al-Rusul al-Nahriya, a composed of a group of large Salah al-Din province during the President Saddam Hussein and It is considered a connection Abu Ma’souma al-Khayqani was Badr-affiliated river patrol with villages located on the two banks fight against ISIS, became closely inhabited by the Albu Nasir. Tikrit between Baiji and Anbar province. the one exercising disposition in a base on the Samarra bridge. of the Tigris River. The al-Jubour connected with al-Muhandis is considered the axis of PMF The Asa’ib also has an office in the city for Saraya al-Salam. The tribe represents the biggest after the ISIS occupation. Also operations. Several factions Baiji. The tribal PMF who are The administration of the shrine director of Samarra intelligence segment of its inhabitants. The representing al-Shirqat in the have offices there, including made up of locals coordinate with of Hassan al-Askari (the 8th is Major Salam from the Sadrist PMF in the town is a tribal one PMF Commission in Baghdad is al-Nujaba’, Badr, Asa’ib, and Jund Major Sa’ad, national security Shiite imam) is private and out movement. The river is patrolled called Brigade 51, led by Asham Ahmad Muhammad al-Saleh. al-Imam. There is a joint office official for Baiji. of the Peace Brigades’ control. from the al-Abbasiya side (15 Sabhan al-Khalaf. Most of the for the administration of PMF Abd al-Sattar al-Murshidi, the kilometers, or about 9 miles, north brigade members are of the 2 . Tuz Khurmato: A town of operations. Abu Mahmoud is 5 . Samarra: One of the largest secretary general of the shrine, of Samarra) by Quwat Wa’ad al-Jubour tribe, with some from three ethnicities. The largest the national security official for districts of Salah al-Din, Samarra is affiliated with prominent Shiite Allah. These people adopt herds the al-Jumailat and the al-Dulaim population is the Kurds, followed the PMF in the province. The produced three of the 12 Shiite political leader Ammar al-Hakim. of buffalo and their owners, and who live in the town. Its territory by the Turkmen, and then the head of Salah al-Din province’s imams, and according to Shiite The previous administrator of these buffalo have led to many

May 2021 46 47 May 2021 incidents, especially at night, Fid’ous is the branch of the the implications of giving the incorporate it with Balad and control the contracts and bids for that have caused the deaths of The PMF al-Tamim tribe that the village is militias control of security and al-Dujail into a Shiite-majority the Baiji refinery and impose a tax citizens and left dozens wounded, “ named after, which consists of 40 feared demographic change since entity, while the rest of Samarra on half the profits. The PMF also including doctors, academics, operates in areas of pro-Asa’ib families. the town is close to the Shiite is Sunni. This would be to dismantled the Baiji and Siniya and military personnel. city of Balad. address demographic changes refineries, along with a fertilizer religious, strategic, 9 . Al-Alam: This area (which and control the water and factory. Large trucks moved the 6 . Balad: A town south of security, and recently became a district) Provincial officials agricultural areas. refineries to Baghdad. After the Samarra and the site of the shrine is a line of villages (al-Alam, area was liberated from ISIS, of Sayyid Muhammad, one of economic significance, Samra, Rabidha, Tel al-Saybat, The governor of Salah al-Din, PMF economic activity the Asa’ib and Badr groups sold the Shiite imams. The town’s such as Baiji, al-Hamdaniya, al-Khazamiya). Ammar Jabar Khalil, is from in Salah al-Din the dismantled facilities back to population has a Shiite majority, It is located within the area of a tribe from al-Dhulu’iya and Salah al-Din at exorbitant prices. but the villages and subdistricts where there are Brigade 88, a Sunni PMF force led has a doctorate in engineering All the factions or registered surrounding Balad are inhabited oil refineries. by Wanas Naji al-Jabara (the son from Tikrit University. He militias affiliated with the Oil sales mostly by Sunnis. The most ” of Sheikh Naji al-Jabara, who was works there as a lecturer and council of ministers have funds prominent of these subdistricts is killed in the battles against ISIS is also a businessman. Khalil’s designated for them in the In the areas between Aldor and al-Ishaqi, which is considered the in 2014). The brigade is headed predecessor was Ahmad general budget. Moreover, one al-Alam controlled by the Badr last area of control of the Peace by Khalid Abdullah al-Jabara al-Jubouri, from the village of of the members of the security group, the militias take oil from Brigades among the southern townspeople. In the al-Na’ima alongside Wanas Naji al-Jabara. al-Hajjaj, near the town of Baiji. and defense committee in the Alas and Ajeel field and subdistricts. The Asa’ib in Balad region east of Aldor, there is a The al-Jabara family is one of the parliament who is from Salah move it eastward through the received help from the Sa’oud tribal PMF led by Sabah Matshar best-known in al-Alam. The first The deputy governor is Ismail al-Din is in a bloc that includes al-Safra checkpoint in order to tribe in destroying houses and al-Hassan. The Badr Organization local government established Halub from the area of al-Ishaqi. PMF commanders. sell it to Kurdish merchants. The gardens, especially in the area is the main group holding the in 2003 was headed by the The second deputy is Ammar security authorities, the NSC, of Azaz Balad. Abu Muhammad area connecting Aldor to al-Alam, retired Gen. Hussein al-Jabara Hikmat from the town of Balad. The PMF’s economic committee and intelligence in Salah al-Din is the security official in the including the route leading to the (deceased), and Abdullah cooperate with them in allowing province, and he is from this tribe. oil wells. The area inhabited by al-Jabara was deputy governor The security leadership of Salah In the PMF within Salah al-Din, the smuggling. Control of the oil The northern part of Balad is the Albu Ajeel tribe is controlled until his assassination on March al-Din has two divisions. The first there are 50 people divided up fields contributed to the Badr and under the command of Brigade by the Asa’ib, which has recruited 29, 2011. Jasim al-Jabara is the Salah al-Din command, into two bodies: one in Tikrit and Asa’ib’s economic revival between 43 Sab’a al Dujail, a PMF faction many members of the tribe. The administered the national security under the leadership of Abd one in Baiji. These PMF members 2015 and 2017. The oil ministry affiliated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. official responsible for the PMF in portfolio, and Khamees al-Jabara al-Mohsen Hatem al-Abbasi. have seized the garages, empty had complete control over the the area, Sheikh Ali al-Nadda, is assumed responsibility for the The Salah al-Din police director land, and other areas affiliated pipelines before that, but Asa’ib 7 . Aldor: Considered the affiliated with the Asa’ib. province’s tribal council. is Qandil Khalil Muhammad with the Tikrit municipal office, as and Badr established control over smallest district in Salah al-Din, al-Jubouri, from al-Dhulu’iya. The well as agricultural areas toward the oil supply by breaking the it is the hometown of Izzat 8 . Al-Dujail: Located in the 10 . Al-Dhulu’iya: A town near director of police in Tikrit is Latif the Jazeera area and al-Duyum. pipelines and filling cargo basins Ibrahim al-Douri, the former vice southernmost area of Salah Balad, where tribal PMF Brigade al-Sajri. The second division is the They have also seized houses with oil and selling it. president under the Saddam al-Din, near Baghdad. Here, 88 has a presence. This faction Samarra operations command, of Baath Party leaders and the Hussein regime. Aldor is Saddam Hussein was subjected is led by Thabit Subji al-Jubouri. led by Emad al-Zuhairi; the ISIS members in the Qadisiya Municipal projects located southeast of Tikrit and to an assassination attempt in Local police and the tactical federal police is headed by Maj. neighborhood and al-Zuhur. northeast of Samarra. It used 1981. The majority of al-Dujail’s regiment affiliated with the Gen. Adnan Wadi Muhsen, who After plundering the houses, they In Balad, the main projects to be the home of the Salah inhabitants are Shiite. The provincial police in al-Dhulu’iya replaced Maj. Gen. Ali al-Lami, started renting them out. are controlled by Muhammad al-Din installation for military town is the embodiment of a also maintain a presence while the director of Samarra al-Baldawi, who is affiliated manufacturing and the Aldor tribal community. The village of there. The al-Jubour tribe alone police is Abd al-Jabbar Abd Aoun. The PMF factions have imposed with the Asa’ib. Among these technical institute. Aldor is under Albu Fid’ous is one of several defended al-Dhulu’iya from ISIS, their control on quarries, oil undertakings is a sewage project the jurisdiction of the Ninth belonging to al-Dujail, and it is making great sacrifices to protect The creation of two commands refineries, and gasoline facilities whose cost reached 50 billion Brigade from Karbala, led by Abu inhabited by the tribe of al-Tamim the town, and refused to hand for the province, including one in Baiji, demanding a portion of Iraqi dinars (about $41.8 million). Sadiq al-Hilli. Within Aldor, there (al-Tamim includes both Shiites over land to PMF groups from in Samarra, is tied to a plan to the profits from the sale of gravel, Another large project is directed is a tribal PMF made up of the and Sunnis). The core of Albu southern Iraq because they knew make Samarra a province and sand, blocks, and gasoline. They by Ammar Hikmet, the governor’s

May 2021 48 49 May 2021 current deputy and Prime Minister and afterwards Baghdad the fields. Families have begun The brigades also demanded 500 More than 100 people from residents of al-Huwaish cannot Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s nephew. intervened to settle the dispute in returning from the Arabat camp pieces of land from Omar al-Badri, the Al Sallo tribe in Samarra re-enter without being subjected favor of the Asa’ib. in Sulaymaniyah after paying the director of the ruins of the town disappeared between Samarra to humiliation and degradation at ‘Taxes’ and checkpoints fees to the Asa’ib. of Samarra, to build a residential and Aldor. There are no clues as the hands of the PMF brigades. Fishing on Al-Tharthar Lake neighborhood for themselves, to their whereabouts, though their Dozens of people from al- Jund al-Imam controls the Plundering of Tikrit and Aldor saying the Peace Brigades names can be found. Huwaish have been kidnapped by highway outside Tikrit heading The lake is one of the best- sacrificed their blood. He realized the militias, and there have been toward al-Tharthar and imposes known places for fishing. Many The militias plundered and Killing of the commander of the their attempt at demographic no clues as to their whereabouts taxes on farmers transporting fishermen live there and take the stole from houses and shops in 4th Division of the federal police change and strongly rejected or news of when they might their goods. The group also fish they catch to the Samarra Tikrit and Aldor and transferred their demand, saying the lands return. Visitors cannot enter imposes fees on the company farmers market to sell it. People property to Baghdad and the The federal police force is al-Huwaish even to visit family, are archeologically valuable and building the stadium west of Tikrit traveling through Samarra from other provinces. Trucks and affiliated with the Interior unless a guarantor comes to transport cars carried equipment, cannot be distributed. But they toward the Jazeera area. different towns and different Ministry, and the commander vouch for them, and then they furniture, and money out of Tikrit insisted, so he offered to give provinces would buy the fish, of its 4th Division, Brig. Gen. can only stay for a limited and Aldor for days. them money to buy lands in In Tikrit, Hezbollah, Jund al-Imam, and the fishermen would make Ali al-Lami, had good relations number of hours. Many times their original areas of residence Risaliyun, Asa’ib, Badr, the a lot of money. However, the with the people of Samarra. visitors are rejected absolutely, Conduct of the PMF security forces from Shirqat to Peace Brigades took control in southern Iraq. The command base was on the even the elderly, even if they are and the Peace Brigades the peripheries north of Samarra, of fishing on the lake and sold Tigris River before the entry of trying to get to a funeral for a and the office of the PMF fish to other provinces to collect Threatening journalists the original Samarra bridge (this The killing of the relative. Foods are not allowed security in Bayt Khairallah set up profits. The Peace Brigades now in the province bridge has been forbidden for commander of the prime to be brought into al-Huwaish checkpoints on the road for cargo allow other fishers, but after the any Samarran to use since the minister’s bodyguard Field research revealed that more without security documents. cars and impose fees on them. fishers complete their catches, PMF arrived in 2014; it has been Chemical fertilizers are among than one journalist in the area the brigades place a price on the One of the major cases that designated as an entrance for the forbidden items. Some people Seizing the said they had been subjected to fish that the brigades will collect. shook public opinion is the killing Iranians only). Al-Lami decided who fled the village in 2014 only Balad farmers’ market threats from PMF actions if they The Peace Brigades then allow to take an inspection tour on found one route of escape – the of Sharif Ismail at the Peace shared information about what the fishers to sell their catches Brigades checkpoint in Samarra the river. He reached an area Jazeera path leading to Mosul. Of When the Balad farmers’ market happens in the province. at whatever higher price they where there were members of those who fled to Mosul, dozens was put up for auction, the Asa’ib in March 2018. Ismail was the want, as long as the brigades an unknown security authority. of the elderly died and are buried and Peace Brigades seized the commander of Brigade 57, which Scores of people taken from the get their cut. One of them took out his weapon there, and some were killed opportunity. To avoid problems was entrusted with protecting town of Aldor and fired at al-Lami, killing him in the bombings. they decided to carry out the Haydar al-Abadi when he was Imposing fees on returnees instantly and wounding those auction in the directorate of prime minister. After the liberation of Aldor from accompanying him – a major Entry to Tikrit the municipal offices of Salah ISIS, the Asa’ib seized the town The Asa’ib faction in the village Attempts at general and a soldier. The file was al-Din in Tikrit, in the presence and destroyed homes, stole of Albu Fid’ous in Yathrib has demographic change closed, as usual. After the liberation of Tikrit by of Fa’iq Zaydan, the director imposed fees on the families properties, and led 160 people the forces headed by Abd al- of the municipal offices. The trying to return home after The PMF and Peace Brigades – women and children among Al-Huwaish: Wahhab al-Sa’adi, who launched representative of the Asa’ib and the area’s liberation from ISIS: have seized a great deal of land them – to an unknown place. A secret no one knew operations from Tikrit University, the representative of the Peace 500,000 Iraqi dinars (about $418) in the province on many pretexts Many people have sought these the PMF forces Asa’ib and Jund Brigades quarreled, and Zaydan for each family after their homes in order to engineer demographic 160 people and reached out to The village of al-Huwaish belongs al-Imam attempted to seize and contacted the SWAT forces to were plundered and destroyed change. For instance, they the highest authorities about to Samarra, and its inhabitants control the entrances to the city put a stop to the fighting. One of and the gardens were washed seized an area called Albu Hirat, the matter, but they remain lost. are from one tribe. Since the and not permit any citizen to the representatives opposed him, away during their displacement. which is affiliated with Samarra. The names of the victims can brigades entered the village in enter without a badge of entry. though, and brandished a pistol In addition, the Asa’ib demands The Samarra municipal office be found online. 2014, they inspired fear in the There are four entrances to Tikrit: in the face of a SWAT officer a portion of the crops from land distributed the land to workers in hearts of the inhabitants because al-Anwa’ in the south, al-Aqwas and ordered him to withdraw where the returning families the city, but the Peace Brigades Scores of Al Sallo tribe members the residents did not know in the north, and al-Alam and immediately. The officer withdrew, have been allowed to recultivate refused to give up the land. disappeared where they would flee. Former Albu Ajeel in the east. There are

May 2021 50 51 May 2021 three types of entry badges: distribution of electricity in the of whom rejected Saddam punish the residents or prevent that undermine the Iraqi state or security organs. In Lebanon, monthly badges and three-month northern region, Waleed Khalid Hussein’s conduct during his their movements. Iraqis’ daily lives. Hezbollah is a separate military badges for employees and daily Hassan, to appoint certain people regime. Some were punished, and force with far greater strength badges for others, including as public sector employees some residents were executed. Influence over security This intelligence briefing has than even the Lebanese armed visitors. The badges include the without qualifications. People fled al-Awja in fear of demonstrated the nature and forces, whereas the Iraqi PMF time of entry and the time they the oppression of the militias, The security forces, despite extent of PMF infiltration of is an extension of the state must leave, and the state of the Reclassifying ancient ruins and they were not permitted to their revulsion at the conduct multiple dimensions of Iraqi that enjoys greater freedom of visitor – ill or elderly – is written return until several months ago, of the PMF and the Peace public and private life. It also operation. This architecture is After UNESCO classified the on the badge. Members of the after they had lost their wealth Brigades because they show no outlined the factions and currents made possible because of the ruins around Samarra as world PMF began overlooking badges and their homes were burned. respect to the army, nonetheless within the PMF itself. The PMF’s deep Iranian penetration into the heritage sites, the PMF began at the beginning of 2019, and they The PMF took property to create remain under the PMF brigades’ sheer size and complexity makes Iraqi state, particularly its law calling the palaces and facilities confined themselves to using bases for itself and changed the influence. Security forces it prone to internal competition, enforcement, intelligence, and from the Abbasid civilization “the employees’ IDs. name of Al-Awja Hospital to the participate in the PMF’s efforts if not infighting. In theory, the security forces. Prison of the Imam Ali al-Hadi,” Imam al-Hadi Hospital. to create demographic change, Iraqi state may, through a “carrot Hampering business a sectarian move that also stirs regarding the possession and stick” approach, co-opt In sum, Iraq’s PMF problem – the in Samarra up contrived victimhood. There The militias seized homes in of the Ali al-Hadi shrine, some elements, particularly tensions over monopolizing is no historical evidence to those ambivalent toward Iranian violence and rule of law – has The PMF has impeded economic the Jazeera Samarra and have and other issues. support the new name. become largely an extension activity in Samarra by closing exploited local livestock and influence. Yet these latter produce for their interest. They Establishing the forces appear to be especially of the Iran problem. Perhaps commercial streets entirely. Albu Ajeel and the ‘Youth of Reform’ more intractably, it is now deeply Bank Street includes hundreds prevent consumers from nearby well-placed to resist such efforts parliament elections intertwined with the Iraqi body of shops and dozens of hotels villages from buying the farm to constrain the militias, as the A group has been established politic, economy, commerce, and is a major business center After Abd Dhiyab al-Ajeeli goods until they are rancid. The backlash against the current called the “Youth of Reform” education, and other sectors where people from the rest of was nominated as the sole PMF also forced the sale of and former prime ministers’ from the town of Samarra. It is that touch the lives of millions of the province go to shop, and representative in the Iraqi homes and buildings near Ali efforts has shown. connected to the NGOs overseen Iraqis and create powerful new Al-Shawaf Street is no less vital. Parliament for the whole Sunni al-Hadi and transferred them directly by the Peace Brigades. An Iraqi government may opt predatory interest groups. Both have been closed. Butchers tribe of Albu Ajeel, the Asa’ib to the Shiite Waqf, compelling The reform group promotes the to tolerate the militias’ de facto Street and the old industrial area faction came out on election the families to sell their homes independent armed status The central government lacks the are considered a center for the day to vote for one of the through threats, blackmail, and Brigades’ ideas and tries to make and focus instead on a “rule capability to tackle this problem sale of vehicle spare parts and candidates from the town of harassment, to the point where them more accepted. of law” approach that tries to through force, and the PMF the repair of engines and farming Balad – a Shiite affiliated with the families no longer wanted to non-violently limit their room for elements in question are too equipment. A great portion of the the Asa’ib. Militias often threaten reside in their homes. A Deeply maneuver. This would probably aware of their own strength to Maryam business market has to accuse Sunnis of taking part Overlapping of authority Entrenched Problem not work. The PMF is likely make concessions otherwise. It been closed, along with the main in the massacre at the Speicher to see such indirect pressure is becoming increasingly unclear street for the old court, including training camp. The militias used The militias’ claims of authority The decision by key Iraqi and as a prelude to more serious how this proverbial disease two hospitals (the general this tactic to get Sunnis to vote sometimes overlap with foreign players to respond to the can be cured without killing prevention center and the family for the Shiite candidate. The state efforts to weaken it, and each other and with security 2014 ISIS threat with large-scale the patient, but any strategy to hospital of Dr. Jamal al-Daradi). militias similarly promoted other may react violently. Whatever forces. This misleads people, militia mobilization likely made attempt this must treat the PMF’s The Bab al-Qabla business street specific candidates in elections the government’s intentions, especially in imposing curfews Iraq’s current crisis inevitable. It penetration into the Iraqi nation has been closed entirely, along in 2018, such as Ahmad al-Rifa’i, the PMF’s infiltration of public and permission for movement is difficult to imagine a scenario and Iraqi life that this report with the hotels and residential who is considered a pawn and private life is creating between the Peace Brigades in which the militarization or reveals as its premise.  buildings in it. for the militias. new interest groups ready and and the Samarra security mobilization of so many men increasingly able to defend Appointments in Baiji The seizure of residences command. The security forces of military age, a great deal of their privileges. permit movement and residents them under Iranian auspices, The Risaliyun faction pressures Al-Awja is large and inhabited go outside for activities, but would not create lasting, powerful The PMF will likely continue to the general director for by thousands of families, many then the Peace Brigades interest groups and relations exert autonomy from the state

May 2021 52 53 May 2021 Appendix of Tables and Maps

Ninewa Security Inspection Checkpoints: MPs of Ninewa Province in the Iraqi Parliament for 2018 Hashd Economy at the Entrances of Baghdad No. Name Bloc/Alliance/Party No. Name Location 1 Khalid Mut’ab Yasin Hassan Victory Alliance- Muttahidun lil-Islah 1 Al-Sayafiya checkpoint Albu Sayfi: Located on the international route that connects 2 Muhammad Mahmoud Taher Victory Alliance Baghdad and the mid-Euphrates provinces. 3 Abd al-Raheem Jasim Muhamad Metlak Wataniyah Coalition 2 Diyala Brigade checkpoint Located south of Baghdad at its entrance from the side of Mada’in. This checkpoint connects the old route between 4 Nawaf Sa’oud Zayd Farhan Wataniyah Coalition Baghdad and the southern provinces. 5 Khalil Muhammad Sa’id Ahmad Abbas Victory Alliance 3 Al-Abayaji checkpoint Located between north Baghdad and south Salah ad-Din 6 Basma Muhamad Basim Sabri Victory Alliance on the international route. 7 Muna Hussein Sultan Yusuf Victory Alliance 4 Iskaniya-Awirij checkpoint Located south of Baghdad on the Baghdad-Babil road. 8 Faris Sadiq Nouri Abd al-Jabbar Kurdistani Alliance 5 Al-Ghalibiyah checkpoint Located east of Baghdad on the route connecting Baghdad and Diyala. Its considered the main 9 Shirwan Jamal Khidr Khalid Kurdistani Alliance checkpoint for the eastern entrance in Baghdad. 10 Tu’ama Abdullah Hamadi Handhal Kurdistani Alliance 6 Al-Karma checkpoint, East of Fallujah. This checkpoint connects 11 Bashar Hameed Mahmoud Abd al-Ghafur Kurdistani Alliance al-Tahaddi checkpoint Baghdad-Anbar through the old route known as the old Baghdad-Fallujah route. 12 Safwan Bashir Yunis Muhammad Kurdistani Alliance 7 Khan Bani Sa’ad checkpoint On the old route between Baghdad-Baqubah. 13 Ikhlas Sabah Khidr Hussein Kurdistani Alliance 8 Dira’ Dijla checkpoint On the road that connects northwest Baghdad-Fallujah. 14 Khalida Khalil Rasho Samo Kurdistani Alliance 15 Falah Hussein Zaydan Khalaf Wataniyah Coalition 16 Lateef Mustafa Ahmad Hassan Wataniyah Coalition 17 Nayef Mukih Shanan Dabas Wataniyah Coalition 18 Intisar Ali Khidr Mahmoud Wataniyah Coalition 19 Thabir Muhammad Sa’id Ridha Wataniyah Coalition 20 Muhammad Iqbal Omar Mahmoud Abdullah Ninewa is my Identity 21 Mahasan Hamdoun Hamid Hassan Ninewa is my Identity 22 Mukhtar Mahmoud Yusuf Salman Fatah Alliance 23 Hanin Mahmoud Ahmad al-Qaddo Fatah Alliance 24 Lilyal Muhammad Ali Yunis Fatah Alliance 25 Osama Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Iraqi Decision Alliance 26 Ahmad Madloul Muhammad Matlak Iraqi Decision Alliance 27 Huda Jarallah Dawoud Hassan Iraqi Decision Alliance 28 Hassan Khalaf Alo Hameed Patriotic Masses Party 29 Muhammad Farman Shahir Salman Patriotic Masses Party 30 Siham Abbas Ali Hamada Patriotic Masses Party 31 Mayzar Hamadi Sultan Yusuf Democratic Program 32 Hussein Hassan Narmo Darwish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 33 Ahmad Abdullah Muhammad Mousa Tamaddun

May 2021 54 55 May 2021 Ninewa Members of the Ninewa Provincial Council Currently in 2020 Continued: Members of the Ninewa Provincial Council Currently in 2020

No. Name Alliance/Party No. Name Alliance/Party

1 Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri The Patriotic Masses and the Alliance of Iraqi Forces 27 Huda Zaki al-Wazan Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc (Head of the Culture and Media Committee) (Ahmad al-Jubouri and Muhammad al-Halbousi) 28 Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Hikma (Head of the Security Committee) 2 Sirwan Muhammad al-Ruzbayani First Deputy for Ninewa Governor: Kurdistan Democratic Party 29 Ghanim Hameed Ahmad Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Nahda 3 Hassan Khalouf al-Sinjari Second Deputy for Ninewa Governor: the Arab Project Hamat Awghlo 4 Saido Jato Hasso al-Sinjari Head of Council: Brotherhood and 30 Owaid Ali Khidr al-Jahish Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 31 Klawiz Ali Amin Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union 5 Omar Elias Ali Elias Head of Council: Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/National Alliance 32 Dawoud Jundi Suleiman Sheikh Kalo Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union 6 Fahima Abbas Babawati Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 33 Aseel Shaheen Agha Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project 7 Saido Hussein Khadr Aws Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 34 Kamila Nashmi al-Matyuti Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc 8 Khalil Shammo Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 35 Hassan Shabib Ibrahim Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project 9 Khidr Elias Adi Kajjo Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 36 Khalida Ismail Mahaimid al-Ma’amari Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc 10 Hashim Muhammad Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 37 Hayam Ilham Abdal Azzo Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project Ali Taha al-Barifkani 38 Daldar Abdullah Ahmad Zaibari Iraqiyat Ninewa - Development and Justice Party 11 Barakat Shamo Nayef Qatto Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 39 Khalaf Obeid Abdullah al-Hadidi Islamic Party 12 Ghazwan Hamid Hameed Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic - Kuta al-Shabak Khalil al-Dawoudi 40 Ayed Raheel Muhammad al-Luwaizi Arab Project 13 Dawoud Baba Bina Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party - 41 Khaz’al Difan Jaber al-Luwaizi Arab Project Kuta al-Masihi 42 Abd al-Rahman Sultan Patriotic Masses Party 14 Khalifa Khalid Aido Hammo Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party - Muhammad al-Waka’ Kuta al-Yazidiyin 15 Kolestan Hassan Ali Suleiman Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party 16 Nour al-Din Yunis Hussein Qablan Deputy Head of the Council - Alliance of Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front 17 Luqman Najm Ahmad Deputy Head of the Council - Alliance of Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front Najm al-Rashidi 18 Hussam al-Din Sa’adoun Hamid Ihsan Movement - Islamic Party Sa’adoun al-Abbar 19 Ali Khudair al-Jubouri Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Halbousi 20 Asin Hamza Khalil Amin Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front - Fatah Alliance 21 Bunyan Muhammad Dhiyab al-Jarba Iraqiyat Ninewa - Shammar Tribe 22 Muhammad Abdullah Mousa The Arab Project 23 Balqis Taha Hussein Shanin Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc 24 Marwan Rashid al-Zaydan Iraqiyat Ninewa - Free Civil Progressive Party 25 Mahmoud Muhammad Patriotic Masses Mahmoud al-Jubouri 26 Dahwi Jafal Muhammad al-Sa’ib Iraqiyat Ninewa - Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari

May 2021 56 57 May 2021 IRAQ

PMF Soldiers/Fighters Baghdad Continued: PMF Soldiers/Fighters

No. Area Head of Group Brigade/Militia/Regiment No. Area Head of Group Brigade/Militia/Regiment

1,500 Ninewa Plain Wa’ad al-Qaddo Al-Shabak Regiment, Brigade 30 - Shiite 150 Hadhr Hawad al-Ahmadi Al-Hadhr Regiment - Sunni (Bartella and Kokjali) 100 Ba’aj Ahmad Mahaidi Saleh Talul al-Ba’aj Regiment - Sunni 1,200 Tel Keppe, Qusayat, Qaraqosh Rayan al-Kaldani Kata’ib Babiliyun - Christian al-Shammari 2,000 Tal Afar - Kubba and Sharikhan Abu Zaynab al-Ta’i (Badr) Al-Abbas Regiment - Shiite 120 Hamam al-Alil Naseef al-Ameed Hamam al-Alil Regiment - Sunni Ibrahim al-Marsoumi 4,000- Sinjar No individual leader, but links Sinjar Resistance Units and Asayish 5,000 to the YPG in Syria and the PKK Izidkhan (some units have been 200 Nimrud Ahmad al-Jawari Al-Nimrud Regiment- Sunni incorporated into Regiment 80) 120 Mosul - al-Qahira and al-Tahrir Ahmad Mahmoud al-Warshan Shield of the Hunchback 400 Sinjar and al-Qaraiwan Al-Khal Ali and Khadida Kojo Lalish Regiment - Yazidi Regiment 15 - Sunni 3,000 Rashidiya and Kabbat Sharikhan Abu Ala’ al-Wala’i Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ - Shiite 75 Sinjar Aamer al-Sinjari Heroes of Sinjar Regiment - Sunni 2,500 Right side of Mosul Abu Baqir al-Jubouri Al-Asa’ib Regiment - Shiite 300 Hadhr Hisham al-Hamdani Al-Hamdani Regiment 11 - Sunni 1,200 Badush Khudair Alaiwi al-Sabbar Saraya al-Khorasani - Shiite 300 Ba’wiza, Kokjali and al-Rashidiya Ahmad al-Jubouri Knights of Jubour - Sunni 600 Nimrud - al-Jad’a and al-Hud Marwan al-Zaidan Al-Luhaib - Sunni 150 Ba’wiza and al-Rashidiya Meqdad al-Sheikh Faris Bayariq al-Iraq Regiment - Sunni Abdullah al-Sab’awi 3,000 Tal Afar, Tal Abta, and Nayef al-Shammari Al-Fatah Militia - Shiite Tal Afar airport 79 Hadhr Mazahem Ghazi Al-Akoub Regiment 17 - Sunni 500 Rabi’a Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari Al-Nawadir Regiment - Sunni 200 Left side of Mosul Yusuf al-Ramah and Ramah al-Mosul Regiment - Sunni Abu Ramah al-Siyab 120 Ba’aj and al-Hadhr Muhammad al-Jubouri Jubour Tribes Regiment - Sunni 200 Qayyarah Muhammad Nouri al-Abd Rabbah Al-Jubouri Commandos 39 - Sunni 100 Nimrud Nazhan al-Sakhr al-Lahibi South Mosul Regiment - Sunni 291 Awinat, al-Ayadhiya Fanar Ahmad Safuk Al-Safuk Regiment 63 - Sunni 100 Rabi’a Watban al-Ramah Al-Tahaddi Regiment - Sunni sub-district (Tal Afar) 150 Salamiya and Nimrud Khalid al-Sabah Jubour Tribe Regiment - Sunni 275 Badush Radhwan Nafi’ Muhammad Badush Regiment - Sunni 200 Mosul - al-Arabi Omar al-Alaf Al-Arabi Neighbourhood, 150 Tal Abta Ali Jasim al-Matyuti Al-Matyutiya Regiment - Sunni Neighbourhood Regiment 14 - Sunni 200 Qayyarah Shahadha Jasim Azzawi Al-Khafji Regiment 46 - Sunni 100 Ba’aj - Sakar area Nawar Nayef al-Afin Al-Jaghayafa Regiment - Sunni al-Khafaji 300 Rabi’a Fawaz Dhiyab al-Jarba Rabi’a Regiment - Sunni 4,000 Badush Muhammad Yahya al-Talib Ninewa Guard Brigade 57 - Sunni 500 Qayyarah Muhammad al-Mar’id Al-Qayyara Martyrs - Sunni 400 Ba’aj and Hadhr Abd al-Karim Madlul al-Jarba Shammar Forces Regiment 52 - Sunni 1,200 Ba’aj Dhiyab Makif al-Shammari Mosul Shield Regiment - Sunni 150 Tal Abta Abdullah As’ad al-Basha Al-Tanaya Regiment 60, 2 - Sunni 500 Ba’aj Ahmad Madlul al-Jarba Lions of Ninewa Regiment 46 - Sunni 400 Rabi’a Faysal Watban al-Jarba Al-Tanaya Regiment 54, 1 - Sunni 250 Jazeera Safuk Mani’ al-Yawar Jazeera Shield Regiment - Sunni 250 Qayyarah Hamidi al-Jou’ani Al-Joua’ana Regiment- Sunni 300 Jabban Munif al-Ali al-Luwaizi Al-Luwaizi Regiment 65 - Sunni 300 Tal Afar - al-Ayadiya Muhammad al-Waka’ Al-Karar Regiment - Shiite

May 2021 58 59 May 2021 Basra Province The Names of the MPs from Basra Province Basra Basra

Position Name Affiliation No. Name Alliance/Bloc

Governor of Basra As’ad Abd al-Amir Abd Deputy Secretary General 1 Aamer Hussein al-Fayez Fatah Alliance al-Ghaffar al-Aidani of the Party of the National Iraqi Congress 2 Uday Awad Fatah Alliance First Deputy of the Governor Muhammad Taher al-Tamimi Sadrist Movement 3 Faleh al-Khaz’ali Fatah Alliance Second Deputy of the Governor Dergham Arif al-Ajwadi Virtue Party 4 Muhamad Abu al-Hail Fatah Alliance (also known as National Program Bloc) 5 Intisar al-Moussawi Fatah Alliance Head of the Provincial Council Sabah Hassan al-Bazuni Da’wa Party (Tanzim al-Dakhil) 6 Mithaq al-Hamidi Fatah Alliance Deputy Head of the Provincial Council Waleed Hameed Kaytan Al-Hikma 7 Rami al-Sikini Sa’irun Rapporteur of the Provincial Council Najla’ Jabbar Majeed Al-Hikma 8 Mudhaffar Ismail al-Fadl Sa’irun Basra Police Commander Lieutenant General He is close to the governor, Popular 9 Badr Sa’igh al-Ziyadi Sa’irun Rasheed Falih al-Halfi Mobilization Forces commanders, and Iran 10 As’ad al-Abadi Sa’irun Basra Operations Commander Lieutenant General Qasim He does not have a relationship with the parties 11 Najah al-Mayahi Sa’irun Jasim Nizal al-Maliki and factions. His official relationship with the governor and Popular Mobilization Forces is 12 Jabbar al-Aibi Victory Coalition within the security frameworks. His area of 13 Jamal al-Muhammadawi Victory Coalition responsibility deals with army intervention in the event of emergencies. 14 As’ad al-Aidani Victory Coalition The Adel Abd al-Mahdi government has no minister from Basra. 15 Mazahem al-Tamimi Victory Coalition 16 Thawra Hadaj Victory Coalition 17 Khalid Abd al-Samad al-Katrani State of Law 18 Salam Abd al-Mohsen al-Maliki State of Law 19 Kadhim Finjan al-Hammami State of Law 20 Safa’ Muslim Bandar State of Law 21 Hassan Khalati al-Bazuni Al-Hikma 22 Zahra Hamza al-Bajari A-Hikma 23 Abd al-Amir Najm Abdullah Men of Works Gathering 24 Abd’un Alawi Taher Will Movement 25 Safa’ Adnan al-Ghanem Al-Wataniyah

May 2021 60 61 May 2021 Names of Members of the Basra Provincial Council Continued: Names of Members of the Basra Provincial Council Basra

No. Name Bloc/Alliance/Party No. Name Bloc/Alliance/Party

1 Ghali Ali al-Mansouri Al-Hikma Bloc 29 Anwar Mudallil Shabar Virtue Bloc 2 Salman Abd al-Razzaq al-Tamimi Al-Hikma Bloc 30 Nash’at Sakban Talib Virtue Bloc 3 Ameen Wahab Abdullah Al-Hikma Bloc 31 Mundhar Riyadh Abd al-Razzaq Islamic Party 4 Jawad Abd al-Abbas Muhammad al-Imara Al-Hikma Bloc 32 Jum’a Hajul Sabr Communist Party 5 Waleed Hameed Kaytan Al-Hikma Bloc 33 Aqeel al-Khalidi Gathering of Justice and Unity 6 Ali Shaddad al-Faris Al-Hikma Bloc 34 Karim Shawwal al-Maliki Future 7 Najla’ Jabbar Majeed Al-Hikma Bloc 35 Nofak Aram Batrsyan Christian Component 8 Iktifa’ Sabahi Muhammad Al-Hikma Bloc 9 Mortada Karim Khaz’ali al-Shahmani Badr Bloc 10 Ghanem Hameed Saleh al-Mansouri Badr Bloc 11 Hussam Hanun Abu al-Hail Badr Bloc 12 Amtar Raheem Nu’ama Badr Bloc 13 Sumayyah Faysal Awda al-Halfi Badr Bloc 14 Rabi’ Mansour To’ama Badr Bloc 15 Nadhim Nimr Abd Badr Bloc 16 Ahmad Thajeel al-Saliti Badr Bloc 17 Sabah Hassan al-Bazuni State of Law Bloc 18 Ameen Mansour Qasim State of Law Bloc 19 Jabbar Abd Ali al-Sa’adi State of Law Bloc 20 Basma Dakhil al-Salmi State of Law Bloc 21 Basim Khalaf Faris State of Law Bloc 22 Ahmad Abd al-Hussein Kadhim State of Law Bloc 23 Fatima al-Mayahi State of Law Bloc 24 Haydar Abd al-Sada al-Sa’adi Al-Ahrar Bloc 25 Muhammad Mahdi Saleh Al-Ahrar Bloc 26 Bushra Hameed Salman al-Muhammadawi Al-Ahrar Bloc 27 Raja’ Fadhel Arir Al-Ahrar Bloc 28 Mujeeb Aziz Kareem Virtue Bloc

May 2021 62 63 May 2021 Names of the MPs in Salah al-Din Province Names of Members of the Provincial Council in Salah al-Din

Name Affiliated with: Name

Manar al-Baldawi The Building Alliance, Abu Mazen, and sometimes with Badr Ahmad Abd al-Jabbar Kareem Muhammad al-Baldawi The Asa’ib Ashwaq al-Jubouri Mahdi Taqi Badr Amina al-Jubouri Jasim al-Jabara from al-Alam Ayad Allawi Amira Abd al-Amir al-Baldawi Dr. Maqdam al-Jumaili from Shirqat Khamis al-Khanjar Jasim Mumtaz Ali Akbar Shama’il Sahab al-Obeidi Khamis al-Khanjar Jum’a Zhahir al-Khazraji Ahmad Abdullah Abd Abu Mazen Fatah affiliated with Hadi al-Amiri Hardan Lafta Ammar Yusuf Hamoud, al-Ata’ Alliance Faleh al-Fayadh Hassan Muhammad Ahmad Kafa’ Farhan Hussein Khalid al-Khazraji Muthanna Abd al-Samad Salim al-Jubouri Khalid Hassan Mahdi al-Darraji Qutaiba al-Jubouri Ayad Allawi Khaz’al Hamad al-Qaisi Ali al-Sajri The Interest Rasheed al-Bayati Rana Abd al-Hameed al-Jubouri Ziyad Ali Abdullah al-Ajeeli Sabhan Mala Chayad Sahar Mawlud Sa’ad Muhammad Yusuf Sa’adiya al-Obeidi Abd Sultan Eisa Uday Dhanun al-Jubouri Ali al-Dujaili Ali Fadhel Faysal al-Jubouri Kamil Abbas Ashraf Mutshar al-Bayati Mutshar Subhi Ghafel (bought the seat from the former member Adnan Ibrahim al-Faraji) Mala Hassan Kirman Munir al-Jubouri Wasmi al-Sahan

Note: The district councils have not changed since their establishment and no elections have happened.

May 2021 64 65 May 2021 Najaf Najaf Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Najaf Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Ihsan Tha’aban Abd Ali Kadhim Victory Coalition Zaynab Atiya Nour al-Alawi Al-Hikma Hassan Razzaq Dawud al-Jahishi Sa’irun Siham Man’am al-Mahna Badr (family/relatives link, a Badr commander) Hassan Abdullah Abadi al-Aquli Sa’irun Sahila Sa’ad al-Sa’igh Badr (political link/independent) Khalid Jawad Kadhim Aboud Al-Hikma Abbas Jabar al-Alaiwi Law Sa’ad Jabbar Muhammad Ali Victory Coalition Ali Hassan Ismail al-Shammari The Najaf for Change Sana’ Muhammad Hameed Jawad Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link with Badr Organization) Aamer Ali al-Arbawi Al-Fadhila (factional link/a commander in the al-Awfiya’ Hashd) Aboud Waheed Aboud Aneed State of Law Coalition: political/organizational link with Da’wa Party Kadhim Abd Hussein al-Jalayjawi Badr (factional link/a commander in the Badr Hashd) Adnan Abd Khudair Abbas Victory Coalition Mohsen Yasin al-Tamimi Al-Jihad Movement (factional link/a commander in the al-Jihad Movement Hashd) Ali Yusuf Abd al-Nabi Omran Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link with Badr Organization) Hadi Da’boul al-Hatimi Al-Hikma Fadhil Jaber Abd Shanin Fatah Alliance (factional link/a commander in Badr Organization) Hala Hassib al-Mashhadi Al-Hikma Majed Adhab Jaber Sajit Sa’irun Wala’ Raheem Hussein Salawi Sa’irun

Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Administration Asifa Hamid al-Yasiri Al-Ahrar Governor: Luay al-Yasiri (Law) Aseel Ibrahim al-Talqani Al-Wafa’ First Deputy: Hashim Najm al-Kar’awi (Al-Hikma) Hussein Abd al-Ameer al-Hadrawi Al-Wafa’ Second Deputy: Talal Bilal al-Aridhi (Al-Wafa’) Fa’iz Hussein Sha’aban Al-Wafa’ Head of Provincial Council: Khudair Na’ama al-Jubouri (Saraya Al-Jihad) Sa’ad Mohsen al-Haris Al-Wafa’ Police Commander: Major General Ghanem Muhammad Ja’afar Al-Husseini Wisam Hussein al-Zajrawi Al-Ahrar Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (Commander of Mid-Euphrates Operations) Razzaq Mohsen Muhammad Sharif Al-Ahrar Radwan Kamil al-Kindi Al-Wafa’ Hussein Waheed al-Eisawi Al-Wafa’ Sahr Karim al-Fatlawi Al-Wafa’ Faruq Salman al-Ghazali Al-Hikma Idris Yahya al-Yasiri Al-Da’wa al-Dakhil (political/organizational link) Ameen Kamil Hameed al-Ghazali Al-Ahrar Bushra Abbas al-Ramahi Al-Dawla al-Adila (political link/independent) Jawad Oweiz al-Ghazali Al-Wafa’ Hassan Hamza Mousa al-Zubaidi Al-Islah Hussein al-Zamili Al-Wafa’ Khudair Nu’ama al-Jubouri Saraya al-Jihad (factional link/a commander in the Saraya al-Jihad militia) Zuhair Hamoudi Qanbar al-Jubouri Al-Islah

May 2021 66 67 May 2021 Karbala Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Karbala Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Karbala

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Manal Hameed Hashem Abbas Victory Coalition Yusuf Majeed al-Habub Al-Liwa’ Hazim Abd Sukhail State of Law Coalition (political links/Shura of the Da’wa Party) Muhammad Hameed al-Mousawi Amal al-Rafidain (overseer of the Qasim al-Jabarin brigade) Muhammad Hussein Safa’ Hashim Nasrallah Asa’ib (factional link/commander in Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Hussein Ahmad Hadi Hussein State of Law Coalition (political links/Shura of the Da’wa Party) Nafi’ Hashim al-Mayali Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Hussein Ali Muhammad Abbas Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Hamid Sahib al-Karbala’i Badr (factional link) Laila Falih Hassan Alwan Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link in the Badr Organization) Majid Sa’eed Muhammad al-Maliki Law (Al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi regiment/al-Sadr al-Awal) Hamid Abbas Yaseen Hashem Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Mahfouz Man’am al-Tamimi Law (factional link/commander in the Al-Shaheed al-Sadr al-Awal militia) Hassan Muhammad Kadhim Alwan Al-Hikma Ahmad Jawad Madi al-Amari - Nabil Hamza Mahsun Ismail Sa’irun Zuhair Kadhim Marhun al-Kariti Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Fatima Abbas Kadhim Hassan Sa’irun Riyadh Muhammad Ali Awda Dahash Sa’irun

Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Bushra Hassan Ashur Hita Law Administration Sandis Imran al-Tarihi Law (link of family/relatives: Leader in the Shura of the Da’wa Party) Governor: Naseef Jasim al-Khatabi (Law) Tariq Katif al-Khaykani Al-Ahrar First Deputy: Jasim al-Fatlawi (Al-Ahrar) Hussein Shadhan al-Aboudi Al-Ahrar Second Deputy: Ali al-Mayali (Al-Ata’) Zuhair Ahmad Abu Dakka Supreme Council (political/organization links: Supreme Council) Head of the Provincial Council: Ali Abd Sakheel al-Maliki (Law) Ala’ Abd al-Wahid al-Ghanimi Al-Hikma Police Commander: Major General Ahmad Zuwaini Janan Abbas al-Wazani Al-Hikma Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab’oun (Rafidain Operations Commander) Jabbar Mohsen J’az al-Jalihawi Amal al-Rafidain Suhaila Shinu Adhab al-Zubaidi Amal al-Rafidain Ali Abd Sakhil al-Maliki Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Muhammad Abd Zaid al-Talaqani Al-Dawla al-Adila (political/organization links) Zahra Matar Hassoun al-Da’ami Al-Dawla al-Adila (political links/independent) Abbas Hameed Hashim al-Mousawi Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Ridha Muhammad al-Sailawi Al-Ahrar Jasim Hameed Hani al-Maliki Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Haydar Ali Al Khanjar Kafa’at al-Taghyeer Hana’ Hadi al-Hasanawi Al-Ahrar Murad Anad al-Jubouri Amal al-Rafidain Aqeel Fa’iq al-Mas’oudi Al-Ahrar Naser al-Khaz’ali Al-Ahrar

May 2021 68 69 May 2021 Samawah/Muthanna Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Muthanna Continued: Samawah/Muthanna Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Faleh Abd al-Hassan Sakr Sultan Victory Coalition Khudair Matar Hajim al-Raishawi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Adnan Hadi Nour State of Law Coalition (political link/Shura of the Da’wa Party) Ajil Kadhim al-Ziyadi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Muhammad al-Asadi Muhammad Hasouni Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Ashwaq Karim Mohsen Atouj Fatah Alliance (family/relatives link, Commander in the Badr Organization) Jawdan al-Eisawi Uday Hatem Rajouj Sha’alan Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Faleh Sari Abdadhi Okab Al-Hikma Rifah Khidr Jayad Ba’ir Sa’irun Sa’aran Obeid Shani Kassar Sa’irun Administration

Governor: Ahmad Manfi Jawda (Law) Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link First Deputy: Sami Na’ama al-Hassani (Al-Ahrar) Ammar Sahib Al Ghareeb Law Second Deputy: Adel Nazik al-Yasiri (Al-Hikma) Anwar Fahim al-Zalimi Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Head of Provincial Council: Hakim Muslim al-Yasiri (Supreme Council) Sa’ad Kadhim Al Sultan Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Police Commander: Major General Sami Sa’oud Jafat Basima Raheem al-Raishawi Asa’ib (family/relations link: commander in the Asa’ib Organization) Operations Commander: Rafidain Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab’oun. Sana’ Hussein al-Safrani Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Hakim Muslim al-Yasiri Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council) Hussein Manisad al-Abadi Al-Hikma Fariq Fuwain al-‘Aajaiyi Al-Hikma Qabil Zagheer al-Zayrjawi Al-Hikma Ahmad Marzuk Salal al-Hassani Al-Hikma Zahra Alaiwi al-Sayaghi Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council) Talib Salman al-Mayali Al-Ahrar Salam Hamza al-Jayashi Al-Ahrar Awsaf Abd al-Karim al-Zalimi Al-Ahrar Harith Lahmoud al-Zayrjawi Tajammu’ al-Kiafa’at Ismail Sawadi al-Jayashi Tajammu’ al-Kiafa’at Zaynab Hassan al-Toubi Tajammu’ al-Kiafa’at Muhammad Arboud al-Zayadi Al-Ahrar Fahad Sayf al-Ghanimi Tajammu’ al-Muthanna Ghazi Mousa al-Khateeb Communist Ali Hussein Aziz Ali Hanoush Al-Muthanna Alliance for Change and Building Wafa’ Fadhil al-Khalidi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Zaynab Raheem al-Jayashi Badr (political/organizations link: Badr Organization)

May 2021 70 71 May 2021 Qadisiya Diwaniyah/Qadisiyyah: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Diwaniyah/Qadisiyyah: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Huda Sajjad Mahmoud Shakir Victory Coalition Saleh Nouri al-Hayawi Da’wa/al-Dakhil (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Abd al-Hussein Aziz Ahmad Jalil Victory Coalition Duha Ridha al-Qusayr Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Abd al-Ilah Ali Muhammad Tahir State of Law oalition (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Abbas Matlab al-Shaybani Al-Mowatin Sa’ad Shaker Aziz Kadhim Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Ali Fawzi al-Khaz’ali Al-Madani Siham Mousa Hamoud Jabar Fatah Alliance (political/organizations link: Badr Organization) Anad Kadhim al-Na’ili Al-Fadhila (factional link/commander in the al-Awfiya’ Hashd) Abbas Sha’il Awda Thajeel Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Fatima Hatif al-Kar’awi Al-Ahrar Ali Mani’ Attiyah Salman Al-Hikma Faydal Hasan al-Na’ili Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Maysoun Jasim Dawoud Ati Sa’irun Majid Jaber al-Salihi Wataniyah al-Bayda’ (political link/independent) Muhammad Ali Hussein Adhafa Sa’irun Maytha Mousa Khasbak al-Zubaidi Jamahir al-Diwaniyah Ahmad Hamza Kati’ Jabar Sa’irun Malhan Imran Mousa Salman

Administration Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Governor: Zuhair Ali al-Sha’alan (Law) Intisar Hadi al-Mousawi Law First Deputy: Hussein al-Mousawi (Al-Ahrar) Iyad Tali’ al-Miyali Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Second Deputy: Malik Kadhim Kati’ (Abna’ al-Diwaniyah) Basim Abd Attiyah al-Awadi Al-Ahrar Head of Provincial Council: Jubayr Salman al-Jubouri (Law) Baqir Ali Sha’alan Al-Wafa’ lil-Iraq Police Commander: Brigadier general Haydar Hassan Mankhi Basma Kadhim Nakar Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (commander of Mid-Euphrates operations) Balsam Ali Talib al-Awadi Abna’ al-Diwaniyah Jubayr Salman al-Jubouri Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Ja’afar Mousa al-Mousawi Jamahir al-Diwaniyah Jamal Farid al-Attiya Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Hafiz Matshar al-Aboudi Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Hakim Hameed al-Khaz’ali Al-Hikma Hussein Jahil al-Badairi Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Hussein Abd al-Hameed Mazruk al-Abidi Al-Mowatin Hussein Muhaysan al-Karidhi Al-Ahrar Hussein Hadi al-Badairi Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council) Hakeema Adheem al-Shabali Jamahir al-Diwaniyah Haydar Hamza al-Shammari Al-Ahrar Khudair Sharif al-Mayahi Wataniyah al-Bayda’ (Political Link/Independent) Zaynab Hamza al-Abidi Al-Hikma

May 2021 72 73 May 2021 Babil Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Babil Continued: Babil Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Falah Abd al-Kareem Radhi Manoukh Victory Coalition Rafla’ Radhi Abd al-Kareem al-Jahishi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Maha Fadhil Kadhim Khudair Victory Coalition Riyadh Adai al-Khafaji Al-Hikma Raheed Adai Karu Hamzah Victory Coalition Zuhair Abbas al-Jawdhari Al-Hikma Sadiq Madlul Hamad Jasim State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Zayd Jawad Hassan Salim Watut Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Mansour Hussein Madour Abbas State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Zaynab Ismail al-Husseini Supreme Council (family link/wife of a leader in the Supreme Council) Haitham Ramadan Abd Ali Harit Kifa’at lil-Taghyeer Coalition (political link/Secretary General of the Kifa’at Bloc) Suhaila Ismail al-Khaykani Supreme Council (political/organization link: Supreme Council) Thamer Dhayban Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa’ib Militia) Sadiq Rasul al-Mahna Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Hassan Shaker Awdah Hussein Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa’ib Militia) Talib Obeid Nasar Al-Hikma Manal Wahab Muhammad Fadhil Ali Fatah Alliance (political/organization link: Badr Organization) Ad Amir Ghali al-Jubouri Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Adnan Fayhan Mousa Shari Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in Asa’ib Militia) Aqeel Jabbar hamza al-Rubai’i Al-Madani Lubna Raheem Karim Fayd Allah Al-Hikma Ali Jasim al-Sultani Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Salim Tahmir Ali Farhud Al-Hikma Ali Hamza Dalli al-Kar’awi Al-Islah Hassan Fad’am Asal Hussein Al-Hikma Kamil Shabeeb Shahtoul Al-Hikma Salam Hadi Kadhim Aboud Sa’irun Majid Hameed al-Qusayr Asa’ib (factional link/commander in the Asa’ib Militia) Ali Ghawi Hassan Jasim Sa’irun Mahdi Akoul Hassan al-Sultani Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Nouras Kamil Attiya Madi Sa’irun Khalid Ali Mousa al-Khafaji Kafa’at Muhammad Ridha Dawoud Nasir Sa’irun Habah Eisa Imran Al-Ahrar Zaynab Hamza Kadhim al-Shammari Kafa’at lil-Taghyeer Radhi Obeid Hajoul al-Jubouri Al-Islah Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Ibrahim Habib Khabat al-Abbasi Al-Hikma Ahlam Rahid al-Watifi Law (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Ahmad Adnan Shaheed al-Gharibawi Al-Fadhila (political/organization link: Al-Fadhila Party) Administration As’ad Abd Harab al-Daraiyi Al-Ahrar Governor: Karar Sabah al-Abadi (Law) As’ad Man’am al-Muslimawi Al-Hikma First Deputy: Habib Hashim al-Hillawi (Asa’ib) Ban Mahdi Kadhim al-Ma’mouri Ansar al-Hussein (family/relatives link, a militia commander) Second Deputy: Hassan Mandeel (Al-Hikma) Hassan Kamoun Karidi al-Ta’i Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council) Head of Provincial Council: Ra’ad Hamza Alwan al-Jubouri (Kafa’at lil-Taghyeer) Hamza Obeid Mousa al-Khafaji The Asa’ib (factional link: Commander in the Asa’ib Militia) Police Commander: Major General Ali Kawa al-Zaghaiyi Haydar Jaber al-Zanbour al-Ajeeli Al-Ahrar Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (commander of Mid-Euphrates operations) Haydar Abd al-Karim Al-Iraqiya Rasheed al-Janabi Khatam Dawoud Jalab al-Hameedawi Kafa’at lil-Taghyeer Ra’ad Hamza Alwan al-Jubouri Kafa’at lil-Taghyeer

May 2021 74 75 May 2021 Anbar Anbar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Anbar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Muhammad Nasir Dalli Ahmad Al-Anbar is Our Identity Sabah Karhout Al-Qarar Adel Khameed Abd al-Latif Fadhil Al-Anbar is Our Identity Taha Abd al-Ghanni al-Hazimawi Al-Qarar Sa’adoun Juwair Farhan al-Dulaimi Al-Anbar is Our Identity Taha Abd Muslih Abd al-Ghanni Rawafid Faleh Yunis Hassan Jadou’ Al-Anbar is Our Identity Obeid Makhlaf al-Suweidawi Abirun Nahla Jabbar Khalifa Mohsen Al-Anbar is Our Identity Adhal Obeid Daji al-Fahdawi Al-Qarar Muhammad Raykan Hadid Ali Al-Anbar is Our Identity Ali Muhammad Darab Al-Qarar Nahla Hamad Abd Saleh Victory Coalition Omar Abd al-Rahman Al-Qarar Hassan Amalawi Faysal Hussein Jabbar Abbas Victory Coalition Eid Emash Talak al-Karbouli Al-Hall Sami’a Muhammad Khalifa al-Ghalab Wataniyah Coalition Fatima Khalaf Saleh Abirun Yahya Ghazi Abd Lateef Wataniyah Coalition Farhan Muhammad Saleh Abirun Kareem Aftan Ahmad Ghatheeth Wataniyah Coalition Fahad Mash’an al-Rashid Al-Ta’awun Haybat Ahmad Abbas Abd al-Jabbar Qarar al-Iraq Alliance Karim Halal Sharqi al-Karbouli Al-Iraqiya Abdullah Abd al-Hameed Qarar al-Iraq Alliance Dhiyab Kharbit Muhammad Yaseen Hameed Al-Iraqiya Ibtisam Muhammad Darab Khalaf Abirun Mahmoud Ahmad Khalaf al-Fahdawi Al-Hall Qasim Muhammad Abd Hamadi Abirun Murdhi Muhammad al-Mahalawi Al-Qarar Na’im al-Ka’oud Abirun Wisam Qahir Abd al-Lateef al-Rawi Al-Hall Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Ahmad Hameed Sharqi al-Alwani Al-Qarar Arkan Khalaf al-Tarmuz Al-Hall Asma’ Osama al-Ani Al-Qarar Amirah Uday Abbas Al-Qarar Administration Iman Jihad Ahmad al-Mashhadani Al-Qarar Governor: Ali Farhan Hameed (Al-Hall) Iman Kurdi al-Akidi Abirun First Deputy: Jasim Muhammad Asal (Al-Qarar) Ibrahim Muhammad Sarhid Al-Qarar Second Deputy: Mustafa Ahmad Arsan al-Jumaili (Al-Hall) Jasim Muhammad al-Halbousi Al-Qarar Head of Provincial Council: Ahmad Hameed Sharqi al-Alwani (Al-Qarar) Hudhaifa Khalaf Jarad al-Eisawi Abirun Police Commander: Haji Razeej Kassar Riyadh Talib al-Jumaili Abirun Operations Commander: Major General Nasir al-Ghannam Sa’ad Jasim Zaydan al-Amiri Al-Hall Salma Ahmad Lafi Al-Hall Shalal Naji Obeid al-Halbousi Abirun Sadiq Jamil Madkhar Al-Qarar

May 2021 76 77 May 2021 Wasit Wasit Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Wasit Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Yusuf Ba’ir Alwan Abd Ali Victory Coalition Maryam Abdullah Jadir al-Jizani Al-Ahrar Iqbal Abd al-Hussein Abu Jari Madhi Victory Coalition Turki Khalaf Ali al-Abd Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) al-Ghanaimawi Kadhim Hussein Ali Jaber State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da’wa Party) Mahdi Ali Jaber al-Mousawi Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ (factional link/commander in Abbas Yaber Owaid Sayeh Kafa’at lil-Taghyeer Coalition the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ Militia) Sa’ad Hussein Hashim Hassan Fatah Alliance (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization) Murad Hamid Alawi al-Shujairi Iraq al-Khair wa al-Ata’ Qasim Muhammad Jalal Hussein Fatah Alliance (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization) Muhasin Khairi al-Dulaimi Asa’ib (factional link/commander in al-Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Militia) Mahmoud Abd al-Ridha Al-Hikma Khalid Hussein al-Ajaiawi Al-Hikma Sa’adiya Abdullah Awfi Hussein Al-Hikma Haydar Hashim Ali al-Fayli Feyli Kurds Hassan Jalal Muhammad Tahir Sa’irun Amal Abd al-Hussein al-Akeeli Al-Mowatin/al-Mu’tamar (political/organizations link: al-Mu’tamar al-Watani) Salman Hassan Badair Zayed Sa’irun Ghadanfar Kadhim Badr (factional link/leader in the Badr Organization) Inas Naji Kadhim Ibrahim Sa’irun Obeid al-Shammari Mazen Abd al-Man’am Jum’a Rajab Feyli Kurds Karim Salman Nasir al-Baidani Al-Hikma Areebi Shaneen Muhammad Al-Islah al-Zamili Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Nasir Daham Muhammad al-Jahishi Watan Mustaqil

Adel Raheem Bahak al-Tamimi Al-Fadhila Abbas Mayeh Sada Majhul Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Wasfi Nasir Zahir Jabar Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Ghalib Ahmad Kadhim al-Radini Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Administration Ala’ Ismail Hameed Hajim Law (political/organization links: Da’wa Party) Governor: Muhammad Jameel al-Mayahi (Al-Hikma) Karkana Qahtan Abd al-Hameed Al-Jihad Movement (family/relatives link, secretary general First Deputy: Adel Hamza al-Zirkani (Al-Ahrar) of the al-Jihad Movement) Second Deputy: Rasheed al-Badairi (Al-Fadhila) Mahdi Yunis Ayal Hazim Al-Hikma Head of the Provincial Council: Mazen Kandouh al-Zamili (Al-Ahrar) Hashim Maksar Mousa al-zamili Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi) Police Commander: Brigadier General Hameed Nahaiwi al-Ayadi Hashim Turki Shakir al-Awadi Al-Hikma Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab’oun (Al-Rafidain Operations Commander) Sajida Nazar Muhammad Ali Al-Hikma Hana’ Khaz’al Jum’a Shabeeb Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer) Abd al-Ilah Nairman al-Shammari Supreme Council (political link/close to the leader in the Supreme Council Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi) Mazen Kandouh Salman al-Zamili Al-Ahrar Raheem Sawadi Kawad Bandar Al-Ahrar Muntadhir Naji Yasir al-Na’amani Al-Ahrar Sahib owaid Yaseen al-Jalaibawi Al-Ahrar

May 2021 78 79 May 2021 Maysan Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Maysan Continued: Maysan Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Siham Shanun Abdullah Adhafa Victory Coalition Maysoun Abd al-Jabbar Ismail Law/Badr (family link: her husband is a commander in the Badr Organization) Baha’ al-Din Nour State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Abd al-Hussein Abd Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma Muhammad Hussein al-Ridha al-Sa’adi Karim Alaiwi Jahoush Sawainakh Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Mortadha Ali Hamoud al-Sa’adi Law/Ansar Allah (factional link: commander in the PMF Commission) Dalal Hassan Muhammad Eisa Fatah Alliance (factional link/her father is a commander in Organization) Jawad Raheem al-Ghadeeri Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Abbas Sarout Mohsen Muslim Al-Hikma Lama Khudayr Dhiyab al-Zaidi Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma Jamal Fakhir Owaid Ali Sa’irun Yusra Naji Dhamad Al-Mowatin/Supreme Council (Law (political/organizations link: Supreme Council) Ali Sa’adoun Ghalam Sa’irun Muhammad Jasim Habeeb al-Sudani Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma Ali Abd al-Kareem Adnan Jasim al-Ghanami Law/Badr (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization) Mudhar Khaz’al Salman Munshid Sa’irun Nawal Abd Ali Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Mahmoud Adeeb Sa’irun Muhammad Majeed Shuwai’ Law/al-Fadhila (factional link/commander in the al-Awfiya’ Militia) Zuwair Muhammad Siham al-Aqeeli Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Muntaha Jabar Saleh Abd Sa’irun

Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Jasim Sahib al-Maliki Al-Ahrar Administration Maytham Mohsen Hatem al-Sadkhani Al-Ahrar Governor: Ali Dawai (Al-Ahrar) Wisam Jawad Kadhim al-Sa’adi Al-Ahrar First Deputy: Jasim Kadhim al-Hajaji (Al-Hikma) Yasir Nu’ama Abd al-Hussein al-Lami Al-Ahrar Second Deputy: Jawad Raheem al-Sa’adi (Al-Jihad and Al-Bina’) Aamer Nasrallah Ali Al-Ahrar Head of the Provincial Council: Mundhar Raheem Khalaf al-Shawi (Law) Eisa Hashim Faleh al-Naji Al-Ahrar Police Commander: Brigadier General Abd al-Khidr Jasim Muhammad Layla Hameed Shaktayar Al-Ahrar Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab’oun (Al-Rafidain Operations Commander) al-Dhahaybawi Ruqayya Raheem Mohsen al-Nouri Al-Ahrar Wajdan Abd al-Hameed al-Fatlawi Al-Ahrar Rahi Abd al-Wahid Nahidh Al-Fadhila (factional link: commander in the al-Awfiya’ Militia) Hassan Ali Maz’al/Abu Law/ Kata’ib Jund al-Imam (factional link: commander in Jamal al-Firtousi Kata’ib Jund al-Imam Militia) Jawad Kadhim Kato/Abu Law/Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Yahya al-Firtousi Abdullah Yahya Raji Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Ali Hassan Karam al-Ghanimi Law/Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization) Mundhar Raheem Khalaf al-Shawi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Sarhan Salim al-Ghalibi Al-Mowatin/al-Hikma

May 2021 80 81 May 2021 Dhi Qar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Dhi Qar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Dhi Qar

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

As’ad Yaseen Sabah Barih Al-Hikma Dahil Radhi Ali Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Ammar Toa’meh Abd Victory Coalition (political link: Member of Shura of al-Fadhila Coalition) Rajah Matroud al-Aboudi Al-Hikma al-Abbas Shanawa Abd al-Amir Salim Mushrif Supreme Council (political link: close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi) Kati’ Najman Jaloud Dhaydan State of Law Coalition (political link: Member of Shura of Da’wa Party) Ata Sajit al-Mousawi Al-Hikma Satar Jabbar Abbas Al-Hikma Sa’ad al-Badri Al-Hikma Nasir Turki Yasir Lufti Fatah Alliance (factional link: Badr Organization) Zaynab Khalaf al-Tamimi Al-Hikma Qusay Mohsen Muhammad Matar Sa’irun Hussein Sanad Al-Ahrar Hamd Allah Mazhar Jawad Hamdan Sa’irun Ali Attiyah Shajar al-Badairi Al-Ahrar Ala Ouda Layedh Shanawa Victory Coalition Kadhim al-Sahlani Al-Ahrar Waleed Abd al-Hassan Aboud Jafeet Fatah Alliance (factional link: Badr Organization) Mayraf al-Khafaji Al-Ahrar Abd al-Ameer Hassan Ali Ta’aban Fatah Alliance (factional link: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Nu’ma Shanan al-Zamili Al-Ahrar Zaynab Waheed Salman Ali State of Law Coalition (political link/Da’wa Party) Abd al-Raheem Kadhim al-Ta’i Solidarity Ghayeb Faysal Aneed Hami Sa’irun Mortada Aboud al-Ibrahimi Solidarity Abd al-Hadi Mohan Abdullah Ismail State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Salma Hashim To’ameh al-Askari Solidarity Naji Radees Abd Sha’aban Sa’irun Ali Jasim al-Ghalibi Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi) Muna Qasim Baqir Jaber Fatah Alliance (political link/independence) Hadiya Jasim Alaiwi al-Khaykani Al-Wafa’ Haifa’ Kadhim Abbad Abd al-Jaleel Sa’irun Deyaa’ al-Hajimi Al-Ahrar Hussein Majid Faiz Munshid Victory Coalition Raheem Yasir al-Khaqani Al-Ahrar Razzaq Muhaibis Ajeemi Tuwaili Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Shaheed Ahmad al-Ghalibi Al-Madani Sadiq Hameed Hassan Owaid - Yahya al-Mushrifawi Al-Islah

Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Nu’man Anbar al-Ibrahimi Al-Fadhila Administration Hassan Waraiwash al-Asadi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Governor: Adel al-Dakhili (Al-Hikma) Rasheed Hameed al-Sari Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) First Deputy: Akram al-Zaidi (Al-Fadhila) Halal Hussein al-Sahlani Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Second Deputy: Abadhir Omar al-Omar (Al-Wafa’) Jabbar al-Mousawi Iraqi Hezbollah (factional link/Kata’ib Hezbollah) Head of the Provincial Council: Raheem Yasir al-Khaqani (Al-Ahrar) Huda Abd al-Zahra Badr (family link) Police Commander: Brigadier General Raisan Kasid al-Ibrahimi Shayma’ Abd al-Sattar al-Fatlawi Al-Fadhila (political/organizations link: al-Fadhila party) Operations Commander: al-Rafidain Hassan al-Wa’ili Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab’oun. To’ameh Obeid al-Asadi Al-Iraq organization (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Agriculture Ministry: Minister Saleh al-Hassani (Kata’ib Jund al-Imam) Rasheed al-Sari Al-Fadhila (factional link/al-Awfiya’ Hashd) Culture Ministry: Abd al-Amir al-Hamdani (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Ashwaq Talib al-Zuhairi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party)

May 2021 82 83 May 2021 Baghdad Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link

Muhammad Ali Saleh Baqir Civil Democratic Alliance Muhammad Salim Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Badr Organization) Abd al-Hussein Abd al-Raheem Hamad Yasir Mohsen Ghayeb Al-Madani Wajih Abbad Hadi Faraj Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Sadiqun) Hussein Ali Kareem Fanjan Victory Coalition Muhammad Sahib Khalaf Ghali Fatah Alliance (political link: link with the commander Shibl al-Zaidi) Aras Habeeb Muhammad Kareem Victory Coalition (Secretary General of al-Mu’tamar al-Watani) Iman Rasheed Hameed Eisa Fatah Alliance (political link: Organizational link with the Badr Organization) Nada Shaker Jawdat Dhiyab Victory Coalition Ahmad Jasim Sabir Muhammad Fatah Alliance (Secretary General of Kata’ib Jund al-Imam) Haydar Abd al-Kadhim Victory Coalition Nu’aima Sabahi Hassan Salim Abbas Jabr Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link with the Badr Organization) Haydar Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi Victory Coalition Hadi Farhan Abdullah Hamad Fatah Alliance (Secretary General of Badr) Haydar Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi Victory Coalition Na’im Abd Yasir Sanikh Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Hana’ Turki Abd Hassan Victory Coalition Talal Khudair Abbas Ka’id Qarar al-Iraq Alliance Ala’ Sakr Sarhan al-Dalfi Victory Coalition Ahmad Ismail Ibrahim al-Mashhadani Qarar al-Iraq Alliance A’isha Ghazal Mahdi Madh’an Wataniyah Coalition Wahda Mahmoud Fahad Abd Qarar al-Iraq Alliance Ghanidi Muhammad Wataniyah Coalition Zafir Nadhim Salman al-Ani Qarar al-Iraq Alliance Abd al-Kareem Abd al-Qadir Ala Tahsin Habib Talabani Baghdad Alliance Zaytoun Hussein Marad Hamadi Wataniyah Coalition Laith Mustafa Hamoud Jaza’ Baghdad Alliance Kadhim Attiya Kadhim Ka’id Wataniyah Coalition Yunis Qasim Shaghati Abd Baghdad Alliance Ziyad Tariq Abdullah Hamad Wataniyah Coalition Fa’iq Da’boul Abdullah al-Sheikh Ali Tamaddun Yahya Ahmad Faraj Hamadi Wataniyah Coalition Insijam Abd al-Zahra Jawad Ali Al-Hikma Kareem Yusuf Hassan Ali Wataniyah Coalition Ali Jubair Lazim Dakhil Al-Hikma Iyad Hashim Hussein Alawi Wataniyah Coalition Jasim Mohan Abdal Khamat Al-Hikma Ali Jabbar Mu’ennis Jaber State of Law Coalition (political link with Mr. al-Maliki) Ali Jasim Muhammad al-Hameedawi Al-Hikma Muhammad Shaya’ Sabbar Hatem State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da’wa Shura Council) Hussein Sa’id Kadhim Ali Will Movement Hisham Abd al-Malik Ali Suhail State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da’wa Shura Council) Sa’ad Maye’ Saleh Abbas Sa’irun Ammar Kadhim Obeid Jasim State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da’wa Shura Council) Shayma’ Ali Hussein Hassan Sa’irun Layla Mahdi Abd al-Hussein Hadi State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da’wa Shura Council) Ra’ad Hussein Shanawi Ghali Sa’irun Atwan Sayyid Hassan Thamer State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Sattar Jabbar Abdullah hassan Sa’irun Ahmad Sulaim Abd al-Rahman Ali State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da’wa Shura Council) Sabah Hassan Sa’irun Aliya Naseef Jasim Azeez State of Law Coalition (political link with Mr. al-Maliki) Muhammad Taloubi al-Akili Nouri Kamil Muhammad Hassan State of Law Coalition (Secretary General of the Da’wa Party) An’am Mazid Nazil Darbash Sa’irun Muhammad Othman Ismail Mustafa Bayariq al-Khair Jawad Hamdan Kadhim Sa’irun Hamad Allah Aliya Faleh Owaid Rasheed Bayariq al-Khair Sabah Jaloub Faleh Hami Sa’irun Ahmad Ali Hussein Jawad Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Badr Organization) Nisreen Fadhil Raham Ali Sa’irun Iktifa’ Muzhar Abd Kassar Fatah Alliance (political link with the Shura of the Badr Organization) Majida Abd al-Lateef Muhammad Ali Sa’irun

May 2021 84 85 May 2021 Baghdad Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament Affiliation/Link Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link

Jawad Abd al-Kadhim Sa’irun Taha Mohsen Sayyid Ali Al-Hikma Muhammad Abbas Zalim Abbas Mousa Al-Hikma Abbas Alaiwi Kadhim Arbij Sa’irun Adel Matar al-Sa’adi Al-Fadhila (factional link: Hashd of al-Awfiya’) Ra’id Jahid Fahmi Saleh Sa’irun Abbas Khudair Abbas al-Mafraji Al-Khair wa al-Ata’ Amjad Hashim Thamer Mawla Sa’irun Abbas Mahdi Saleh al-Hamdani Wataniyah Ala’ Sabah Hashim Shalash Sa’irun Adnan Jameel al-Mashhadani Al-Qarar Hassan Karim Matar Shamkhi Sa’irun Ali Ahmad al-Eithawi Wataniyah Coalition Manahil Jalil Ali Hussein Sa’irun Ali Hamdan Salman al-Husseini Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Nofal Sharif Jawdat Sahar Mandaean Ali Ahmad Faraj Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party)

Ali Thamer al-Sarhaid Wataniyah Coalition Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Ali Ja’afar Ali Hussein al-Allaq Badr (factional link: Badr Organization) Ali Khudair Hajoul al-Hassani Al-Ahrar Ahmad Jawdat al-Maliki Al-Ahrar Ali Kamil Albuawaimar Al-Fadhila (factional link: Hashd of al-Awfiya’) Arkan Hassan al-Bayati Turkmen Ali Na’ama Ali al-Hamdani Al-Ahrar Arkan Fakhri al-Janabi Al-Qarar Ghaleb Abbas al-Zamili Al-Ahrar Iman al-Sheikh Al-Ahrar Gharub Sabri al-Azzawi Wataniyah Coalition Iman Jawad al-Barzanji Al-Iraqiya Fadhil Hussein al-Shuwaili Al-Ahrar Taghreed Saleh al-Shammari Law (political link/Shura council of the Da’wa Party) Farhan Qasim al-Nasiri Communist Tha’ir Abd al-Amir Jasim al-Bahadali Al-Ahrar Falah Hamoud Ahmad Al-Iraqiya Tha’ir Abd al-Jaleel al-Sa’idi Law (political link/independent) Fu’ad Ali Akbar al-Fayli Fayli Jasuma Raheem al-Kareemawi Al-Ahrar Kamil Sa’id Obeid Al-Ahrar Jawad Kadhim Awd al-Dalfi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Majid Ali To’ameh al-Sa’adi Al-Ahrar Hassoun Kadhim Mohsen al-Ruba’ie Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Mazen Yunis Razouqi Christian Daha’ Abd al-Azeez al-Rawi Al-Qarar Muhammad Ameen Wataniyah Coalition Ra’ad Jabbar al-Khameesi Mandaean Sha’alan al-Hamza Ra’ad Hatem al-Maliki Al-Ahrar Muhammad Jaber al-Ata Law (political link/close to Nouri al-Maliki) Riyadh al-Adhadh Wataniyah Coalition Muhamad Jasim Hamoud Fayadh Badr (factional link/Badr Organization) Riyadh Mohsen Salman al-Aqabi al-Fadhila (factional link: Leader of al-Awfiya’ Militia) Muhammad Jasim Al-Hikma Muhammad al-Ruba’ie Zaina Saleh al-Haydari Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Ma’een Hameed al-Kadhimi Badr (factional link/Badr Organization) Sa’ad Sader Hamsan al-Daraji Al-Hikma Mahdiya Abd Hassan al-Lami Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Sa’ad Abd al-Jabbar al-Matlabi Law Nahida Ali al-Tamimi Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party) Suhair Ghazi al-Jubouri Iraq Coalition Nazar Thamer al-Sultani Al-Hikma Sadiq Aneed al-Zamili Law (political/organizations link: Da’wa Party)

May 2021 86 87 May 2021 Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council PMF Operations Commanders

Members of Provincial Council Affiliation/Link Region Commander Unit

Nisreen Hadi al-Jahimi Al-Ahrar East Anbar Taher al-Khaqani Imam Ali Combat Division, Brigade 2 Na’im Hato al-Naji Al-Dakhil organization (political link/from the Da’wa Party al-Dakhil organizations) West Anbar Qasim Muslih Liwa al-Tafuf: Brigade 13 Nouri Jasim al-Janabi Wataniyah Coalition Ninewa Khudair al-Matruhi Badr: Brigade 21 Huda Jalil al-Janabi Al-Hikma Rafidain Nadhim Kadhim al-Mousawi Linked to Badr: Brigade 10 Wajan Zagheer al-Akili Badr (political/organizations link: Badr) Diyala Taleb al-Mousawi - Ya’qoub Abd al-Wahid al-Mousawi Law (political link: Shura council of the Da’wa party) Mid-Euphrates Ali al-Hamdani Ali al-Akbar: Brigade 11 Ru’uf Sabri Alaiwi Al-Iraqiya Salah al-Din Safa’ al-Sa’adi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Jazeera Unknown Presumably Kata’ib Hezbollah, stretches from Jurf al-Sakhr, to south of Baghdad, toward the Syrian border in west Anbar Administration Basra Abu Jinan al-Basri Badr: Brigade 1 Governor: Muhammad Jaber al-Ata (State of Law) Kirkuk and East Tigris Hameed Ibrahim al-Sahalani Badr Organization First Deputy: Ali Haijal Hamad al-Jubouri (Al-Qarar) Second Deputy: Ahmad Ali Faraj al-Eithawi (Al-Iraqiya al-Hurra) Head of the Provincial Council: Riyadh al-Adhadh (Al-Wataniyah) Police Commander: Major General Majid Faleh al-Mousawi Operations Commander: Major General Abd al-Hussein al-Tamimi

Interior Ministry: Yaseen al-Yasiri (Candidate/Badr) Connections Ministry: Dr. Na’im al-Ruba’ie (Badr) Transportation Ministry: Abdullah al-La’ibi Bahidh (Badr) Ministry of Work and Social Matters: Basim Abd al-Zaman al-Ruba’ie: (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq)

May 2021 88 89 May 2021 May 2021 90 91 May 2021 May 2021 92 93 May 2021 May 2021 94 95 May 2021 Contact

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