Heirs of the Prophet: Islamic Authority and International Politics in the 21 Century by James A. Mikulec, Jr. B.A., Mercyhurst C

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Heirs of the Prophet: Islamic Authority and International Politics in the 21 Century by James A. Mikulec, Jr. B.A., Mercyhurst C Heirs of the Prophet: Islamic Authority and International Politics in the 21 st Century by James A. Mikulec, Jr. B.A., Mercyhurst College, May 2005 M.A., George Washington University, August 2007 A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2014 Dissertation directed by Marc Lynch Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and of Media and Public Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that James A. Mikulec, Jr. has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of December 13, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Heirs of the Prophet: Islamic Authority and International Politics in the 21 st Century James A. Mikulec, Jr. Dissertation Research Committee: Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and of Media and Public Affairs, Dissertation Director Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member Martha Finnemore, University Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2014 by James A. Mikulec, Jr. All rights reserved iii Dedication I dedicate this dissertation to Jessica and to my family, especially my parents, James and Donna Mikulec, and my grandparents, Peter and Joyce Izzi and Joseph and Laura Mikulec, who always encouraged me to pursue the things that I love. Without their constant support, I would not be here today. iv Acknowledgements This dissertation was written during (and, in some cases, was an eyewitness to) a particularly important, but volatile period in the political and social history of the Middle East and the Muslim world. The Arab Spring, which began approximately a year after I defended my dissertation prospectus, significantly changed the political makeup of the region as well as Islam’s role in this process. During my initial “soak and poke” trip to the region in 2009, I was very late for a scheduled appointment at an Egyptian library when then-President Mubarak’s motorcade closed down several major Cairo streets. Conversely, parts of the conclusion chapter were written with the sound of protests and gunfire in the background during Egypt’s tumultuous summer of 2013. In many ways, these unexpected twists and turns forced me to always consider what about the region (and Islam’s role in regional politics) is new and what has remained the same. In acknowledging those who helped me in completing this long process, I must first and foremost thank my family and friends. Without their constant love and support, I would never have made it this far toward my lifelong dream of earning a Ph.D. As mentioned on the previous page, this project is dedicated to them. I would also like to thank all of the teachers I have had throughout my life who have taught me to love the social sciences, especially my high school teachers Mr. Russ Cannon and Mr. David Osiecki and my college professors Dr. Brian Ripley and Dr. Michael Federici. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee at George Washington University, especially my advisor, Marc Lynch, for all of their patience in dealing with someone who was finishing their dissertation part-time while also contending with a full plate of other responsibilities. I would also like to thank the Institute of Middle East v Studies at George Washington University for a travel grant to help me undertake a short research trip to the region in 2009. Finally, I would like to thank all of my colleagues (at GW and elsewhere) who helped me conceptualize this project, gave me practical advice on various aspects or questions related to it, or read one or more of the many drafts. vi Abstract of Dissertation Heirs of the Prophet: Islamic Authority and International Politics in the 21 st Century Senior Islamic authorities ( ‘ulama ) have reached different levels of consensus when contesting their response to major international events in the 21 st century, largely agreeing on the appropriate response in some cases while remaining strongly divided in others. This variation has been present even in cases when Islamic authorities considered substantively similar issues in close chronological proximity. Furthermore, these levels of consensus changed over time in some cases, growing stronger or weaker, but remained relatively constant in other cases. Therefore, my research question for this project is: What accounts for variation in the level of consensus achieved by Islamic authorities when contesting their responses to major international events and why does this level of consensus change or not change in response to subsequent developments? For each case, I determine the initial level of consensus among Islamic authorities around the issue as captured in the Arabic language press then look to see to what extent this consensus grew stronger, weaker, or stayed the same in response to contestation and subsequent developments. In addition to providing insight about authority in Islam, the project also speaks to important questions in international relations, including the nature of political authority and delineating the effects of arguing on international politics. My dependent variable for this study is consensus, which is a strong marker of authority across borders, especially in Islam. Consensus is an ordinal variable (categorized as low, mixed, or high) and consists of the degree to which authorities vii coalesce around a common position on the event in question. The primary factor that accounts for differences in the level of Islamic authorities’ consensus is how these actors frame the events in question and specifically, to what extent these frames align. When the frames chosen by Islamic authorities have a high degree of alignment, a stronger consensus is likely whereas incompatible frames are more likely to produce mixed or low consensus. In addition, uncertainty is the variable that best explains when Islamic authorities’ level of consensus is most likely to change. High uncertainty produces the conditions most conducive for change because it forces authorities to take new positions or reevaluate old ones as interests, social identities, etc. are in flux. When uncertainty is low, authorities are more likely to fall back on their previous positions and change in the level of consensus is less likely. In examining the above concepts, the study examines Islamic authorities’ contestation surrounding four major international events since 2000 (grouped into sets of two). Each pair contrasts related events that dealt with the same fundamental issue, but that produced different levels of consensus as well as different types of change over time. The first pair compares contests over suicide attacks during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-01), which produced a divided consensus among the ‘ulama that endured over time, and the September 11 attacks (2001), which initially produced high consensus that ultimately devolved into low consensus. The second set of cases contrasts Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 against Husni Mubarak in Egypt, which initially led to a mixed consensus that ultimately strengthened into a strong consensus, and the Qadhafi regime in Libya, which resulted in strong unification among the ‘ulama that persisted. viii Table of Contents Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Abstract of Dissertation vii List of Tables x Chapter 1: Islamic Authority, Consensus, and International Politics 1 Chapter 2: Who Speaks for Islam?: Religious Authority in the 21 st Century 42 Chapter 3: Islamic Authority and Violence: The Palestinian Intifada and the 9/11 Attacks 80 Chapter 4: Power of the ‘Ulama or the ‘Ulama of Power?: Islamic Authority and the Arab Spring 147 Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Paradox of Islamic Authority in the 21 st Century 215 Bibliography 243 ix List of Tables Table 1: Consensus and Change in Four Cases Studies 15 x Chapter 1: Islamic Authority, Consensus, and International Politics On September 14, 2001, within days of the September 11 attacks, Shaykh Yusef al-Qaradawi, a highly influential Egyptian Islamic religious scholar ( ‘alim , pl. ‘ulama ) based in Qatar, strongly condemned al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States earlier that week. Qaradawi holds a doctorate in Islamic theology from Cairo’s prestigious al-Azhar University, has one of the most popular satellite television programs in the Arab world on al-Jazeera, and has been one of the strongest influences on the Muslim Brotherhood for decades. He said “Our hearts bleed for the attacks that have targeted the World Trade Center as well as other institutions in the United States…The U.S. is biased in favor of Israeli assaults on Palestinians, but this does not permit assaults on civilians such as women, children, and the elderly” (Kurzman 2003: 159). Qaradawi was not alone and was joined by ‘ulama from all ideological stripes, including several militant Islamist groups, in coming out against the attacks in no uncertain terms. Less than three months later, a series of Palestinian suicide attacks killed dozens of Israeli non-military personnel. Qaradawi vocally supported these operations, arguing that the goal of the Palestinian attacks against Israel “was the liberation of their homeland and their means for the attacks was their own bodies” while “the attacks on the United States had as their aim terrorizing others and the means of those who carried out the acts were the bodies of others.” 1 The Palestinian issue sharply divided ‘ulama across the Muslim world with some, including the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the Shaykh al- 1 “Weapons of the Weak,” Al-Ahram (Egypt), 13 December 2001. 1 Azhar, condemning the attacks’ suicide methods or civilian targets while others praised it as honorable self-sacrifice for the good of the community. It is clear that the senior ‘ulama’s collective contestation about major international events has produced different levels of consensus among them.
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