Ekstrimisme Dalam Tafsir (Studi Penafsiran Sayyid Qut}B Terhadap Q.S Al Ma>Idah: 44-47 Dalam Tafsi>R Fi> Z{Ila>L Al-Qur'a>N)

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Ekstrimisme Dalam Tafsir (Studi Penafsiran Sayyid Qut}B Terhadap Q.S Al Ma>Idah: 44-47 Dalam Tafsi>R Fi> Z{Ila>L Al-Qur'a>N) Ekstrimisme dalam Tafsir (Studi Penafsiran Sayyid Qut}b terhadap Q.S al Ma>idah: 44-47 dalam Tafsi>r Fi> Z{ila>l al-Qur'a>n) Asyhari Institut Agama Islam Faqih Asy’ari Kediri email: [email protected] Abstract The main cause of radicalism is the distorted understanding of the Qur'an and hadith. One of the Qur'anic verses used to legitimize the precept of the extreme radical group is Q. S al-Maidah: 44. Explicitly this verse seems to justify the radical group's claim that in this world all people have infidels because no one applies the Islamic law perfectly. Sayeed Qutb (d. 1966) is referred to as one of the people of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt interpreting the verse on a textual basis. Using the library research method, researchers answered two basic problems; (1) How Sayeed Qutb interprets Q. S al Maidah: 44?, (2) How do the scholars interpret Q. S al Maidah: 44?. To answer the researcher to comb the interpretation of Sayeed Qutb in the book of Zilal al-Qur'an, then compare it with the interpretation of the other scholars in the books of interpretation. This research resulted in the conclusion that Sayeed Qutb's interpretation of Q. S al-Maidah: 44 is deviant from the interpretation of all Islamic scholars. The interpretation of Sayeed Qutb precisely corresponds to the interpretation of the Khawarij group at the time of the Caliph Ali ibn AbiTalib. The scholars interpret the passage with three interpretations. First, the meaning of kufr in the verse is a major sin, secondly, that a person is considered infidels when not applying Islamic law because of legal reasons other than Islam is better than Islamic law, third, the passage is revealed to the Jews, that the Jews who did not apply Islamic law were unbelievers. Keywords: extremism, al-Hakimiyyah Accepted: Revised: Published: Januari 2019 Maret 2019 April 2019 E-ISSN : 2503-314x P-ISSN : 2443-3950 Jurnal El-Faqih, Volume 5, Nomor 1, April 2019 https://ejournal .iaifa.ac.id/index.php/faqih 131 Pendahuluan Fenomena meningkatnya gairah keagamaan di kalangan muda, tidak sepenuhnya melegakan. Karena disinyalir aksi-aksi kekerasan yang belakangan terjadi, berawal dari fenemona tersebut yang diwarnai dengan sikap berlebihan (al-ghuluw) dan ekstimitas (al-tat}urruf). Sehingga konsep menegakkan kebenaran dan memberantas kemunkaran (al-amr bi al-ma'ru>f wa al-nahyi' 'an al-munkar) bagi sebagian mereka menjadi dalih berbagai aksi kekerasan. Fenomena di atas diakibatkan oleh pemahaman ayat-ayat al-Qur'an dan hadits Nabi dengan secara literal dan apa adanya, tanpa mempertimbangkan dan menghubungkannya dengan sekian ayat atau hadits lainnya sebagai sebuah kesatuan nilai-nilai agama. Dalam sejarah klasik cara-cara kekerasan seperti ini pernah dilakukan oleh Khawa>rij yang juga dikenal begitu bersemangat dalam keagamaan, tetapi dengan pemahaman sempit, sehingga berlebihan. Fenomena ini telah dikabarkan oleh Rasulullah dalam sebuah sabdanya, bahwa akan datang suatu kelompok dari kalangan muda dengan pemikiran yang sempit, mereka mengutip ayat-ayat al-Qur'a>n, tetapi mereka keluar dari agama, seperti panah lepas dari busurnya. Iman mereka hanya sampai di tenggorokan, tidak sampai ke hati sehingga tidak dapat memahaminya dengan baik.1 Al-Qur'a>n surat Q.S al-Ma>idah: 44, adalah salah satu ayat di dalam al- Qur'a>n yang sering dijadikan dalih untuk melegalkan segala praktek kekerasan dan teror yang dilakukannya. Ayat tersebut mereka pahami secara z}a>hirnya, bahwa seseorang yang tidak mempraktekkan hukum al-Qur'a>n, maka ia termasuk orang kafir, dan halal darahnya. Pemahaman seperti ini juga yang dipahami oleh salah satu sub sekte Khawa>rij yang bernama al-Baihasiyyah. Mereka mengatakan bahwa seorang penguasa jika menghukumi dengan selain hukum syara’ maka ia telah kafir, rakyatnya juga kafir, baik yang patuh kepadanya maupun yang tidak.2 Kelompok Khawa>rij pertama kali muncul, ketika khalifah Ali bin Abi T{a>lib (w.40 H) menerima tah}ki>m. Sikap Ali ini dianggap sebagai pengabaian 1Diriwayatkan oleh al-Bukha>ri, S{ah}i>h} al-Bukha>ri, kita>b al-mana>qib,ba>b 'alamat al-nubuwwah fi al-Isla>m, (al-maktabah al-sya>milah, Vol.2), juz 3, 1321 2Buhaisiyah adalah salah satu sekte kelompok Khawârij pengikut Abu Buhaisy ibn Haisham ibn Jabir yang menganggap daulah Umayyah sebagai negara syirik dan menghalalkan darah umat Islam. Setelah lari dari al-Hajjaj, ia di potong tangan dan kakinya oleh al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik.Lihat: Ibn al-Mutahhar, al-Bad`u wa al-Ta>rikh, juz 1, 299. http://www.alwarraq.com E-ISSN : 2503-314x P-ISSN : 2443-3950 Jurnal El-Faqih, Volume 4, Nomor 2, Oktober2018 132 terhadap hukum Allah yang menyebabkan kufur. Dalam perkembangannya, paham Khawa>rij mengkafirkan seorang muslim hanya karena melakukan maksiat seperti zina, minum khamr, memakai hukum selain hukum Islam karena suap atau nepotisme. Al-Qusyairi (w.465 H) menceritakan bahwa kelompok Khawa>rij menegaskan bahwa siapa saja yang menerima suap dan menghukumi dengan selain hukum Allah, maka ia telah kafir.3 Pemahaman Q.S al-Ma>idah: 44 secara literal, sebagaimana pemahaman Khawa>rij kembali muncul pada masa sekarang ini. Sayyid Qut}b (w.1966 M) dan al- Maudu>di adalah dua orang yang dikenal berfaham h}a>kimiyatullah seperti yang dipahami oleh kelompok Khawa>rij. Pembahasan Dalam Q.S al-Ma>idah: 44 Allah ta’alaberfirman: َّ َّ َّ ٓ َّ ۡ َّ َّ ۡ َّ َّ َّ ُ ٗ َّ ُ َّ ۡ ُ ُ َّ َّ ُ َّ َّ َّ ۡ َّ ُ ْ َّ َّ َّ ُ ْ َّ َّ َّ ُ َّ إِ ناِأنزلناِٱلتورىٰةِف يهاِهدىِونورِٞۚيحكمِب هاِٱلنب يونِٱل ذينِأسلمواِل ل ذينِهادواِوِٱلََّّٰٰنِ يونِ َّ َّ ۡ ۡ َّ ُ َّ ۡ ُ ۡ ُ ْ َّ َّ َّ َّ ُ ْ َّ َّ ۡ ُ َّ َّ ٓ َّ َّ َّ َّ ۡ َّ ُ ْ َّ َّ َّ ۡ َّ ۡ َّ َّ وٱلأحبارِب ماِٱستحف ظواِ منِك تٰ بِٱّلل ِوَكنواِعليه ِشهداءِٞۚفلاِتخشواِٱلناسِوٱخشو نِولاِ َّ ُ َّ ۡ َّ ُ ْ َّ َّ َّ ٗ َّ ٗ َّ َّ َّ ۡ َّ ۡ ُ َّ ٓ َّ َّ َّ ُ َّ ْ َّٓ َّ ُ ُ ۡ َّ ُ َّ تشتَّواِ بِٔ َّٔايٰت يِثمناِقل يلاِٞۚومنِلمِيحكمِب ماِأنزلِٱّللِفأولٰئ كِهمِٱلكٰف َّونِِ ِ Artinya: Sungguh, kami yang menurunkan kitab Taurat; di dalamnya (ada) petunjuk dan cahaya. Yang dengan kitab itu para nabi yang berserah diri kepada Allah memberi putusan atas perkara orang Yahu>di, demikian juga para ulama dan pendeta-pendeta mereka, sebab mereka diperintahkan memelihara kitab-kitab Allah dan mereka menjadi saksi terhadapnya. Karena itu, janganlah kamu takut kepada manusia, (tetapi) takutlah kepada-Ku. Dan janganlah kamu jual ayat-ayat-Ku dengan harga murah. Barang siapa yang tidak memutuskan dengan apa yang diturunkan Allah, maka mereka itulah orang-orang kafir.4 Sayyid Qut}b (w.1966 M) dalam tafsirnya menjelaskan bahwa orang yang memakai hukum selain hukum Allah, maka ia termasuk orang-orang yang kafir. Ia menafsirkan ayat di atas, dengan bahwa tidak ada seorangpun yang muslim selama penguasa menjalankan pemerintahannya dengan hukum selain hukum 3Al-H{abasyi, Risa>lah al-Tah}dzi>r min al-Firaq al-Tsala>th,7 4Departemen Agama, Al-Qur’a>n Dan Terjemahnya. 153 E-ISSN : 2503-314x P-ISSN : 2443-3950 Jurnal El-Faqih, Volume 4, Nomor 2, Oktober2018 133 syara’, meskipun dalam persoalan yang kecil sekalipun.5 Menurutnya orang yang memakai hukum selain hukum al-Qur'a>n sekalipun dalam satu permasalahan, berarti telah menolak ketuhanan Allah, dan telah menjadikan ketuhanan tersebut bagi dirinya. Dengan dasar ini Sayyid Qut}b (w.1966 M) menghalalkan darah para penguasa yang memakai undang-undang positif, ia juga menghalalkan darah rakyat para penguasa tersebut.6 Pendapat senada disampaikan oleh al-Maudu>di (w.1399 H), ia menyatakan bahwa negara atau masyarakat yang tidak menerapkan hukum Allah (h}a>kimiyatullah) adalah masyarakat ja>hiliyah dan dianggap telah ka>fir.7 Mereka yang menerima prinsip-prinsip negara Islam disebut muslim, dan yang tidak menerima disebut non muslim. Atas dasar itulah menurutnya masyarakat sebuah negara Islam dibatasi.8 Sayyid Qut}b (w.1966 M) menghimbau kepada mereka yang menamakan diri al-Jama>'ah al-Isla>miyyah atau H{izb al-Ikhwa>n agar merebut tampuk kekuasaan dari tangan para penguasa dan menghapus undang-undang buatan mereka serta melakukan pemberontakan dan kudeta di negara-negara di mana mereka berada.9 SayyidQut}b (w.1966 M) juga menyebutkan bahwa eksistensi (keberadaan) umat Islam telah terputus (vakum) sejak beberapa abad lamanya. Ia mengatakan bahwa pada saat ini seluruh dunia berada dalam kejahiliyyahan.10 Ia juga mengatakan bahwa kita sekarang berada dalam kejahiliyyahan seperti jahiliyyah pada permulaan Islam, atau bahkan lebih gelap (parah).11 Kemudian Sayyid Qut}b (w.1966 M) juga menyebutkan bahwa barang siapa yang memutuskan suatu permasalahan -meskipun dalam masalah yang kecil- dengan selain hukum syara’ maka ia telah keluar dari Islam.12Pada bagian lain, Sayyid Qutb} (w.1966 M) menyatakan bahwa orang-orang yang mengatakan diri mereka muslim dan tidak menegakkan hukum yang Allah turunkan, maka mereka tak ubahnya seperti ahl al-kitab> .13 Ia menjelaskan 5Sayyid Qut}b, Fi>Zila>l al-Qur'a>n, Juz 4, 590 6Sayyid Qut}b, Fi>Zila>l al-Qur'a>n, Juz 6, 898-899 7Muhammad `Ima>rah, Abu al-A'la al-Maudu>di> wa al-S{ahwah al-Isla>miyah (Bairut: Da>r al- Wihdah, 1986 M) 229 8Al-Maudu>di>, Naz}ariyat al-Isla>m wa Hadyuhu (Bairut: Muassasah al-Risa>lah) 331 9Sayyid Qut}b, Fi>Zila>l al-Qur'a>n, Juz 3, 1449-1450 10Ibid, 8 11Sayyid Qut}b, Ma'âlim fi al-Tariq, 17-18 12Sayyid Qut}b, Fi>Z{ila>l al-Qur'a>n, Juz 2, 841 13Sayyid Qut}b, Fi>Z{ila>l al-Qur'a>n, Juz 2, 940 E-ISSN : 2503-314x P-ISSN : 2443-3950 Jurnal El-Faqih, Volume 4, Nomor 2, Oktober2018 134 bahwa Islam adalah sistem hidup yang menyeluruh, barang siapa mengikutinya seluruhnya maka ia adalah orang mukmin dan berada di dalam agama Allah, dan barang siapa mengikuti selainnya meskipun dalam satu permasalahan maka ia telah menolak keimanan dan merampas ketuhanan Allah sekaligus telah keluar dari Agama Allah, meskipun ia menyatakan konsisten terhadap akidah Islam dan mengaku sebagai seorang muslim.14 Bahkan kelompok radikal yang sering disebut sebagai H{a>kimiyyahtulla>h yang kerap mengatribusi umat Islam dewasa ini sebagai masyarakat ja>hiliyyah (sebagaimana dituturkan oleh al-Maudu>di> dan Sayyid Qut}b), lebih jauh menganggap sistem demokrasi yang dianut oleh hampir seluruh negara-negara dunia Islam dewasa ini, sebagai salah satu bentuk penerapan hukum selain hukum Allah, dan karenanya dianggap komunitas negara kafir.
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