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IRAQ For Humanitarian Purposes Only REFERENCE MAP Production date : 17 December 2020 Administrative Boundaries and Major Settlements TURKEY Governorate District P-Code Governorate District P-Code Al-Anbar Al-Falluja IQG01Q01 Diyala Kifri IQG10Q06 Al-Kaim IQG01Q02 Duhok Al-Amadiya IQG09Q01 Al-Ramadi IQG01Q03 Duhok IQG09Q02 Al-Rutba IQG01Q04 Sumail IQG09Q03 Zakho Ana IQG01Q05 Zakho IQG09Q04 H!Zakho Haditha IQG01Q06 Erbil Al-Zibar IQG11Q01 H!Amedi Heet IQG01Q07 Erbil IQG11Q02 DUHOK Al-Basrah Abu Al-Khaseeb IQG02Q01 Koysinjaq IQG11Q03 Al-Amadiya Al-Zibar Al-Basrah IQG02Q02 Makhmour IQG11Q04 Sumail Duhok Al-Faw IQG02Q03 Rawanduz IQG11Q05 Sumel Dahuk Mergasur H! (!! Al-Midaina IQG02Q04 Shaqlawa IQG11Q06 H!Lower Al-Qurna IQG02Q05 Kerbala Ain Al-Tamur IQG12Q01 M Akre osu H! Rawanduz Al-Zubair IQG02Q06 Al-Hindiya IQG12Q02 l L Ain Sifne a H! k Soran Shat Al-Arab IQG02Q07 Kerbela IQG12Q03 Telafar e Al- Aqra H! H!Choman Al-Muthanna Al-Khidhir IQG03Q01 Kirkuk Al-Hawiga IQG13Q01 Tilkaef Shikhan Al-Rumaitha IQG03Q02 Daquq IQG13Q02 Tilkaif H! Al-Salman IQG03Q03 Dibis IQG13Q03 Sinjar Shaqlawa Al-Samawa IQG03Q04 Kirkuk IQG13Q04 H!Telafar Shaqlawa Sinjar Mosul H! Al-Najaf Al-Kufa IQG04Q01 Maysan Al-Amara IQG14Q01 H! (!! Pshdar H!Hamdaniya Rania Al-Manathera IQG04Q02 Ali Al-Gharbi IQG14Q02 ERBIL H! Al-Najaf IQG04Q03 Al-Kahla IQG14Q03 Al-Mosul Al-Hamdaniya Erbil Ranya Qalat Dizah ! Al-Qadissiya Afaq IQG05Q01 Al-Maimouna IQG14Q04 (! Dokan H! Ba'aj H! Koysinjaq Lake Al-Diwaniya IQG05Q02 Al-Mejar Al-Kabir IQG14Q05 Erbil H! Al-Hamza IQG05Q03 Qalat Saleh IQG14Q06 NINEWA Koysinjaq Al-Shamiya IQG05Q04 Ninewa Al-Baaj IQG15Q02 Dokan H! Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah IQG06Q01 Al-Hamdaniya IQG15Q03 Dokan Chamchamal IQG06Q02 Al-Hatra IQG15Q04 Al-Baaj Makhmur Derbendikhan IQG06Q03 Al-Mosul IQG15Q05 H! Sharbazher Chwarta Panjwin Dokan IQG06Q04 Al-Shikhan IQG15Q06 Makhmour Dabes H! H! Penjwin Halabcha IQG06Q05 Aqra IQG15Q01 Hatra ! Kalar IQG06Q06 Sinjar IQG15Q07 H! Sulaymaniyah H Dibis Chamchamal (!! Panjwin IQG06Q07 Telafar IQG15Q08 Shirqat H! Al-Hatra H! Kirkuk Pshdar IQG06Q08 Tilkaef IQG15Q09 SYRIA (!! Al- Al-Shirqat Sulaymaniyah Rania IQG06Q09 Salah Al-Din Al-Daur IQG16Q01 Kirkuk Sharbazher IQG06Q10 Al-Shirqat IQG16Q02 H!Hawiga Halabcha KIRKUK Babil Al-Hashimiya IQG07Q01 Balad IQG16Q04 Al-Hawiga AL-SULAYMANIYAH Al-Hilla IQG07Q02 Beygee IQG16Q03 Halabja H!Daquq Chamchamal DerbendikhanH! Al-Mahaweel IQG07Q03 Samarra IQG16Q05 H!Darbandikhan Al-Mussyab IQG07Q04 Tikrit IQG16Q06 Baghdad Al-Adhamiya IQG08Q01 Tooz Khurmato IQG16Q07 Daquq Al-Kadhmiyah IQG08Q02 Thi Qar Al-Chibayish IQG17Q01 H!Baiji Tooz Khourmato Al-Karkh IQG08Q03 Al-Nasiriya IQG17Q04 Beygee H! Kalar Al-Mada'in IQG08Q04 Al-Rifai IQG17Q02 Tooz Al-Mahmoudiya IQG08Q05 Al-Shatra IQG17Q03 Tikrit Khurmato Kfri Al-Risafa IQG08Q06 Suq Al-Shoyokh IQG17Q05 H! Kalar Al-Thawra IQG08Q07 Wassit Al-Hai IQG18Q01 H!Tikrit H! Diyala Al-Khalis IQG10Q01 Al-Kut IQG18Q02 Kifri Ru'ua Al-Muqdadiya IQG10Q02 Al-Namaniya IQG18Q03 H! SALAH AL-DIN Baladruz IQG10Q03 Al-Suwaira IQG18Q04 Ka'im H! Al-Daur H! H!Ana Haditha Daur Baquba IQG10Q04 Badra IQG18Q05 Ana Khanaqin H! Khanaqin IQG10Q05 Khanaqin Al-Kaim Samarra Samarra (!! H!Haditha DIYALA Al-Khalis H!Balad H!Muqdadiya Balad Khalis Al-Muqdadiya H!Al-Dujayl H! Heet Ba`aqubah Mandali (!! H! H!Heet H! Baquba Baladruz Ramadi (!! Falluja IRAN Habbaniyah H! H!Baghdad H! H! ! H! (!^H!H Lake H! H! H! Al-Ramadi H! Rutba AL-ANBAR BAGHDAD Badra H! Al-Falluja H! H! H! Badra Suwaira Azezia R H! ! a Al- H z z a Mussyab z Al-Suwaira a H! L Al-Rutba a Musayab ke H!Mahawil Kerbala Al-Mahaweel WASSIT Ain Al-Tamur !! H! ( Hindiya H! BABIL Ain Al-Tamur Hilla Al-Na'miya Kut Al-Kut Al- ! H! (!! Ali Al-Gharbi JORDAN (! KERBALA Al-Hashimiya H! Hindiya Hashimiya Al-Namaniya Kerbela Al-Hilla H! Ali Al-Gharbi H!Hai Al-Amara Al-Kufa Afaq Al-Hai Kufa H! H! Diwaniya Afaq (!!Najaf ShamiyaH! (!! Manathera Al-Diwaniya H! MAYSAN Amara Al- (!! Manathera AL-QADISSIYA Al-Kahla Al- Hamza Rifa'i H! H! Maimouna Kahla Shamiya H! H! Al-Rumaitha Al-Rifai Mejar Al-Kabi Al-Hamza Al-Maimouna H! Qal'at Saleh H!Rumaitha H! Tarmia Qalat Saleh H! H!Shatra AL-NAJAF Samawa Al-Shatra Al-Mejar Al-Kabir (!! Khidhir Al-Najaf Al-Samawa H! THI QAR Al-Khidhir Al-Qurna Nassriyah Qurnah (!! Chibayish H! Al-Adhamiya Al-Nasiriya H! Midaina Baghdad Suq H! Al-Shoyokh H! Al- Governorate Suq Midaina Shat Al-Arab Al-Shoyokh Al-Kadhmiyah Al-Chibayish Adhamiyah Thawra City Al-Basrah H!Al-ThawraH! Kadhimiyah H! 7 Nissan Salman Basrah(!! Shatt Al-Arab Resafa H! H! H! H! Zubair Abu H! Al-Khaseeb Abu Ghraib Al-Karkh H! Karkh H! H! Karadah AL-BASRAH Abu Mansour H! AL-MUTHANNA Al-Khaseeb Al-Mada'in Al-Zubair Rasheed Al-Salman H! Al-Risafa Al-Faw H!Fao Mada'in Al-Mahmoudiya H! Mahmoudiya H! SAUDI KUWAIT P e r ARABIA s i a n G u l f Scale on A1: 1:1,650,000 Km 0 50 100 Legend Data sources: Administrative boundaries: Iraq Central Statistics Office. Modified by Country Boundary Railway OCHA SYRIA Settlements: © OpenStreetMap contributors Governorate Boundary Primary Road Roads and railways: OCHA IRAN Water areas: OCHA, © OpenStreetMap contributors Baghdad (!^ District Boundary Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N JORDAN Contact : [email protected] (!^ Country Capital Lake / River File: REACH_IRQ_MAP_IRAQ_Reference_17Dec2020 (!! Governorate Capital Green Area Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH KUWAIT H! Major City Urban Area (Baghdad) partners, associates, donors mentioned on this map. SAUDI ARABIA (!^ H! (!!.
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