The New Gap Between Iran and the West the Presidental Election As an Expression of a Fundamental Shifting of Power

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The New Gap between Iran and the West The Presidental Election As an Expression of a Fundamental Shifting of Power

Johannes Reissner SWP Comments

The outcome of the presidential election in June 2005 was indicative of fundamental social and political developments in Iran 26 years after its Revolution. The surprise victory by populist neo-Conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reflected resentment amongst poorer Iranians. Moreover, a younger generation of politicians whose politics were primarily shaped during their country’s eight-year war against Iraq (1980–1988) has now become the tone-setting political class, including in government. Self-assurance is the new credo, and by no means just for those who won the election. Inspired by China’s example, Iran is determined to use its wealth of energy resources to go its own way without bowing to the imperious West. But this does not necessarily imply anti- Western politics. Instead, Iran may assertively distance itself from the West and either make clear demands or give the cold shoulder, as it sees fit.

The sometimes highly contradictory state- ! open internal power struggles and ments made by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad generational conflicts have now broken both before and since his election and out within its ranks; also his background may tempt external ! younger politicians whose outlook has observers to label the new Iranian president been shaped more by the war with Iraq a Conservative populist. But such labeling than by the Revolution are rising to is an insufficient basis for second-guessing prominence; and his future policies, assuming that it is he ! the gulf between Iran’s social classes has who will be determining them in the first once again become a political issue. place. Regardless of speculations about These developments will certainly re- Ahmadinejad’s future role and policies, quire further, more extensive analysis, but the outcome of the latest presidential at the same time the main current of the election highlights several fundamental changes that have occurred should be developments in Iranian society and borne in mind here, to clarify the hypo- politics: thesis summed up by the title of this paper ! The Conservative elite may now domi- regarding the opening up of a ‘new gap’ nate all the elected and non-elected state between Iran and the West. institutions, but

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1 Conservatives pulling all the strings foreign policies. However, in spite of all The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the differences between the Iranian state Iran’s new president, which also came as a apparatus and society, it is highly unlikely surprise to the Iranian people, places both that this situation will prompt an uprising the elected and non-elected state institu- by the ‘freedom-loving people’ against the tions in the hands of the Conservatives, ‘regime of the mullahs,’ as hoped for by thereby affording both Ayatollah Khame- American hardliners and groups of Iranian nei, the Leader of the Revolution, and the exiles with pipe dreams about regime regime’s political elite a greater feeling of change. Instead, there is every indication security. For under the surface in the of fresh divides among the Conservative Conservative camp there had been linger- political elite. ing mistrust that the Reformists are ultimately intent on changing the system and enjoy the backing of the West. And The “Principle-ists” although the Conservatives had always Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is regarded as one reached some kind of arrangement with of the ‘people of principle’ or “principle- President Khatami and his allies, at the ists” as English papers in Iran as well as the same time they had constantly endeav- BBC monitoring service render the Persian oured to muzzle the Reformist movement, word osulgaran, basically meaning ‘funda- mainly with the help of the Guardian mentalists.’ The Conservative victors in the Council and the judiciary. February 2004 general election adopted this Indeed, the sole aims of string-pulling positively charged translation to describe by the Guardian Council in both the 2004 themselves, especially the political party general election and the recent presidential Abadgaran, or ‘Builders of Islamic Iran,’ election and of the legal clampdown on whose ranks include the Iranian parlia- the Reformist movement was to oust from ment’s present speaker, Gholam Ali Haddad political office those individuals whose Adel. In the run-up to that general election, loyalty to the ‘system’ was in doubt. This despite all the Conservatives’ deep-seated was nothing other than a struggle between political enmity towards the United States, those who see themselves as true cham- now and then they did not shrink back pions of the Revolution and those who are from comparing themselves with American regarded as ‘not being one of us’. Appeals neo-Conservatives as a religiously funda- by the Leader of the Revolution for the mentalist, but also successful, modern nation to put up a unified front were political movement. merely designed to stem excesses in this Soon after the new parliament was conflict that might jeopardise the state, but formed in May 2004, the top priority for he neither could, nor wanted to prevent the political elite in Iran, alongside the such a clash. The prominent role played by nuclear stand-off with the West, became mistrust in Iran is perfectly captured by the fielding candidates for the presidential explanation given by well-known journalist election. Between the Reformist parties, Amir Mohebbian, from the Conservative and even more clearly among the ranks of newspaper Resalat, when it became ap- the Conservatives, genuine competition parent to general astonishment after the arose as the latter vied to put up a candi- 2004 general election that the new funda- date who would stand a real chance against mentalists in parliament saw eye to eye the then 70-year-old former President with the Reformists on many political Rafsanjani, who only decided to stand just issues: “Ah yes, but people trust us.” before the election. In the autumn before Ahmadinejad’s election victory means the election the Conservatives had formed that the Conservatives now bear sole a 15-member ‘Coordinating Council of responsibility for Iran’s domestic and Revolutionary Forces’. The little we know

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2 about the Council’s activities clearly suffered for an Islamic Iran reap fewer suggests that even amongst the Conser- fruits from the Revolution than those vatives there is considerable political who are constantly stealing a glance at rivalry, which is strongly marked by gener- the West? ational issues. Blame for the lack of unity This generation has very few clerics who was laid at the door of the ‘young genera- are politically-minded mullahs, though it tion’. As early as the following winter, does derive support from rather traditional former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati religious mullahs in the background. None- broke away from the Coordinating Council theless, Ahmadinejad is said to have chosen and announced his candidature as an Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi as religious author- ‘independent principle-ist,’ only to desist ity (marja’, literally meaning ‘source of emu- from standing once Rafsanjani announced lation’), and Mesbah Yazdi is an ayatollah that he was willing to take office again. notorious for being a ‘firebrand’ of revolu- Ahmadinejad was by no stretch of the tionary Islam, a man who has said that imagination the Coordinating Council’s the Revolution was not waged to sustain first-choice candidate. Shortly before the democracy. election, pointing to his poor performance It is not the vehement sermons of the in the polls, his fellow Conservative can- old mullahs of the Revolution that have didates are said to have spread the rumour shaped the political understanding of the that he was withdrawing his candidacy. It principle-ists,’ even if they feel more drawn may be that Ahmadinejad was too radical to their views than to the more intellectual for the ‘Builders of Islamic Iran,’ who had treatises written by Abdolkarim Sorush, elected him mayor of Tehran, for he is a once a figurehead for the Reformists. But member of the Central Committee, con- this does not mean to say that the ‘princi- sidered an extreme grouping of individuals ple-ists’ are anti-intellectuals; it is just that ‘sacrificing themselves for the Revolution’. theology and philosophy are deemed less So what characterises these ‘principle- important now. Many intellectuals who ists’? Their leaders are aged between 40 and are also ‘principle-ists’ may have read the 50, which means that they are too old to philosophy expounded by Professor Jürgen belong to the generation born after the Habermas as well, and in one telling Revolution which Western analysts have instance in 2003 the Conservative news- frequently cited as the decisive force behind paper Resalat printed in full the lecture he the push for reforms, but too young to gave in Tehran, translated into Persian. Yet qualify as people who actually engineered this does not necessarily make anyone a the Revolution. Instead, they belong to an disciple of Habermas. And although being age group whose politics were shaped quite able to refer to oneself as a ‘man of letters’ specifically by the eight-year war against is still a prestigious claim in Iranian society Iraq (1980–1988). They are people for whom (the parliamentary speaker cultivates his the spiritual strength provided by religion reputation as a translator of Kant), for and a basic nationalism put to the test in the ‘principle-ists’ science and technology active defence of their country constitute which augur progress count for more. an unshakeable, pragmatic whole. Yet they This mixture of fundamental religious con- resist being typecast in the dichotomy of victions and a predilection for technology ‘ideologues’ versus ‘pragmatists’. Instead, is characteristic of all, not just Islamic they openly intend to vaunt their set of mainstream fundamentalists. principles and participate in globalisation on their own terms. The social tensions that underlay Ahmadinejad’s election can A new role for the military? be summed up in this single question of Where the ‘principle-ists’ are concerned, theirs: Why should we who fought and the combination of basic underlying

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3 religious principles and a fascination for increase in the number of former military technology should also be viewed against officers in politics should also be seen as the backdrop of the formative experience linked to the rise of a new generation, of Iran’s eight-year war against Iraq. When namely the age group whose development that war broke out, Ahmadinejad volun- was shaped by the war with Iraq. So the teered to join the Revolutionary Guards, problem of growing political prominence where he served in a special unit. Three for the military will have to be monitored, other Conservative presidential candidates, especially seeing as members of the Revo- Mohsen Reza’i, Bagher Qalibaf and Ali lutionary Guards and Basij are said to have Larijani, also had military backgrounds. been involved in the ‘irregularities’ in the Reza’i, the secretary of the Expediency elections which, had they never occurred, Council, who withdrew his candidacy might have resulted in Ahmadinejad not shortly before the presidential election, reaching the final ballot. was long time Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards. After the student demonstrations in July 1999, the suppres- The election victory: sion of which caused great bloodshed, A “tsunami of the ‘principle-ists’” former police chief Mohammad Bagher One headline in the hardline newspaper Qalibaf signed the letter written by the Keyhan described Ahmadinejad’s election military’s top brass in which Khatami had victory, which also came as a complete warned that the armed forces might surprise to the Iranian people, as a “tsu- intervene if such demonstrations against nami of the ‘principle-lists’.” The elections the Leader of the Revolution and the did not meet the standards required to regime were repeated. Many of the Con- describe them as ‘fair and free’. As has servatives voted into parliament in the become almost customary nowadays, the 2004 general election are said to be military Guardian Council had rejected politically men in civilian clothes. The Iranian oppo- unsuitable candidates. Voters were in- sition in exile puts their number at more fluenced by their local Friday preachers, than 40. and on the day of the election itself both However, repeated warnings about the the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards had creeping spread of the political influence of had their hand in the run of events. When the military—and of the Revolutionary the votes were counted on 18 June, for a Guards Corps in particular—stem not only long time the former Reformist parliamen- from the opposition in exile, but also from tary speaker Mehdi Karrubi was in second inside Iran itself. And given the economic place, close behind leading candidate Akbar role played by the Revolutionary Guards Hashemi Rafsanjani. Only late in the day and the Volunteer Corps, or Basij, via the did Ahmadinejad just pip Karrubi to the positions they occupy in revolutionary post for second place and thereby reach the foundations, such influence should not second and final ballot, which he then be underestimated. However, at present it proceeded to win, beating Rafsanjani by seems unlikely that Iran’s military can 61.7% to 35%, with an election turnout of expect to play a role on the scale of that 59.8% (3% less than in the first ballot). enjoyed by its counterpart in Pakistan, for In an open letter to the Leader of the Iranian society has been extremely wary of Revolution, Mehdi Karrubi complained the military holding sway over politics ever bitterly, but his protests were brushed since the era of the Pahlavi shahs (1925–79). aside. Later on, in a second open letter, he Not for nothing did Mohsen Reza’i stress called for the results in various provinces during his election campaign that he had to be checked. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani long ago shed his military uniform in also complained about election fraud, but order to go into politics. Furthermore, an said he would not refer the matter to any

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4 judges, since they would anyway be jani was nothing more than a figure sym- neither willing nor able to see that justice bolising the corrupt super-rich. For them was done. He added that he would leave the relationship with the USA after 26 years the matter in God’s hands. President of American opposition to Iran and sanc- Khatami announced that he would submit tions are of secondary importance, as is the a dossier on election fraud to the Leader of country’s nuclear programme. As it turned the Revolution, the parliamentary speaker out, Rafsanjani’s election campaign, which and the elected president. However, for the was tailored very much to the younger time being the ‘tsunami’ of Ahmadinejad’s generation living in northern Tehran, was victory appears to have drowned out any easily tarred by his opponents as ‘offensive’ protests. and ‘pro-Western’. Indeed, it is not really Ahmadinejad’s victory can be attributed clear why the Iranian electorate should be first and foremost to popular support from won over by Hashemi stickers printed in ordinary people and the lower middle English, rather than Persian. class, namely those voters neglected by the By contrast, Ahmadinejad’s populism Reformists. “We couldn’t translate the worked because in principle he approved of slogan of democracy into daily bread,” the historical development of the Islamic acknowledged Mohammad-Reza Khatami, Republic of Iran and sent out the message president of the Islamic Iranian Participa- that any wrong turns taken could be over- tion Front, the leading Reformist party. come with God’s help and some self-assur- The new gulf that has opened up ance. Ahmadinejad uses the slogans of the between the rich and poor in Iran is blamed Revolution not in attempt to turn back the essentially on the economic policy of recon- clock, but rather as familiar references struction and structural change imple- which people can latch onto before starting mented by Rafsanjani since the early 1990s, to look forward. Debates about structures, which gave rise to nouveaux riches and cor- the type of regime and democracy are ruption, and benefited the upper middle ‘not his thing’; he sees himself as a ‘street class that tends to identify with the cleaner’ who sweeps clear the road ahead Reformist movement. and wants to have an impact within the Given this undercurrent of a major country’s structures. His negative election social divide and resentment against the message about democracy, reminiscent of rich pro-Western element in Iranian statements by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, society, Ahmadinejad managed to kindle saying that “the Revolution wasn’t waged hope amongst his followers. Justice was the to install democracy,” is a reference to watchword of his election campaign, and “Western liberal democracy.” In its place his slogan was “It’s possible and we can do he proposes „religion-based democracy“, it!”. So Ahmadinejad’s election campaign which the Leader of the Revolution was more about giving people hope and declared back in 2000 to be a core element self-assurance than about announcing a of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s image of certain politics. And his credibility was itself. For Ahmadinejad this form of democ- shored up by his reputation as a man of racy is the means to an end, a way of secur- integrity and someone who was prepared ing justice, not a fetishised end in itself. His to put his shoulder to the wheel. call for greater participation by underpin- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, on the other ning the autonomy of the country’s local hand, had said he wanted to embrace the authorities and provinces is in keeping relationship with the USA. In so doing he with such an outlook. broke a taboo imposed by the Leader of the Certain similarities between such a par- Revolution and made himself the West’s ticipation-based understanding of democ- preferred candidate. Yet for the 17 million racy and the emphasis of social justice and people who voted for Ahmadinejad, Rafsan- semi-official notions of Islam in Turkey,

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5 Malaysia and Indonesia are unmistakeable. extent than normal in the country’s minis- But there is a question mark over whether tries following a presidential election. The the current ‘bottom-up’ mobilisation will main focus will be on the Ministry of Petro- not once again be smothered ‘from above’. leum, which has a reputation for being a Another good question is how the health of hotbed of corruption. Resentment against the country’s economy could possibly be the oil industry technocrats who are per- restored without any structural changes ceived as being Rafsanjani supporters and being implemented. the interests of Islamist technicians in securing lucrative posts for themselves will probably also be a factor here. How- What kind of politics? ever, extensive personnel changes could Iran’s president and prime minister are impact negatively on oil production and only responsible for the country’s execu- the natural gas industry and exacerbate tive. The main thrust of Iranian policy, the country’s ‘brain drain’. To begin with especially with respect to security and the new government looks set to use sub- foreign policy issues, is determined by the sidies to keep its promise of greater social Leader of the Revolution and the country’s justice. High oil prices would provide the Security Council, and in legislative matters money required to do this. the Expediency Council (still chaired by With respect to freedom, whether free- Rafsanjani) plays a key role as the body dom of the press, freedom of expression mediating between parliament and the or the freedom to live one’s life as one Guardian Council. On top of this institu- chooses, Ahmadinejad found himself con- tional stranglehold on its freedom to fronting the full impact of visions of horror organise things the way it wants, particu- spread both within Iran and above all larly where Iran’s development is con- abroad, portraying him as an ultra-Con- cerned the new government is bound to servative ‘obscurantist’ intent on setting its Five-Year Plan and 20-Year Perspective. the clock back, a man whose sole aim was Ahmadinejad has long since revised his, in to rescind painstakingly wrested freedoms. some cases, drastic election statements The media, which confuse reforms with against privatisation and the institutions a Western outlook, reported that Ahma- of a market economy (“the stock market is dinejad had had a few trendy pizzerias a gambling den”),and his economic policy and cafés in northern Tehran closed down, ideas are now geared towards a ‘clean’ but failed to mention the large number of market economy with a strong social and similar restaurants that still characterise cooperative component. the cityscape. In his struggle for justice and against Measures designed to plaster over the corruption, the new president finds himself social gulf will probably be taken, and faced with the dilemma of having to take clothing regulations are an only too well- action against the Revolutionary Guards, known way of doing this. However, there is amongst others, who are actively involved no reason to expect the full abolition of the in the country’s existing economic struc- freedoms gained in the past, and for more tures and non-transparent, economically serious reasons than the fact that Ahma- powerful foundations. For this reason, one dinejad’s cultural advisor has promised observer of the situation in Iran neatly almost utopian press freedoms. The regime summed up Ahmadinejad’s situation as knows that the young people who voted for that of a “Robin Hood in the service of the Ahmadinejad want for themselves much of Sheriff of Nottingham.” what the golden youth of the ‘Aghazadeh,’ Consequently, the kind of changes that i.e. the sons of influential and prosperous can be expected will affect not structures, parents (including mullahs), enjoy in but personnel, and will do so to a greater northern Tehran.

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6 Under Khatami in particular, the for the time being relations between the regime’s ruling classes had spread the USA and Iran have continued to deteriorate. view that society could be kept ticking over Some US media have made much of the by showing a certain degree of largesse, fact that Ahmadinejad is suspected of and that there is therefore no point in having been involved in the occupation banning satellite dishes and modern life- of the American Embassy after the Revo- styles as long as the regime itself is not lution in 1979. Some European media under threat. Yet Ahmadinejad’s election followed them in this. For the Iranians this makes this outlook even more solid than kind of behaviour is merely further proof it was under his predecessor. Moreover, it of the West’s double standards, for the self- is of course clear that the post-election same media have never made much of the situation does not mean that social and fact that many of the leading Reformists politico-ideological differences have sud- were once ringleaders behind the embassy’s denly gone away. It wasn’t just the Reform- occupation. ist newspapers that worked out for the new For the time being, the regularly trotted president that he had only gained the votes out view that the regime would be perfectly of 35% of the electorate. During his election willing to take pragmatic steps if it felt campaign Ahmadinejad himself, taking up secure and if the Reformists could not be a slogan used by the Reformist movement, attributed with having usefully improved stressed that Iran belonged to all Iranians. relations with the USA, can only be deemed And even the Leader of the Revolution, theoretically accurate speculation. Ahma- Ayatollah Khamene’i, is evidently aware of dinejad’s usually abbreviated statement the considerable tensions in Iranian society, “We don’t need America” gives us no clues for in his first reaction after the election he as to his specific future policy vis-à-vis the prohibited any public celebrations. USA. The quotation in full reads as follows: “We are self-assured and capable enough not to be dependent on the USA for our What can the West expect? progress and development,” with the stress This is another question for which there is on “self-assured.” not yet any specific answer, though it may Accordingly, Iran’s interest in adopting a well be useful to ask ourselves the counter pragmatic attitude towards the Americans question put by many Iranians, namely in the immediate vicinity, especially in Iraq what can Iran expect (yet) from the West? and Afghanistan, and at the same time Naturally a question mark hangs over how restricting their room for manoeuvre either Ahmadinejad will behave towards the USA, diplomatically or physically whenever pos- but most Iranians typically believe that the sible, is unlikely to change. The visit by the ball is in Washington’s court. That attitude Iraqi defence minister and prime minister gained further purchase with the elections and the conclusion of a security agree- and evidently impacts on relations with ment with Iraq are one indication of this; Europe and especially on the nuclear nego- another is the appeal made to the USA by tiations. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in From the very outset, President Bush which Iran now has observer status along- deemed the elections unfair and not free, side India and Pakistan, calling for a date and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for the withdrawal of their troops from condemned them as “thoroughly out of Central Asia. step” with democratic trends in the region. Europe’s relations with Iran are charac- Let us hope that both these politicians take terised by sustained booming economic the social and political changes in Iran, as relations and the nuclear debate, both of expressed in the election results, more which look set to be affected by Iran’s seriously than their own words. Meanwhile, boosted self-assurance, which by no means

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7 just applies to Ahmadinejad’s supporters, valuable. According to the Financial Times but also to Iranian nationalists in favour of the nuclear negotiations have reached the reform. They all share the view that Iran is point at which both sides are now only really not dependent on European capital, playing the ‘blame game’. For the time since there is certainly no shortage of being, the key factor is that both sides have capital in the Persian Gulf which since expressed their willingness to persevere 11 September 2001 has no longer been with the negotiations. Ahmadinejad’s primarily invested internationally, but election will primarily affect the mood of rather increasingly also in their country. the talks. For although it is not he who will What is more, the Europeans’ political decide on the nuclear issue, Iran’s greater support and recognition are only of limited assertiveness since his election will no use. Past experience has shown that Euro- doubt increase the already extensive pres- pean support brings little, especially where sure not to ‘give in’ whatever happens, a breakthrough in relations with the USA whilst at the same time waiting impatiently is concerned. Ultimately, foreign trade will for some movement in US policy. continue to diversify with the focus on European politicians involved with Iran Asia—the current buzzword being ‘Greater will have to get used to the idea of having Asia,’ to which Iran feels it belongs. Mean- less reform-minded dialogue partners while, the technology Iran needs and and realise that the ready understanding which is only available in Europe it will of old—in discussions about civil society, simply buy. democracy and human rights—could Iran has sought to diversify its foreign become more problematic. On the other trade by leaning towards Asia since the hand, in the best-case scenario it is con- early 1990s and at difficult times in the ceivable that the Iranians will more country’s ‘critical dialogue’ this has also clearly formulate their own interests and been invoked as a threat. However, the fact demands. More than ever, the country’s that over the last four years Europe’s share new-found self-assurance is borne along on (EU-15) of worldwide exports to Iran has both Islamic and nationalistic currents. averaged 44.4%, would appear to suggest Consequently, Ahmadinejad could strike that the vision of a diversification of more of a chord than condemnations of Iranian foreign trade that would prove him before the election as a man with damaging to Europe remains merely a ‘ultra-Conservative’ or ‘Taliban’ views distant prospect. Nonetheless, visions can might have suggested would be the case. influence political attitudes. The word is For at the very least self-assurance brings that when calls for tender are issued, with it a sense of protection against preference should be given to domestic external interference and paternalism, or non-European bids offering almost the leaving the country undisturbed to work same quality. In view of the anticipated out where its own interests lie. sweeping personnel changes, Europeans As mentioned before, the higher level of would be well advised to broaden their self-assurance will not necessarily entail an business contacts. anti-Western policy, and the Iranians’ lively The protracted nuclear negotiations interest in cultural relations and intellec- have, if anything, damaged European- tual discussion with the West is unlikely Iranian relations. The predominant view to wane very rapidly. Meanwhile, where in Iran is that at best the Europeans mean Europe’s policy on Iran is concerned, more well, but are too weak and have too little extensive communication on issues of to offer. The Europeans, however, are con- substance, and greater focus on sounding vinced of their own good intentions and out positions and opportunities for cooper- consider their efforts and what they can ation will be important, even if the talks offer for Iran’s long-term development as themselves end up proving more difficult.

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8 To begin with—and not just against the backdrop of the nuclear negotiations— Europe’s long-term interest of tying Iran into international structures, which would also serve the country’s future development, may prove even harder to convey. The Iranians’ style of politics is unlikely to change much either. Drawing on Ahma- dinejad’s slogan—“It’s possible and we can do it”—one could also sum up this outlook as follows: “It is going to work out somehow, and somehow we are going to make it.”

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SWP Comments 35 August 2005