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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani: a Trait Analysis

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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani: A Trait Analysis The role of leadership in the shift of Iranian Nuclear Policy Bachelor Project: Political Leaders in International Relations Supervisor: F.E. Bakker Sadjia Safdari – s1551574 Words: 8330 Abstract This study compares the leadership traits of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. The main question is: what is the role of leadership traits in the shift of Iranian Nuclear Policy? By comparing Iran’s nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s presidency, this study will try to find out if the change in Iran’s nuclear behaviour from an aggressive one during Ahmadinejad’s presidency to a moderate one during Rouhani’s is due to leadership traits. This study will use Hermann’s ‘Leadership Trait Analysis’ to determine leaders’ leadership traits. The Profiler Plus software measures these traits and analyses the spontaneous interviews of both presidents. The goal is to find out if certain leadership traits influence behaviour in the nuclear policy decision-making process by analysing official reports of the IAEA, U.N. speeches and secondary literature. 2 Index Abstract __________________________________________________________________________________ 2 Introduction _______________________________________________________________________________ 4 Literature Review ___________________________________________________________________________ 6 First Image ______________________________________________________________________________ 6 Leadership Trait Analysis __________________________________________________________________ 7 Most Similar System Design _______________________________________________________________ 10 Concepts ______________________________________________________________________________ 10 Islamic Republic of Iran _____________________________________________________________________ 11 Domestic political system _________________________________________________________________ 12 Method and Data __________________________________________________________________________ 14 Quantitative Content Analysis _____________________________________________________________ 14 Data collection _______________________________________________________________________ 14 Profiler Plus _________________________________________________________________________ 15 Results __________________________________________________________________________________ 16 Distrust of Others _______________________________________________________________________ 17 Analysis _________________________________________________________________________________ 19 Data collection _________________________________________________________________________ 19 Comparison Iranian Nuclear Policy _________________________________________________________ 20 Background information: Iran’s Nuclear Policy before 2005 ___________________________________ 20 Rejection E3 proposal vs. historic phone call with Obama _____________________________________ 20 Enrichment activities at Natanz vs. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action __________________________ 22 Conclusion __________________________________________________________________________ 23 Other explanations ______________________________________________________________________ 24 Conclusion _______________________________________________________________________________ 26 3 Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran formed its nuclear program during the administration of president Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and continued under president Khatami (1997-2005). Although, Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the Revolution of 1979, when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei restarted its nuclear program in 1984. It has been an important diplomatic topic since then (Davies, 2013, p. 220). Khamenei (1989-present) urged Rafsanjani and Khatami to defend Iran’s right and necessity of a nuclear program. Meanwhile, Western countries became more concerned with the idea that a nuclear Iran will challenge the fragile situation in the Middle- East. They feared that Iran’s nuclear program would set off a spiral of nuclear proliferation in the Middle-East and kill off the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Leonard, 2005). After the 2005 presidential elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took the office of president of Iran. With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the nuclear issue got a more confrontational tone (Moshirzadeh, 2007) and Iran’s Foreign Policy became more ‘aggressive’ when Ahmadinejad announced the continuation of nuclear enrichment. Severe sanctions by the U.N. and the U.S. followed which led to the disconnection of Iran from the global economic system. Iran’s aggressive new foreign policy posture created eight years of tension and rivalry between Iran and the Western powers (Davies, 2013, p. 208). In 2013, Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections, and many believed that Rouhani would start a new chapter in Iran’s relations with the world. Within his first 100 days, Rouhani signed the Geneva Agreement with the P5+1 – the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany – countries. The Geneva Agreement guaranteed 8- billion-dollar cash inflow and no new sanctions in return for Tehran’s slowing down of enrichment activities and full implementation of international control over these activities provided further relief (Ehteshami, 2014). The Agreement has been the first step for the solution of the nuclear issue so far and it managed to sustain mutual trust for the next steps. The question raises: what contributed to the change in Iran’s attitude towards the nuclear issue? While the foreign policy of the U.S. in the Middle East and the international sanctions by the E.U. and U.S. stayed the same during Iran’s presidential transition, Iran changed their nuclear policy decision-making. Did the individual leader influence this change? This study will try to answer this question by a comparative analysis of two Iranian presidents who succeeded each other; former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and current president Hassan Rouhani. First, the leadership style of both presidents will be operationalized through Hermann’s ‘Leadership Trait Analysis’ (LTA). The LTA uses the Profiler Plus software to analyse the spontaneous selected material. Subsequently, the LTA of both leaders will be 4 analysed in relation to Iran’s Nuclear Policy. One tries to explain the shift from an aggressive nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad to a moderate one during Rouhani. The goal is to find out if variation in leadership traits influenced the nuclear policy decision-making. The dependent variable; Iran’s Nuclear Policy is analysed by looking at observable behaviour through specific agreements and policies in official reports by the IAEA, and speeches at the U.N. General Assembly held by Ahmadinejad and Rouhani regarding the nuclear issue. Finally, secondary literature is used for critical and historic analyses of the actions and words of both presidents. 5 Literature Review First Image The study of individuals in International Relations is underdeveloped. The grand theories such as Realism and Liberalism hold on to the idea that the international relations are explained on a systemic level, also known as the state-centric perspective. They ignore the individual level of analysis and assume that individuals cannot explain international relations since the human nature is constant. According to these theorists; individuals are rational and naturally act out of self-interest. Therefore, when explaining war; states should always be at war because every individual acts out of self-interest and has to defend itself. And since states are not always at war, human nature cannot explain why states go to war (Waltz, 1959, pp. 27-30). However, individuals are not all the same in principle and not every individual acts out of self-interest. Personalities, ideas, and beliefs of individuals differ, so it is possible that variance in these traits explains the differences in international relations. Therefore, human nature is not constant, but it varies (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 111-112). Moreover, individuals make the decisions within a state (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Ultimately, individuals build alliances and create threats that maintain or destroy a balance of power. Individuals set the goals, strategies, and capacities of states. Individuals determine how the state uses its resources to pursue their goals (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 134-136). Byman and Pollack confirm the stigma: focus on state-centric perspective is widely supported in the international relations. The idea prevails that individuals are unimportant in major events due to factors such as the anarchist system, domestic politics, and fixed institutions (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108). The "macro attention" for states is implicitly accompanied by the message that structures between states matter. As a result of these structures, the individual will inevitably behave towards these structures (Gerring, 2007, p. 176). However, not only the structure of an anarchist system influences the behaviour of an individual, but the behaviour of an individual can also influence the structural system (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 109). Individual leaders not only influence the actions of their states, but their attitude also forms the reactions of other states (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 134-136). Choosing a particular strategy or marching towards war are ultimately all decisions by individuals (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 145). Scholars stated that leaders have different beliefs
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