Understanding Ahmadinejad Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman Washington, DC June 2006 No

Home , Amir Taheri, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Khatami, Ramita Navai

The American Understanding Ahmadinejad Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman Washington, DC June 2006 No. 1

Who is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?1 Before his meteoric rise to power in the summer of 2005, Iran’s ultra-conservative president was a relative political unknown.

Since taking office in August 2005, peccable revolutionary credentials. however, the 50-year-old Ahmadinejad As a member of the radical “Office for has done much to demonstrate his radi- Strengthening Unity” during the Islamic cal credentials. He has ratcheted up the Revolution, Ahmadinejad played a major Islamic Republic’s hostile rhetoric toward role in planning and executing the 1980 Israel and the United States. His govern- takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.2 ment has systematically rolled back do- Subsequently, he became a commander mestic freedoms and deepened its control in the Pasdaran, the feared clerical army over Iranian society. And, under his direc- created by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Kho- tion, the Islamic Republic has accelerated meini to serve as the “shock troops” of the its very public march toward an atomic Islamic Republic. In that capacity, Ah- capability. madinejad served as an instructor for the Yet much remains unknown about Basij, the regime’s fanatical domestic mi- Iran’s president. What drives Ahmadine- litia, during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.3 jad’s extremist worldview? And is he simply Afterward, Ahmadinejad served as the a pawn of the country’s Supreme Leader, governor of Ardebil province, and as an or the representative of a separate interest organizer of Ansar-e Hezbollah, the most group competing for power in Tehran? As notorious of Iran’s guruh-i fishar (vigilante the current crisis over Iran’s nuclear am- or “pressure” groups),4 until eventually bitions continues to deepen, the answers becoming mayor of Tehran in 2003. to these questions have become crucial for Ahmadinejad’s ascendance is a reflec- American policymakers. tion of the rising power of the Pasdaran in Iranian politics. Indeed, Iran’s clerical army has been the principal beneficiary PASDARAN POWER of the conservative re-entrenchment that Ahmadinejad’s harsh, uncompromis- has taken place in Iranian politics over the ing political rhetoric has led many to label past several years. In what was widely seen him as unsophisticated. But Iran’s new as a backlash against the failed policies of president is no political novice. Rather, he president Mohammad Khatami, the Feb- is a seasoned strategic operator with im- ruary 2004 elections for Iran’s parliament

Ilan Berman is Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, and Director of the Council’s Iran Freedom Initiative. 1. An early version of this paper (majles) resulted in a rout for Iran’s “re- ing his presidential victory was to visit appeared in National Review Online on January 19, 2006 un- formist” camp, swinging no fewer than Khomeini’s tomb in a public show of his der the title “False Prophet.” 130 seats to conservatives.5 Additional continuing devotion to the founder of the 10 2. “Profile: Mahmoud Ahma- gains—such as the Pasdaran’s assumption Islamic Republic. Since then, Ahmadine- dinejad,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), of control over the country’s media sector jad has publicly demonstrated his com- June 19, 2005, http://english. aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ in May 2004 with the appointment of a mitment to Khomeini’s vision. At home, 91109A0C-83F4-438F-9CC1- former commander, Ezatullah Zarghami, in keeping with his belief that “all orders 52DF6936CC6B.htm. to the post of the Islamic Republic’s na- in the Islamic Republic must be based on 3. Matthias Kuntzel, “Ahmadine- tional press and media chief6—have fur- the Qoran and the [Revolutionary] tradi- jad’s Demons,” The New Repub- ther solidified conservative influence over tion,”11 Iran’s president has launched a full lic, April 14, 2006, http://www. tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=2006042 Iran’s political discourse. Close to a third bore offensive on lax morals and foreign 4&s=kuntzel042406. of Iran’s 290 parliamentary deputies now influence.12 Abroad, meanwhile, Ahma- 4. Ibid. have links to Iran’s military complex, and dinejad has revived an expansionist for- 42 are directly affiliated with the Pasda- eign policy vision for the Islamic Repub- 5. In 2000, reformists won 189 7 of 290 seats in the majles, far ran. lic, promising supporters that “[t]he wave outstripping their conservative This new crop of conservatives is dis- of the Islamic revolution will soon reach counterparts, who secured just 13 54. Four years later, the roles tinct from other nodes of regime power the entire world.” were reversed, with conserva- in the Islamic Republic. Its members are tives capturing 190 seats to the overwhelmingly military strategists and reformists’ 50. See, respective- ly, the CIA World Factbook 2003 tacticians, rather than professional cler- DIVINE INSPIRATION and the CIA World Factbook ics.8 As such, they generally lack the po- But Ahmadinejad is more than simply a 2006. This outcome was at least partially manipulated; ahead litical experience of Iran’s clerical estab- political reactionary; he is also a self-styled of the preliminary round of vot- lishment (including the ability to safely messianic missionary. Iran’s president is a ing, Iran’s powerful Guardian navigate international crises). By the same disciple of the Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Council had disqualified 3,533 of 8,144 viable candidates, most token, this political elite is far less prac- Mesbah-Yazdi, an obscure Qom cleric who of them reformists. Mahan Abe- ticed in the language of taqiyyah (obfus- preaches a radical strain of Shi’ite libera- din, “Iran After the Elections,” Middle East Intelligence Bulle- cation) and kitman (dissimulation) that is tion theology. Mesbah-Yazdi is a member, tin 6, no. 2/3 (February/March routinely used by and possibly the de facto 2004), http://www.meib.org/ar- Iran’s clerical class head, of the Hojatieh, ticles/0402_iran1.htm. Iran’s president in their diplomatic a powerful semi-secret 6. Kamal Nazer Yasin, “Iran’s dealings.9 Simply religious society origi- Revolutionary Guard Make Bid is a disciple of for Increasing Power,” Eur- put, Ahmadinejad nally created in the asia Insight, May 19, 2004, and his ilk say what 1950s as a political tool http://www.eurasianet.org/ the Ayatollah departments/insight/articles/ they mean and against Iran’s Baha’i eav051904a.shtml. mean what they Mohammad Taqi religious minority. But 7. “The Revolutionary Guards say, and do so to a the Hojatieh was so fa- Are Back,” The Economist, June much greater de- Mesbah-Yazdi, an natical and apocalyptic 19, 2004, http://www.economist. gree than Iranian that even Khomeini com/world/africa/displayStory. cfm?story_id=2773140. leaders have in the obscure Qom cleric eventually deemed it past when interact- too extreme, formally 8. Some analysts have dubbed this group the “war generation” ing with the outside who preaches a banning the sect from in a reflection of their formative world. political life in the early experiences during the eight 14 year Iran-Iraq War. See Ray The growing radical strain of 1980s. Takeyh, “A Profile in Defiance,” power of the Pasda- Like that of the The National Interest 83, Spring ran has been mir- Hojatieh itself, Mes- 2006, 16-21. Shi’ite liberation rored by a concert- bah-Yazdi’s worldview 9. Amir Taheri, “No Change ed effort to revive is exclusionary, anti- in Iran’s Strategic Goals,” theology. Gulf News (Dubai), Novem- the revolutionary democratic and deeply ber 11, 2005, http://www.gulf- principles espoused by its creator and in- anti-Western.15 In his writings and pub- news.com/Articles/RegionNF. asp?ArticleID=189738. spiration, the Ayatollah Khomeini. One lic speeches, he has agitated for—among of Ahmadinejad’s first public acts follow- other things—the rollback of individual 10. “President-Elect Re-

2 ArticleUnderstanding Title • AhmadinejadPublication Date voting rights, the targeting of opposition him, “a historic war between the oppres- news Allegiance with Imam Khomeini,” IRNA (Tehran), press and politicians, and the forcible Is- sor [Christians] and the world of Islam” June 26, 2005, http://www. lamization of Iranian universities.16 Most is under way, and the Islamic Republic is irna.ir/en/news/view/line- notable, however, is his fervent belief in on the front lines.23 Thus, as Ahmadine- 16/0506260277120702.htm. the imminent return of the “Hidden jad told a closed-door session of the majles 11. Mehrdad Sheibani, “Good- bye to the Republic,” Rooz (Teh- Imam,” or Mahdi, a messiah-like religious foreign policy and national security com- ran), August 11, 2005, http:// figure from the 9th Century that many mittee in January 2006, Iran must aban- www.roozonline.com/eng - believe will return as a result of a regional don its decade-and-a-half-old policy of lish/009328.shtml. conflagration. “détente” with the West in favor of con- 12. For an in-depth analysis, see Ahmadinejad has been deeply influ- frontation.24 Mehdi Khalaji, “Tehran’s Re- newed War on Culture,” Wash- enced by these ideas. “Our revolution’s The tool of choice in this struggle ap- ington Institute for Near East main mission is to pave the way for the re- pears to be Iran’s nuclear program. As Policy Policywatch No. 1054, November 21, 2005, http://www. appearance of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi,” some commentators have suggested, Ah- washingtoninstitute.org/tem- Ahmadinejad told a meeting of national madinejad’s defiant pursuit of an atomic plateC05.php?CID=2405. religious leaders in November 2005. “To- option despite mounting international 13. “Iran’s Ahmadinejad Looks day, we should define our economic, cul- pressure is grounded in the belief that to Export ‘New Islamic Revolu- tural and political policies based on the their country’s nuclear successes are a tion,’” Agence France Presse, 17 June 30, 2005, http://www. policy of Imam Mahdi’s return.” sign of divine intervention, and that the dailystar.com.lb/article. He has wasted no time turning this Islamic Republic is destined to become a asp?edition_id=10&categ_ principle into policy. Back in 2004, while nuclear-armed regional hegemon.25 id=2&article_id=16353. still mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad is 14. Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Zealotry Puts Iran on Apocalyp- said to have secretly ordered an urban re- tic Path,” The Australian (Can- construction plan to make the city more ALTERING THE INTERNAL berra), January 16, 2006, http:// accessible for the Mahdi’s return.18 Since BALANCE www.theaustralian.news.com. au/story/0,20867,17831552- his ascension to the presidency, he has Ordinarily, none of these factors would 31477,00.html. perpetuated this practice, funneling sub- be overly important. Under the tradition- 15. Colin Freeman, “The Rise of stantial federal funds (some $17 million) al structure of power within the Islamic Prof ‘Crocodile’ – a Hardliner to renovate the Jamkaran mosque—which Republic, the office of the president is an to Terrify Hardliners,” Tele- empty one, completely controlled by— graph (London), November 20, houses the well from which the Mahdi is 2005, http://www.telegraph. expected to materialize—and opening and beholden to—the Supreme Leader. co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/ discussions about the creation of a direct Indeed, despite sweeping to power on a news/2005/11/20/wiran220. 19 xml&sSheet=/news/2005/11/20/ train route from there to Tehran. “reformist” platform, Ahmadinejad’s pre- ixnewstop.html. Since taking office, Ahmadinejad has decessor, Mohammad Khatami, failed to 16. Shervin Omidvar, “Ay Yazdi: also elevated fellow Hojatieh members enact virtually any progressive domestic Universities Must Become Islam- to key positions of political power in the measures, instead presiding over an ex- ic,” Rooz (Tehran), December pansion of regime repression and an accel- 15, 2005, http://www.roozon- Islamic Republic’s bureaucracy. At least line.com/english/012534.shtml; four of Ahmadinejad’s twenty-one cabinet eration of Iran’s efforts to acquire weapons Hossein Bastani, “Kill Them, members are said to be members of the of mass destruction. There Is No Need for a Trial,” 20 Rooz (Tehran), January 16, Hojatieh society, and one of the presi- To some extent, this state of affairs 2006, http://www.roozonline. dent’s closest and most respected advisors, has persisted; certainly, Ahmadinejad com/english/013494.shtml. Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh, is reportedly could not have risen to the presidency 17. As cited in Paul Hughes, a member of Mesbah-Yazdi’s inner cir- without the endorsement and backing of “Iran President Paves the Way 21 Iran’s Supreme Leader. However, telltale for Arabs’ Imam Return,” Re- cle. This confluence of forces has led to uters, November 17, 2005. a number of controversial governmental signs suggest that, now that he is in office, Ahmadinejad has set about changing 18. Scott Peterson, “Waiting for measures in recent months, most promi- the Rapture in Iran,” Christian nent among them the October 2005 rati- all that. In recent months, Iran’s president Science Monitor, December 21, fication of a formal cooperation pact with has undertaken a systematic campaign to 2005, http://www.csmonitor. 22 com/2005/1221/p01s04-wome. the Twelfth Imam. consolidate power by elevating loyalists html. The belief in the imminent return of to key governmental posts, launching a 19. Ibid. the Mahdi has driven Ahmadinejad’s for- major clampdown on independent media, eign policy brinksmanship. According to and reordering the relationship between 20. Special Correspondent, “Shi’ite Supremacists Emerge American Foreign Policy Council • www.afpc.org 3 from Iran’s Shadows,” Asia the central government and Iran’s regions. of a December 2005 directive, Ahmadine- Times (Hong Kong), September 9, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/ This initiative has included: jad has imposed sweeping new restrictions atimes/Middle_East/GI09Ak01. on foreign travel and foreign contacts for html. Expanded censorship. In recent months, Iran’s professional diplomatic corps.31 21. Arash Mahdavi, “The Man Ahmadinejad has imposed major new Behind the President,” Rooz restrictions on radio, television and film Imposing ideological conformity. In a move (Tehran), November 6, 2005, content, including a ban on the playing of that echoes the “cultural revolution” that http://www.roozonline.com/ english/011447.shtml. all Western and “offensive” music on state- followed the establishment of the Islamic run radio and television stations.26 Under Republic in 1979, Ahmadinejad’s govern- 22. Kamal Tehrani, “An Agree- ment with the Absent Imam,” his direction, Iran’s Ministry of Culture ment has launched a review of the employ- Rooz (Tehran), October 17, has banned the publication of virtually all ment contracts of university-level profes- 2005, http://roozonline.com/ 27 11english/010974.shtml. books. Ahmadinejad has also authorized sors hired since 1997—a step that many a campaign of media intimidation—one see as a prelude to the firing of educators 23. “Ahmadinejad: Wipe Israel Off Map,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), that has included threats against opposi- deemed by the regime to be too “un-Is- October 26, 2005, http://eng- tion journalists and a purge of personnel lamic.” A number of academics at some of lish.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ in at least one prominent news agency.28 Iran’s leading higher-learning institutions 15E6BF77-6F91-46EE-A4B5- A3CE0E9957EA.htm. (including Tehran University and Tehran’s Consolidation of power. Ahmadinejad’s as- University of Alameh Tabatabai) have al- 24. “Iran’s President Criticizes cendance has been followed by a system- ready been warned that their contracts Past 16 Years of Détente with atic campaign to replace key governmental West,” VOA News, January 3, will not be reviewed once they expire, and 2006, http://www.voanews.com/ positions with former Pasdaran command- english/2006-01-03-voa52.cfm. more expulsions are predicted in the near ers loyal to his radical worldview. No future.32 In a similar fashion, the Iranian 25. Amir Taheri, “The Frighten- fewer than 13 members of Ahmadinejad’s regime has intensified its efforts to clamp ing Truth of Why Iran Wants the 21-member cabinet previously held high- Bomb,” Sunday Telegraph (Lon- down on “immoral behavior” within the don), April 16, 2006, http://www. profile positions in the Islamic Republic’s Islamic Republic, enacting restrictive new telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main. clerical army—including Foreign Minister social measures aimed at greater regula- jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/04/16/ Manoucher Mottaki (a former Pasdaran do1609.xml&sSheet=/por- tion of the public conduct of Iranian citi- tal/2006/04/16/ixportal.html. officer responsible for running terrorist zens. Among these is the imposition of a de operations in Turkey), Defense Minister 26. “Iran President Bans West- facto dress code on the female population ern Music,” BBC (London), Mostafa Mohammad-Najar, who served of Tehran, as well as an expansion of the December 19, 2005, http:// as part of the Pasdaran expeditionary force news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ activities of the Islamic Republic’s “morals east/4543720.stm. in Lebanon in early 1980s, and Culture police.”33 and Islamic Guidance Minister Moham- 27. Maryam Kashani, “The Walls of the Banned City,” Rooz mad Saffar-Harandi, the former director The impact of these changes has been (Tehran), January 8, 2006, of the Pasdaran’s political bureau. In addi- pronounced. In recent months, the U.S. http://roozonline.com/eng - lish/013225.shtml. tion to cabinet appointments, Ahmadine- Department of State and the Congressio- jad also has commenced a purge of offi- nally-mandated U.S. Commission on In- 28. “The Inadequate Security of Journalists,” E’temad (Teh- cials at the regional level, so far replacing ternational Religious Freedom have both ran), April 12, 2006; Shahram the governors of at least six of Iran’s thirty noted a deepening of repression and reli- Rafizadeh, “Darker Days Ahead provinces.29 gious persecution within the Islamic Re- for Journalists,” Rooz (Tehran), public.34 Iran has likewise begun taking April 18, 2006, http://roozonline. Restructuring diplomacy. Simultaneously, com/english/015056.shtml. new steps to isolate its population from Ahmadinejad has launched a major over- foreign influence—among them the cre- 29. “Iran: Purge of Moderates haul of Iran’s professional diplomatic corps. Extends to Governors and ation of new Internet control measures Banks,” Adnkronos Internation- At least twenty of the Islamic Republic’s al (Rome), November 11, 2005, and the allocation of millions of dollars top diplomats—including Tehran’s envoys 35 http://www.adnki.com/index_ for domestic propaganda efforts. Most 2Level.php?cat=Politics&loid= to Paris, Berlin and London—already have significant of all, however, is mounting 8.0.227843672&par=0. been fired, and more changes are expected. evidence that on a number of key topics, 30. Ramita Navai and Richard The key factor in the purge, observers say, chief among them the nuclear issue, the Beeston, “Iran Sacks Diplomats is a failure to effectively promote the presi- Iranian presidency appears to have begun in Purge of Reformers,” Times dent’s extremist agenda.30 Those diplomats of London, November 2, 2005, to emerge as an independent foreign poli- http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ that have remained, meanwhile, have had cy actor in its own right. article/0,,251-1854018,00.html. their autonomy severely curtailed. As part ArticleUnderstanding Title • PublicationAhmadinejad Date 4 IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERI- the event of an internal power struggle. 31. “Iran: New Limits on Travel CAN POLICY Indeed, jitters over Ahmadinejad’s poli- Abroad,” Adnkronos Interna- For American policymakers, the chang- cies and potential independence have al- tional, December 19, 2005, http://www.adnki.com/index_ es underway within the Islamic Republic ready sparked a backlash in some corners 2Level.php?cat=Politics&loid= have at least two concrete implications. of Iran’s clerical establishment, most no- 8.0.241132494&par=0. The first is military. Some analysts have ticeably through the strengthening of the 32. Hamid Irani, “Hard-line responded to the current crisis over the powers of his political opponent and ri- Iranian Government Reviews University Professors Con- Islamic Republic’s atomic efforts by sug- val, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi tracts,” Rooz (Tehran), March gesting that it would be possible for the Rafsanjani, in his capacity as head of the 2, 2006, http://roozonline.com/ United States to deter a nuclear-armed country’s main arbitration body, the Expe- 11english/014354.shtml. 36 37 Iran. In making this assertion, they have diency Council. Listening devices have 33. “Iran Moves to Stop ‘Immoral relied on the experience of the Cold War, also reportedly been found in a number of Behavior,’” Spiegel Online (Ber- lin), May 9, 2006, http://service. during which the threat of mutual nuclear key regional and federal offices that have spiegel.de/cache/internation- annihilation created a stable “balance of close contact with Ahmadinejad and his al/0,1518,415236,00.html. 38 terror” between Moscow and Washing- cabinet. This suggests that at least some 34. U.S. Department of State, ton. in Iran no longer believe a future struggle Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Iran,” Coun- Such assumptions, however, are deeply for political dominance within the Ira- try Reports on Human Rights flawed. Cold War deterrence functioned nian leadership to be entirely out of the Practices 2005, March 8, 2006, successfully because a series of conditions question. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2005/61688.htm; Press (good communication, rational decision- Should such a struggle emerge, its out- Release, Press Release, “Iran: making, well-informed strategic plan- come is likely to be dictated by where Ah- USCIRF Concerned Over Dete- riorating Situation for Religious ning, and, most importantly, a shared madinejad places his religious loyalties. Minorities,” United States Com- assumption that war should be avoided) From the 1979 Islamic Revolution until mission on International Reli- were presumed to exist between the Unit- his death a decade later, the Ayatollah gious Freedom, February 24, 2006, http://www.uscirf.gov/ ed States and the Soviet Union. None of Ruhollah Khomeini served simultane- mediaroom/press/2006/febru- these are present in America’s current re- ously as the Islamic Republic’s rahbar (Su- ary/02242006_IranDeteriorat- lationship with Iran, indicating that the preme Leader) and its marja’taqlid (model ingSituation.html. risk of miscalculation by either Tehran or of religious emulation). The first post was 35. “Iran Allocates $15M for Anti-U.S. Budget,” Associated Washington is far too political, the second Press, March 13, 2006; Meysam great for a successful spiritual. Khomeini’s Salehian, “Iran Jams Satellite bilateral deterrence Ahmadinejad’s death brought with it Broadcasts,” Rooz (Tehran), May 2, 2006, http://roozonline. relationship. More- a bifurcation of these com/english/015293.shtml. over, Ahmadinejad’s apocalyptic functions. The Aya- 36. See, for example, Barry apocalyptic worldview tollah Ali Khamenei R. Posen, “We Can Live with a suggests that at least worldview suggests assumed the post Nuclear Iran,” New York Times, February 27, 2006, http://www. one segment of the of rahbar, but has nytimes.com/2006/02/27/ Iranian leadership is that at least one weathered repeated opinion/27posen.html. now seeking to foment challenges to his reli- 37. Ayelet Savyon, “The ‘Second precisely such a nucle- segment of the gious authority from Islamic Revolution’ in Iran: Pow- ar confrontation—ef- more senior clerics. er Struggle at the Top,” Middle Iranian leadership East Media Research Institute fectively making Iran Ahmadinejad’s men- Inquiry and Analysis 253, No- “undeterrable” in the tor, Mesbah-Yazdi, is vember 15, 2005, http://memri. is now seeking to org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=arch traditional sense of such a challenger, and ives&Area=ia&ID=IA25305. the word. has openly questioned foment a nuclear 38. “Bugging State Buildings,” The second has to Khamenei’s religious Ya Lesarat ol-Hoseyn (Tehran), 39 do with religious au- confrontation. credentials. Indeed, March 22, 2006. thority. Unlike both some have speculated 39. Richard Ernsberger, Jr., of his predecessors, that Mesbah-Yazdi is “Religion Versus Reality,” Iran’s new president is not a cleric but a himself a contender for the Islamic Re- Newsweek, December 12, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ military man, with a distinct constituency public’s top post, and could be conspiring id/10313618/site/newsweek/. of his own—one that he can marshal in to use the upcoming Fall elections of the 40. Ibid. American Foreign Policy Council • www.afpc.org 5 country’s powerful Assembly of Experts, say that Ahmadinejad’s rise to power has The American Foreign which selects the Supreme Leader and su- significantly complicated American op- Policy Council pervises his activities, to supplant Khame- tions vis-à-vis Iran. But it has also served 509 C Street NE nei.40 In the event of such a struggle, it is to clarify them. Iran’s new president is Washington, DC 20002 not at all clear on what side Ahmadinejad plain-spoken in his radicalism, and open Tel.: (202) 543-1006 and his followers in the Pasdaran would about his intentions. Policymakers in Fax: (202) 543-1007 find themselves. Washington would do well to take him at [email protected] Given the foregoing, it would be safe to his word. Herman Pirchner, Jr. President

Ilan Berman Vice President for Policy

John C. Wobensmith Vice President for Development and Senior Fellow in Intelligence Studies

Annie Earley Director of Communications

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