The American Understanding Ahmadinejad Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman Washington, DC June 2006 No. 1 Who is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?1 Before his meteoric rise to power in the summer of 2005, Iran’s ultra-con- servative president was a relative political unknown. Since taking office in August 2005, peccable revolutionary credentials. however, the 50-year-old Ahmadinejad As a member of the radical “Office for has done much to demonstrate his radi- Strengthening Unity” during the Islamic cal credentials. He has ratcheted up the Revolution, Ahmadinejad played a major Islamic Republic’s hostile rhetoric toward role in planning and executing the 1980 Israel and the United States. His govern- takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.2 ment has systematically rolled back do- Subsequently, he became a commander mestic freedoms and deepened its control in the Pasdaran, the feared clerical army over Iranian society. And, under his direc- created by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Kho- tion, the Islamic Republic has accelerated meini to serve as the “shock troops” of the its very public march toward an atomic Islamic Republic. In that capacity, Ah- capability. madinejad served as an instructor for the Yet much remains unknown about Basij, the regime’s fanatical domestic mi- Iran’s president. What drives Ahmadine- litia, during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.3 jad’s extremist worldview? And is he simply Afterward, Ahmadinejad served as the a pawn of the country’s Supreme Leader, governor of Ardebil province, and as an or the representative of a separate interest organizer of Ansar-e Hezbollah, the most group competing for power in Tehran? As notorious of Iran’s guruh-i fishar (vigilante the current crisis over Iran’s nuclear am- or “pressure” groups),4 until eventually bitions continues to deepen, the answers becoming mayor of Tehran in 2003. to these questions have become crucial for Ahmadinejad’s ascendance is a reflec- American policymakers. tion of the rising power of the Pasdaran in Iranian politics. Indeed, Iran’s clerical army has been the principal beneficiary PASDARAN POWER of the conservative re-entrenchment that Ahmadinejad’s harsh, uncompromis- has taken place in Iranian politics over the ing political rhetoric has led many to label past several years. In what was widely seen him as unsophisticated. But Iran’s new as a backlash against the failed policies of president is no political novice. Rather, he president Mohammad Khatami, the Feb- is a seasoned strategic operator with im- ruary 2004 elections for Iran’s parliament Ilan Berman is Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, and Director of the Council’s Iran Freedom Initiative. 1. An early version of this paper (majles) resulted in a rout for Iran’s “re- ing his presidential victory was to visit appeared in National Review Online on January 19, 2006 un- formist” camp, swinging no fewer than Khomeini’s tomb in a public show of his der the title “False Prophet.” 130 seats to conservatives.5 Additional continuing devotion to the founder of the 10 2. “Profile: Mahmoud Ahma- gains—such as the Pasdaran’s assumption Islamic Republic. Since then, Ahmadine- dinejad,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), of control over the country’s media sector jad has publicly demonstrated his com- June 19, 2005, http://english. aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ in May 2004 with the appointment of a mitment to Khomeini’s vision. At home, 91109A0C-83F4-438F-9CC1- former commander, Ezatullah Zarghami, in keeping with his belief that “all orders 52DF6936CC6B.htm. to the post of the Islamic Republic’s na- in the Islamic Republic must be based on 3. Matthias Kuntzel, “Ahmadine- tional press and media chief6—have fur- the Qoran and the [Revolutionary] tradi- jad’s Demons,” The New Repub- ther solidified conservative influence over tion,”11 Iran’s president has launched a full lic, April 14, 2006, http://www. tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=2006042 Iran’s political discourse. Close to a third bore offensive on lax morals and foreign 4&s=kuntzel042406. of Iran’s 290 parliamentary deputies now influence.12 Abroad, meanwhile, Ahma- 4. Ibid. have links to Iran’s military complex, and dinejad has revived an expansionist for- 42 are directly affiliated with the Pasda- eign policy vision for the Islamic Repub- 5. In 2000, reformists won 189 7 of 290 seats in the majles, far ran. lic, promising supporters that “[t]he wave outstripping their conservative This new crop of conservatives is dis- of the Islamic revolution will soon reach counterparts, who secured just 13 54. Four years later, the roles tinct from other nodes of regime power the entire world.” were reversed, with conserva- in the Islamic Republic. Its members are tives capturing 190 seats to the overwhelmingly military strategists and reformists’ 50. See, respective- ly, the CIA World Factbook 2003 tacticians, rather than professional cler- DIVINE INSPIRATION and the CIA World Factbook ics.8 As such, they generally lack the po- But Ahmadinejad is more than simply a 2006. This outcome was at least partially manipulated; ahead litical experience of Iran’s clerical estab- political reactionary; he is also a self-styled of the preliminary round of vot- lishment (including the ability to safely messianic missionary. Iran’s president is a ing, Iran’s powerful Guardian navigate international crises). By the same disciple of the Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Council had disqualified 3,533 of 8,144 viable candidates, most token, this political elite is far less prac- Mesbah-Yazdi, an obscure Qom cleric who of them reformists. Mahan Abe- ticed in the language of taqiyyah (obfus- preaches a radical strain of Shi’ite libera- din, “Iran After the Elections,” Middle East Intelligence Bulle- cation) and kitman (dissimulation) that is tion theology. Mesbah-Yazdi is a member, tin 6, no. 2/3 (February/March routinely used by and possibly the de facto 2004), http://www.meib.org/ar- Iran’s clerical class head, of the Hojatieh, ticles/0402_iran1.htm. Iran’s president in their diplomatic a powerful semi-secret 6. Kamal Nazer Yasin, “Iran’s dealings.9 Simply religious society origi- Revolutionary Guard Make Bid is a disciple of for Increasing Power,” Eur- put, Ahmadinejad nally created in the asia Insight, May 19, 2004, and his ilk say what 1950s as a political tool http://www.eurasianet.org/ the Ayatollah departments/insight/articles/ they mean and against Iran’s Baha’i eav051904a.shtml. mean what they Mohammad Taqi religious minority. But 7. “The Revolutionary Guards say, and do so to a the Hojatieh was so fa- Are Back,” The Economist, June much greater de- Mesbah-Yazdi, an natical and apocalyptic 19, 2004, http://www.economist. gree than Iranian that even Khomeini com/world/africa/displayStory. cfm?story_id=2773140. leaders have in the obscure Qom cleric eventually deemed it past when interact- too extreme, formally 8. Some analysts have dubbed this group the “war generation” ing with the outside who preaches a banning the sect from in a reflection of their formative world. political life in the early experiences during the eight 14 year Iran-Iraq War. See Ray The growing radical strain of 1980s. Takeyh, “A Profile in Defiance,” power of the Pasda- Like that of the The National Interest 83, Spring ran has been mir- Hojatieh itself, Mes- 2006, 16-21. Shi’ite liberation rored by a concert- bah-Yazdi’s worldview 9. Amir Taheri, “No Change ed effort to revive is exclusionary, anti- in Iran’s Strategic Goals,” theology. Gulf News (Dubai), Novem- the revolutionary democratic and deeply ber 11, 2005, http://www.gulf- principles espoused by its creator and in- anti-Western.15 In his writings and pub- news.com/Articles/RegionNF. asp?ArticleID=189738. spiration, the Ayatollah Khomeini. One lic speeches, he has agitated for—among of Ahmadinejad’s first public acts follow- other things—the rollback of individual 10. “President-Elect Re- 2 ArticleUnderstanding Title • AhmadinejadPublication Date voting rights, the targeting of opposition him, “a historic war between the oppres- news Allegiance with Imam Khomeini,” IRNA (Tehran), press and politicians, and the forcible Is- sor [Christians] and the world of Islam” June 26, 2005, http://www. lamization of Iranian universities.16 Most is under way, and the Islamic Republic is irna.ir/en/news/view/line- notable, however, is his fervent belief in on the front lines.23 Thus, as Ahmadine- 16/0506260277120702.htm. the imminent return of the “Hidden jad told a closed-door session of the majles 11. Mehrdad Sheibani, “Good- bye to the Republic,” Rooz (Teh- Imam,” or Mahdi, a messiah-like religious foreign policy and national security com- ran), August 11, 2005, http:// figure from the 9th Century that many mittee in January 2006, Iran must aban- www.roozonline.com/eng - believe will return as a result of a regional don its decade-and-a-half-old policy of lish/009328.shtml. conflagration. “détente” with the West in favor of con- 12. For an in-depth analysis, see Ahmadinejad has been deeply influ- frontation.24 Mehdi Khalaji, “Tehran’s Re- newed War on Culture,” Wash- enced by these ideas. “Our revolution’s The tool of choice in this struggle ap- ington Institute for Near East main mission is to pave the way for the re- pears to be Iran’s nuclear program. As Policy Policywatch No. 1054, November 21, 2005, http://www. appearance of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi,” some commentators have suggested, Ah- washingtoninstitute.org/tem- Ahmadinejad told a meeting of national madinejad’s defiant pursuit of an atomic plateC05.php?CID=2405. religious leaders in November 2005. “To- option despite mounting international 13. “Iran’s Ahmadinejad Looks day, we should define our economic, cul- pressure is grounded in the belief that to Export ‘New Islamic Revolu- tural and political policies based on the their country’s nuclear successes are a tion,’” Agence France Presse, 17 June 30, 2005, http://www.