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Notes Introduction 1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1970). 2. Ralph Pettman, Human Behavior and World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 275– 76. 3. Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” Commentary, January 1976; Ofira Seliktar, The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq (New York: Palgrave Mac- millan, 2008), 4. 4. Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in Amer- ica (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). 5. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 24– 49; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Chapter 1 1. Quoted in Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemma of Human Rights (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 11– 12, 114– 15, 133, 138– 39; Hedley Donovan, Roosevelt to Reagan: A Reporter’s Encounter with Nine Presidents (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 165. 2. Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 357; Peter Meyer, James Earl Carter: The Man and the Myth (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 18; Michael A. Turner, “Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5 (1991): 275– 86. 3. Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World’s Intelligence (Washington, DC: Brassey’s [US], 1993), 169; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 136– 37. 4. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 143; Jimmy Carter and Rosalynn Carter, Everything to Gain: Making the Most of the Rest of Your Life (New York: Random House, 1987), 7; Richard T. 182 Notes Sale, “Carter and Iran: From Idealism to Disaster,” Washington Quarterly 3 (1980): 75– 87; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 196. 5. Christos Ionnides, America’s Iran: Injury and Catharsis (Lanham, MD: Univer- sity Press of America, 1984), 20; William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 161; Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981); Kamran Mofid, Development Planning in Iran: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Wiesbach, Cam- bridgeshire, England: Menas Press, 1987), 193. 6. Babak Ganji, The Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revo- lutionary Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 24. 7. Ofira Seliktar, Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The Carter Administration and the Fun- damentalist Revolution in Iran (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000). 8. Seliktar, Crystal Ball Test, 62. 9. Amir Taheri, Nest of Spies: America’s Journey to Disaster in Iran (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 90. 10. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 182, 500; Houchang E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Mod- ernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 228; Ganji, Politics of Confrontation, 25. 11. Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 142. 12. Seliktar, Crystal Ball Test, 67. 13. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah’s Story (London: Michael Joseph), 221. 14. Ledeen and Lewis, Debacle, 144; Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America’s Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 34; Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den, Muslim Students Following the Line of Imam (Tehran: Center for the Publica- tion of the U.S. Espionage Den’s Documents; Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1980– 99), vol. 8, 173–80; Charles- Phillipe David, Nancy Ann Carol, and Zachary A. Seldon, Foreign Policy Failure in the White House: Reappraising the Fall of the Shah and the Iran- Contra Affair (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 52; Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the West: A Critical Bibliography (London: Rout- ledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 418; James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American- Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 247; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 193; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 21– 23; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), 526. 15. Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 158; Sussan Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement (Boul- der, CO: Westview Press, 1990), M. M. J. Fischer, “Becoming Mullah: Reflections on Iranian Clerics in a Revolutionary Age,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980): 83– 117; Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1985), 174, 194– 95, 199– 213. 16. Taheri, Spirit of Allah, 194; Majid Tehranian, “Communication and Revolution in Iran: The Passing of a Paradigm,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980): 17. Notes 183 17. Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran, 158; George Lenczowski, “The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Section,” Foreign Affairs 57 (1979): 796– 820; Lenczowski, “Iran: The Awful Truth behind the Shah’s Fall and the Mullah’s Rise,” American Spectator 12 (1979): 12– 15; Taheri, Spirit of Allah, 216– 17; Morris Mottale, The Political Sociol- ogy of the Islamic Revolution (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987), 35. 18. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (London: J. B. Tau- ris, 1985), 33l; Richard C. Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order (New York: Paragon Press, 1991), 248; Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 11; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), 27– 28; Anthony Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974– 1979 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), 144; William H. Sullivan, Obligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 94. 19. Ganji, Politics of Confrontation, 50– 52; Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Devel- opment (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979); Timothy Naftali, The Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 100– 101. 20. William H. Sullivan, “Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken,” Foreign Policy 40 (1980): 177; Sale, “Carter and Iran”; Bill, Eagle and the Lion, 245; Scott Arm- strong, “Failing to Heed the Warning of Revolutionary Iran,” The Washington Post, October 26, 1980; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 208. 21. Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: The Thirty-Year Clandestine Struggle against the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, 2008), 16; Seliktar, Crystal Ball Test, 84; Ganji, Politics of Confrontation, 60– 61; Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intel- ligence Network (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), 110– 111; Sick, All Fall Down, 37– 41; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 324. 22. Chehabi, Iranian Politics, 238– 39; Ionnides, America’s Iran, 31– 32. 23. Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginal- ity, and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1980), 86– 88; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 206; Ganji, Politics of Confrontation, 70; Amir Taheri, The Unknown Life of the Shah (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 256. 24. Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den, Muslim Students, vol. 25, 72– 79; Sick, All Fall Down, 50; Karen L. Pilskin, “Camouflage, Conspiracy, and Collaborators: Rumors of the Revolution,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980): 51–81; Richard W. Cot- tam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 176. 25. Ledeen and Lewis, Debacle; Joseph Alpher, “The Khomeini International,” Wash- ington Quarterly 3 (1980): 54–74; Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxanne Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince (New York: Modern Library, 1997), xxiii. 26. Parsons, Pride and the Fall, 67; Farmanfarmaian and Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil, 445– 46. 27. Sick, All Fall Down, 41, 45; Chehabi, Iranian Politics, 277– 79. 184 Notes 28. Bill, Eagle and the Lion, 246; Sick, All Fall Down, 69; Brzezinski, Power and Prin- ciple, 355; Armstrong, “Revolutionary Iran”; John Prados, Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 435– 36; Barry Rubin, Secrets of States: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 189– 90. 29. Ionnides, America’s Iran, 41– 42; White Paper, 03564, 7– 8; Bill, Eagle and the Lion, 254; Sick, All Fall Down, 92; Rhodri Jeffreys- Jones, The CIA and American Democ- racy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 221. 30. Ledeen and Lewis, Debacle, 33, 124, 169; Sick, All Fall Down, 61; Meyer, James Earl Carter, 94; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), 189. 31. Pahlavi, Shah’s Story, 185; Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, “The State, Classes and Modes or Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution,” State, Culture and Society 1 (1985): 12; Cynthia Helms, Ambassador’s Wife in Iran (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1981), 204; William B. Quandt, “The Middle East Crisis,” Foreign Policy 58 (1980): 540– 62; Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 25; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 371– 72; Ganji, Politics of Confrontation, 72; Taheri, Unknown Life, 264– 65.
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