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The Sun Is Setting on President Ahmadinejad

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The Sun Is Setting on President Ahmadinejad The sun is setting on President Ahmadinejad Erika Holmquist Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s time in office video clip aiming to prove that Larijanis brother Fazel has been controversial. Ahmadinejad has gone from and by association the whole Larijani family is corrupt. being favored by Iran’s great leader Ayatollah Khamenei No doubt the immediate objective was to discredit Ali to engaging in open struggles with him. Khamenei’s Larijani in order to torpedo his chances of joining the support was a decisive factor in Ahmadinejad’s re-election presidential race, and thereby improving the odds for in 2009. The election was perceived as fraudulent Ahmadinejad’s ally Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. in the eyes of many Iranians and led to extensive Ali Larijani could easily dispel Ahmadinejad’s demonstrations and corresponding governmental allegations by distancing himself from his brother’s crackdowns. Since then Ahmadinejad’s confrontational actions. Effectively turning the tables on Ahmadinejad, style of governing has had a detrimental effect on Larijani then asked the justified question of why he relations between him and Khamenei, mainly because had not brought the allegation to the attention of the Ahmadinejad has come off as challenging Khamenei’s authorities instead of bringing it to the Parliament. authority on several issues. As their good relationship He also explained that Ahmadinejad had contacted soured, Ahmadinejad’s influence in Iranian politics him prior to the parliamentary session and tried to use diminished. the clip to blackmail himself out of being questioned. Ahmadinejad has been severely criticized during this Larijani added that he was glad that Ahmadinejad had last presidential period, primarily due to the poor state done what he did, because it proved to the public what of the Iranian economy. The presidential election on kind of person he really is. Ahmadinejad left the session June 14, 2013 will close Ahmadinejad’s time in office. in anger. Although he personally cannot be re-elected for a third Obviously, Ahmadinejad’s attack on Larijani in time, his actions show that he does not want to leave Parliament was a failure, and it leaves many questions the political scene quietly. He is using the little time and unanswered. For example, why did he eliminate the leeway he has left to influence political developments in element of surprise? If he wanted to embarrass Larijani his favor. perhaps it would have been smarter not to tell him This was particularly obvious on two occasions beforehand about what would happen. But, by using during this year’s Dah-e Fajr – the ten-day long annual the material to allegedly blackmail himself out of being celebration of the Iranian revolution. On February 3, questioned in Parliament – had it succeeded – he 2013 while attending a parliamentary hearing regarding could have avoided public bad will in connection to the pending impeachment of one of his ministers, the impeachment of one of his government’s ministers. Ahmadinejad attacked and displayed his rivalry with Seemingly, Ahmadinejad’s actions were intended to Ali Larijani, parliamentary speaker and Khamenei’s improve the public’s view of him and his supporters close associate. In what seemed to be an attempt to shift either by avoiding the impeachment issue or by showing focus from himself to Larijani and to garner goodwill that Larijani is corrupt. Although the stakes were high, for himself and his supporters, Ahmadinejad played a he obviously thought his gamble would pay off. When FOI Memo 4392 Asia Security Briefing No. 5 Project No: A11304 March, 2013 Approved by: Johannes Malminen it backfired, it worsened his already strained relationship to Ahmadinejad was very eloquent and pointed to a with Khamenei. The Ayatollah does not like this kind of number of embarrassing mistakes made by Ahmadinejad internal political strife to become public knowledge, as it during his presidency, therefore what could have been can damage the people’s trust in the establishment. a catastrophe for Larijani ended up on a more positive The second occasion was on February 10, the last day note. Although Ahmadinejad’s accusations of corruption of Fajr. Ahmadinejad delivered a speech in honor of the against the Larijanis may not be far from the truth, the revolution at Freedom square in Tehran, while his arch- “proof” he put forward was questionable and did not enemy Ali Larijani spoke to his constituency in the holy achieve the intended goal. Ali Larijani’s family is very city of Qom. When attendants faithful to Ahmadinejad powerful and is known to have Khamenei’s ear. Besides started throwing shoes and prayer tablets at Larijani, he the speaker himself, his brothers also occupy important had to cut his speech short. The battle between the two positions within the political establishment. For example, had escalated to a new level. In his speech, Ahmadinejad Mohammad Javad Larijani is Khamenei’s advisor, Sadegh delivered an astounding warning to Iranians of the risk Larijani is chief of the judiciary and the previously that the coming presidential election could be rigged. mentioned Fazel Larijani is a diplomat. The speech could definitely be interpreted as a challenge As the sun is setting on Ahmadinejad’s presidential to Khamenei’s authority as well as to the honor of his era and political career, he is pulling out all the stops political rivals. to keep Larijani and his other enemies from succeeding The political rivalry between Ahmadinejad and him. Shortly after the Parliament fight, Khamenei Larijani has deep roots. They are both members of the scolded both men in a Friday sermon for acting same conservative political alliance, the Abadgaran. inappropriately. He also said that they should put their Larijani was the Abadgaran’s presidential candidate in issues aside and join forces against the outside enemy. the election in 2005, but Ahmadinejad also participated Khamenei is obviously worried. Ahmadinejad’s resolve and won. Larijani has always been a harsh critic of to go after Larijani and his family in this public manner Ahmadinejad’s style of governing, and now media indicates that the presidential election in June is going rumors suggest that Larijani aims for the presidential to be challenging not only for the contenders, but also office. So far, Larijani has not addressed these rumors. for Khamenei who wants the election to be held without Thus, Ahmadinejad’s actions during Fajr could be viewed disturbances. The public battle between Ahmadinejad as attempts to discredit Larijani in order to sabotage his and Larijani is a symptom of a greater power struggle coming campaign. A plausible explanation for this is within Iran’s conservative elite which threatens that Ahmadinejad wants his ally and friend Mashaei to Khamenei’s ability to hide the regime’s shortcomings. represent the Abadgaran in the election. Ahmadinejad Thus, whether Khamenei likes it or not, the coming has given ambiguous messages on what he hopes to do presidential election may turn into a challenge of the after his term is finished. On the one hand he has said present order. Stay tuned! that he is leaving politics altogether, and on the other he has hinted at the opposite fuelling speculations that Erika Holmquist he hopes to run for office again in 2017. If Mashaei Swedish Defence Research Agency becomes president, it could enable Ahmadinejad to have a political role in the future. Please visit www.foi.se/asia to find out more about FOI’s However, by acting out in Parliament he has managed Asia Security Studies Programme. to discredit himself more than Larijani. Larijani’s speech FOI Phone: +46 8 5550 3000 Customer: Ministry of Defence Swedish Defence Research Agency Fax: +46 8 5550 3100 SE-164 90 Stockholm www.foi.se.
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