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Meet the Larijanis, a Power in Iran's New Aristocracy News & Analysis

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16 September 25, 2016 News & Analysis Iran Meet the Larijanis, a power in Iran’s new aristocracy Gareth Smyth as his son Faridaddin’s role in the leader’s office. Haddad-Adel’s second daughter London is married to Rouhollah Rahmani, a US-born computer scientist who or many centuries, Iran, before returning to Iran worked for under various dynasties, Microsoft and Amazon. established an aristocracy knitted together by privi- The best known of five lege and marriage. Under sons born to Ayatollah FReza Shah, who assumed the crown Mirza Hashem Amoli is in 1925, and his successor, Moham- Ali Larijani, 59, the mad Reza Shah, the Pahlavi dynas- ty presided over a country that in parliamentary popular belief was ruled by an oli- speaker. garchy of “one thousand families”. Under the Islamic Republic, some But of all the influential families, have whispered of a new thousand the Larijanis are perhaps the most families. “My father recently used prominent. Still the best known of the term about those benefiting five sons born to Ayatollah Mirza from sanctions relief,” an Iranian Hashem Amoli is Ali Larijani, 59, academic, speaking on the condi- who as parliamentary speaker tion of anonymity, told The Arab helped steer the landmark July Weekly. 2015 nuclear agreement with US- “In its first decade [after 1979], led world powers through the leg- the Islamic Republic was informal, islature. many of the clergy intermarried A consummate insider, he was with the bazaar and then a younger formerly an IRGC commander, generation with the [Islamic] Revo- minister of Labour, head of state lutionary Guards [Corps] (IRGC), broadcasting and the top security the bureaucracy, the universities official. Like his brothers, Ali Lari- and wider business interests. Plus, jani was born in the Iraqi city of Na- (LtoR) Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian President Hassan Rohani, Iran’s families like to have a son in each jaf, after his father, from a religious Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, and former judiciary chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi attending a field,” the academic said. family in the Caspian province of meeting with Iranian senior officials in Tehran, last June. Across the political factions there Mazandaran, fled the shah’s rule. are famous examples of intermar- The eldest brother, Moham- riage: Mohammad Reza Khatami, mad Javad Larijani, 65, gained a nology, he was ranked second in an Ahmadinejad ally and a former now calling Sadegh an ayatollah, dashing younger brother of former mathematics doctorate from the the world in 2015 for publications in Tehran state prosecutor facing ac- some analysts see him as a possi- president Mohammad Khatami, is University of California, Berkeley, medical ethics by Google Scholar. cusations concerning three prison ble successor when Khamenei dies husband to a granddaughter of 1979 before serving in the 1980s as an As president, Ahmadinejad saw deaths. or retires. Should that happen, he revolution leader Ayatollah Ruhol- influential deputy Foreign minister himself as challenging the estab- The relevant connection was to could count on support from his lah Khomeini; former president but his reputation was damaged by lishment and in 2013 he took on the the rising star among the Larijani family. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his revelations of a secret trip in 1997 to Larijani brothers, showing parlia- brothers — Sadegh Larijani — the There is popular scepticism, how- controversial vice-president, Es- England to reassure the British that ment recordings of their involve- sole cleric among the five who is ever. “Some Iranians speak of the fandiar Rahim Mashaei, are linked conservative presidential candidate ment in shady business dealings. head of the judiciary, a post to Larijanis disrespectfully as the ‘Dal- by the marriage of their children. Ali Akbar Nateqh-Nouri harboured Nearing the end of his second term, which Khamenei appointed him in ton Gang’, the wild west American no hostile intentions; rumours also Ahmadinejad had already clashed 2009 after he served on the watch- criminal cowboys [including three Among all the had Mohammad Javad criticising with Khamenei and with parlia- dog Council of Guardians. brothers] who became a popular TV influential families, the leader’s competence. ment and had been summoned by Like Ali, Sadegh, 55, married an cartoon in Iran for many years,” the the Larijanis are “Mohammad Javad works today deputies to defend his Labour min- ayatollah’s daughter. His father-in- academic said. perhaps the most with the judiciary internationally ister against impeachment. law is Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Kho- “But have no doubt, if Sadegh as a director of human rights but Ahmadinejad hit back by show- rasani, a traditional cleric whose wants to be leader, whatever policy prominent. he’s somehow been sidelined,” said ing parliament a video clip of Fazel son Mohsen Vahid was widely pic- differences they might have, Ali will the academic. “He wasn’t helped by Larijani, formerly cultural attaché tured in the Iranian media in 2014 support his brother. They all will. The belief that former parlia- accusations from Ahmadinejad of in Ottawa, apparently discussing delivering his father’s greetings to They’re all together and they bring mentary speaker Gholam-Ali involvement in certain land deals.” buying a factory at a knock-down Khamenei in his hospital bed as he many connections with them.” Haddad-Adel is close to Supreme Bagher Larijani, 55, a deputy min- price from the state’s social welfare recovered from prostate surgery. Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is ister for Medical Education, is more organisation. In return, he offered Sadegh Larijani is part of a ris- Gareth Smyth was chief supported by a daughter’s marriage of a technocrat. A leading medical to use family connections to se- ing generation of politicised clergy correspondent for the Financial to Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as well doctor who specialises in endocri- cure leniency for Saeed Mortazavi, close to the leader. With supporters Times in Iran from 2003-07. Iran’s useful business of tombs and shrines Viewpoint he Iranian regime is projects without paying compen- another method to benefit from rightful God-fearing… legal spending and making sation to the people who had to the dead. The holy scholar”. a lot of money from leave their land or homes. According to the Iranian According to Shia teachings, the the business of tombs The holy tombs and shrines are constitution, the position of the tombs and Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi (born in and holy shrines. also a source of substantial country’s supreme leader, which shrines 869AD), is said to have disap- Before the 1979 income, as visitors often donate was filled by Khomeini till his are also a peared in 931AD in Iraq and will Trevolution, led by Ayatollah money and valuables for the death and is now occupied by reappear at the end of time. In source of Ruhollah Khomeini, there were maintenance of the sites, which Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is meant Iranian law, the supreme leader approximately 1,500 shrines in the state takes charge of. to serve as acting on behalf of the substantial takes charge of the country’s most Iran. Today, that figure is seven This part of the business proved revered Twelfth Imam in Shia income. important decisions, including Abass times greater, reaching an so profitable that Iran has Islam. the declaration of war and peace. al-Kaabi estimated 10,500 across the coun- expanded its projects of shrine Article 5 of the constitution Ruling on behalf of the absent try, an average increase of nearly building in Iraq and Syria. The states that “during the absence of Mahdi, the supreme leader 300 shrines a year. shrines there also serve strategic the removed Twelfth Imam (may replaces the people’s sovereignty On occasions when the govern- purposes, where they are used by God hasten his reappearance) with the absolute power of the ment wants to evict people from a Iran for its sectarian wars in the government and leadership of the “government of the legal scholar” certain area to allow for space for Arab world. community in the Islamic (known as velayat-e faqih). a project, it claims that it found The Iranian regime has found Republic of Iran belong to the So the reasoning goes that the remains of a revered figure. Khamenei is authorised by the The figures were often cited as Mahdi and the 11 imams before the grandsons of Musa al- him to appoint the head of the Kadhim, a descendant of Prophet judiciary, the commanders of the Mohammad and the much- armed forces, the head of radio revered seventh Shia imam. and television and six members of The shrine would be accompa- the Guardian Council. nied by positive media attention, Some of the attributions leaving the remaining local normally given to the 12 imams residents happy with the reli- began to be used to describe the gious finding. The small space supreme leaders. taken up by the new tomb allows Not only did Khomeini rule in the government to install other the name of the dead but since his death 27 years ago, the former supreme leader has become a revered figure religiously. Criticism of Khomeini is harder Before the 1979 revolution, today than during the years when there were approximately he was in power. Now we hear of “the spirit” or 1,500 shrines in Iran. “the path” of Khomeini that we Today, that figure is seven must follow. times greater. An Iranian man takes a picture of women outside the Massoumeh holy shrine in the Abass al-Kaabi is an Iranian writer city of Qom, 130km south of Tehran. of an Arab Ahwazi origin..
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