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Reportes Del CEMOAN Elección Entre Leales Febrero de 2013 Número 7 ISSN: 2215-2768 Reportes del CEMOAN Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte CEMOAN Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales - Universidad Nacional Heredia, COSTA RICA Elección entre leales Palabra clave Faccionalismo – procesos electorales – religión - sistema político iraní Facciones políticas Key words y lucha por la presidencia en la República Islámica de Irán Factionalism – elections – religion - political system of Iran Sergio I. Moya Mena (*) Resumen Este artículo analiza las elecciones presidenciales del 14 de junio de 2013 en la Re- pública Islámica de Irán. Después de una descripción del entorno económico en que se desarrollará la elección, se plantean dos consideraciones analíticas: en primer lugar, el contexto político del proceso electoral, caracterizado por factores como la hegemon- CEMOAN ía de los sectores conservadores, el empoderamiento de los Cuerpos de la Guardia Re- volucionaria Islámica, el recrudecimiento del autoritarismo, el conflicto entre el Líder Centro de Estudios de Supremo y el presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad y el debilitamiento del Movimiento Medio Oriente y África del Norte Verde y los sectores reformistas. En segundo lugar, la lucha por el poder entre las di- versas facciones político-ideológicas. Para esto, se analizan los orígenes y el perfil político de las más importantes facciones y de los posibles candidatos a la presidencia, y se concluye que este sería un proceso electoral marcadamente restringido a aquellos candidatos que aseguren el statu quo y la continuidad del régimen. Reportes del CEMOAN No. 7 “No te aflijas, la vida va a reinar Luego de situar el entorno econó- una vez más en el jardín donde mico, este artículo pretende contextuali- suspiras, y verás pronto sobre zar la elección presidencial a partir de tu frente, oh cantor de la noche, una cortina de rosas. dos factores: las tendencias recientes en No te aflijas, si durante algunos el sistema político iraní y el marco de instantes, las esferas lucha por el poder entre las distintas fac- estrelladas no giran de acuerdo a tus ciones políticas, fundamentalmente las deseos; la rueda del tiempo no va conservadoras. siempre en el mismos sentido” Hafiz El escenario económico Aunque se trata de una decisión Introducción eminentemente política, no se puede abs- traer la elección presidencial del comple- esde el triunfo de la Revolu- jo escenario económico que envuelve al ción Islámica en 1979, los pro- país. Irán se enfrenta a sanciones econó- cesos electorales han sido un micas cada vez más fuertes promovidas mecanismo importante para por los Estados Unidos y sus aliados, lo Ddeterminar las cuotas de poder entre las cual, de manera inevitable, planteará re- distintas facciones ideológicas que han tos cada vez más intricados al próximo operado dentro del sistema político iraní. presidente, con repercusiones en la pro- Las elecciones han posibilitado cierta al- ductividad económica y en la calidad de ternancia entre pragmáticos, reformistas y vida de los iraníes. Esto, a pesar de que conservadores, lo cual ha sido un factor las más altas autoridades del país, enca- relevante para entender el considerable bezadas por el Líder Supremo, el Ayato- grado de estabilidad política que la Re- llah Alí Khamenei, insisten en que el país pública Islámica disfrutó hasta la elección “superará las sanciones bárbaras impues- presidencial de 2009, cuyos resultados fue- tas y no “sucumbirá”: ron impugnados por un sector importante "El frente de la arrogancia ha de la población. hecho un uso máximo de los esfuerzos y el poder para obligar a la nación Los iraníes elegirán el 14 de junio iraní a rendirse por medio de sancio- de este año a un nuevo presidente, en me- nes y presiones, pero esta nación va a dio de una cada vez más difícil situación tolerar las dificultades, ya que ha entendido el complot del enemigo así económica interna y con un entorno inter- como su objetivo táctico y estratégi- nacional complicado por los reacomodos co, y actúa sobre su correcta com- de poder en la región asociados a las Re- prensión y reconocimiento". (1) vueltas Árabes y la fuerte presión de las potencias occidentales en torno al progra- Es evidente que más allá de la ma nuclear iraní, que podría derivar inclu- retórica, la capacidad de resistencia del so en un ataque militar contra el país. A gobierno iraní se ve cada vez más vulne- esto se añade un escenario político interno rada por el peso de las sanciones, espe- caracterizado -entre otros factores- por la cialmente las que atañen directamente a hegemonía de los sectores conservadores y las exportaciones de petróleo, afectando un creciente autoritarismo que restringe la tanto la producción, como la exportación participación política y el debate. del crudo. Según un reporte de la Agen- 2 3 Reportes del CEMOAN No. 7 cia Internacional de Energía, AIE, la pro- Irán, que hasta hace poco fue el ducción de petróleo iraní pasó de 3.6 mi- segundo exportador de crudo dentro de la llones de barriles por día (bpd) en noviem- Organización de Países Exportadores de bre de 2011 a 2.7 millones bpd en noviem- Petróleo, OPEP (después de Arabia Sau- bre de 2012 (ver gráfico No. 1), una ten- dita), ha sido desplazado por Irak al ter- dencia a la disminución que según esta cer lugar. El fuerte descenso en la pro- agencia, podría continuar en los primeros ducción está socavando seriamente las meses de 2013 (2). finanzas de Irán. En 2011, el 60% del presupuesto del país (unos US$ 100 mil El 7 de enero de 2013 el Ministro millones de dólares) fue generado por las de Petróleo Rostam Qasemi, admitió que exportaciones de petróleo. Este año habrá las exportaciones petroleras se habían re- menos dinero para gastar, lo cual, como ducido en un 40% en los nueve meses an- afirma el analista Alireza Nader, será un teriores, debido a las sanciones económi- factor que podría generar una presión cas (3); y en diciembre, el Ministro de adicional sobre los principales aliados de Economía Shamseddine Hosseini, recono- Khamenei, incluyendo la clase comer- ció que los ingresos generados por el ciante bazaarí y los Cuerpos de la Guar- petróleo habían caído un 50% desde que dia Revolucionaria Islámica, CGRI entró en vigor el embargo occidental sobre (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami), crudo iraní en julio de 2012. conocidos como Pasdaran (4). Gráfico No. 1 Oferta de petróleo iraní (millones de barriles diarios) Fuente: IEA Oil Market Report, 12 de diciembre de 2012. 3 Reportes del CEMOAN No. 7 Para complicar aún más el panora- de Guardianes (shura-ye negahb), nom- ma, el Banco Central iraní ha anunciado bra al Jefe del Poder Judicial, designa y que la tasa de inflación en el período de 12 revoca al Jefe de Estado Mayor Combi- meses que terminó el noveno mes del ca- nado y Comandante en Jefe de los Pasda- lendario iraní Day (19 de enero 2013), ran -el más poderoso aparato militar del llegó al 28,7%, (la cifra sería mucho más país-, puede revocar al presidente en alta según economistas independientes) lo “consideración de los intereses del país”, cual ya ha generado protestas populares en si la Corte Suprema lo encuentra culpa- los últimos meses, especialmente por el ble de violar sus responsabilidades cons- aumento de precio de productos básicos de titucionales y concede amnistías o reduc- la dieta iraní como el pollo. Adicionalmen- ción de sentencias (7). te, el rial se ha devaluado un 80% desde 2011. La figura del presidente fue defi- nida en la Constitución (Artículo 113) Todo lo anterior configura un pano- como la “más alta autoridad oficial des- rama económico y social muy complicado, pués del Líder Supremo” y tiene a su car- que constituirá uno de los principales de- go la responsabilidad de cumplir la Cons- safíos del próximo presidente. titución y presidir el Poder Ejecutivo, excepto en “aquellos ámbitos que corres- pondan directamente al Líder Supremo”. Aspectos formales de la elección El presidente debe ser elegido entre las presidencial personalidades religiosas y políticas que reúnan las siguientes condiciones: “ser de La difícil situación económica del origen y nacionalidad iraní, ser un admi- país y el endurecimiento de las sanciones, nistrador experimentado, tener buenos configuran el contexto en el que se lle- antecedentes, ser digno de confianza y varán a cabo las elecciones presidenciales virtuoso, creyente y ligado a los princi- de junio, para elegir al sucesor de Mah- pios de la República Islámica y a la doc- moud Ahmandinejad. trina oficial del país,”(Artículo 115). El presidente puede ser depuesto por dispo- La Constitución iraní de 1979 defi- sición del Tribunal Supremo o la Asam- nió un particular sistema político que com- blea Consultativa Islámica (majlis-e shu- bina elementos republicanos y democráti- ra-ye eslami) con la aprobación del Líder cos, con componentes teocráticos. La ins- Supremo o del Consejo de Discernimien- tancia central del sistema político iraní, to (8). Esta situación se ha presentado alrededor de la cual giran todas las relacio- una única vez, cuando Abulhassan Bani nes de poder, es la figura del Líder Supre- Saddr, fue destituido por el Majlis en ju- mo de Irán (vali-e Faqîd-e iran), cuyo po- nio de 1981. der se deriva de la teoría del wilâiat-ul Faqîd, diseñada por el Ayatollah Ruhollah El presidente es electo por un pe- Khomeini, fundador de la República Islá- riodo de cuatro años, pudiendo reelegirse mica (5). De acuerdo al Artículo 110 de la por un único periodo. Las candidaturas a Constitución, el Líder Supremo ejerce - la presidencia deben ser formalmente entre otras facultades- el mando de las aprobadas por el Consejo de Guardianes, fuerzas armadas, designa a la mitad de los procedimiento que constituye un verda- juristas-teólogos que integran el Consejo dero filtro político y religioso, pues es común que se postulen cientos de aspi- 4 5 Reportes del CEMOAN No.
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