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The Changing MIDDLE EAST Andrzej Kapiszewski The Changing MIDDLE EAST Selected Issues in Politics and Society in the Gulf Kraków 2006 Editorial Board: Klemens Budzowski, Andrzej Kapiszewski, Zbigniew Maciąg, Jacek M. Majchrowski Cover design: Igor Stanisławski Copyright© by Andrzej Kapiszewski ISBN 83-89823-17-9 Printed by: Drukarnia Tercja s.c. Acknowledgments Articles published in this volume originally appeared in the following publications: 1. George W. Bush’s “promotion o f democracy" agenda in the Middle East—Acta Asiatica Varsoviensa, no. 17, 2004, pp. 71—90 (expanded and updated version of the original) 2. Elections and parliamentary activity in the GCCstates. Broadening political participation in the Gulf monarchies — Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, Abdulhada Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani (eds), Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 2006, p p .88-131 3. Saudi Arabia: Steps toward democratization or reconfiguration of authoritarianism? — fournal of Asian and African Studies, 2006, no. 41. 4. The Iraqi elections and their consequences. Power-sharing, a key to the country’s political future - Looking into Iraq, Chaillot Paper, no. 79, Walter Posh (ed.), July 2005, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, pp. 13-24 Acknowledgments 5. Iran’s new revolution? President Ahmadinejad and the power struggle in Tehran - Politeja, no. 2 (4), 2005, pp. 245-255. 6. Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries — paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on “International Migration and Development in the Arab Region”, The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, Beirut, Lebanon, 15-17 May, 2006. 7. Population and workforce in Oman - Oman. Studies on Politics, Economy, Environment and Culture of the Sultanate, Andrzej Kapiszewski, Abdulrahman Al-Salimi and Andrzej Pikulski (eds), Kraków, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, pp. 245-266. 8. Non-indigenous citizens and “stateless” residents in the Gulf monarchies. The Kuwaiti „bidun” - Krakowskie Studia Międzynaro­ dowe, no. 2 (VI), 2005, pp. 61—78. The publishers wish to thank the aforementioned for permission to use the copyright material. Foreword The Arab world has not been a happy or successful place for quite a while. As one of Arab diplomats once said: “There is a sense of failure, which has opened a gap between the rulers and the ruled. It has led to a lack of confidence in Arab culture, and hostility to foreign influences.”1 The Arab Human Development Reports2002 and 2003, prepared by a group of leading Arab intellectuals under the auspices of the UNDP and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development confirmed such a very pessimistic view of the Arab world.2 The combined gross domestic product of the 22 Arab countries was lesser than Spains. Labor productivity in these countries dropped between I960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere in the world. Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates of economic growth. An exploding population cannot be supported by scarce resources and every other citizen is ready to emigrate. According to the authors of Arab Human Development Report, the main reason for the dramatic situation in the Arab world is poor governance. “The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of the world has barely reached the Arab world (...) The freedom deficit undermines human development and it is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.” - 7 - Foreword Many Western experts stress that there is a dramatic gap between the levels of freedom and democracy in Arab countries and the rest of the world.3 First of all, there are no true Western-type democracies in the Arab world or really free Arab countries. Secondly, in the last more or less three decades, this world, as a whole, has not seen any significant improvement in political openness, respect for human rights, and transparency, contrary to the trends in all other parts of the world. Democracy is now present in states following every major religious or philosophical tradition: Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Muslim and Jewish. It is present in rich as well as very poor states, in big and small countries. But, as Larry Diamont pointed out, “by any category that is meaningful in the world today, there is only one set of countries that is completely undemocratic: the Arab world.”4 The Economist evaluated the state of democracy in all Arab countries and results presented on the special scale (April 3, 2004). The most democratic Arab state, Morocco, barely crossed the middle point, while several countries, with Saudi Arabia at the top, did not even reach a quarter of the possible level of democracy. This situation increasingly worries enlightened intellectuals in the Arab world and Western governments. It is believed to be typical for sudden and violent conflicts, which can de-stabilize the whole region of high strategic importance, and for further spread of terrorism. Not beginning here a comprehensive analysis of the very complex issue: democracy in the Islamic world, let me just note that there exist very different opinions on the matter. Some people believe that the very idea of democracy “is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam”.5 As Lisa Anderson explained: “Islam’s failure to distinguish the realms of Caesar and God, its insistence that sovereignty rests with God and that the essence of the law is divinely revealed and therefore beyond human emendation, its discriminatory treatment - 8 - Foreword of women and non-Muslim minorities, all appear quite inconsistent with democratic politics.”6 Also in reality, many Arabs, derived from teaching of the Koran and historical tradition, believe that firm rule, based on consensus rather than elections, is good form of government. In turn, for a group of experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace major reasons for democracy deficit in the Middle East are not connected with Islam but are caused by: (1) lack of previous experience with democracy, which, for example, facilitated transitions in Central and Eastern Europe; (2) lack of the prolonged periods of economic growth and the resulting changes in educational and living standards as well as life styles, which led several Asian countries to democratic changes (in fact there is a socioeconomic deterioration in the Middle East); (3) lack of a positive “neighborhood effect”, the regional, locally exerted pressure to conform, which helped to democratize Latin America.7 Moreover, what makes the democratization of the region more difficult to achieve is: a fear of illiberal Islamic movements, which have broad support in most of the Arab countries and which can win democratic elections, if introduced, and while in power abrogate democracy itself; the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the fact that is regularly exploited by rulers of the Arab countries to deflect attention of their citizens from domestic problems; the negative perception of the United States, whose promotion of democracy in view of Washington’s support of Israel and occupation of Iraq is perceived as a new American attempt to dominate the Arab world.8 Many people believe however that democracy can be implemented in Muslim societies and states. They argue that, first of all, there are reasonably democratic Muslim states already, like Turkey. Then, there are millions of Muslims living in democratic states of Europe, United States or Asia who have successfully - 9 - Foreword combined their religion with demands of the democratic system. There are also Arab countries, not only the non-Arab Muslim states, that have experimented successfully with democracy. For example post-Saddam Iraq, Lebanon, Marocco and even the Palestinian Authority practiced pretty free elections and have functioning parliaments, proving that certain democratic procedures can be implemented in the predominantly Islamic states. Finally, more and more experts begun to believe that also the Islamic doctrine itself “contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy” and that the only question is to find out how and under what circumstances elements in Islam favorable to democracy “can supersede the undemocratic aspects”.,J At the same time profound social changes accompany political transformations. Let me mentioned a few. There are changing group identities in the Arab world. Although common religion, language, customs and memory of the glorious past maintain their importance, nation-state identity plays increasingly important role. Arab societies became younger due to high fertility rate which brings tremendous pressure on the labor market. In effect, growing unemployment increases on one side immigration and, on the other, pressure governments for economic reforms. Arab populations are becoming better educated and aware of the real causes of problems facing their countries. Emancipation of women is under way, despite the fact that they still face considerable discrimination. Urbanization continues, with all changes the movement from traditional rural or Bedouin type of life to city’s permanent settlement can bring. Etc. Recently, these issues have obtained special importance in relation to the Gulf states due to developments in the region. American politics, deposition of the Saddam Hussein regime, process of occupation and transformation of Iraq, daily bloody attacks in the country, international crisis over nuclear program of Iran and highly controversial politics of new Iranian president Ahmedinejad, -10- Foreword problems with democratization of conservative monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and with the dominant role of the foreign labor in these states preoccupy minds of local and world politicians, academics and average people. In the last year or so, I have published several articles and presented few papers on various conferences on these topics. Most of them are not easily available. Interest in certain academic centers and think- tank groups encouraged me to put them together in one volume. It’s content starts with the analysis of President George W. Bush “democratization drive” in the Middle East, with special emphasis on its impact on the Gulf states.
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