King and Karabell BS

k o No. 2 • April 2013 o l t Africa: Iran’s Final Frontier? u By Michael Rubin O The Islamic Republic of Iran’s diplomatic ambitions may be broader than Western policymakers believe: Tehran sees many of Africa’s 54 countries as easy picking in a zero-sum game for influence. This outreach takes many n guises and is geared toward specific diplomatic and military purposes that could challenge US aims across r Africa. In comparison with recent American presidents who made just three visits to Sub-Saharan Africa in e the last decade, Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad travels to Africa at least annually, with key Iranian t ministers visiting even more frequently. Iran’s strategy toward Africa has been threefold. First, Tehran is reaching out to countries voting in important international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council s and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors, as well as African states active in the a Non-Aligned Movement and African Union. Second, Iranian officials seem to be prioritizing outreach to African countries that mine or are prospecting for uranium. And, third, senior Iranian officials are seeking to E cement partnerships with littoral states that can provide the Iranian navy with access to strategic bases. e This Outlook was originally published as an Operational Environment Watch of the Foreign Military l Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. d The Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear in 1990, the United States did not generally sta - d ambitions remain at the center of American tion any carriers in the Persian Gulf. i diplomatic attention. Outreach to Iran was the focus of President Obama’s first television Key points in this Outlook : M interview as president in 2009. 1 A desire for rapprochement continues into the Obama admin - • Iran is forging ties with African nations to istration’s second term. Speaking at the Munich leverage aid and soft power in exchange Security Conference on February 2, 2013, for for diplomatic favors and to use Africa as example, Vice President Joe Biden offered direct, cover for military or nuclear objectives. bilateral talks with Iran. 2 Policy concern regard - • Iran’s Africa strategy involves courting ing Iran also consumes a disproportionate share African countries voting in important inter - of US military resources. Even as the number of national bodies, prioritizing outreach to aircraft carriers within the US Navy shrinks to African countries that mine uranium, and 10—down from 12 in 2007—the Pentagon cementing partnerships that could give Iran remains committed to stationing an aircraft-car - access to strategic naval bases. rier strike group in the Persian Gulf, largely • The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic outreach because of Iran. Before Operation Desert Shield to African nations will increasingly chal - lenge US aims across Africa and in its sur - Michael Rubin ([email protected]) is a resident scholar at rounding waters. AEI. 1150 Seventee nth Street, N. W., Wa s hi ngt on, D.C. 20036 20 2.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2- Iran’s strategy, however, is broader than Western poli - ment and the African Union. Second, beyond the diplo - cymakers’ focus on its nuclear program and its activities matic quid pro quo, Iranian officials appear to be priori - in the Middle East or perhaps Latin America. American tizing outreach to those African countries that are strategists might describe Iran as a “regional power,” but mining or prospecting for uranium. Lastly, senior Iranian in recent years, Iranian officials have described the officials have sought to cement partnerships that they Islamic Republic as an “extra-regional power.” 3 They could leverage into gaining access to strategic bases. see Iran as a pivotal state able to exert its influence not only in the Middle East, but also in South Asia, and not The Quest for Diplomatic Support only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the Indian Ocean. Tehran’s diplomatic ambitions, however, may be consid - Both the UN Security Council and IAEA normally have erably broader: Iran increasingly appears to be looking African representation. Togo and Rwanda currently serve at Africa as fertile ground for expanding its influence. as nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council Iranian outreach takes many guises and is geared toward (between 2010 and 2011, Gabon and Nigeria served in specific purposes, some diplomatic and others military. this position). South Africa held a security council seat between 2007 and 2008 and again between 2010 and 2011, with Uganda serving in the interim. Nigeria, South In comparison to recent American presidents Africa, and Tanzania also currently serve on the IAEA who made three multicountry African visits Board of Governors, and in recent years, Niger and Kenya have also served there. The countries listed largely coin - between 2003 and 2012, the Iranian president cide with the emphasis of Iran’s Africa outreach. travels to Africa at least annually, while other Iranian diplomats have long sought to cultivate ties Iranian ministers visit even more frequently. with South Africa. The Islamic Republic’s opposition to Apartheid set the foundation for warm ties after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1994. Iranian sup - With successive US administrations and European ply of oil to South Africa has heightened economic rela - governments effectively ignoring Africa, Tehran sees tions. For Tehran, however, trade is not the only factor many of Africa’s 54 countries as diplomatic easy picking in Iran’s desire to have good relations with South Africa. in a zero-sum game for influence. In comparison to “South Africa is a key member of the Non-Aligned recent American presidents who made three multicoun - Movement, a bloc of developing countries that has try African visits between 2003 and 2012, the Iranian resisted the efforts to force Tehran to halt uranium president travels to Africa at least annually, while other enrichment,” a commentary in the official Tehran Times Iranian ministers visit even more frequently. 4 explained. 7 In his latest tour of Africa in January 2013, Iranian Iran’s attempts to leverage its relationship with South Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi visited Benin, Africa into support on the UN Security Council and the Ghana, and Burkina Faso before ending his tour in IAEA Board of Governors paid dividends. 8 Despite the Ethiopia, where he attended the annual African Union February 2008 IAEA report that found that the Islamic summit. Speaking in Ghana on January 7, 2013, he Republic continued to enrich uranium in violation of its declared Africa to be an Iranian priority. 5 Salehi’s safeguards agreement and two security council resolu - rhetoric is not empty; his tour tops off a concerted five- tions, the South African government used its position year Iranian push. 6 on the security council to oppose further sanctions Over this time, the Iranian diplomatic strategy against Iran. 9 toward Africa has been threefold. First, with additional Whether South African advocacy for Iran is sincere aid, Tehran has cultivated relationships with countries or cynical, the African state reaps benefits. While the voting in important international bodies, such as international community sought to constrain Iranian nonpermanent members of the United Nations (UN) sales and thereby the Islamic Republic’s income, South Security Council or term members serving on the Inter - Africa refused to cooperate. In 2010, Iranian crude oil national Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of accounted for 25 percent of South Africa’s petroleum, Governors. Additional targets for Iranian largesse have much of it at discounted prices. 10 Most recently, South been African states active in the Non-Aligned Move - Africa threw a last-minute wrench into an IAEA resolu - - 3- tion criticizing Iran’s failure to comply with security where he signed a host of agreements to expand and council resolutions. 11 South African authorities have facilitate business. 19 Early the next year, Gabonese been helpful to the Islamic Republic in other ways: the President Ali Ben Bongo Ondimba met Mottaki on the US Department of the Treasury has accused South sidelines of the African Union conference. Mottaki reit - Africa’s cell phone company MTN of helping Iran skirt erated Iran’s desire to expand political and economic ties prohibitions on imports of US technology. 12 with Gabon. 20 Two months later, Gabon used its seat on the security council to support Iran’s nuclear program. 21 Nigeria’s role in both the security council and at the In 2010, Iranian crude oil accounted for IAEA translated into sustained Iranian outreach. Nigeria 25 percent of South Africa’s petroleum, may be oil-rich, but with a dysfunctional economy leav - much of it at discounted prices. ing most Nigerians impoverished, the country welcomed any foreign investment to create jobs. Instead of supply - ing oil—Iran’s strategy of first resort to countries whose South Africa is not alone. After Togo announced its support Tehran wants—Tehran offered to manufacture intention to seek a UN Security Council seat, Tehran’s Iranian automobiles in Nigeria, providing poorer Nigeri - outreach to the tiny West African nation increased. ans with assembly-line jobs and perhaps giving Iranian In September 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud agents cover to operate in the region. 22 Iranian engi - Ahmadinejad met Togolese Foreign Minister Elliott neers also helped Nigeria bolster its own production, Ohin. “An extensive and profound cooperation between lending Iranian engineering expertise to Nigerian efforts Iran and Africa will go a long way to modify interna - to explore offshore gas fields. 23 During a subsequent visit tional relations and regional balance,” Ahmadinejad to Nigeria, Salehi sweetened the commercial pot further declared. 13 with promises of preferential tariff reductions and bol - Then-Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki stered trade.

Load more