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Menas Associates Ltd Cannot Ensure Against Orbeheld Disclaimer Publisher Menas Iran Strategic Focus 02 /14 >>> Politically independent monthly news and analysis of strategic developments in Iran 02 Slow, slow, quick quick slow: The path to a · Volume 10 · Number· Volume 10 comprehensive deal 014 2 On 18 February the negotiating teams of Iran implementation of the interim deal began on 20 the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the (AEOI) director Ali Akbar Salehi has already and the P5+1 (the United States, United King- January and has proceeded smoothly. Western enrichment site in Fordo, and the degree of Inter- stated that Tehran is willing to make adjust- February dom, Russia, France, and China plus Germany) governments have introduced some sanctions national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervi- ments to reduce concerns about its utilisation. started a new round of talks in Vienna to final- relief, and Iran is reconfiguring some of the com- sion over the programme. Evidently, compromises ise the agenda for negotiations towards a com- ponents of its nuclear programme, in particular are possible in all these areas. As Foreign Minister The Fordo site was originally designed to enrich prehensive nuclear deal. reducing the level of uranium enrichment to Mohammad Javad Zarif remarked, making sure uranium to 20 per cent and has been reconfig- below 5 per cent. that the nuclear programme remains peaceful is ured to reduce that to below 5 per cent. West- This round of negotiations is expected to take also an Iranian objective. ern governments insist that the site should be 6 to 12 months. Its objective is clear: based on Although the Iranian delegation believes that a shut down, however, and that scenario is unac- the interim deal signed on 24 November 2013, comprehensive agreement is achievable within Iran currently has 19,000 centrifuges, 9,000 of ceptable to Iran. the comprehensive agreement will address the agreed timeframe, all sides agree that the them spinning. The P5+1 want the number of technical and operational issues related to the negotiations – as well as the eventual imple- active centrifuges cut to 4,000, and technical The formula for a future IAEA inspection regime Iranian nuclear programme in exchange for a mentation of an agreement – will be a challeng- or inspection regimes will be needed to address will be established in the ratification and imple- gradual lifting of sanctions and respect for Iran’s ing path. Western concerns. mentation of the Additional Protocol by Iran. right to use peaceful nuclear technology. As it is clear that Tehran will ratify the protocol The main areas of contention over technical modi- As far as the Arak heavy water reactor is con- only once all sanctions have been lifted, the So far, the interaction has been positive. The fications will be the number of active centrifuges, cerned, Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran core challenge on the Western side will be >>> Commentary 1 Month in review 2 Special feature 5 Oil & gas 6 Economy & business 9 Iran diary 12 > The path to a comprehensive deal > International affairs: Assets > Why Rohani needs economic > Oil sector news > Banking and finance > Zarif meets Ashton in Davos unfrozen successes > Gas sector news > Trade news > IAEA officials inspect Arak > Domestic issues: Questioning Zarif > Upstream project update > Economy in brief > Foreign ministers meet in Munich > Nuclear news: Modifying Arak > Zarif meets Kerry > Key risks > Rohani addresses anniversary crowds 2 the ability of the US government to offer genu- to believe that Western governments are not MONTH IN REVIEW >>> Menas Associates ine sanctions relief. serious in their engagement, the dynamics will deteriorate. International affairs Some key sanctions are engrained in congres- Iran Strategic Focus is published monthly Sold by subscription only sional laws, and dismantling them will require Another factor is the pace of implementation. Produced by Menas Associates staff very high political capital from President Barack Considering the obstacles that the Obama Iran–US Meeting on final nuclear accord 014 Managing Director: Charles Gurdon Obama. For now, the US administration is offer- administration faces in Congress, Washington is 2 Production Editor: Blakeley Words+Pictures ing Tehran waivers on existing sanctions. These looking at a longer-term scenario in which sanc- The foreign ministers of the United States ISSN 1751-4614 offer only temporary and limited satisfaction. tions are lifted only gradually and parallel to and Iran held rare private talks on the side- © 2014 All rights reserved complex technical verifications of the peaceful lines of the Munich Security Conference on 2 February Menas Associates Ltd Regional and domestic factors nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. February to discuss the next stage in efforts 31 Southampton Row Re-establishing a degree of regional sustain- to reach a comprehensive agreement to end London ability and calm, especially the containment Tehran believes that a comprehensive agreement the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. WC1B 5HJ United Kingdom of Al-Qa’ida–style terrorism, is an important can be achieved in 2014, however, and that common interest that will compel the two it should be implemented within two to three Overcoming animosity +44 (0)20 3585 1401 sides to look favourably at a compromise in years. It knows that a drawn-out process will be President Hassan Rohani said on 22 Janu- Iran Strategic Focus · Focus Strategic Iran [email protected] the nuclear issue. more vulnerable to sabotage by spoilers – not ary that the decades-old enmity with the www.menas.co.uk just the US Congress but also regional events. United States could be turned into friend- Furthermore, current Iranian domestic dynamics ship if both sides made an effort. He was and the commitment of Supreme Leader Ayatol- Tehran will therefore attempt to speed up the speaking in a Swiss television interview lah Ali Khamenei to the negotiation process pace of both negotiations and implementation, after arriving in Davos to attend the World is conducive to a resolution. There may be no although it is uncertain whether Washington Economic Forum. room for a normalisation of ties between Tehran will be able to accommodate this expectation. and Washington, but the current space created That effort sometimes seems up hill both for a nuclear compromise is real. The good news for Iran is that the pro-Israeli ways. Majles Speaker Ali Larijani said on Copyright lobby in the United States, the American Israel 25 January that Iran would boost military All information contained in this publication is copyrighted in It is true that Khamenei continues to assert he is Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has been spending in response to US Secretary of the name of Menas Associates Ltd and as such no part of this publication may be reproduced, repackaged, redistributed, ‘pessimistic’ about the outcome of negotiations, on the defensive in recent weeks and unable to State John Kerry’s remark that the United resold in whole or in any part, or used in any form or any means but essentially he could have stopped them if he mobilise support for anti-Iran initiatives. States reserves a military option if Tehran graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, wanted to. He is playing his role, which is as an breaks the interim nuclear deal reached recording, taping, or by information storage or retrieval, or by any other means, without the express written consent of the instrument to put pressure on all sides in order Essentially, Tel Aviv is as much challenged with world powers in November. publisher. to produce the best possible deal for Iran. by the regional developments as Tehran and Disclaimer Washington are. If Al-Qa’ida style terrorism and And Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khame- Menas Associates Ltd cannot ensure against or be held Timing and pace responsible for inaccuracies. To the full extent permissible extremism become the common enemy of key nei said on 8 February that the United by law Menas Associates Ltd shall have no liability for any At the end of the day, both sides know that international and regional players, the regional States would overthrow the Iranian govern- damage or loss (including, without limitation, financial loss, they will have to compromise. The critical issue dynamics will shift. ment if it could, adding that Washington loss of profits, loss of business or any indirect or consequential loss), however it arises, resulting from the use of any material is time: the government of Hassan Rohani had a ‘controlling and meddlesome’ attitude appearing in this publication or from any action or decision needs to produce tangible results before the All in all, the outlook remains positive but towards the Islamic Republic. >>> taken as a result of using the publication. www.menas.co.uk mood changes. If key Iranian stakeholders come challenging. Commentary 1 Month in review 2 Special feature 5 Oil & gas 6 Economy & business 9 Iran diary 12 3 Erdogan visits Iran Iran–Islamic countries diplomat. He insists that the abducted diplo- for sanctions at the current juncture. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hosting the Islamic mat is still alive. visited Iran on 29 January to bolster trade and Inter-Parliamentary Union Former secretary of state Hillary Clinton energy ties. During his stay, Erdogan met Ira- An Islamic Inter-Parliamentary Union (IIPU) Tehran summons UAE diplomat backed US President Barack Obama opposition nian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei meeting opened in Tehran on 18 February. Tehran summoned a United Arab Emirates dip- to new economic sanctions in a 26 January let- and President Hassan Rohani. Key speakers included the former head of IIPU lomat over the death of Seyyed Ali Hosseini, ter to the chair of the Senate Armed Services 014 and current Sudanese Parliamentary Speaker an Iranian national who was being held in cus- Committee, Democrat Carl Levin of Michigan.
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