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Diplomatic Unease Casts Shadow on Jordan-Iran Ties

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Diplomatic Unease Casts Shadow on Jordan-Iran Ties 16 April 23, 2017 News & Analysis Iran Diplomatic unease casts shadow on Jordan-Iran ties The Arab Weekly staff “It is advisable that the Jordanian king take a passing look first at the statistics released about the Jorda- London nian terrorists joining [the Islamic State] and other blood-spilling and iplomatic relations be- ignorant groups and then make tween Jordan and Iran an opinion on Iran which is on the are going through a pe- frontline of the fight against terror- riod of unease following ism and extremism and striving to the trading of insults be- strengthen security in the region,” Dtween Amman and Tehran. Ghasemi said. The Jordanian Foreign Ministry Jordan’s Foreign Ministry said said it summoned Iranian Ambas- Ghasemi’s “unacceptable” com- sador to Amman Mujtaba Fardousi ments were “a failed attempt to Bour to deliver a “strongly worded misrepresent the central role the protest.” kingdom plays in supporting re- The protest was against a state- gional security and stability and ment from Iranian Foreign Minis- fighting terrorism.” try spokesman Bahram Ghasemi branding comments Jordanian King King Abdullah said Abdullah II made to the Washington Iran was involved in Post as “silly and careless.” “strategic problems” King Abdullah told the American in the region. newspaper that Iran was involved in “strategic problems” in the re- gion. “There is an attempt to forge a Former Jordanian Ambassador to geographic link between Iran, Iraq, Tehran Bassam al-Amoush told the Syria and Hezbollah/Lebanon,” he website AlkhaleejOnline.net that said. the “Iranian transgression against He added that Iran’s Islamic Revo- Jordan needed a strong response, lutionary Guards Corps troops were especially since the proximity of within 70km of Jordan’s border and the Iranians from the Jordanian- Better days. A 2014 file picture shows Jordan’s King Abdullah II (R) walking with Iranian Foreign that non-state actors approaching Syrian border represents a threat to Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Amman. (Reuters) the frontier “are not going to be tol- Jordan.” erated.” “Amman is an influential player In a response published in Arabic in the region, and the Iranians must states to accuse Iran of supporting time stressed its condemnation “of ISIS. Those rebels are also opposed by Iran’s Fars news agency, Ghasemi know that Jordan will not stand terrorism in exchange for mate- the Iranian interference in the in- to the regime of Syrian President said: “It appears the Jordanian king idly while Iran makes hostile state- rial support,” stated an article on ternal affairs of Arab states” as well Bashar Assad, which Iran staunchly made a fundamental and strategic ments or threats against Jordan,” he Alalam’s website. as Tehran’s “interference in inter- backs. mistake in defining terrorism.” added. Amid the tensions, Jordan can- nal Saudi affairs,” in a reference to The foreign ministers of Iran, Jordanian Information Minister celled a football match with Iran Iran’s criticism of Nimr’s execution. Russia and Syria discussed the re- Jordan cancelled a Mohammad Momani said: “We’re that was scheduled to take place in “For years, Amman has been deployment of US military equip- football match with a country that deals positively with Tehran in May. keen on having a policy of ‘minimal ment to the border with Jordan dur- Iran that was the rest of the world but such rheto- Relations between Amman and problems’ with the Iranians,” wrote ing a meeting in Moscow, reported scheduled to take ric (by Iran) is shameful and unac- Tehran were warm prior to the 1979 the London-based Arabic newspa- TASS. ceptable.” He added: “Iran would be Iranian Revolution. Jordan took per Rai al-Youm. However, Jordan “There have been some reports place in Tehran. more welcome if its officials learn Iraq’s side during its 1980-88 war “has a lot of reservations on the the United States has moved mili- how to control their tongues.” with Iran. Iranian intelligence, which Amman tary equipment to Jordan’s south- Ghasemi said King Abdullah’s In response, the Arabic-language Jordan cut diplomatic ties with believes is trying to penetrate some ern borders,” Syrian Foreign Min- comments showed “his ignorance Iranian media outlet Alalam ac- Iran in 2016 in solidarity with Ri- of its institutions,” it added. ister Walid Muallem was quoted and his superficial view of develop- cused King Abdullah of being a yadh after Saudi diplomatic mis- Jordan hosts tens of thousands as saying. “We discussed that ments in the region.” “submissive… fixer for hire” to Arab sions were attacked in Tehran and of refugees from the war in neigh- question and I can confirm that we “It would be better if (King Abdul- Gulf sheikhs who reward his servic- Mashhad by Iranians protesting the bouring Syria and is part of a US-led have common procedures against lah) put aside some of his time to es with “crumbles and leftovers”. execution of Shia Saudi cleric Nimr coalition fighting the Islamic State any aggression that might have study the logic, history and geogra- “Jordan is bowing to pressure al-Nimr. (ISIS). Amman has also provided occurred in relation to Syrian phy of the region,” he said. from the United States and Gulf The Jordanian government at the support to Syrian rebels fighting territory.” Iran election may be pointer to race for supreme leader Gareth Smyth presidential fray surprised those as- In the letter announcing his can- suming he was busy managing the didacy, Raeisi appeared to suggest shrine, unlikely to beat Rohani and he would run whether or not he was London would keep ambitions in check until the PFIRF’s choice. the leadership succession. Raeisi’s candidacy was a big sur- ran’s Council of Guardians has prise in Tehran. His close relation- drawn up a shortlist of six can- Raeisi is considered a ship with Khamenei has inevitably didates from the 1,600 people likely candidate to raised the issue of who Khamenei who registered for the May 19 would prefer as president. Why, presidential election. succeed Khamenei, 77. people ask, is Raeisi standing just a IDespite months of speculation year after being appointed to head that he might be excluded, Iranian the Imam Reza shrine? President Hassan Rohani made There has been, however, a lively Given his past role in the judici- the cut, as have First Vice-Presi- social-media campaign among con- ary, Raeisi could reverse the lim- dent Eshaq Jahangiri and Mostafa servatives to urge him to stand and, ited social relaxation under Rohani. Joining the mix. Iranian cleric Ebrahim Raeisi (C) registers his Hashemitaba, a reform-minded as chairman of the shrine, he has He would also mitigate Rohani’s candidacy for the upcoming presidential election at the ministry vice-president under both Akbar access to influential clerical and se- cautious challenge of vested inter- of interior in Tehran, on April 14. (AFP) Hashemi Rafsanjani and Moham- curity networks that will help in the ests like religious foundations and mad Khatami. presidential election. the Islamic Revolutionary Guards sition is better.” Movahedi-Kermani. On the principlist side are Tehran The shortlist of six can change. Corps. In foreign policy, Raeisi Ostensibly, the leadership succes- Should the succession occur with Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf Appeals are possible and candidates might make little difference. sion has little to do with the presi- Rohani as president, two of these and Mostafa Mirsalim, minister of may withdraw. “Ayatollah Khamenei doesn’t dency. When it comes, the choice of three (Rohani and Sadegh Larijani, culture in the last years of the Raf- Jahangiri, for example, is widely want a president who will challenge a new leader lies with the Assembly the judiciary chief and a likely lead- sanjani presidency. thought to have been a “Plan B” in everything [internationally],” said of Experts, 88 clerics elected in Feb- ership contender) would probably case Rohani did not pass the Guard- Saeid Golkar, a lecturer at North- ruary 2016. not support Raeisi as leader. ian Council. Neither should Rohani western University and senior fel- In 1989, the assembly took two But with Raeisi as president, two fear Hashemitaba, who is not wide- low at the Chicago Council on Glob- days after Ayatollah Ruhollah of the three — Raeisi and Movahedi- About 1,600 ly known and who in the 2001 elec- al Affairs. Khomeini’s death to choose Khame- Kermani’s nominee — would prob- tion — when Khatami was re-elect- “Raeisi will bring pragmatic, if nei, with matters discreetly orches- ably support Raeisi. people have registered ed — won only 28,000 votes — 0.1% more conservative, people: But he trated by Rafsanjani, then parlia- Khamenei’s biggest concern as candidates for Iran’s of the total. won’t be confrontational. The for- mentary speaker and chairman of about the next president might then May 19 presidential The real challenge to Rohani eign minister would be like [Foreign the Expediency Council, and pre- be the transition to a new supreme comes from the principlists, who Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif, sumably by Khamenei himself, who leader. election. have been working to agree on a but from the right.” was president and remained so for There has been speculation for single candidate best placed to win, There could, however, be another two months after becoming leader. years over Khamenei’s health and The most intriguing nomination which presumably means Ghalibaf issue in Khamenei’s mind: His own The constitution stipulates a new publicity around his prostate sur- is Ebrahim Raeisi, 56, appointed in or Raeisi. successor. leader should be chosen in “the gery in 2014 and his evident frail- 2016 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iran’s lack of an effective party “Rohani is respectful, pragmat- shortest possible time.” In the inter- ness have reminded Iranians of his supreme leader, to lead the foun- structure has made such coordina- ic, he doesn’t challenge Ayatollah regnum, the leader’s considerable mortality.
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