idden Rivalries behind Iranian Foreign-Policy Making: H The Case of Zarif’s Resignation The Background: Foreign-policy Circles of Power in the Islamic Republic Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era: From Apex to Zenith The Present: Resignation and Back amid a Troublesome Presidential Chief of Staff Rajjab 1440 40 March 2019 2 © KFCRIS, 2019 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 40 - 25/3/2019 L.D. No: 1440/8472 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 3 Hidden Rivalries behind Iranian Foreign-Policy Making: The Case of Zarif’s Resignation Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 4 Abstract Iran’s government and foreign policy have been thrust into turmoil by the sudden resignation from his post and subsequent reinstatement of foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The unexpected development adds to the increasing difficulty of the Hassan Rouhani administration to avoid slipping into the classic “lame-duck” position of presidential tenures approaching their end. With little over two years remaining of his second and last mandate, Rouhani is increasingly hemmed in by a growing inability to direct the key levers of policy, particularly the economic and foreign-policy components, and has now been hit by a salvo of unexpected friendly fire. This article will provide the background to Zarif’s decision, the reasons behind its rescinding by Rouhani, and the consequences for the government and the rest of the establishment. Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 5 The Background: Foreign-policy Circles of Power in the Islamic Republic Since reaching the unmatched pinnacle In order to gain a better understanding of the of having successfully negotiated the Joint reasons that led to Zarif’s sudden departure, it is Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of worth casting a brief glance at the institutional 2015 to the Supreme Leader’s satisfaction positioning of the foreign minister position in and approval, Javad Zarif’s tenure as foreign the Islamic Republic. Since the early 1980s, the minister has entered into a progressive foreign minister’s position is best understood downward spiral. His style of operation won as being that of a trusted and “augmented” him many loyal admirers in the West but messenger for the rest of the state system, was a stark departure from the austere and a figure entrusted with frequent contact and guarded approach of his predecessors, who negotiation with the outside world, particularly were all from the moderate or entrenched the West, but whose actual decision-making conservative wings of the Islamic Republic’s powers and influence are considerably limited. political class. In hindsight, it appears that his As Hassan Rouhani himself stated in the success with the JCPOA was due primarily formal letter rejecting Zarif’s resignation that to the unique synergy and personal rapport the foreign minister’s role is that of “executor” he was able to establish with his American of foreign policy, thereby implying that the counterpart, secretary of state John Kerry, “design” of the policy is specified by other rather than a systemic thawing of relations bodies. between the two arch-foes. Zarif’s track record Therefore, rather than exhibiting executive on other issues has been less successful. His flair and ability, foreign ministers are, primarily, substantial inability to rein in the progressive supposed to be individuals who benefit from deterioration of Iran’s relationship with most the undisputed trust of senior stakeholders of the Arab countries has been matched by and, most importantly, the Supreme Leader the gradual fading of substantive dialogue to implement their foreign-policy aspirations. with the West beyond JCPOA-related matters. This characteristic has allowed Zarif and While he still visits Europe to engage with the some of his predecessors to cautiously push EU foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini the envelope on “red-line” issues, such as or to attend international gatherings such engaging with the United States, when it came as the Munich Security Conference and the to achieving broader results, such as the nuclear Mediterranean Dialogues in Rome, Zarif’s deal of 2015 or the quelling of Taliban rule over success rate in bilateral dialogue has been Afghanistan in 2001. Dialogue with the United stymied in recent times by a variety of States in both cases was a means to an end as factors, some of which are similar to those envisaged by the Supreme Leader and others, that prevented the expansion of ties between and not an end to itself, as perhaps hoped for Iran and Europe in the 1990s, which will be by Zarif in 2015, or by foreign minister Seyed discussed further. Kamal Kharrazi in 2001. Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 6 Throughout the 1980s, congestion within the shifted both the burden and the pivot point of executive branch and Supreme Leader Sayyid decision making in the foreign-policy realm to Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini’s general detachment the leadership. His control over foreign policy from the foreign-policy arena effectively turned was cemented by the continued tenure of Ali the foreign ministry into a realm contended Akbar Velayati, who became foreign minister by the president and the prime minister, with in 1981 as a compromise to assuage Khamenei outside interventions of the Speaker of the after he failed in his quest to appoint Velayati Majlis, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The foreign (who was, and probably remains, the closest ministry was kept out of certain incidents, such political ally to Khamenei) to the position of as the Iran-Contra scandal, but came to the prime minister. Velayati towed Khamenei’s fore when Mehdi Hashemi, the controversial increasingly trenchant line on many foreign- relative of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, policy issues, especially ties with America. was executed in 1987, having been accused, This stance pitted him against Rafsanjani in effect, of severely undermining government advisors such as Ataollah Mohajerani, who policy concerning the Arab world through his famously called for direct negotiations with the own network of Arab allies. United States in an article in June 1990, which In 1988, the long-serving prime minister, was rejected by Khamenei. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, suddenly resigned from The long-serving Ali Akbar Velayati, his post (only to be reinstated by an angry who held office between 1981 and 1997 and Khomeini). His secret resignation letter noted had always been a Khamenei confidant, was his inability to affect foreign policy and bitterly replaced by Kharrazi, a more moderate figure remarked how the deputy foreign minister at the whose familial ties with Khamenei, while time had several channels of communication retaining elements of moderation in tune with with the West, none of which were known to Khatami’s reformist agenda, made him suitable him. These examples prove that the foreign for the post. Kharrazi trod a fine line between ministry’s inability to assume a central role in Khatami’s desire to mend fences with the ECC many issues was a feature that had already set in following years of “critical dialogue” caused by during the 1980s, and not a new phenomenon. the assassination of Iranian dissidents in several The constitutional reform of 1989, which countries, a circumstance that Velayati decried, ended with the removal of the prime ministerial during televised presidential debates in 2013, as position, effectively thrust the foreign minister having a debilitating effect on his own efforts, into an ongoing tug-of-war between the as well as Khamenei’s more hawkish positions. Supreme Leader and the president by virtue of Neither Velayati nor Kharrazi entered into any the creation of the Supreme National Security type of confrontation with Khamenei over the Council (SNSC), an oversight body for foreign boundaries of their authority or their role, and policy comprised of the president, the foreign they were rewarded by retaining a foothold in minister, and two representatives from the the upper-level foreign-policy decision making Supreme Leader. Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali following the end of their tenures, a factor that, Hosseini Khamenei’s far more active approach as will be seen, was to affect the tenures of their to his post, as opposed to that of Khomeini, successors. Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 Rajjab 1440 - March 2019 7 The first considerable change to the foreign a hostile takeover bid for the SNSC, which ministry came during the early Ahmadinejad ended up under the control of an erstwhile period, in 2005. By that time, the ministry was Ahmadinejad ally, Saeed Jalili, in 2007. In 2010, populated with career diplomats and political the president fired Mottaki, whose performance appointees who had consolidated power and was universally considered as lackluster, and leverage from the early 1980s onward, which replaced him with a figure much closer to Ahmadinejad viewed as a potential obstacle to Khamenei, Ali Akbar Salehi, an urbane figure his aspirations to shape government according who, for the first time, presented Iran with a to his own designs. Ahmadinejad installed a foreign minister who spoke near-native English. figure with considerably less power as foreign Salehi’s tenure marked a return to the era of minister, the former ambassador Manouchehr Velayati and Kharrazi. It also confirmed the Mottaki. By that time, Iranian foreign policy erosion of the authority of the foreign ministry was effectively spread between the foreign in another key area: regional policy. Since the ministry, the SNSC, and an ad hoc advisory time of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, body that was staffed by Velayati and Kharrazi the Arab Middle East had been increasingly and run within Khamenei’s bayt, or household. seen as a critical national security issue, which The complexity of this arrangement came to became progressively assigned to the Quds the fore in 2003, when the nuclear crisis began Force, the elite overseas unit of the Iranian to take shape.