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Iran in Latin America Threat Or ‘Axis of Annoyance’? IRAN Wilson Center Reports on the Americas • # 23 Woodrow I N LA TI N A IRAN IN LATIN AMERICA M E R Threat or ‘Axis of Annoyance’? I C A Threat or ‘ A xis of A nnoyance’? EDITED BY Cynthia Arnson Haleh Esfandiari and Adam Stubits Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004 Tel. (202) 691-4030 Fax (202) 691-4076 www.wilsoncenter.org/lap Latin American Program Middle East Program IRAN IN LATIN AMERICA: THREAt or ‘AXIS OF ANNOYance’? Latin American Program Middle East Program IRAN IN LATIN AMERICA: THREAt or ‘AXIS OF ANNOYance’? Edited by Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari and Adam Stubits Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas # 23 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the national, living memorial honoring President Woodrow Wilson. In providing an essential link between the worlds of ideas and public policy, the Center addresses current and emerging challenges confront- ing the United States and the world. The Center promotes policy-rele- vant research and dialogue to increase understanding and enhance the capabilities and knowledge of leaders, citizens, and institutions world- wide. Created by an Act of Congress in 1968, the Center is a nonpartisan institution headquartered in Washington, D.C., and supported by both public and private funds. Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director Available from the Latin American Program Board of Trustees Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair One Woodrow Wilson Plaza Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 Public members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; www.wilsoncenter.org/lap Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, Secretary, ISBN 1-933549-95-5 U.S. Department of Education; Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; David Ferriero, Archivist The photograph on the cover of this publication was taken on June 10, of the United States; James Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for 2007, during a speech by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega to students the Humanities at Tehran University. An Iranian student is holding a sign which adjoins portraits of Presidents Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua) and Evo Morales Private Citizen Members: Charles Cobb, Jr., Robin Cook, Charles (Bolivia), emblazoned with the words “Alliance for Justice.” Notably, L. Glazer, Carlos M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchison, Barry S. Jackson, the words are written not in Farsi or in Spanish, as one might expect, but Ignacio E. Sanchez rather, in English, apparently for an audience in the United States. Photo: Getty Images CONTENTS ix P r e f a c e Cynthia J. Arnson and Haleh Esfandiari 1 Introduction Adam Stubits 13 Iran in Latin America: An Overview Douglas Farah 25 Tehran’s Perspective on Iran-Latin American Relations Farideh Farhi 35 Iran’s Place in Venezuelan Foreign Policy Elodie Brun 51 The Shadow of Iran in Argentina Takes on a Suspicious Shape Hugo Alconada Mon 65 Iranian-Nicaraguan Relations Under the Sandinista Government: Rhetoric or Anti-Establishment Foreign Policy? Javier Meléndez and Félix Maradiaga 83 Bolivian Foreign Policy: Observations on the Bolivia- Iran Relationship Gustavo Fernández | vii | 101 Recent Diplomatic Developments Between Ecuador and Iran: A Gesture of Sovereign Affirmation or PREFACE Lukewarm Geopolitical Alignment? César Montúfar 115 Biographies of Contributors s this publication goes to press, Iran’s relationship with Latin America has once again captured headlines. Iranian President AMahmoud Ahmadinejad made a state visit to Brazil in late November 2009, the first Iranian president to have done so since the mid-1960s. During the visit, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva publicly defended Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peace- ful purposes, and portrayed the invitation to Ahmadinejad as part of a Brazilian effort to play a broader role in brokering peace in the Middle East. Indeed, Ahmadinejad’s visit followed closely upon visits to Brasília by both Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Lula’s diplomatic overture to the Iranian leader elicited sharp criti- cism both in Brazil and the United States. Critics pointed to Iran’s con- tinued defiance of the international community over access to its nu- clear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as the Iranian government’s stepped up repression of domestic opponents following disputed presidential elections in June 2009. Before returning to Tehran, Ahmadinejad also went to Bolivia and made his fourth visit to Venezuela. In Caracas, President Hugo Chávez welcomed the Iranian president as a “gladiator of anti-imperialist struggles” and used the occa- sion to denounce Israel as “the murderous arm of the Yankee empire.1 As this report demonstrates, the growing and multi-layered relationship between Iran and numerous Latin American countries since Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 is driven by a combination of factors. These include, for both sides, and economic self-interest, shared anti-U.S. and anti-imperial- ist ideology, and the desire—especially evident in the Brazilian case—to play a larger role on the world stage, assert foreign policy independence, and diversify international partners beyond the United States. However, of special concern to the international community is the nature of Iran’s intentions regarding its nuclear program and what they might portend for Iran’s relationship with countries of the Western hemisphere. | viii | | ix | The economic relationship between Iran and Latin America is growing Nicaragua, and Venezuela; the articles emphasize the foreign policy objec- although its full extent is hard to quantify. There is not only a lack of reli- tives and strategies of Latin American nations as well as the strategic objec- able statistics but also a vast chasm between the promise and actual realiza- tives of the Iranian government. Originally presented at a conference at tion of productive and infrastructure investments by Iran. International the Woodrow Wilson Center in July 2008, the papers have been revised, Monetary Fund figures compiled by the Latin Business Chronicle indicate translated, and updated since. We make no claim to having the final word that trade between Iran and Latin America tripled between 2007 and 2008, on this controversial and ever-changing subject. Indeed, the lack of trans- rising to $2.9 billion—almost half of which was between Brazil and Iran. parency in many aspects of the Iranian-Latin American relationship, and (By these estimates Venezuela, whose relationship with Iran has raised the particularly, the clandestine nature of many of the alleged activities, point greatest amount of political and strategic concern, is in fifth place, behind to the need for additional, dispassionate analysis. In calling for additional Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru.2) By contrast, total trade between China research, we emphasize the need for facts to serve as the drivers of policy, and Latin America in the same 2007-2008 period amounted to $140 bil- not the other way around. That this has not always been the case, espe- lion, an amount that dwarfs the trade between the region and Iran.3 cially in the recent past, should make us all doubly careful. Moreover, while political and commercial relations are closely cor- Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program related, they are not always identical. Argentina is Iran’s second largest Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program trading partner in Latin America, yet its diplomatic relationship is deeply strained. Argentina has asked for the extradition of several current and former Iranian government officials for their roles in the terrorist bomb- Notes ing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. In September 2009, and under instruction from Argentine President Cristina Fernández 1 Quoted in Simon Romero, “In Welcoming Iranian President, Chávez Blasts de Kirchner, the Argentine delegation walked out of the room when Israel,” New York Times, November 26, 2009, p. 12. See also, “Ayatollahs in the President Ahmadinejad began to address the UN General Assembly.4 Backyard,” Economist, November 8-December 4, 2009, p. 41. Iran’s behavior in the international system, from its support of terrorist 2 “Latin America: Iran Trade Triples,” Latin Business Chronicle, December 2, 2009. movements, to the limited cooperation with international inspections of 3 “China-Latin American Trade: New Record,” Latin Business Chronicle, its nuclear program, has logically raised concern and even alarm about its November 23, 2009. increased activities in Latin America. The Manhattan District Attorney’s 4 Letter to Cynthia Arnson from Argentine Ambassador Héctor Timerman, office has launched an ongoing investigation of Venezuelan collaboration September 30, 2009. with Iran to procure financing and materials (including uranium) for weap- 5 “The Link between Iran and Venezuela: A Crisis in the Making?” Briefing ons production in violation of U.S. and international sanctions.5 Some by Robert M. Morgenthau at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., September 8, 2009. analysts have gone so far as to claim that that Venezuela’s “encouragement 6 Norman A. Bailey, “Iranian Penetration into the Western Hemisphere of the penetration
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