February 16, 2021 CLOSING OF POLITICAL AND CIVIC SPACES: SPOTLIGHT ON NICARAGUA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
February 16 Agenda ...... 2
Part I: Nicaraguan Spring: The Rise & Repression of a Protest Movement ...... 5 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space
Part II: How Did We Get Here? Background on the Current Political Landscape ... 7 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space El Pacto: Leftist on Paper but Not in Practice Questionable Reelections Reforms Favor Authoritarianism An Economy in Ruins Impacts of COVID-19 and Hurricanes Eta & Iota The 2021 Election
Part III: Recent Laws Limiting Civic Space ...... 15 Law of Regulation of Foreign Agents Special Law of Cybercrimes Law of Life Sentence Law of Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty, Self-determination for the Peace Penal Code Reform A Diverse and Divided Opposition Civic Alliance for Justice & Democracy White & Blue Unity Great National Coalition Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights U.S. Policy and the Biden Administration’s Challenges
Speaker Biographies ...... 24
1 February 16, 2021 AGENDA
AGENDA
Welcome & Introduction
Introduction to Topics for Meeting
Understanding the Current Context of Nicaragua • Current Political Context & Closing of Civic Space ◦ Guest Speaker | Carlos Fernando Chamorro, Founder and Editor, Confidencial • Asociación Madres De Abril ◦ Guest Speaker | Francys Valdivia, President, Asociación Madres De Abril • Legal Challenges for Philanthropy ◦ Guest Speaker | Claudia Guadamuz, Senior Legal Advisor, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
Open Q&A with Donor Roundtable Members
Presentation & Discussion on Phase III Methodology
Announcements: • Webpage & Evaluation • Grantmaking Database Tool • Upcoming Session
2 February 16, 2021 BRIEFING
Key Discussion Points
The future of democracy and human rights in Nicaragua face an enormous test in 2021. After three plus years of political turmoil, repression, and the closing of civil and political spaces Nicaraguans will head to the polls on November 7th to elect their next president. The electoral playing field tilts strongly in favor of the current regime of Daniel Ortega, and away from any opposition challengers. Ortega has served as Nicaragua’s president for over 20 years and has control of the country’s legislature, electoral council, and court system. Furthermore, he is taking aggressive steps to undermine the political opposition, civil society, and any independent press by ushering through a series of laws that weaken basic democratic and human rights guarantees. For its part, the opposition is fractured and facing enormous obstacles to competing in an election largely controlled by Ortega and his political machine.
Given this context, what role can philanthropy play in supporting efforts to reopen political space, unify the opposition, and counter the regime’s repressive actions?
3 Economist Intelligence Unity Democracy Index Trends
4 Part I Nicaraguan Spring: The Rise & Repression of a Protest Movement
On April 18, 2018, Nicaraguan students and pensioners took to the streets of the capital Managua and other large cities to protest proposed reforms to the social security system that would have reduced pensions by five percent and the government’s failed response to a wildfire that broke out earlier in the month in a biosphere reserve that is home to the ancestral lands of several indigenous groups. In response, the government cracked down with violence perpetrated by police and armed groups aligned with the ruling Sandinista Party commonly referred to as “turbas” by locals. Instead of quelling demonstrations, the repression sparked outrage and gave protesters greater purpose and more widespread support.
Although President Ortega rescinded his proposed reforms to pensions within days, the protests continued as they were always about more than just the reforms or the wildfire. Tensions over Ortega’s drift toward authoritarianism and dismantling of checks on presidential power had simmered for years, particularly since his reelection to a third term in November 2016 was marred by allegations of fraud. The violent repression of protesters beginning in the spring of 2018 was the most visible manifestation of that authoritarianism since Ortega returned to power in 2007.
Protests continued for months as the coalition, known as El Pacto, Ortega had built during his latest tenure as president collapsed, with many former allies becoming prominent critics, forcing the government to enter into a dialogue with the opposition mediated by the Catholic Church. One of the major flashpoints was a Mother’s Day protest on May 30 that was led by mothers whose children had been killed during the protests. That protest ended with another 15 dead.
Protesters employed some of the tactics used by Sandinistas in the ‘70s against the Somoza dictatorship, including the construction of barricades, while ongoing violence by the government and party loyalists fueled indignation. But by August, demonstrations had grown scarce after the government, in an offensive called “Operation Clean-Up,” dismantled the barricades, arbitrarily detained protesters en masse, and committed more acts of violence against protesters, swelling the casualty count to over 300 suspected to have been murdered by government security forces or its para-military turbas. Tens of thousands of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica to escape persecution. Many of whom live there to this day.
5 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space
From the very beginning of demonstrations, the violent repression of protesters carried all the hallmarks of a coordinated attack. The National Police not only turned a blind eye to the violence caused by the turbas – mobs of Sandinista loyalists which first emerged in the 1980’s to harass and intimidate opponents – it also coordinated with them. Furthermore, it oversaw the repression undertaken by its own diverse units, which according to a report by the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts, “can only be explained as being the result of a decision taken at the highest level and sustained over time,” implicating President Ortega, who is also the Supreme Chief of the National Police.
Additionally, the GIEI found substantial evidence that the Nicaraguan State engaged in crimes against humanity in putting down the 2018 uprising. “From the information available, it can be deduced that the State of GIEI | Nicaragua Report Nicaragua has carried out behaviors that according to international law, they must be considered crimes against humanity,” the expert panel found. They based their findings, in part, on evidence that the state engaged in “widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population. This conclusion is based on the geographical and temporal extension of the events, on the amount of victims, the seriousness of the repressive actions, as well as the existence of certain patterns of conduct carried out with State resources, and that responded to a policy defined and endorsed from the pinnacle of state power.”
According to a Freedom House report, “[i]n 2018, state forces, with the aid
of informally allied armed groups, responded to a mass antigovernment Freedom House | Nicaragua: movement with violence and repression. The rule of law collapsed as Country Profile the government moved to put down the movement, with rights monitors reporting the deaths of at least 325 people, extrajudicial detentions, disappearances, and torture.”
The Ortega government has continued its efforts to repress dissent and
opposition throughout 2020. Several independent media outlets had Associated Press | Media, their offices seized and were prohibited from broadcasting on television. NGO offices taken over by The Associated Press reported on December 23, 2020 that the offices of government in Nicaragua several independent media outlets and NGOs were taken over by the government. “Two media outlets and several non-governmental groups said Wednesday (12/23) that their offices apparently were confiscated by the government of President Daniel Ortega, with placards posted at the properties reading “Property of the Health Ministry.” Both Confidencial and Hora Cero – leading independent media sources – were affected. AP quoted Carlos Fernando Chamorro, founder and editor of Confidencial saying, “the regime is officially practicing confiscation, in violation of Nicaragua’s constitution...We have lived in a state of total illegality for two years, and today Ortega has confirmed there is no rule of law in Nicaragua.”
6 Total Number of Political Prisoners
Source: Presas y Presos Politicos Nicaragua
According to one calculation, of the total number of political prisoners detained since 2018, about 111 remain in custody. Many more have been released to house arrest. Opposition members are often arbitrarily detained or placed under house arrest without justification. For example, Felix Maradiaga, a leading opposition voice and possible presidential contender from the UNAB, is under constant surveillance and effectively under house confinement even though he’s never been charged with a crime. Brandishing the Nicaraguan flag – whose blue and white colors become the symbols of the protest movement – can and has resulted in arrest or violence perpetrated by police and turbas.
Part II How Did We Get Here? Background on the Current Political Landscape
President Daniel Ortega (born November 11, 1945) first rose to prominence as a guerrilla leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and then as one of the five members of the junta that took control of the Nicaraguan government after the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. In 1981, he was named coordinator of the junta and in 1984 he was elected president for his first term.
In 1990, the toll of a U.S.-sponsored counterinsurgency, known as the Contras, and widespread disenchantment with the FSLN’s management of the economy led to Ortega’s defeat at the polls. A former ally Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of the famous journalist Pedro Joaquin Chamorro who was assassinated by the Somoza dictatorship, united the opposition and brought an end to the initial Sandinista period. Undeterred by the loss, Ortega ran for president in every subsequent election – maintaining 7 a foothold in politics that allowed him to broker deals and govern “from underneath” – until finally winning again in 2006.
El Pacto: Leftist on Paper but Not in Practice
That win was made possible by a strategy of rapprochement with many of Ortega’s previous political nemesis. Ortega first negotiated a political pact in 1998 with President Arnoldo Alemán (1997 – 2002) of the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) that among other things, granted the outgoing president an automatic seat in the National Assembly – prized by Alemán who had his hopes set on becoming that body’s president after his term ended – and lowering the threshold for winning the presidential election without triggering a runoff from 45 percent to 35 percent, so long as the candidate with the most votes had a lead of at least five percent.
The pact, or El Pacto as it became known, also included a tacit deal with the business sector and the Catholic Church. In his first government, Ortega
had feuded bitterly with Nicaragua’s traditionalist Cardinal Obando y El País | El aborto hipoteca a Bravo but by 2005, the FSLN joined with conservatives and the church in a los sandinistas campaign to abolish an article of the constitution related to the country’s anti-abortion laws that allowed for an exception when the mother’s life was at risk. Just before the election, the FSLN legislators voted in unanimity with conservatives to abolish the exception, making Nicaragua one of only four El Nuevo Diario | Boda Ortega-Murillo se efectuó en countries in Latin America that prohibits abortion under any circumstance. la Unica Ortega also agreed to be married by Obando y Bravo in 2005 helping to cement the Sandinista’s conciliation with the Catholic church.
Although Ortega’s return to the presidency in 2006 was considered part of the pink tide of leftist politicians that came to power in the early part of this century in rejection of the neoliberal policies that had dominated the region for the decade prior, by then, Ortega had morphed from a hardline socialist into a pragmatist more concerned with maintaining power than ideological purity. As such, he abandoned much of his past criticism of capitalism and instead made a pact with the country’s oligarchy – known locally as El Gran Capital – agreeing that he would not interfere with their businesses – as the FSLN had done in the ‘80s – in exchange for political loyalty.
For both sides, it was akin to a deal with the devil. But it also became an effective means to an end. Despite FSLN protests before the ratification of CAFTA in 2005, Ortega never pulled out of the free-trade deal. Nor did he push for structural reforms, such as to the country’s regressive tax code, including massive tax concessions for big business, or business-friendly labor laws. At the same time, Ortega aligned himself with Venezuela’s socialist firebrand Hugo Chavez and joined the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of our America (ALBA), which helped prop up the Nicaraguan economy, reduce poverty, and also make the rich of the “gran capital” even richer. 8 Questionable Reelections
In the three elections Ortega lost between 1990 and 2006, he earned at most 42 percent of the vote and it was believed that the anti-Sandinista vote would prohibit him from winning a runoff. Nevertheless, in 2006, he won on the strength of El Pacto and against a divided field with roughly 38 percent of the vote. El Pacto also led to the PLC and FSLN dividing up seats on the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Council as well as those of the newly created national comptroller, the top auditing body tasked with oversight of public spending, or according to critics, sweeping corruption committed by the ruling elite under the rug. In 2009, Ortega announced his desire to run for reelection for a second consecutive term, which was prohibited by the constitution. Without the votes in the National Assembly needed to reform the constitution, Ortega looked to the Supreme Court, E&N | 5 movimientos que which ultimately made a ruling in his favor. Although the ruling was highly hizo Daniel Ortega para questionable—the pro-sandinista justices on the Court had called in lograr una reelección indefinida justices, to issue the decision—Ortega’s ongoing support from the FSLN and pact with the oligarchs ensured that there wouldn’t be strong enough opposition to endanger his bid for reelection, nor a coup to take him out similar to what happened in Honduras that same year.
Official results for the 2011 election gave Ortega and the FSLN landslide victories, including a supermajority in the National Assembly that would The Carter Center | The allow the party to unilaterally reform the constitution. Observers, however, November 2011 Elections in denounced numerous irregularities and the opposition never accepted the Nicaragua results.
Reforms Favor Authoritarianism
With absolute power consolidated across the government – guaranteeing impunity for the ruling elite – Ortega and the FSLN moved to give more Daniel Zovatto | Reelection, Continuity and Hyper- power to the presidency and reform the constitution to allow for unlimited Presidentialism in Latin reelection as well as election by a simple majority, abandoning the America already low threshold of 35 percent plus a five percent lead. Meanwhile, disenchantment with Ortega’s increasing authoritarianism grew, particularly among Nicaragua’s small middle-class, and the flood of easy money from Venezuela dried up as oil prices dropped.
In the lead up to the 2016 election, the Ortega administration made a number of moves to tip the scales in its favor. Five months prior to the election, the Constitutional Court removed Eduardo Montealegre, legislator CENIDH | Informe final “Elecciones Nacionales” del and former presidential candidate, as coordinator of the opposition año 2016, en Nicaragua Independent Liberal Party (PLI), replacing him with a government ally and effectively neutering the party that, at the time, had the second- most representatives in the National Assembly. The following month, the National Coalition for Democracy, which had been led by the PLI, withdrew from participating in the election after its candidate, Luis Callejas, was 9 disqualified by the Supreme Court. El País | La oposición se retira de las elecciones en That year, Ortega also nominated his wife, Rosario Murillo, to be his running Nicaragua mate, signaling his intention to maintain his family’s power above all else and making official what had been her de facto role for the past decade.
Murillo, a poet known for her extravagant clothing and jewelry, first met BBC | Quién es Rosario Ortega in the late ‘70s and later became director of the Institute of Culture Murillo, la extravagante mujer de Daniel Ortega y during her husband’s first term. In 1998, her loyalty to Ortega was tested poderosa vicepresidenta de when Zoila América, Murillo’s daughter from a previous relationship, Nicaragua accused him of rape and psychological abuse. Murillo defended Ortega by calling her an “ungrateful daughter.” El Tecolote | Nicaragua’s First Daughter shares After Ortega regained the presidency, Murillo took the reins of the Council of #MeToo Story in New Documentary Communications and Citizen Power, where she shaped the government’s image and began a long campaign to control the media and attack anyone who speaks out against the government. The Ortega family own at least four TV channels and a radio station in Nicaragua. Today, Murillo is the BBC | Zoilamérica Narváez y most visible of the couple and considered by many the de facto president. el testimonio que sacudió a Nicaragua
Without the presence of international observers, Ortega was declared winner of the 2016 election with 72 percent of the vote, according to government statistics, in what many considered the most deeply Reuters | Cómo Ortega levantó un imperio flawed and controversial process since his return to power. Although the mediático que enriquece a government claimed that 70 percent of eligible voters had gone to the polls, su familia y afianza su poder en Nicaragua widespread mistrust and calls for boycotts make the opposition’s estimate of a participation rate of roughly 35 percent appear more credible.
Discontent with the rigged electoral process and increasing CIDOB | Nicaragua 2016: elecciones autoritarias en authoritarianism of the Ortega and Murillo regime lingered until April 2018 un escenario incierto when ongoing tensions boiled over into a mass protest movement.
An Economy in Ruins
Nicaragua has historically been one of the Western Hemisphere’s poorest nations. One of the primary factors that led to Ortega’s ouster in 1990 was the FSLN’s mismanagement of the economy. “By 1993, economic output was around 60 percent lower than prior to the 1978–79 Sandinista revolution, leaving about half of Nicaraguans surviving in poverty,” according to a report by the Wilson Center. By the time Ortega retook the reins of power Wilson Center | Nicaraguan Tragedy: From Consensus to in 2007, the economy had largely recovered and was on a firm trend of Coercion positive growth. This was due in part to a major increase in the export of manufactured goods that was aided by open economic policies and integration into the global economy. Today, manufactured goods are the country’s biggest export, followed by agriculture and livestock (mostly coffee and beef), and mining. The value of remittances, however, still tops any single export category.
10 Multidimensional Poverty
The ALBA agreement infused the economy with more cash and helped the country weather and bounce back quickly from the 2008 – 2009 global economic recession. From 2008 to 2015, “Venezuelan loans and grants totaled $3.7 billion, nearly $460 million per year.” As one of the poorest countries in Latin America, Nicaragua was perhaps the most dependent upon the aid from Venezuela, not only for economic stimulus, but also political stability. The end of such generous aid put a crack in the coalition that Ortega has relied upon to maintain power and forced the government to reduce popular subsidies for energy and other household expenses.
Nevertheless, the economy continued to grow at a healthy rate until the government’s repression of the April 2018 protest movement isolated the country and brought the economy crashing down. That year, the economy The World Bank | GDP growth had been projected to maintain growth around 4.5 percent but instead (annual %) - Nicaragua retracted almost 4 percent, representing a negative swing of roughly 8 percent. In 2019 the economy contracted a further 4 percent. The pandemic then made a bad economic outlook worse. A pair of major hurricanes that hit back-to-back in November 2020 delivered another major blow, causing an estimated $750 million in economic losses. The last time the Nicaraguan Reuters | Hurricanes Eta, Iota hit Nicaragua with $743 economy was in such a freefall was the late ‘80s. Ortega was blamed and million in economic losses suffered his first electoral loss.
11 Select Central American Countries GDP per Capita 1960-2019 (Current $USD)
Source: World Bank Data
Impacts of COVID-19 and Hurricanes Eta & Iota
Nicaragua’s already precarious economic situation was dealt additional devastating blows in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and back- to-back hurricanes in November that devastated much of its northern Atlantic coast region (RAAN). Unsurprisingly, those impacts have been felt strongest by rural towns and indigenous communities where infrastructure and poverty are a constant challenge.
In the case of the hurricanes Eta and Iota, the government of Nicaragua estimated the total cost of the destruction at $743 million. The Inter- American Development Bank pledged $1.2 billion in reconstruction funds. The Nicaraguan Disaster Prevention System (SINAPRED) reported that and estimated 3 million Nicaraguans were exposed to the hurricane, and 56 municipalities impacted.
12 Indigenous and farm communities along the coast and areas bordering Honduras were particularly hard hit. Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas) and surrounding Miskito communities, especially Wawa Bar and Houlover, absorbed the brunt of the devastation. An estimated 98 percent of the infrastructure damage was concentrated on roads, land transportation, and community buildings such as hospitals and schools. The region was cut off from the rest of the country with no electricity, internet, telephone, or drinking water for several days.
The COVID-19 pandemic was also believed to have dealt a staggering blow to Nicaragua’s poor. Nevertheless, official figures as reported by the World Health Organization suggest that COVID exposure has been relatively low in Nicaragua – some 5,027 confirmed cases and 170 deaths as of January 3, 2021. A June 2020 article in the Journal of Global Heath cast doubt on JOGH | Nicaragua’s surprising response to the government’s number in large part because, ”the government has not COVID-19 only dismissed the recommendations of world health authorities to take precautions but has flouted them by organizing large-scale public events.” A coalition of independent medical professionals and students have formed the Observatorio Ciudadano de COVID-19 Nicaragua and have reported on February 3rd alternative numbers of 12,777 “suspicious” cases in over 90 percent of Nicaragua’s municipalities.
The economic and human toll of the hurricanes and COVID-19 pandemic are still difficult to measure. The World Bank estimated that the Nicaraguan
economy would shrink by nearly 6 percent in 2020, which would likely grow The World Bank | Nicaragua at just 1.1 percent in 2021. The World Bank report issued before November’s Overview hurricane found the following, “The COVID-19 (Coronavirus) pandemic plus the violence that has prevailed in the last years, job losses, a fall in consumer and business confidence, and a decline in labor intensive sectors such as construction, commerce and tourism have taken a social and economic toll, further halting progress achieved in poverty reduction since 2005.” Below is a graph showing the importance of tourism to the Central American economies.
13 Percentage of GDP from Tourism
National Income from Tourism
14 The 2021 Election
On November 7, 2021, Nicaragua will hold elections for President, the National Assembly, and the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). Despite being term-limited, President Daniel Ortega is seeking his fourth consecutive term as president, serving over 20 years in that capacity and as head of state for more than 25 years. Though generally unpopular, he has political cunning (El Pacto) and has used repression to establish a stranglehold on the National Assembly, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), and the court system to create an electoral and political system that nearly guarantees his re-election. He has repeatedly changed the election system to his favor meaning he can win with a simple plurality of votes in a “first-past-the-post” system.
Part III Recent Laws Limiting Civic Space
In addition to undermining the political opposition and independent civil society through repression and vilification, Ortega has ushered through the National Assembly in the past several months, a series of laws and reforms that observers fear will limit the ability of civil society and individuals to organize and hold government to account for its action. These laws also make it nearly impossible for members of the opposition to mount a serious challenge to the rule of President Ortega and the FSLN in the coming November 2021 election. Among other things, these laws allow Ortega to declare opposition figures calling for accountability and change in government as “terrorists” or “traitors to the homeland.”
The following is a brief summary of some of the most worrisome legal reforms:
Law of Regulation of Foreign Agents (Ley de regulación de agentes extranjeros)
Passed on October 15, 2020, this law requires all persons or entities that ICNL | Comentarios sobre receive foreign funding to register as foreign agents and follow a strict set la Normativa para la of rules for the receipt and use of foreign funding. Critics say that the law Regulación, Supervisión y Sanción de Agentes is aimed at civil society and independent media due to their roles in the Extranjeros protest movement, which the government hopes to exercise greater control over and throttle funding that could be used against it
The law prohibits persons or entities who are considered foreign agents 15 from “intervening in questions, activities or issues of external or internal politics,” or from running for public office or holding any kind of government position for a period of one year from the date which they are no longer considered a foreign agent. In essence, civil society or media organizations that receive foreign funding are prohibited from acting as government watchdogs or participating in other inherently political activities. Given that the law was approved roughly a year before the 2021 election, it will also prevent many from potentially running for public office for opposition parties.
Special Law of Cybercrimes (Ley especial de ciberdelitos)
Approved on October 27, 2020 and deemed the “Gag Law” by critics, this law is seen by critics as an attack on the independent press, and in particular, against investigative journalism. Under the law, whistleblowers who divulge classified information or even the persons who receive classified information, such as journalists, could be subject to imprisonment for up to ten years. At the same time, the government would be able to compel private businesses to extract user data from its systems that observers fear could be used for malicious purposes.
The law would also permit the government to imprison for up to five years anyone who posts on the internet or social media “false and/or misrepresented information that causes alarm, fear and anxiety in the population.” A FSLN legislator who voted for the law cited as an example Observatorio Nicaragua | of what would fall under “fake news” reports that thousands of persons COVID-19 had been infected with COVID-19 and died from the illness in Nicaragua. But evidence suggests that those reports are true, underscoring fears of arbitrary enforcement against persons who publish information that is inconvenient for the government.
Law of Life Sentence (Ley de cadena perpetua)
A constitutional reform that was approved in November and then ratified in January creates an exception to a limitation on prison sentences at 30 years so that persons convicted of a hate crime can be condemned to a life sentence. The reform states that a life sentence can be imposed “when there are cruel, degrading, humiliating and inhuman hateful circumstances that, due to their impact, cause shock, rejection, indignation, and disgust in the national community.” Critics say that the definition of what constitutes a hate crime is too ambiguous and that it is also not contemplated in the penal code, leaving the door open for arbitrary use against opponents of the government.
16 Law of Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty, Self-determination for the Peace (Ley de defensa de los derechos del pueblo a la independencia, la soberanía y autodeterminación para la paz)
On December 21, Congress approved a sweeping law that observers fear will be used to disqualify members of the opposition from participating in the November 2021 general election. It is worth reading the text of the law:
“Nicaraguans who lead or finance a coup, that alter the constitutional order, that encourage or incite terrorist acts, who carry out acts that undermine independence, sovereignty, and self-determination, that incite interference from foreign nationals in internal affairs, ask for military interventions, organize with financing from foreign powers to execute acts of terrorism and destabilization, that propose and manage economic, commercial and financial blockades against the country and its institutions, those who demand, exalt and applaud the imposition of sanctions against the State of Nicaragua and its citizens, and all those who harm the supreme interests of the nation contemplated in the legal system, will be “Traitors to the Homeland” so they will not be able to run for popularly elected positions…”
In approving the law, the leader of the FSLN in the Assembly mentioned the “terrorists” from 2018, a clear reference to protesters who according to this law will be barred from running for office, now or in the future. The IACHR condemned the law for including an overly broad description of who would qualify as a ‘traitor’ and for not “specifying the procedures or the competent authorities for its determination,” adding that the lack of independence of government institutions represents a “grave risk of discretional and arbitrary application.”
Penal Code Reform
The most recent legal maneuver by the FSLN controlled National Assembly to stamp out dissent and control the opposition was a reform to the penal code approved on February 2, 2021 that extends the time for which a person can be detained by the police without being charged from 48 hours to up to 90 days. The reform was condemned by observers and human rights groups who fear the reform would allow police to detain opponents of the government without justification, allowing the police “to detain in order to investigate instead of investigate in order to detain.”
A Diverse and Divided Opposition
Although the FSLN has consolidated power across government, the party arguably enjoys less support than at any time since the 90’s when it first 17 lost power. The violent repression of protesters led to mass defections from the party of former loyalists, including many notable figures who played E&N | Nicaragua: El 70% de la población demanda la important roles in the toppling of the Somoza dictatorship and subsequent renuncia de Ortega government that ruled during the 80s. In June of 2018, roughly 70 percent of the country wanted Ortega and Murillo to resign, according to a poll. The pandemic and the government’s mishandling of the crisis has further eroded support.
Out of the 2018 protests emerged a number of movements aimed at ousting Ortega and Murillo, many of whom joined forces in opposition coalitions.
Civic Alliance for Justice & Democracy (Alianza Civica por la Justicia y la Democracia ACJD)
The ACJD was the first coalition to take form when it was founded in May 2018 with help from the Catholic Church in order to present a united front against the government at the start of the national dialogue. Member organizations in the AJCD include, among others, the chamber of commerce COSEP, several student organizations, farmer’s groups, women’s groups, a coalition of political parties and movements called the Broad Front for Democracy (FAD), intellectuals and regional leaders. Up until January 2021, Juan Sebastian Chamorro, entrepreneur and nephew of former President Violeta de Chamorro, was the alliance’s executive director. Chamorro resigned his position to focus his efforts on a run for president.
White & Blue Unity (Unidad Azul y Blanco UNAB)
Named for the colors of the Nicaraguan flag that have become the symbol of the opposition, the UNAB was created in the fall of 2018 and includes roughly 90 organizations, such as youth groups, civil society organizations, feminist groups, regional groups and the political group Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), which was founded in the 90’s by former supporters of the FSLN. For a time, the ACJD was also a member of the UNAB. Among the UNAB’s leadership council until January 2021 was Felix Maradiaga, an academic who, along with Chamorro and others, is one of the leading presidential candidates for the opposition.
Great National Coalition
In an effort to unify the opposition, the Alliance and the UNAB helped create the National Coalition (CN) in January 2020 along with the Farmer’s Movement and four political parties. Less than a year later, however, the ACJD pulled out of the coalition, underscoring divisions within the opposition, particularly between the UNAB, considered more grassroots, 18 and the AJCD, considered more tied to the business and middle classes. The Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) was also expelled from the coalition DW | Surge coalición “Unidad azul y blanco” due to its leadership’s ties with the FSLN. contra Ortega en Nicaragua
Today, the National Coalition and the ACJD are the two main political forces on the opposition side. The latter has recently forged an electoral alliance with the Citizens for Liberty Party (CxL) called the Citizen Alliance. Ciudadanos por La Libertad | The center-right CxL was founded in 2016 and is led by the political activist Sobre Nosotros Kitty Monterrey. The union between the ACJD and CxL places in doubt the hope for a united opposition ahead of the 2021 election. Many within the National Coalition and UNAB believe that CxL represents the interests of the Gran Capital, and thus are distrustful of their intentions given their role in the Pacto that gave rise to Ortega’s stranglehold on power. Furthermore, Kitty Monterrey has been a divisive figure among the opposition by strongly and publicly criticizing the UNAB for refusing to join the Citizen Alliance. Canal Uno | Kitty Monterrey
A recent poll conducted by CID/Gallup found that the FSLN still enjoys the largest support among any political party in the country at 25 percent, while the overwhelming majority has no particular allegiance to any party. The UNAB comes out slightly ahead of the CxL, which is aligned with the ACJD.
Party Preference
Source: CID/Gallup Public Opinion Poll #98
19 Opposition Candidate with Highest Chance of Winning
Source: CID/Gallup Public Opinion Poll #98
What the poll makes clear is that there is deep distrust of political parties among the country’s opposition. While the FSLN still enjoys a relatively strong “hard vote” of party loyalists, it also suggests that the vote for the opposition is up for grabs, and that a divided opposition with multiple candidates means a likely Ortega win, while an opposition united around a consensus candidate could seriously challenge Ortega. Among opposition candidates, the same poll found that Cristiana Chamorro, daughter of former President Violeta de Chamorro, is the person on the opposition side who is believed to be the most likely to be able to win, followed closely by Felix Maradiaga of the UNAB and her cousin, Juan Sebastian Chamorro of the ACJD. Miguel Mora, former director of the independent media outlet 100% Noticias was not included in the poll but is considered a leading candidate.
Source: Asamblea Legislativa de Nicaragua, Image: Montserrat Boix
20 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Most of Nicaragua’s indigenous and afro-descendant peoples live in two autonomous areas: the North Atlantic Autonomous Area (Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte), or RAAN, and the South Atlantic Autonomous Area (Región Autónoma del Atlántico Sur), also known as RAAS. These areas were (and are) generally considered to be “remote” from Nicaragua, given the vast jungle that separates the Atlantic coast from the cities on the Pacific coast.
The Sandinista revolution created great upheaval in these areas, when the Miskitu people joined forces with the Contras and the Mayangna people with the Sandinistas. In 1984, Ortega created the RAAN and RAAS autonomous zones in an effort to further integrate them into the Sandinista project. Other communities on Nicaragua’s Atlantic (or Caribbean) coast include Rama and Ulwa indigenous peoples, as well as Garífuna and Creole afro-descendant peoples.
Despite the existence of these autonomous areas, the Nicaraguan State
has a poor record of respecting the rights to self-determination and land James E. Roger College of of indigenous peoples. In 1998, the community of Awas Tingni (Mayangna) Law | Awas Tingni achieved a landmark judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that obliged the State to recognize their collective land rights. It took more than seven years for this decision to be implemented. Indigenous peoples continue to suffer violence, oppression, and the impact of Oakland Institute | extractive industries in their territories. Nicaragua’s Failed Revolution
Poverty Rate Compared With Access to Services
Source: El Porvenir 21 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights HRW | Nicaragua: Prohibición del aborto In October 2006, Nicaragua approved a ban on abortion in all supone riesgo para la salud y la vida circumstances. This absolute prohibition of abortion puts the health and lives of women and girls at risk. Barely a month later, in November 2006, a woman who suffered complications in her pregnancy died after doctors NCBI | Woman dies after were afraid to intervene to save her life. doctors fail to intervene because of new abortion law in Nicaragua Government authorities report that every year, more than 1,000 girls between 10- and 14-years-old give birth. In a survey done by the United Nations Population Fund in 11 municipalities in the country, between 40 and 80 percent of people considered that sometimes, girls who suffered sexual UNFPA | Situación de la salud sexual y reproductiva abuse are to blame for that abuse themselves.
U.S. Policy and the Biden Administration’s Challenges
During the Trump Administration, Nicaragua was included in the region’s “Troika of Tyranny” along with Cuba and Venezuela. Then-National Security AP | Nicaragua essentially Advisor, John R. Bolton, coined the phrase in a November 1, 2018 speech bans opposition from 2021 announcing that the Administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” elections against countries like Iran, China, and North Korea would be extended to the three Latin American countries. In his speech Bolton said, “Under this administration, we will no longer appease dictators and despots near Two Weeks Notice | John our shores in this Hemisphere. We will not reward firing squads, torturers, Bolton’s Troika of Tyranny and murderers. We will champion the independence and liberty of our Speech neighbors. And this President, and his entire administration, will stand with the freedom fighters.”
The policy was based on three pillars – direct confrontation with the target countries including leaving open the possibility of kinetic engagement; extensive diplomatic efforts to isolate the country including through multilateral institutions; and direct sanctions of individual leaders with the regime, as well as economic sectors of the country.
While the Trump Administration pursued all three strategies in the case of Nicaragua, these efforts were arguably subdued when compared to efforts regarding Venezuela and Cuba. Top Administration officials such as Mauricio Claver-Corone and Elliot Abrams, tasked with implementing the policy in the western hemisphere, devoted significantly more time and energy on Venezuela and reversing the Obama Administration’s Cuba opening. In the end, the Administration’s Nicaragua policy was run primarily from the U.S. Mission to the OAS led by the U.S. Permanent Representative, Carlos Trujillo, a young political protégé of Senator Marco Rubio.
Ultimately, despite all the “pressure” the Trump Administration sought to place on Daniel Ortega and his government, he remained in place and 22 was emboldened to pass numerous laws to undermine the opposition and strengthen his chances to win re-election.
The Biden Administration has inherited a dysfunctional policy, a weakened opposition, and an Ortega on the verge of consolidating his power for another four-year term. Nevertheless, a few broad outlines of the Biden team’s approach to Nicaragua are beginning to emerge.
First, they are likely to jettison the failed “Troika of Tyranny” policy of maximum pressure. Rather than viewing Nicaragua as part of an international conspiracy, they will likely define Nicaragua a part of the battle against authoritarianism and anti-democratic practices common among the rest of Central America.
They will continue to exert pressure on the Ortega government through the OAS and other multilateral institutions, but they will likely take some time to reconsider how to use sanctions drawing important lessons from the Venezuela experience where sanctions have contributed to a dire humanitarian crisis. Additionally, it appears that they will assess what actions can be taken in the context of the CAFTA-DR free trade deal, something that would affect the entire Mesoamerica region and could add pressure on some in the private sector that are too often linked to corruption and guardians of an undemocratic status quo.
Finally, the Biden team will have to decide how it wants to approach the 2021 elections in Nicaragua. To what extent is it willing to enter into dialogue with the Nicaraguan government on electoral conditions, pressing for reforms and international observation? Furthermore, it will need to use both carrots and sticks to urge the government to cease its harassment of opposition groups and figures, and respects basic freedoms of expression, assembly, and political participation. Finally, it will need to find a strategy for encouraging greater opposition unity through an open and transparent process for selecting candidates for the November elections.
23 January 19, 2020 SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES
Carlos Fernando Chamorro Founder and Editor, Confidencial
Carlos Fernando Chamorro, founded (and is currently the editor of) Confidencial, a weekly publication combining investigative journalism and analyses of current affairs, which the U.S. magazine The Nation called “the most respected muckraking operation in the country.” Chamorro also directs and hosts a popular Sunday night television program called Esta Semana (This Week), featuring investigative reports, feature stories and interviews with political leaders.
Francys Valdivia President, Asociación Madres De Abril
Francys Valdivia is President of Nicaragua’s Association of Mothers of April (AMA). The Association represents family members of those killed during the Ortega regime’s suppression of democracy in mid-2018. An emerging women’s rights advocate from a rural agricultural village in northern Nicaragua, Valdivia became the founding president of AMA following the extrajudicial killing of her brother.
Claudia Guadamuz Senior Legal Advisor - Latin America, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
Claudia Guadamuz is a Senior Legal Advisor on ICNL’s Latin America and the Caribbean team. She leads ICNL’s work in Mexico, Central America, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Chile where she provides technical assistance to civil society organizations and governments to promote enhancements to the regulatory framework for the civic sector so they can exercise their rights to associate, to assemble freely, to express their opinions and to participate in policymaking.
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