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Iran, the United States, and the 'Cup of Poison'

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Iran, the United States, and the 'Cup of Poison' IraN DECISION MAKER: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seen with a portrait of his predecessor, is key to any possible rapprochement REUTERS/IRNA Tehran and Washington have both tried to improve relations in the past decade. Here’s why they have failed Iran, the United States, and the ‘cup of poison’ BY LOUIS CHARBONNeaU AND Parisa HAFEZI NEW YORK/ANKARA, JUNE 12, 2013 ive months ago Iran’s foreign minister sent an into “broad discussions with the United States.” unusual letter to the country’s supreme leader, The supreme leader, though cautious about the FAyatollah Ali Khamenei. It was time, Ali Akbar prospect, sent a reply to Salehi and the rest of the Salehi wrote according to two sources who read the Cabinet: he was not optimistic but would not oppose letter, to reach out to Tehran’s arch foe by entering them if they pursued the initiative. SPECIAL REPORT 1 MIDDLE EAST IRAN, THE UNITED States, AND THE ‘CUP OF POISon’ BEHIND THE SCENES Insiders say Iran’s foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi (left) and outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have both made attempts to open talks with Washington but been thwarted. REUTERS/MUHAMMAD HAMED AND LUCAS JACKSON Salehi’s move was bold on many counts, Those who want a deal “Those who want a deal can’t deliver, and not least the risk it posed to him in bypass- can’t deliver, and those who can those who can deliver don’t want a deal,” ing outgoing Iranian president Mahmoud deliver don’t want a deal. Sadjadpour said. Ahmadinejad. The outgoing president has After more than three decades without fallen out of favor with the supreme leader Karim Sadjadpour diplomatic relations, suspicion runs deep in recent years and openly opposed Salehi’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on both sides. Yet behind the scenes both proposal, the sources said. Iran and the United States have shown “Salehi endangered his career - and camp or will lead anywhere, though a for- more interest in some kind of dialogue than even his security,” said a source who knows mer senior Iranian official said Khamenei’s commonly thought. Salehi and saw the letter. “But he said this green light for direct talks with the OBAMA LETTERS letter will be registered in history.” Americans will remain valid even after the The three-page handwritten letter, re- June 14 presidential election. Ten years ago last month Iran sent the ad- ported here for the first time, is the lat- Iran’s U.N. mission did not respond to a ministration of then-President George W. est Iranian proposal for dialogue between request for comment. Bush a secret proposal for wide-ranging Tehran and the United States, which are at Western powers hope Ahmadinejad’s bilateral talks to resolve disagreements on odds over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran says successor will be someone who is on good many issues, including its nuclear program. it is for peaceful domestic purposes, but terms with the supreme leader, avoids anti- Some in the U.S. State Department wanted Western countries and many in the Middle Israeli rhetoric and supports serious nego- to move on the proposal; but the Bush ad- East believe it is aimed at producing bombs. tiations on Iran’s nuclear program. But the ministration dismissed the idea of dialogue So far, the letter has led nowhere. But choice for Iranian voters is limited. Iran’s with a country it had branded part of an a Reuters examination of the relationship reformists, who might be more inclined “axis of evil” with North Korea and Saddam between Washington and Tehran reveals it to compromise over the nuclear program, Hussein’s Iraq. is even more complex than commonly un- have been barred or sidelined in the elec- That rejection undermined reformists, derstood, though still distant and untrust- tion. The six carefully vetted presidential former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein ing. Based on interviews with diplomats, candidates are dominated by hardliners Mousavian wrote in his 2012 memoirs. current and former government officials, close to Khamenei. There were no subsequent offers of broad intelligence sources and well-connected Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie negotiations with Washington that could academics, it shows how infighting in Iran Endowment for International Peace, a lead- claim to have Khamenei’s support, accord- and suspicions in the United States have so ing Iranian-American expert on Khamenei, ing to Western diplomats and officials. far blocked attempts to thaw relations. remains pessimistic that any deal can be When President Barack Obama took It is not clear whether Salehi’s proposal struck with the United States while the office in 2009 he reversed the U.S. line signifies a change of tack by Khamenei’s 73-year-old Khamenei is alive. and offered Khamenei direct engagement SPECIAL REPORT 2 MIDDLE EAST IRAN, THE UNITED States, AND THE ‘CUP OF POISon’ - provided Iran was serious about ending one-on-one, face-to-face meeting with concerns over its nuclear program. Obama the supreme leader is the former Episcopal twice wrote directly to Khamenei, in 2009 Bishop of Washington, John Bryson and again in 2012. Chane.(When U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon The letters have never been published, met Khamenei in 2012 in Teheran, Jeffrey though some details were leaked to report- Feltman, a former U.S. State Department ers. Unknown until now is that Obama official, was also present but in his capacity proposed a list of American interlocutors as U.N. Under-Secretary-General, not as a who could negotiate with the Iranians. U.S. citizen). One possible go-between, according to one Chane told Reuters he met Khamenei source, was William Burns, now deputy on the sidelines of a conference on religion secretary of state and previously the chief and politics in Tehran in 2008. Khamenei U.S. negotiator in six-power negotiations talked to Chane about “Iran’s troubled rela- on the Iranian nuclear crisis. tionship with the West,” including the U.S. Khamenei, who has final say on all do- and British role in overthrowing the demo- mestic and foreign policy matters, never cratically elected government of Prime reciprocated with his own list of Iranian Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 negotiators, the sources told Reuters. and Washington’s subsequent support for “One of the difficulties in getting nego- the autocratic Shah of Iran. tiations with Iran going is who you talk to,” Chane remains in contact with Khamenei a former Obama administration said on con- and has occasionally acted as a go-between. dition of anonymity. “You need to talk with In 2011 he played a role in helping to se- the supreme leader or someone who’s close to cure the release of two American hikers. He him. No one else matters. And the supreme keeps his distance from the U.S. government leader has been unwilling to talk with us.” but told Reuters he had agreed to relay mes- Obama administration officials insist they INTERLOCUTOR American Bishop John Bryson sages between the State Department and are serious about engagement with Iran, but Chane is in contact with the Supreme Leader. Khamenei’s office in the past. He did not also about preventing Iran from acquiring nu- REUTERS/Caren FIROUZ provide any details. clear weapons. “The onus remains with Iran if AHMADINEJAD OVERTURES it wants to pursue a path to end its isolation,” said Caitlin Hayden, a National Security initially suspicious of Obama’s willingness Though Khamenei mostly stayed silent, Council spokeswoman. “We hope that Iran’s to engage with Tehran, U.S. and Israeli of- Ahmadinejad, who became Iran’s president leaders will choose to make concrete progress ficials have said. But over time they real- in 2005, did not. The politician widely vili- towards addressing international concerns ized that Obama’s commitment to engage fied in the West for doubting the Holocaust and finding a diplomatic solution. We cer- helped win him the international backing and questioning Israel’s right to exist, sent tainly remain ready to so, but the window for to implement painful sanctions against a letter to Obama in 2008 congratulating diplomacy is not open indefinitely and all op- Tehran, Western officials told Reuters. him on his election victory. tions are on the table.” While more pragmatic elements in Iran’s Then in 2009 Ahmadinejad made an Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat opaque collection of clerical councils, min- offer, delivered by U.N. nuclear watchdog who advised Hillary Clinton in the State istries and advisory groups have indicated chief Mohamed ElBaradei, of direct talks. Department and then spent two years on an interest in dialogue with America and a Obama showed little interest, partly because Obama’s national security staff is more diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff, of Ahmadinejad’s public comments on the blunt: “The administration was up for bilat- Khamenei’s office has resisted direct nego- Holocaust and Israel, but mainly because he eral. It’s not that it didn’t happen because the tiations, say U.S. and other Western dip- was seen as unable to sway the supreme lead- U.S. was reluctant to do it. It didn’t happen lomats. It has pressed ahead with nuclear er, Western and former Iranian officials say. because the Iranians weren’t prepared for it.” enrichment in defiance of U.N., U.S. and Nevertheless, there were informal Israel, which considers Iran’s nuclear European Union sanctions. contacts. program one of its top security threats, was The only American to have had a “Despite radical rhetoric, Ahmadinejad SPECIAL REPORT 3 MIDDLE EAST IRAN, THE UNITED States, AND THE ‘CUP OF POISon’ did more than all his predecessors to (try to) advance rapprochement with Washington,” Iran’s nuclear facilities a source familiar with Iran-U.S.
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