Foreign Minister Mottaki Dismissed and Salehi Installed SWP Comments New Trends in Iranian Diplomacy Before Istanbul Nuclear Talks Walter Posch

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Foreign Minister Mottaki Dismissed and Salehi Installed SWP Comments New Trends in Iranian Diplomacy before Istanbul Nuclear Talks Walter Posch

In December 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki was dismissed. His dismissal falls into a certain pattern of replacements and new appointments in the foreign policy institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. With this personnel policy, President Mahmud Ahmedinejad tries to achieve essentially two aims: to secure a position as one of the most important politicians of the Iranian right wing (“osulgara”, “Principalists”) and to get more influence over Iran’s foreign policy apparatus. At the same time, these changes in the foreign policy field signal a new de-escalating style by which the Iranians hope to create a positive political atmosphere in the up-run to the next round of nuclear negotiations in Istanbul scheduled for January 2011.

Manuchehr Mottaki was removed from weighed his words carefully before com- office in a less than graceful way – during menting on domestic political issues. As an official visit to Senegal. Embarrassingly a result, he enjoyed almost unanimous enough it was his hosts who informed him support in the parliament. Yet it was these of his dismissal. connections that made Ahmadinejad In general, Mottaki is said to be a cau- suspicious of Mottaki. tious politician who maintained good con- On the factional level it is noteworthy tacts within the government, the Parlia- that the Foreign Ministry has its éminence ment (read the political factions within grise, in this case it is former Foreign Minis- the Principalists) and the highest echelons ter Ali Akbar Velayati, who is at the same of the system, namely the office of Su- time advisor to the Supreme Leader in for- preme Leader Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali eign policy affairs. Velayati was rumored Khamenei, Iran’s ultimate power holder. to be contemplating a run against Ahma- Having direct access to this office is perhaps dinejad in the last presidential elections. the best definition of what it means to be This detail is important because unlike a “heavyweight” politician in the Islamic any other candidate from the right wing Republic. At the same time Mottaki wisely Velayati would stand a real chance to pre- stayed away from political infighting and vail against Ahmadinejad.

Dr. Walter Posch is a researcher at SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 2 January 2011

1 Already in 2007, when Ahmadinejad contact and access to the Supreme replaced Ali Larijani as the Secretary Leader’s office. General of the Higher National Security He started the implementation of this Council (HNSC), his ambitions went beyond strategy as soon as he became president in installing Saeed Jalili but he also tried to 2005. Immediately after assuming his new increase his personal influence over the For- role Ahmadinejad ignored the traditional eign Ministry and to destroy the influence conservatives’ wish to appoint members of Velayati there. In the interim period of their party to cabinet positions. In the between the 2008 parliamentary elections summer of the same year he replaced the that made Larijani Speaker of Parliament nuclear negotiator and general secretary and the day Mottaki was replaced, Ahma- of the Higher National Security Council dinejad’s power concerning foreign policy Hassan Rouhani with a more radical poli- was to a certain degree restrained by criti- tician, Ali Ardashir Larijani. cism from the Parliament on one side and However, it is apparent that Larijani was tacit obstruction by Velayati and his in- never meant to be the final replacement fluence in personnel politics in the foreign since in 2007 Larijani was in turn replaced ministry on the other. by Saeed Jalili, a close personal friend and Another reason was Mottaki’s closeness confidant of the President. In the following to Larijani. He was Larijani’s campaign years he moved among others against manager during the 2005 presidential elec- three politicians who had access to the Su- tions when the latter competed with Ahma- preme Leaders office, were well entrenched dinejad. Mottaki never cut his relations in within the Principalist faction and with Larijani, even after he joined the cabi- belonged to the security and intelligence net of Ahmadinejad and, according to establishment. Namely Interior Minister Iranian sources, served there loyally. This Mostafa Purmohammadi (2008) the retired relationship had to arouse Ahmadinejad’s but still respected former intelligence czar suspicion, even more so as Larijani became Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri (2009), one of his most outspoken critics. and Intelligence Minister Gholamhossein As such, replacing Mottaki was a ques- Mohseni-Ezhei (2009). tion of time and was directed primarily Interestingly, Iran’s contested President against both Larijani and Velayati, in other remained silent during the first months words against his political competitors. But following his re-election in 2009 – except for Ahmadinejad this is more than a mere when he dismissed Mohseni-Ezhei on personal affair. account of Ezhei’s mismanagement during the 2009 crackdown. In other words, whilst all other principalist factions did their best A pattern of replacement to sideline Rafsanjani and to crack down The way Ahmadinejad disposed those who on the reformists Ahmadinejad was hedg- worked with or for him proves that he is a ing his bets and continued his policy of systematic and thoughtful political oper- strengthening his position within the poli- ator struggling against huge impediments tical right. and obstacles created by the regime’s politi- And finally comes the replacement of cal establishment. In this, he is pursuing a Manuchehr Mottaki which is meaningful clear strategy aiming at two objectives: in several regards, above all in view of Firstly, to establish himself and his close Mottaki’s ability to communicate directly followers as the main representatives with the Supreme Leader’s Office. Thus, by of the neofundamentalist right wing. replacing Mottaki Ahmadinejad achieved Secondly, to make himself the only another aim of becoming the sole link important politician with exclusive between the government and the leadership. But removing a politically well-

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

2 entrenched minister like Mottaki was a his opinion clear, actually downgrading delicate matter, where much depended the all-powerful special representatives on timing. to ordinary presidential advisors and explicitly restoring the importance of the Foreign Ministry. Mottaki saves the day, But it was the alleged special representa- but not himself tives themselves who most harmed their Some Iranian analysts quite reasonably cause. For instance, when one of them argue that Ahmadinejad first wanted to remarked critically on the Turkish Geno- replace Mottaki three years ago with some- cide perpetrated against the Armenians one more to his liking. If this is correct, it during World War I (1914-18) it was Mottaki would have coincided with the removal of – a Turkish speaker – who had to ease ten- Larijani in 2007. But Larijani’s dismissal sions with Ankara, an indispensible partner and other dismissals that took place in for Iran. This episode exposed a dramatic 2008 and 2009 and the subsequent restruc- lack of diplomatic professionalism of the turing in the ministries concerned con- special representatives to the watchful eyes sumed too much political energy. Hence, of the Iranian public as well as within the replacing Mottaki had to be postponed. Principalists. Mottaki’s and the Foreign In 2010, however, Ahmadinejad felt that Ministry’s position was therefore publicly he had to move. Not only was Mottaki an strengthened. If Ahmadinejad wanted to important minister, he also scored against tighten his grip on the Foreign Ministry, he the President on two important foreign had to move sooner rather than later. The policy points: Ahmadinejad’s appointment situation got even worse when the Islamic of “special envoys” and his disastrous Africa Republic suffered one of its most dramatic policy. The idea of “special envoys” or “spe- diplomatic defeats in Africa: in November cial representatives” in foreign policy mat- 2010 Nigerian authorities discovered a sub- ters was Ahmadinejad’s brainchild. In a stantial Iranian shipment of arms bound nutshell it meant that four long-standing for Gambia. The ensuing diplomatic row friends of his would be tasked with delicate resulted in the breaking off or downgrad- foreign policy dossiers such as the Middle ing of the level of diplomatic relations with East, Asia, Afghanistan and the Caspian some 20 African countries. Once again it Sea. To this one has to add the fact that the was Mottaki who had to set things straight. nuclear file falls within the portfolio of The final decision to relieve Mottaki Jalili, the Secretary General of the HNSC. from his position must have been taken Hence, not much seems to be left for the around summer 2010 when Mottaki had Foreign Ministry. Indeed, almost all stra- critically remarked on one of the special tegic long-term planning would have representatives. The reason to finally move shifted to the President’s bureau and was obviously related to the Manama Dia- the special representatives. In the end, logue Conference Dinner on 3 December Ahmadinejad and his circle of friends 2010 when Mottaki listened to the speech would have arrogated the power and of Hillary Clinton. Mottaki had to defend competences of the Foreign Ministry. his decision to remain in the room when As soon as these plans became known Clinton spoke against hard-line critics. But they met dramatic resistance. The Parlia- many analysts in Tehran took a cautiously ment was not about to allow its right to positive note of Clinton’s remarks. And oversee foreign policy slip away. Opposition Ahmadinejad picked on that impression mounted also within the Principalist obviously hoping for a positive round, if faction where the President was severely not a break-through in the Istanbul talks criticized. But, most importantly the Su- scheduled for the end of January 2011. But, preme Leader too weighed-in and made in case there is indeed a small chance for

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

3 success in the negotiations, then Ahmadi- experience to the political clout of the nejad did not want a person in his cabinet HNSC. who would be strong on his own account. By sacking Mottaki, Ahmadinejad was able to have his cake and eat it too. On the one hand he strengthened his grip on the Salehi installed but political right. On the other hand, appoint- “advisors” remain ing a technocrat as caretaker minister to The appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi as the Foreign Ministry guarantees the minis- caretaker Foreign Minister is one of Ahma- try works smoothly. At the same time with- dinejad’s smartest moves, for domestic, out parliamentary confirmation Salehi institutional and foreign policy reasons. remains merely caretaker without any To begin with, Salehi is a technocrat; his political support, depending solely on the core expertise is that of a nuclear scientist will of the president. Therefore Salehi’s as well as that of a diplomat. Salehi served nomination as caretaker does not mean the Iran as ambassador to the IAEA and later he president would forget about his vision of a became head of the Iranian Atomic Energy new streamlined foreign policy apparatus. Organization (IAEO), a position he still On the contrary, after the Supreme Leader holds. As a diplomat he was employed at prevented the installment of presidential the Iranian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi special representatives by downgrading Arabia. Considering his political affilia- them to mere advisors, Ahmadinejad coun- tions, he is closer to reformist than fun- tered by nominating two more “special damentalist circles. Quite surprisingly, advisors” on Foreign Policy issues, one for these political affiliations did not harm Latin America and one for Africa. In other him in the eyes of the President. On the words, in adapting to changed circum- contrary, Ahmadinejad’s style of personnel stances Ahmadinejad still preserved the policy where individual and personal rela- impetus of his original idea. tions count more than political convictions For example, in tasking his advisors with must have made Salehi a preferable can- missions to foreign countries he dispos- didate for the position of Foreign Minister, sessed the Foreign Ministry of any leading unlike Mottaki, whose excellent connec- role. In other words, Ahmadinejad wants tions to the high echelons of the regime his “special advisors” to act as if they are in and the Parliament Iran’s president found fact special representatives. This said they so troublesome. are not the only ones to conduct important Salehi’s independence from any of the missions for the Islamic Republic! With neo-fundamentalist power houses allows regards to bilateral relations with Turkey for a smooth cooperation with Jalili on the Supreme Leader preferred to send his both personal and institutional grounds. own advisor – Velayati – to Erdogan who On personal grounds because there is no expressed the leadership’s hope of closer competition between Jalili and Salehi. regional cooperation with Turkey, Iraq and Institutionally, because nothing much Syria. And in Iraq, Khamenei tasked Salehi changed: Salehi is already involved in the to deliver a confidential message to Grand nuclear decision making processes as head Ayatollah Sistani. of the IAEO. Hence Salehi will not only This puts Salehi in a delicate situation, continue to contribute real expertise to the after all his President scorns anything less negotiations but his new upgraded position than direct relations with the Supreme will give him more gravitas since he will Leader’s Office. In any case, the president’s be able to draw on the Ministry’s expertise. preference for special advisors in almost all This in turn will increase the role of the salient foreign policy domains is a serious Ministry in the negotiations by further challenge for the new Minister. It will adding its much needed foreign policy require significant political tact and sen-

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

4 sitivity for Salehi to strengthen his minis- Tehran’s subculture of Holocaust deniers try’s role and convince the president’s and neo-Nazis and their Western friends advisors to better coordinate with Iran’s now lacks any backing in the system and diplomatic corps in order to avoid any thus, this decision represents another proof future diplomatic faux pas. So, whereas the of the President’s will to de-escalate. What a appointment of Salehi will most certainly difference four years can make: In 2006 the strengthen the Islamic Republic’s diplo- President offered Ramin and his kindred mats in the nuclear realm, it remains to spirits an international stage, whereas in be seen whether the same can be said in 2010 a lot of them have been expelled while relation to other foreign policy fields. the President simultaneously promotes technocratic talent to high positions.

A new style in foreign policy Appointing Salehi, a technocrat who Ahma- Implications for the nuclear talks dinejad had personally sacked in 2005 for What do these changes imply for the future being too soft in defending Iran’s “undeni- of the nuclear talks? able nuclear rights,” demonstrates a desire First, there is Iran’s willingness to negotiate to pursue de-escalation both domestically as the December 2010 Geneva talks have and with the international community. shown. Currently there are no signs that Domestically Ahmadinejad did not care this willingness would abate. On the con- about the radical neo-fundamentalists trary, the signals Ahmadinejad sent out like who were upset when Iran signed the Addi- the January 2011 offer to allow some IAEA tional Protocol in 2003. On the contrary, members to visit Iran’s nuclear facilities or he assigned the very man who signed the the bombastic declaration according to Additional Protocol - Salehi – to the posi- which the country now produces its own tion of Foreign Minister. But this also fuel rods are intended to be positive signs. means that Ahmadinejad with regard to In principle, they aim to create a positive the international community is willing domestic atmosphere in the run-up to the to pick up a more constructive path, at talks in Istanbul, scheduled for January least in style. 20–22, 2011. However, a willingness to This also holds true for regional policy. negotiate in principle does not equal a Salehi’s first statement in which he under- willingness to compromise. Still, Ahma- scores the importance of Turkey and Saudi dinejad has obviously grasped the necessity Arabia for Iran shows a much needed appre- of negotiations as well as the need to create ciation of political realities. The importance a benign political atmosphere in order to of Turkey is beyond debate in Iran, but this succeed. The selection of a moderate care- cannot be said about Saudi Arabia, which is taker Foreign Minister and the explicit wish Iran’s most significant competitor in the to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, region. By Appointing Salehi who uttered one of the West’s most important allies in benign remarks towards the Wahhabi King- the region, clearly demonstrate this change dom, Ahmadinejad distanced himself from of style, if not of substance. the most radical voices of the political right Secondly, once set on the negotiations in Tehran, the majority of them simultane- track Ahmadinejad braves resistance within the ously scorn Arabs, Saudis, Sunnis and system. His willingness to find a negotiated Wahhabis. solution to the nuclear file is well-known Another detail corroborates this cautious and politicians like Larijani and Musavi positive trend: the President’s sacking of even criticized the President’s “soft” stance Mohammad Ali Ramin in December 2010, on the nuclear issue after the Geneva talks who is one of the organizers of the so called in 2009. Other forces opposing the deal are “Holocaust conference”. This means that active, as the last bomb attacks against

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

5 nuclear scientists in the heart of Tehran – one of them was a friend and former stu- dent of Salehi’s – prove. The President and his followers accused the perpetrators of being enemies of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the nuclear file. Of course the Iranians were also quick to accuse the US, Israel and the UK of being responsible but, even so, they ultimately came to the nego- tiating table and this is what counts. Third, there should be no illusions that Ahmadinejad pursues a grand bargain which would allow him not only to crush the domestic opposition (this has happened

These Comments reflect and to strengthen Iran’s regional position. solely the author’s views. Renowned scholars like Farideh Farhi have

SWP already commented critically on the high Stiftung Wissenschaft und domestic costs of such a deal (i.e. human Politik German Institute for rights violations) and both domestic and International and international resistance to it. Security Affairs Fourth, can Ahmadinejad deliver? The an- Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 swer is yes, under current circumstances he 10719 Berlin is the only viable partner through whom a Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 negotiated solution can be achieved. After www.swp-berlin.org all, he is willing to take personal risks and, [email protected] as we have seen, he is also uniquely capable ISSN 1861-1761 of checking extremely powerful individuals in the regime, thus nullifying their poten- tial power to obstruct. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Supreme Leader counts on him to find a negotiated solution with the west. Besides, many of those regime heavyweights Ahmadinejad has sidelined so humiliatingly concentrate on the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections to challenge him. That means there are at least another three years before he and his followers’ positions could be seriously challenged. For many in the West the prospect of contributing to the stabilization of Ahma- dinejad’s presidency may be inconvenient or even shocking. But this is the reality to live with after both sides missed their op- portunity in 2005 with the liberal minded Islamist President Mohammad Khatami.

SWP Comments 2 January 2011