SWP Comments 2011/C 02, January 2011, 6 Pages

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Foreign Minister Mottaki Dismissed and Salehi Installed SWP Comments New Trends in Iranian Diplomacy before Istanbul Nuclear Talks Walter Posch

In December 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki was dismissed. His dismissal is part of a recent pattern of replacements and new appointments in the foreign policy institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. With this personnel policy, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is trying essentially to achieve two aims: to secure a position as one of the most important politicians of the Iranian right wing (“osulgara”, “Principalists”) and to gain more influence over Iran’s foreign policy apparatus. At the same time, these changes in foreign policy signal a move towards de-escalation, by which the Iranians were hoping to create a positive political atmosphere at the nuclear negotiations in Istanbul, which recently took place in Istanbul on January 20–21.

Manuchehr Mottaki was removed from weighed his words carefully before com- office in a less than graceful way – during menting on domestic political issues. As a an official visit to Senegal. Embarrassingly result, he enjoyed almost unanimous enough, it was his hosts who informed him support in the parliament. Yet, it was these of his dismissal. connections that made Ahmadinejad sus- In general, Mottaki is said to be a cau- picious of Mottaki. tious politician who maintained good con- On the factional level, it is noteworthy tacts within the government, the parlia- that the foreign ministry has its éminence ment (read: the political factions within the grise, in this case it is former Foreign Mini- Principalists), and the highest echelons of ster Ali Akbar Velayati, who is still advisor the system, namely the office of Supreme to the Supreme Leader in foreign policy Leader Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khame- affairs. Velayati was rumoured to have con- nei, Iran’s ultimate power holder. Having templated a run against Ahmadinejad in direct access to this office is perhaps the the last presidential election. This detail is best definition of what it means to be a important because, unlike any other can- “heavyweight” politician in the Islamic didate from the right wing, Velayati would Republic. At the same time, Mottaki wisely have stood a real chance of prevailing stayed away from political infighting and against Ahmadinejad.

Dr. Walter Posch is a researcher at SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 2 January 2011

1 Already in 2007, when Ahmadinejad contact and access to the Supreme replaced Ali Ardashir Larijani as the Secre- Leader’s office. tary General of the Higher National Secu- He started the implementation of this rity Council (HNSC), his ambitions went strategy as soon as he became president in beyond just installing Saeed Jalili – he 2005. Immediately after assuming his new was also trying to increase his personal in- role, Ahmadinejad ignored the traditional fluence over the foreign ministry and to conservatives’ wish to appoint members of destroy Velayati’s influence there. In the their party to cabinet positions. In the interim period between the 2008 parlia- summer of the same year, he replaced the mentary elections that made Larijani nuclear negotiator and general secretary of Speaker of Parliament and the day Mottaki the HNSC, Hassan Rouhani, with a more was replaced, Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy radical politician, Ali Ardashir Larijani. power was to a certain degree restrained However, it is apparent that Larijani was by criticism from the parliament on one never meant to be the final replacement, side and tacit obstruction by Velayati and since in 2007 Larijani was, in turn, replaced his influence on the foreign ministry’s by Saeed Jalili, a close personal friend and personnel on the other. confidant of the president. In the following Another reason was Mottaki’s closeness years, he moved against three politicians – to Larijani. He was Larijani’s campaign among others – who had access to the manager during the 2005 presidential Supreme Leader’s office, were well- election when the latter stood against entrenched within the Principalist faction, Larijani and Ahmadinejad. Mottaki never and belonged to the security and intelli- cut his relations with Larijani, even after gence establishment. The three politicians he joined the cabinet of Ahmadinejad, were: Interior Minister Mostafa Purmo- which – according to Iranian sources – he hammadi (2008); the retired but still served loyally. This relationship had to respected former intelligence czar, arouse Ahmadinejad’s suspicion, even more Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri (2009); so as Larijani became one of his most out- and Intelligence Minister Gholamhossein spoken critics. Mohseni-Ezhei (2009). As such, replacing Mottaki was only a Interestingly, Iran’s contested president question of time and was directed pri- remained silent during the first months marily against both Larijani and Velayati – following his re-election in 2009 – except in other words, against his political com- when he dismissed Mohseni-Ezhei on petitors. But for Ahmadinejad, this is more account of Ezhei’s mismanagement during than a mere personal affair. the 2009 crackdown. In other words, whilst all other Principalist factions did their best to sideline Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and A pattern of replacement to crack down on the reformists, Ahmadi- The way Ahmadinejad disposed of those nejad was hedging his bets and continued who worked with or for him proves that his policy of strengthening his position he is a systematic and thoughtful political within the political right. operator struggling against huge obstacles And finally comes the replacement of created by the regime’s political establish- Manuchehr Mottaki, which is meaningful ment. In this, he is pursuing a clear strategy in several regards, above all in view of aimed at two objectives: Mottaki’s ability to communicate directly Firstly, to establish himself and his close with the Supreme Leader’s office. Thus, by followers as the main representatives of replacing Mottaki, Ahmadinejad achieved the neo-fundamentalist right wing. another aim of becoming the sole link Secondly, to make himself the only between the government and the leader- important politician with exclusive ship. But removing a politically well-

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

2 entrenched minister like Mottaki was a made his opinion clear, actually downgrad- delicate matter, where much depended ing the all-powerful special representatives on timing. to ordinary presidential advisors and explic- itly restoring the importance of the foreign ministry. Mottaki saves the day, But it was the alleged special representa- but not himself tives themselves who most harmed their Some Iranian analysts quite reasonably own cause. For instance, when one of them argue that Ahmadinejad first wanted to remarked critically on the Turkish Geno- replace Mottaki three years ago with some- cide perpetrated against the Armenians one more to his liking. If this is correct, it during the First World War (1914–18) it was would have coincided with the removal of Mottaki – a Turkish speaker – who had to Larijani in 2007. But Larijani’s dismissal ease tensions with Ankara, an indispensa- and other dismissals that took place in ble partner for Iran. This episode exposed 2008 and 2009 and the subsequent restruc- a dramatic lack of diplomatic professional- turing in the ministries concerned con- ism of the special representatives to the sumed too much political energy. Hence, watchful eyes of the Iranian public as well replacing Mottaki had to be postponed. as within the Principalist faction. Mottaki’s In 2010, however, Ahmadinejad felt that and the foreign ministry’s position was he had to move. Not only was Mottaki an therefore publicly strengthened. If Ahma- important minister, he also scored against dinejad wanted to tighten his grip on the the president on two important foreign foreign ministry, he had to move sooner policy points: Ahmadinejad’s appointment rather than later. The situation got even of “special envoys” and his disastrous Africa worse when the Islamic Republic suffered policy. The idea of “special envoys” or “spe- one of its most dramatic diplomatic defeats cial representatives” in foreign policy mat- in Africa: in November 2010 Nigerian ters was Ahmadinejad’s brainchild. In a authorities discovered a substantial Iranian nutshell it meant that four long-standing shipment of arms bound for Gambia. The friends of his would be tasked with delicate ensuing diplomatic row resulted in the foreign policy dossiers such as the Middle breaking off or downgrading of the level of East, Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caspian diplomatic relations with some 20 African Sea. To this, one has to add the fact that the countries. Once again, it was Mottaki who nuclear file falls within the portfolio of had to set things straight. Jalili, the secretary general of the HNSC. The final decision to relieve Mottaki Hence, not much would seem to be left for from his position must have been taken the foreign ministry. Indeed, almost all sometime in summer 2010 after Mottaki strategic long-term planning would have had made a critical remark about one of shifted to the president’s bureau and the the special representatives. The decision special representatives. In the end, Ahma- was obviously related to the Manama Dia- dinejad and his circle of friends would have logue Conference Dinner on 3 December arrogated the power and competences of 2010, in which Mottaki attended the speech the foreign ministry. of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As soon as these plans became known, Mottaki had to defend his decision to re- they met dramatic resistance. The parlia- main in the room after Clinton began ment was not about to allow its right to speaking against hard-line critics. But many oversee foreign policy slip away. Opposition analysts in Tehran took a cautiously posi- mounted also within the Principalist tive approach to Clinton’s remarks. And faction, where the president was severely Ahmadinejad picked up on that impres- criticised. But most importantly, the sion, obviously hoping for a positive round, Supreme Leader, too, weighed in and if not a breakthrough, in the recent Istan-

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

3 bul talks. But, in case there was indeed a turn, will increase the role of the ministry small chance for success in the negotia- in the negotiations by further adding its tions, then Ahmadinejad did not want a much needed foreign policy experience to person in his cabinet who would be strong the political clout of the HNSC. on his own account. By sacking Mottaki, Ahmadinejad was able to have his cake and eat it too. On the one hand, he strengthened his grip on Salehi installed the political right. On the other hand, but “advisors” remain appointing a technocrat as caretaker minis- The appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi as ter to the foreign ministry guarantees the caretaker foreign minister was one of ministry works smoothly. At the same time, Ahmadinejad’s smartest moves – for do- without parliamentary confirmation, mestic, institutional, and foreign policy Salehi remains merely a caretaker without reasons. any political support who is dependent To begin with, Salehi is a technocrat; his solely on the will of the president. There- core expertise is that of a nuclear scientist fore, Salehi’s nomination as caretaker does as well as that of a diplomat. Salehi served not mean the president has forgotten about Iran as ambassador to the IAEA and later his vision of a new streamlined foreign became head of the Iranian Atomic Energy policy apparatus. On the contrary, after the Organization (IAEO), a position he still Supreme Leader prevented the instalment holds. As a diplomat he was employed at of presidential special representatives by the Iranian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi downgrading them to mere advisors, Ahma- Arabia. Considering his political affilia- dinejad countered by nominating two more tions, he is closer to reformist than fun- “special advisors” on foreign policy issues: damentalist circles. Quite surprisingly, one for Latin America and one for Africa. these political affiliations did not harm In other words, in adapting to changed him in the eyes of the president. On the circumstances, Ahmadinejad has preserved contrary, Ahmadinejad’s style of personnel the impetus of his original idea. policy – where individual and personal For example, in tasking his advisors with relations count more than political con- missions to foreign countries, he stripped victions – must have made Salehi a prefer- the foreign ministry of any leading role. In able candidate for the position of foreign other words, Ahmadinejad wants his “spe- minister, unlike Mottaki, whose excellent cial advisors” to act as if they are, in fact, connections to the highest echelons of the special representatives. But his advisors are regime and the parliament Iran’s president not the only ones to conduct important found so troublesome. missions for the Islamic Republic! With Salehi’s independence from any of the regards to bilateral relations with Turkey, neo-fundamentalist powerhouses allows the Supreme Leader preferred to send his for smooth cooperation with Jalili on both own advisor – Velayati – to Erdogan. Vela- personal and institutional grounds: on per- yati was to express the leadership’s hope of sonal grounds because there is no competi- closer regional cooperation with Turkey, tion between Jalili and Salehi; institution- Iraq, and Syria. And in Iraq, Khamenei ally, because nothing much has changed: tasked Salehi to deliver a confidential mes- Salehi is already involved in the nuclear sage to Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hussaini decision-making processes as head of the Sistani. IAEO. Hence Salehi will not only continue This puts Salehi in a delicate situation. to contribute real expertise to the negotia- After all, his president scorns anything less tions, but his new upgraded position will than direct relations with the Supreme give him more gravitas since he will be able Leader’s office. In any case, the president’s to draw on the ministry’s expertise. This, in preference for special advisors in almost all

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

4 salient foreign policy domains is a serious Another detail corroborates this cautious challenge for the new minister. It will positive trend: the president’s sacking in require significant political tact and sen- December 2010 of Mohammad Ali Ramin, sitivity for Salehi to strengthen his minis- who is one of the organisers of the “Holo- try’s role and convince the president’s caust conference”. This means that Tehran’s advisors to better coordinate with Iran’s subculture of Holocaust deniers and neo- diplomatic corps in order to avoid any Nazis and their Western friends now lacks future diplomatic faux pas. So, whereas the any backing in the system. Thus, this deci- appointment of Salehi will most certainly sion offers more proof of the president’s strengthen the Islamic Republic’s diplo- intent to move towards de-escalation. mats in the nuclear realm, it remains to What a difference four years can make: in be seen whether the same can be said in 2006 the president offered Ramin and his relation to other foreign policy areas. kindred spirits an international stage, whereas in 2010 a lot of them were ex- pelled while the president simultaneously A new style in foreign policy promoted technocratic talent to high Appointing Salehi – a technocrat who positions. Ahmadinejad had personally sacked in 2005 for being too soft in defending Iran’s “undeniable nuclear rights” – demonstrates Implications for the nuclear talks a desire to pursue de-escalation, both do- What do these changes imply for the future mestically and with the international com- of the nuclear talks? munity. First, there is Iran’s willingness to negotiate, Domestically, Ahmadinejad did not care as illustrated at the December 2010 Geneva about the radical neo-fundamentalists who talks. Currently, there are no signs that this were upset when Iran signed the Additional willingness will abate. On the contrary, the Protocol in 2003. On the contrary, he ap- signals Ahmadinejad has sent out – like pointed the very man who signed the the January 2011 offer to allow some IAEA Additional Protocol – Salehi – to the posi- members to visit Iran’s nuclear facilities or tion of foreign minister. But this also the bombastic declaration that the country means that, with regard to the interna- now produces its own fuel rods – are in- tional community, Ahmadinejad is willing tended to be positive signs. In principle, to take a more constructive path, at least they aim to create a positive domestic regarding style. atmosphere in the run-up to the talks in This also holds true for regional policy. Istanbul, scheduled for 20–22 January 2011. Salehi’s first official statement – in which However, a willingness to negotiate in he underscored the importance of Turkey principle does not equal a willingness to and Saudi Arabia for Iran – showed a much compromise. Still, Ahmadinejad has ob- needed appreciation of political realities. viously grasped the necessity of negotia- The importance of Turkey is beyond debate tions as well as the need to create a benign in Iran, but this cannot be said about Saudi political atmosphere in order to succeed. Arabia, which is Iran’s most significant The selection of a moderate caretaker competitor in the region. By appointing foreign minister and the explicit wish to Salehi, who uttered benign remarks to- normalise relations with Saudi Arabia – one wards the Wahhabi kingdom, Ahmadinejad of the West’s most important allies in the distanced himself from the most radical region – clearly demonstrate this change voices of the political right in Tehran – of style, if not of substance. the majority of them simultaneously scorn Second, once set on the negotiations Arabs, Saudis, Sunnis, and Wahhabis. track, Ahmadinejad has braved resistance within the system. His willingness to find a nego-

SWP Comments 2 January 2011

5 tiated solution to the nuclear file is well- For many in the West, the prospect of known, and politicians like Larijani and contributing to the stabilisation of Ahma- Mir Hossein Musavi even criticised the dinejad’s presidency may be inconvenient president’s “soft” stance on the nuclear or even shocking. But this is the reality to issue after the first Geneva talks in October live with after both sides missed their op- 2009. Other forces opposing the deal are portunity in 2005 with the liberal-minded active, as proven by the last bomb attacks Islamist President Mohammad Khatami. against nuclear scientists in the heart of Tehran – one of them was a friend and former student of Salehi’s. The president and his followers accused the perpetrators of being enemies of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the nuclear file. Of course, the Iranians were also quick to accuse the

These Comments reflect and this is what counts. solely the author’s views. Third, there should be no illusions that

SWP Ahmadinejad is pursuing a grand bargain that Stiftung Wissenschaft und would allow him not only to crush the Politik German Institute for domestic opposition (this happened already International and with the Islamist Left/Green Movement) Security Affairs but also to strengthening his own position, Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 both personally and institutionally, and 10719 Berlin to strengthen Iran’s regional position. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Renowned scholars like Farideh Farhi have www.swp-berlin.org already commented critically on the high [email protected] domestic costs of such a deal (e.g., human ISSN 1861-1761 rights violations) and both domestic and international resistance to it. Fourth, can Ahmadinejad deliver? The answer is yes, under current circumstances he is the only viable partner through whom a negotiated solution can be achieved. After all, he is willing to take personal risks and, as we have seen, he is also uniquely capable of checking extremely powerful individuals in the regime, thus nullifying their poten- tial power to obstruct. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Supreme Leader counts on him to find a negotiated solution with the West. Besides, many of those regime heavyweights Ahmadinejad has sidelined so humiliatingly are concentrat- ing on the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections to challenge him. That means there are at least another three years before he and his followers’ positions can be seriously challenged.

SWP Comments 2 January 2011