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The Usual Surprise? Iran’S Presidential Elections by Rouzbeh Parsi

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The Usual Surprise? Iran’S Presidential Elections by Rouzbeh Parsi 21 2013 Mehdi Dehghan/AP/SIPA Mehdi The usual surprise? Iran’s presidential elections by Rouzbeh Parsi When the 2009 presidential election in Iran The powers that be took a clear and harsh went awry, and its aftermath rocked the au- stance against the reformists in the aftermath thority and legitimacy of the system (nezam), of the 2009 campaign. On paper, therefore, it seemed that nothing could bring the Islamic the ‘principlists’ had the opportunity to re- Republic back to normalcy. Back then, the next shape the system and the political landscape presidential elections looked far away and be- of the Islamic Republic in their own image, yond anyone’s ability to imagine. Yet, for all with a conservative president and parliamen- other things that can be said about the Islamic tary majority, a cowed, loyal opposition, and Republic, it has insistently and regularly held the military and intelligence-related institu- its presidential polls, wars and political crises tions firmly behind the ‘corrective’ measures. notwithstanding. And now, in 2013, we are Yet this unique configuration did not pro- yet again trying to grapple with the compli- duce a clear set of policies. Nor was any se- cated game of politics in Tehran as the offi- rious attempt made to heal the wounds and cial campaign has started. Doubts exist about rifts that the 2009 elections had engendered. how many citizens will actually go to the polls In addition, Tehran’s relations with the West this time (it was a remarkable 80 per cent in deteriorated further and the impact of new 2009), but the fact that - on 14 June - presi- sanctions on an already mismanaged econo- dential elections are to be held in conjunction my made itself felt. In other words, despite with local and city council votes may increase holding all the levers of power, the ‘princi- the chances of a decent voter turnout. plist’ camp has not governed the country any better nor strengthened its standing in the The paradox of ‘principlism’ world. Why so? Since 2009, the system has had to manage First, ‘principlism’ is primarily defined by its not just the fallout of the elections but also negation of reformism. Hence, without a vi- the final disintegration of the narrative of a able reformist foil, the disparate and motley united ‘principlist’ camp (the term used by nature of the ‘principlists’ becomes painfully those who identify themselves as conserva- apparent. Second, the revolutionary ideology tives on a variety of issues) in Iranian politics. - understood and championed by the ‘prin- European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 1 ciplists’ as the singular focus and purpose of control the process and ensure that the ac- the Islamic Republic - is not dominant in the tual contenders come from within the circle country. In fact, the outgoing president him- of those loyal to the system. self, with all his Islamist and revolutionary credentials, cannot be trusted to toe the par- As a result, there is huge discrepancy between ty line. His brand of conservatism does not the number and range of persons registering seem to include sufficient deference to the in order to run in the elections and the small way the networks comprising the nezam op- group of actual candidates eventually allowed erate and, especially, to its core element - the to do so. The vetting is done by the conserv- office and the person of the supreme leader. ative-leaning Guardian Council, which is un- der no obligation to justify its decisions in Third, Iran is neither as frail nor as isolated approving and rejecting candidates. For this as its Western foes would like to claim and presidential campaign, 686 hopefuls had reg- think, despite all the difficulties and provo- istered; the Guardian Council chose eight. The cations of President Ahmadinejad on the in- chosen ones indicate the degree of variation ternational stage. Tehran’s margin of profit, that the system (or rather those wielding its as it were, has shrunk, but it still exists, both levers at the moment) is willing to tolerate. economically and politically. And for some within the religious-political elite in Tehran, The two hopefuls that garnered most atten- the enmity of (and to) the West fits their tion registered in the last half hour before the worldview and suits their political narrative deadline. Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, former perfectly. vice president to Ahmadinejad and his closest confidante and ally, has been the lightning rod Having said that, of those conservatives there is also a ground- ‘Tehran is a status quo actor, not unlikely who have become swell - domestically increasingly disillu- - for mending fences to prefer negotiations and half-measures sioned with the presi- with the West (with- dent and think his out necessarily suc- that leave all parties sufficiently satisfied policies as not only cumbing to it). Both over confrontations that may or may not reckless but, more public opinion and importantly, insuffi- the political dis- lead to all out victory.’ ciently loyal to the su- course have matured preme leader. The mix and no longer entertain the revolutionary of economic populism and appeal to Iranian notions of re-making the world and oppos- nationalism that the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei ing the world powers. Much of the hardline duo has crafted can be seen as a particularly rhetoric in Tehran has indeed a feel of rear dangerous form of implicit acknowledgement guard action, as if negating and staving off of just how post-revolutionary Iranian soci- the post-revolutionary reality of 21st centu- ety has become. That Mashaei would make it ry Iran; and foreign players reacting to this through the vetting process appeared unlikely rhetoric, paradoxically, help keep up the illu- from the outset – especially in light of the past sion that Iran is a revolutionary country will- two years - though not totally impossible. ing to sacrifice it all for those ideals. Reality, however, is much more mundane: Tehran is a The other main ‘non-candidate’ is two-time status quo actor, not unlikely to prefer nego- president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. A tiations and half-measures that leave all par- centrist at heart, he has connections to re- ties sufficiently satisfied over confrontations formists and conservatives alike, and a pedi- that may or may not lead to all out victory. gree second to none (speaker of parliament, confidante of Ayatollah Khomeini, and en- The prelude gineer of the reconstruction of the coun- try in the 1990s after the war with Iraq). The peculiarities of Iran’s presidential elec- He represents the hope of re-adjusting the tion process indicate the split attitude of the course to lower key policy in both the do- nezam towards its own commitment to the mestic and foreign arenas. With him back notion of popular sovereignty. On the one in charge, reformists and others were hop- hand, the system needs to display its inclu- ing for a more professional and steady hand sive character in order to buttress its legiti- at the helm of the state, a manager rather macy. On the other, it is also compelled to than a rabble rouser or ideologue. Consider- European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 2 ing his pedigree, his candidacy should have his dismay and shock at the Guardian Coun- been stopped before he actually became a cil’s decision. The very independent-minded potential candidate: discouraging him from conservative MP Ali Motahhari (son of the signing up would have saved everybody face. late Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, one of the Apparently, however, Rafsanjani felt that he founders of the Islamic Republic) wrote to had enough backing or not enough opposi- the supreme leader as well, stating that if tion, and thus he applied. At that point the Ayatollah Khomeini himself had tried to be- political price for stopping him rose tremen- come a candidate today under a pseudonym, dously. And yet, for some of the more arch- he would have been disqualified. For his part, conservative elements of the ruling elite, this Rafsanjani let it be known that he would not was clearly a price worth paying to stave off appeal the rejection. a course correction to the centre. Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Council (which The chosen ones mediates disputes between the Majlis and the Guardian Council) was thus disqualified. The eight candidates that were allowed to run represent the ideal set up for the ‘principlist’ A widely disseminated version of what hap- hardliners. There is one reformist, Mohammad pened behind the scenes was published by Reza Aref, and one centrist, Hassan Rouhani. Jaras, a website affiliated with the reform- Rouhani is an ally of Rafsanjani and is already ist camp. What is in effect channeling interesting is not its ‘On the one hand, the system needs to the hope some voter veracity, or the de- groups attached to tails, but rather what display its inclusive character in order to Rafsanjani as presi- it tells us about the dential contender. deep rifts within the buttress its legitimacy. On the other, it is Rouhani’s criticism circles of power, and also compelled to control the process and of the approach to the cost everyone nuclear negotiations understands reject- ensure that the actual contenders come - and Ahmadinejad’s ing Rafsanjani en- from within the circle of those loyal to policies more gener- tails. According to ally - has been quite Jaras, the original the system.’ sharp, and has not vote in the Guardian stopped. Council was in Rafsanjani’s favour; as this be- came clear, the Minister of Intelligence and Another candidate with a history related to the Commander of the Islamic Revolution Rafsanjani is Mohammad Gharazi.
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