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The Usual Surprise? Iran’S Presidential Elections by Rouzbeh Parsi

21 2013 Mehdi Dehghan/AP/SIPA Mehdi The usual surprise? ’s presidential elections by Rouzbeh Parsi

When the 2009 presidential election in Iran The powers that be took a clear and harsh went awry, and its aftermath rocked the au- stance against the reformists in the aftermath thority and legitimacy of the system (nezam), of the 2009 campaign. On paper, therefore, it seemed that nothing could bring the Islamic the ‘principlists’ had the opportunity to re- Republic back to normalcy. Back then, the next shape the system and the political landscape presidential elections looked far away and be- of the Islamic Republic in their own image, yond anyone’s ability to imagine. Yet, for all with a conservative president and parliamen- other things that can be said about the Islamic tary majority, a cowed, loyal opposition, and Republic, it has insistently and regularly held the military and intelligence-related institu- its presidential polls, wars and political crises tions firmly behind the ‘corrective’ measures. notwithstanding. And now, in 2013, we are Yet this unique configuration did not pro- yet again trying to grapple with the compli- duce a clear set of policies. Nor was any se- cated game of politics in as the offi- rious attempt made to heal the wounds and cial campaign has started. Doubts exist about rifts that the 2009 elections had engendered. how many citizens will actually go to the polls In addition, Tehran’s relations with the West this time (it was a remarkable 80 per cent in deteriorated further and the impact of new 2009), but the fact that - on 14 June - presi- sanctions on an already mismanaged econo- dential elections are to be held in conjunction my made itself felt. In other words, despite with local and city council votes may increase holding all the levers of power, the ‘princi- the chances of a decent voter turnout. plist’ camp has not governed the country any better nor strengthened its standing in the The paradox of ‘principlism’ world. Why so? Since 2009, the system has had to manage First, ‘principlism’ is primarily defined by its not just the fallout of the elections but also negation of reformism. Hence, without a vi- the final disintegration of the narrative of a able reformist foil, the disparate and motley united ‘principlist’ camp (the term used by nature of the ‘principlists’ becomes painfully those who identify themselves as conserva- apparent. Second, the revolutionary ideology tives on a variety of issues) in Iranian politics. - understood and championed by the ‘prin-

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 1 ciplists’ as the singular focus and purpose of control the process and ensure that the ac- the Islamic Republic - is not dominant in the tual contenders come from within the circle country. In fact, the outgoing president him- of those loyal to the system. self, with all his Islamist and revolutionary credentials, cannot be trusted to toe the par- As a result, there is huge discrepancy between ty line. His brand of conservatism does not the number and range of persons registering seem to include sufficient deference to the in order to run in the elections and the small way the networks comprising the nezam op- group of actual candidates eventually allowed erate and, especially, to its core element - the to do so. The vetting is done by the conserv- office and the person of the supreme leader. ative-leaning , which is un- der no obligation to justify its decisions in Third, Iran is neither as frail nor as isolated approving and rejecting candidates. For this as its Western foes would like to claim and presidential campaign, 686 hopefuls had reg- think, despite all the difficulties and provo- istered; the Guardian Council chose eight. The cations of President Ahmadinejad on the in- chosen ones indicate the degree of variation ternational stage. Tehran’s margin of profit, that the system (or rather those wielding its as it were, has shrunk, but it still exists, both levers at the moment) is willing to tolerate. economically and politically. And for some within the religious-political elite in Tehran, The two hopefuls that garnered most atten- the enmity of (and to) the West fits their tion registered in the last half hour before the worldview and suits their political narrative deadline. , former perfectly. vice president to Ahmadinejad and his closest confidante and ally, has been the lightning rod Having said that, of those conservatives there is also a ground- ‘Tehran is a status quo actor, not unlikely who have become swell - domestically increasingly disillu- - for mending fences to prefer negotiations and half-measures sioned with the presi- with the West (with- dent and think his out necessarily suc- that leave all parties sufficiently satisfied policies as not only cumbing to it). Both over confrontations that may or may not reckless but, more public opinion and importantly, insuffi- the political dis- lead to all out victory.’ ciently loyal to the su- course have matured preme leader. The mix and no longer entertain the revolutionary of economic populism and appeal to Iranian notions of re-making the world and oppos- nationalism that the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei ing the world powers. Much of the hardline duo has crafted can be seen as a particularly rhetoric in Tehran has indeed a feel of rear dangerous form of implicit acknowledgement guard action, as if negating and staving off of just how post-revolutionary Iranian soci- the post-revolutionary reality of 21st centu- ety has become. That Mashaei would make it ry Iran; and foreign players reacting to this through the vetting process appeared unlikely rhetoric, paradoxically, help keep up the illu- from the outset – especially in light of the past sion that Iran is a revolutionary country will- two years - though not totally impossible. ing to sacrifice it all for those ideals. Reality, however, is much more mundane: Tehran is a The other main ‘non-candidate’ is two-time status quo actor, not unlikely to prefer nego- president . A tiations and half-measures that leave all par- centrist at heart, he has connections to re- ties sufficiently satisfied over confrontations formists and conservatives alike, and a pedi- that may or may not lead to all out victory. gree second to none (speaker of parliament, confidante of Khomeini, and en- The prelude gineer of the reconstruction of the coun- try in the 1990s after the war with ). The peculiarities of Iran’s presidential elec- He represents the hope of re-adjusting the tion process indicate the split attitude of the course to lower key policy in both the do- nezam towards its own commitment to the mestic and foreign arenas. With him back notion of popular sovereignty. On the one in charge, reformists and others were hop- hand, the system needs to display its inclu- ing for a more professional and steady hand sive character in order to buttress its legiti- at the helm of the state, a manager rather macy. On the other, it is also compelled to than a rabble rouser or ideologue. Consider-

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 2 ing his pedigree, his candidacy should have his dismay and shock at the Guardian Coun- been stopped before he actually became a cil’s decision. The very independent-minded potential candidate: discouraging him from conservative MP Ali Motahhari (son of the signing up would have saved everybody face. late Ayatollah , one of the Apparently, however, Rafsanjani felt that he founders of the Islamic Republic) wrote to had enough backing or not enough opposi- the supreme leader as well, stating that if tion, and thus he applied. At that point the Ayatollah Khomeini himself had tried to be- political price for stopping him rose tremen- come a candidate today under a pseudonym, dously. And yet, for some of the more arch- he would have been disqualified. For his part, conservative elements of the ruling elite, this Rafsanjani let it be known that he would not was clearly a price worth paying to stave off appeal the rejection. a course correction to the centre. Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Council (which The chosen ones mediates disputes between the Majlis and the Guardian Council) was thus disqualified. The eight candidates that were allowed to run represent the ideal set up for the ‘principlist’ A widely disseminated version of what hap- hardliners. There is one reformist, Mohammad pened behind the scenes was published by Reza Aref, and one centrist, . Jaras, a website affiliated with the reform- Rouhani is an ally of Rafsanjani and is already ist camp. What is in effect channeling interesting is not its ‘On the one hand, the system needs to the hope some voter veracity, or the de- groups attached to tails, but rather what display its inclusive character in order to Rafsanjani as presi- it tells us about the dential contender. deep rifts within the buttress its legitimacy. On the other, it is Rouhani’s criticism circles of power, and also compelled to control the process and of the approach to the cost everyone nuclear negotiations understands reject- ensure that the actual contenders come - and Ahmadinejad’s ing Rafsanjani en- from within the circle of those loyal to policies more gener- tails. According to ally - has been quite Jaras, the original the system.’ sharp, and has not vote in the Guardian stopped. Council was in Rafsanjani’s favour; as this be- came clear, the Minister of Intelligence and Another candidate with a history related to the Commander of the Islamic Revolution Rafsanjani is . His sup- Guards Corps (IRGC) requested to meet the port base is somewhat unclear and, so far, Council members and showed them opinion his campaign has focused – perhaps too polls that indicated that Rafsanjani would technically - on the perpetual inflation the win. In a subsequent extraordinary voting Iranian economy and its citizens suffer from. session, his candidacy was rejected. Also close to the centre - but from the other side - stands , a former IRGC In order to avoid a show down and save commander who has evolved into one of the everybody embarrassment, Speaker of Par- many independent conservatives critical of liament implored the supreme Ahmadinejad. leader to overturn the Council’s decision. The response was that Ayatollah Khamenei But it is within the ‘principlist’ block that did not want to interfere with the process. the real contenders of the elections lie. Iran’s Both Larijani and the secretary of the council, former foreign minister, , Abbasali Kadkhodaei, subsequently turned was supposed to form an electoral alliance with to Rafsanjani in the hope of persuading him two other presidential hopefuls, Gholam-Ali to withdraw before the rejection became of- Haddad-Adel and Bagher Qalibaf. ficial - to no avail. Once the news came out, a The purpose of this so-called ‘2+1 coalition’ number of prominent figures expressed con- was to regroup, align and unite the ‘princi- sternation: Ayatollah Khomeini’s daughter plists’, yet at no point in time was it clear Zahra wrote an open letter to the supreme who was supposed to be the candidate and leader asking him to overturn the decision who the ‘wing men’. Consequently, all three and ‘prevent dictatorship’, while his grand- stood and all three ended up being approved son Hassan wrote to Rafsanjani expressing by the Guardian Council.

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 3 Both Velayati and Haddad-Adel have the can influence the political atmosphere as well trust of the supreme leader and can therefore as policy implementation - by facilitating or be considered to be safe choices. Their weak- obstructing, for instance, progress in the nu- ness lies in their lack of managerial experi- clear negotiations. ence and tested ability to effect actual policy. In this respect, Qalibaf is their opposite, a All this said, it is important to remember ‘doer’ by nature with a proven track record, what constitutes the centre of gravity in Ira- good reputation and recognition. Yet this also nian politics in the long run. Revolutions sel- means that he is viewed as someone prone to dom solve the societal tensions that engender making decisions on his own, with his own them in the first place. In fact, to a certain opinions and ambitions. These characteris- extent, they can make things worse - and can tics, especially after the Ahmadinejad experi- rarely escape the socioeconomic fissures they ence, do not endear him to the supreme lead- have failed to heal. Thus, the fundamental er. Ayatollah Khamenei is thus faced with a structural problems of the Islamic Republic - kind of dilemma between executive skills the perpetually unanswered questions of so- and political loyalty. cial justice, economic development and po- litical participation - compel each group and The final candidate, whose name has been segment of the political elite to come up with touted off and on over the past year, is Iran’s some kind of response, temporary as well as chief nuclear negotiator, . A bona long term. This remains a constant as the fide conservative in the mould of the supreme system goes through its cycles of contraction leader himself, he is considered to be particu- and expansion in allowing differing political larly well placed to receive support by many in perspectives and solutions to these problems. the ‘principlist’ camp as a younger and more It does not matter how wide or narrow the reliable version of Velayati and Ahmadinejad. political discourse is: even within the nar- Yet he lacks executive experience and is not rowest of political spectrums, a certain vari- a household name, as most of his activity has ation of answers will arise in response to the been in the foreign policy arena - where he same recurrent questions. Therefore, even if seems to be determined to follow the tough left only with the Jalilis and Qalibafs of this line laid down by the supreme leader. world - both from the conservative political family - contenders will end up adopting dif- The bottom line(s) ferent stances and devising different answers to the most compelling issues. Some func- The two paramount issues in this election are tional equivalent of the left vs. right, reform- the economy and the need to improve the ists vs. ‘principlists’ divide will thus develop political environment. The economy is the and assert itself all over again. central issue par excellence. Its deterioration is increasingly being felt by a cross section Rouzbeh Parsi is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS. of society. There is a palpable lack of trust in the government’s management of the eco- nomic situation, with galloping inflation, highly unstable currency and unemployment rates that leave little hope for each genera- tion of new college and university graduates. More than any other issue, this is what the candidates need to (and will) address. The issue of the political environment may be perceived as more technocratic and endemic to the Islamic Republic’s fabric and style of politics; yet it is crucial both for how domes- tic reforms can be implemented and Iran’s foreign policy developed. Several candidates have criticised President Ahmadinejad for his confrontational style in foreign policy. In stra- tegic terms, however, most goals are set and ambitions framed elsewhere (e.g. in Supreme National Security Council), but the president

European Union Institute for Security Studies June 2013 4

QN-AK-13-021-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1110

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