Guardian Politics in Iran: a Comparative Inquiry Into the Dynamics of Regime Survival
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GUARDIAN POLITICS IN IRAN: A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY INTO THE DYNAMICS OF REGIME SURVIVAL A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Payam Mohseni, M.A. Washington, DC June 22, 2012 Copyright 2012 by Payam Mohseni All Rights Reserved ii GUARDIAN POLITICS IN IRAN: A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY INTO THE DYNAMICS OF REGIME SURVIVAL Payam Mohseni, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated a singular institutional resiliency that has been absent in other countries where “colored revolutions” have succeeded in overturning incumbents, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, or where popular uprisings like the current Arab Spring have brought down despots or upended authoritarian political landscapes, including Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and even Syria. Moreover, it has accomplished this feat without a ruling political party, considered by most scholars to be the key to stable authoritarianism. Why has the Iranian political system proven so durable? Moreover, can the explanation for such durability advance a more deductive science of authoritarian rule? My dissertation places Iran within the context of guardian regimes—or hybrid regimes with ideological military, clerical or monarchical institutions steeped in the politics of the state, such as Turkey and Thailand—to explain the durability of unstable polities that should be theoretically prone to collapse. “Hybrid” regimes that combine competitive elections with nondemocratic forms of rule have proven to be highly volatile and their average longevity is significantly shorter than that of other regime types. My study demonstrates how guardian regimes that produce a strong system of checks-and-balances through ideologically buttressed veto players are more adept at surviving as a hybrid political system. Guardian checks-and- balances produce gradual, inclusive and re-distributive process of institutional transformation that attracts multiple stakeholders in the political order while simultaneously preventing the monopolization of power by any one group. To delineate these mechanisms at work, I undertake iii a comparative analysis of the policymaking processes of Iran in regards to the state’s economic privatization drive. The findings are consequently compared to policymaking on economic privatization in Russia, which is moving towards greater authoritarianism, and Turkey, which is democratizing. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have been very fortunate for all of the help and support I’ve received throughout the entire process of researching and writing this dissertation. My deepest gratitude goes to my dissertation committee whose members both nurtured the development of my theoretical thoughts from the very beginning of my doctoral study at Georgetown University and guided me throughout this challenging journey. My dissertation would not have been possible without the incredible support and encouragement of my advisor, Daniel Brumberg. Thank you for believing in me and pushing me to strive beyond my own expectations. Your thoughts and writings have been truly significant in my intellectual development. I am forever indebted to Marc Morjé Howard for his unwavering support and astute guidance throughout the different stages of this endeavor. My intellectual interest in political regimes—and hybrid regimes in particular—was sparked by you, and my advancement in this field of study has been a direct result of your kind encouragement and constant help. Thank you so much for your valuable commitment to me as both your student and friend. I am truly grateful to Steven Heydemann who opened my eyes to the beautiful complexity and rigor in the study of political science and whose keen insights have greatly shaped and guided my work. I sincerely appreciate all of the substantive knowledge and help you have provided me in this process. Beyond my committee, I owe special thanks to Juan Linz for his invaluable guidance and advice on my dissertation as well as on my work on hybrid regimes more broadly. As a professor, his intellectual passion, humbleness, sincerity, and kindness are truly inspirational qualities—providing me with a role-model I could only wish to follow. I am thankful to Farideh Fardi for her guidance on Iranian politics and her extensive comments and feedback on different aspects of my Iranian case study. I would also like to express my gratitude to Clyde Wilcox, v Andrew Bennett, Samer Shehata, and Harley Balzer at Georgetown University and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Michael Watts, and Gillian Hart at U.C. Berkeley for their important role in my theoretical studies and intellectual development. I am particularly grateful to Michael Watts for awakening my interest in the social sciences and encouraging me to find the courage and passion to follow my dreams. My experience undertaking two years of fieldwork in Iran was both intellectually productive and personally meaningful. I gained the opportunity to not only become intimately acquainted with the culture and lifestyle of the people and to study the political processes of the country but to also reconnect and spend time with my extended family, relatives, and friends. I am grateful to each and every one of them for their indispensable help and support throughout my stay. I would also like to thank the members and staff of the Iran Privatization Organization, the Presidential High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad, the Iranian National Library, the University of Tehran Library, and the Center for Doctrinal Analysis who helped me in the pursuit of my research. Thanks are also due to my fellow colleagues at Georgetown University for their friendship and camaraderie throughout my studies, including Jocelyn Mitchell, Enrique Bravo Escobar, Philipp Bleek, Seth Robinson, and Lorena Buzon. I would like to specially thank Leah Gilbert, with whom I have the fortune of sharing my theoretical interest and work on hybrid regimes. I will never forget the unique experience and teamwork we displayed in our research and writing on hybrid regimes. I am grateful for all of the help and feedback you have given me on my work. To Felipe Mantilla, thank you for your friendship and the countless hours of conversation that made my time at Georgetown that much more intellectually stimulating. And I am indebted to you for all of the help, thoughts, and comments you provided on my work. vi My greatest thanks and appreciation are to my family members without whom I could have never undertaken this dissertation. Thanks to Maman Lila, Nazila, Mehrshad, Mehrdad, Baba Saeed, and Susan. Your inexhaustible love and unwavering support have been pivotal throughout my education. In particular, I am very grateful to my grandmother who has taught me the importance of compassion, wisdom, and love and has always encouraged me to strive towards my fullest potential. Thank you, and I love you all. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my great-grandmother, Zohreh Joon, who passed away during my stay in Iran. I will always miss you. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Part I. The Puzzle and Theory of Hybrid Regime Survival Chapter One: Guardian Regimes—Halfway Houses that Stand 12 Chapter Two: The Politics of Managed Instability 39 Part II. Regime Resiliency & Transformation in Iran Chapter Three: Privatization and Elite Contestation in an Islamic State 70 Chapter Four: Contentious Negotiations: The Rewards of Collective Policymaking 115 Chapter Five: Delegating Privatization: The Battle to Implement Change 153 Part III. Elaborating the Paradigm Chapter Six: Regime Change and Survival in Comparative Perspective 196 Conclusion 244 Appendix A: Classification of Iranian Political Factions 253 Appendix B: Illustrations of “Islamic” Social Science Models 264 Appendix C: The General Policies of Article 44 of the Islamic Republic of Iran 269 Bibliography 275 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Attempted Cases of Iranian Strategic Institutional Change 66 Figure 2. The Power Structure of the Iranian Regime 87 Figure 3. Classification of Political Factions in the Islamic Republic of Iran 92 Figure 4. Factional Alliance from 1980 – 1988 in the Islamic Republic of Iran 97 Figure 5. Alliance of the Theocratic Right and the Republican Right from 1989 – 1996 99 Figure 6. Alliance of the Republican Left and the Republican Right from 1997 – 2004 104 Figure 7. Iranian Privatization Revenues, 1991 – 2005 106 Figure 8. Alliance of the Theocratic Left and Theocratic Right from 2005 – 2012 108 Figure 9. The Positions of Important Regime Figures in 2001 112 Figure 10. The Positions of Important Regime Figures in 2008 113 Figure 11. Iranian Privatization Revenues 165 Figure 12. Yearly Privatization Revenues by Economic Sector in Billion Iranian Rials 167 Figure 13. Yearly Privatization Shares (%) by Economic Sector 167 Figure 14. Total Privatization Shares (%) by Sector, March 2005 – 2009 168 Figure 15. Comparative Privatization Revenues 169 Figure 16. Turkish Privatization Revenues, 1985 – 2010 201 Figure 17. Comparison of Turkish Privatization Revenues Before and After 2005 202 Figure 18. Freedom of Press Ratings in Turkey, 2002 – 2011 222 Figure 19. Examples of Continuum-Based Classifications of Iranian Factions 256 Figure 20. Abbasi’s Representation of Iranian Factions in 2005 259 Figure 21. Abbasi’s Representation of Iranian Factions in 2006 261 ix Figure 22. Humanism