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Home , Ali Akbar Velayati, Ali Larijani, Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, Mehdi Bazargan, Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad Javad Zarif

A report on a recent development in the Middle East and the Muslim world.

A Survey of the Islamic Republic of ’s Elite

Introduction 1- The Leadership 2- The Executive Branch 3- Beyond the Executive Branch 4- The IRGC Leadership

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 15 September 2014 2 Introduction

One of the defining features of the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran is the unique nature of its political class. “Political class” here is taken to mean the segment of society which holds incumbency in state institutions, according to the definitions of Gaetano Mosca and others. The Islamic Republic’s ruling elite is at once restricted and diverse. It encompasses a complex mix of pious laity and Shi’ite clergy of various levels and prominence. It also lacks some of the basic elements of other modern political elite classes, such as structured and well-defined parties. The Iranian political class seeks to substitute its lack of political parties with the alternative model of “factions,” loosely organized congregations of figures who hold common views on key themes, such as foreign and defense policy or social management. This characterization, popularized by the analyses of international media and prominent academic and think-tank studies, is too broad to be truly accurate.While factions do exist within the Iranian system, they are amorphous, lack discipline, and find themselves splintered at times of major divisions within the elite, such as the period following the contested 2009 elections. It is more useful to note that the Islamic Republic’s elite is structured along clannish lines, with influential figures scattered across the various institutions. These figures create loose and flexible groups of supporters and followers, who in turn rely upon their patrons for access to political positions, privilege, and a durable presence within the upper rungs of state institutions. By and large, the most prominent political figure in this configuration of the state is Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. However, it should be noted that the atomised and informal mechanisms which govern the state system, and which have roots in traditional forms of interaction within Iranian society, also gravitate against attempts to impose a more rigid authoritarian system and effectively ward off dictatorship through a complex mechanism of bargaining and negotiation1. In order to understand how Iran’s political class works, it is crucial to examine the processes which grant entry into the political elite. The lack of structured political organizations, or parties, makes the “card-carrying” method common to many party-based systems, whether democratic or not, irrelevant to political prominence. This is important, as it has led to figures having a lower standing within the elite, such as , gaining incumbency in high political office without being endorsed as a consensus candidate or becoming a leader of a major political organization. A complex web of interpersonal relations forms the basis of the Islamic Republic’s political elite. The following presents the main protagonists of the current elite of the Islamic Republic will be presented, through a scheme which looks at their positioning within the various branches of state.

1- Thedowreh , for example, is a traditional, informal gathering, limited usually to no more than half a dozen participants. Its aim is that of bringing together influential personalities of different persuasions, and remits, and to foster the collective influence and benefit. The dowreh has been a staple of Iranian social interaction throughout the past century.

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1 - The Leadership: Seyyed

This overriding goal has resulted, however, in Khamenei becoming increasingly suspicious and allergic to attempts at political change and reform. Khamenei has two major political strategies that have been instrumental to his success: he has created a multi-layered strata of elite laymen and clergy who wholly owe their positions of privilege and authority to his decision-making, and are therefore firmly beholden to him, and he has resolutely refused Seyyed Ali Khamenei to recant any executive decision. This latter characteristic has made him, inter alia, oblivious Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei to calls for a scale-down of the political is the second Supreme Leader of the Islamic repression in 2009. While generally portrayed Republic. Born in in 1939, Khamenei as a haughty, xenophobic figure who resolutely belongs to the generation of religious abhors the West, politically and culturally, revolutionary figures who were closely Khamenei’s actual worldview has remained an associated with Khomeini until his death in enigma to many, including close affiliates, as 1989 and held high political office during the episode surrounding the rare publication of the first decade of the Revolution. A non- a biography of the Leader in 2012 suggests. charismatic and dour personality, Khamenei Khamenei almost entirely owes his current has proven to possess remarkable resilience and political power to his post-revolutionary expertise in the handling of state matters. His activities. By the time of the fall of the ’s control of the state edifice grew from a fragile regime, in 1979, Khamenei was one among alliance with the then power broker Hashemi many lower-ranking clerics who had taken part Rafsanjani in 1989 to comprehensive control in the revolutionary activities and had remained at present. At heart, Khamenei is a pragmatist faithful to Khomeini since the latter’s exile in who aspires to be the third figure in Iranian 1964. While there is evidence that his activities modern history (after Mozafereddin Shah2 in led to his questioning by the Shah’s secret 1906 and his predecessor, Khomeini, in 1989) police Savak, a jail term, and exile, there is little to die in office. evidence that his activities were as influential as

2- The monarch who granted Iran’s constitution in 1906, and died peacefully the following year, while in power. This feat was repeated only by Khomeini in 1989, as all other monarchs (Mohammad Ali Shah, Ahmad Shah for the Qajars and Reza and Mohammad for the Pahlavis died in exile).

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 4 those of other figures, like the late By that time, Khamenei had become a and Hossein Beheshti or prominent MP for and would lead the Hashemi Rafsanjani. However, Khamenei charge against President Bani-Sadr during his possessed enough clout to be included in impeachment proceedings in . By the the inner circles of Khomeini’s supporters end of that year, Khamenei would suddenly be from the spring of 1979, when he served as catapulted to the presidency by the mini civil war deputy defence minister in the Provisional which occurred after bani-sadr’s ejection from Revolutionary Government of . office and the assassination of both Beheshti4 and The post provided Khamenei with experience in the second president, Mohammad Ali Rajai. military affairs and the armed forces that would It was only after the Rajai’s death that later prove useful to him,3 especially since most Khomeini backed down from his insistence Iranian clergy were ignorant in military matters. on banning clerics from the executive branch. By the autumn of 1979, Khamenei was also Khamenei, then secretary-general of the IRP, one of the leaders of the Islamic Republic Party was elected almost unopposed. (Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami), the organisation The election of Khamenei brought an end to that was hastily set up by Khomeini’s clerical the period of relative anarchy at the helm of the followers as a way of differentiating itself from government, becoming as he did the first Iranian other parties (Mojahedin-e Khalq, Fadayan-e president to serve out his first and second terms. Khalq, Tudeh in primis) which had emerged The period from 1981-1989 was also, however, from the underground to mass popular support marked by political confrontations which would in 1979. Both Khamenei and Rafsanjani would have a deep and lasting effect during following play peripheral roles in the turbulent politics of decades. In its quest to limit the authority that period. On a trip to Mecca at the time of the of President Bani-Sadr, due to concern over takeover of the US Embassy, both figures were Khomeini’s refusal to accept his removal from left out of the complex negotiations that would office, the Parliament had drastically curtailed bring an end to the saga in January 1981. the powers of the presidency, reducing its

3- Khamenei made much future use of the experience gained during the Bazargan period in his future position as commander in chief of the armed forces. As opposed to Khomeini, who was also constitutionally bestowed the post but preferred to delegate it to other state figures, Khamenei actively assumed control over the armed forces, amd nurtured a class of chiefs of staff loyal to himself, particularly with regards to the IRGC. 4- Ayatollah was a pivotal figure of the early stages of the Revolution. An urbane, astute political player, he coordinated the late push of the opposition to the Shah in the latter part of the Seventies and became a key member of the Khomeini loyalists in 1979. He was the mentor and inspiration for a whole generation of politically-minded and active clerics, such as the presidents Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rowhani, who all openly acknowledge the importance of their encounter with Beheshti in their political formation. He was also the key figure behind the founding of the Islamic Republic Party Hezb( -e Jomhuri-ye Islami) in , and developed it into the vehicle for confronting the other major political parties then active on the scene, such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq and Tudeh Parties. Beheshti successfully engineered the IRP’s success in the first parliamentary elections of 1980, and used the party’s control over the chamber to engineer the progressive weakening and downfall of President Bani-Sadr. His assassination in July 1981, when he was slain together with 71 other high ranking officials, deprived the Khomeinist front of a key strategist. He was never fully replaced, but the figure who comes the closest to his vision and mindset is .

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 5 capacity to appoint senior economic officials, semi-public support for Mousavi’s premiership, including the governor of the Central Bank, succeeded in bringing about 99 votes against and assigning to the prime minister most of the Mousavi in a parliamentary confidence vote. powers in the selection of cabinet members. The case, which became known as the “affair Khamenei suffered an early political defeat in of the 99 people”, was a key turning point in the weeks following his election as president, the political history of the Islamic Republic. It when he tried to propose a political ally, Ali pitted the emerging right and left-wing factions Akbar Velayati, then a non-descript MP for more clearly against each other and deeply Tehran, as the new prime minister. The proposal affected the psychology of the confrontation was shot down by radical MPs, who proposed between the sides, with Khamenei emerging as Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the caretaker Foreign a clearly disadvantaged figure in the aftermath minister. An assertive member of the emerging of his unsuccessful tussle with Mousavi. left factions, Mousavi would spend the next Khamenei’s prestige and standing would be four years exerting increasing control over the further damaged in early 1988, when, in response executive branch, to the extent that it is rumored to the Labour Minister’s quest for more authority that Khamenei considered not running for to deal with the private sector, he sought to office again upon the end of his first mandate. prevent the cabinet and the Prime Minister Persuaded to run by Khomeini’s office, he from accruing even more powers. Khomeini nevertheless appeared on national TV during the responded by publicly criticizing Khamenei’s electoral campaign and proceeded to severely understanding of Shari’a principles. After being lambast his lack of authority, claiming that his very publicly rebuked, Khamenei lost further “hands were tied behind his back” when it came ground. The president also suffered a partial to criticizing the Economics minister for the state humiliation in the days following the publication of the economy. Khamenei’s easy re-election of Khomeini’s fatwa against , did not alleviate increasing tensions. Exploiting when he stated, during Friday prayers at Tehran a loophole in the Constitution, Khamenei University, that the world’s Muslims could pushed for the creation of a new government forgive the author should he express remorse after his re-election, and once again attempted and called upon the flock to avoid attacking to place Velayati in the Prime Minister’s seat. Western embassies as retaliation, before being Khamenei’s attempts were, however, thwarted admonished, both by the prime minister and by a report on troop morale allegedly provided Khomeini’s office, on the inalterable nature of by the then-commander in chief of the IRGC, Khomeini’s order. Mohsen Rezai, who stated that Mousavi’s By the summer of 1989, Khamenei was an popularity within the armed forces would result increasingly beleaguered figure, a member of in the weakening of military resolve in the army Khomeini’s inner circle but unable to make in the case of his departure. inroads in his quest for additional political Undeterred by the turning tide, Khamenei authority and also at the receiving end of sought to force the issue, and, despite Khomeini’s several significant political defeats. The death of

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Khomeini, however, brought a swift change in the creation of dozens of religious schools his political fortunes. Through what is likely to producing ulama loyal to him. This last step is have been an error of judgement by Rafsanjani, in particular buttressed by Khamenei’s sense who saw in Khamenei a weak and docile figure of insecurity within the clerical establishment, who would allow him carte blanche in his an insecurity he sought to address by staging reconstruction efforts, Khamenei was elevated to media operations, such as the photographing of the Supreme Leader position without having the the orderly masses of talabehs (students) who required religious pre-requisites, or substantial routinely gather at his official residence for backing within the political and clerical systems. Kharej lessons.5 This sort of visual portrayal This controversial selection, which also resulted of Khamenei’s mujtahid skills stands in strong in the overnight elevation of his religious rank, contrast to that of leading marji’s such as Sistani in the official media, from Hojjatoleslam to in or Vahid Khorasani in , who rarely Ayatollah, also meant that Khamenei was forced if ever resort to making use of student numbers to build a new power structure for himself, a to shore up their clerical credentials. It has to task which he set out to do from 1989. be noted here that, despite frequent reports on the staggering value of financial institutions Khamenei the Supreme Leader connected to Khamenei’s office.6 Khamenei For the past 25 years, Khamenei has been does not have a culture of ostentatious wealth steadily increasing his influence within the and opulence that was a hallmark of African state system, driven primarily by the experience leaders such as Mobutu or Bokassa or, to some of the 1980s and the desire to keep potential extent, the former Shah. Rather, he spends rivals at bay. He has worked hard to exercise the vastly accumulated wealth to fund his strong control over the newer generations of patronage network, thereby strengthening his the Islamic Republic’s elite, particularly over hold on power. figures, now in their fifties and sixties, who have Khamenei has repeatedly clashed with the a scant or less than central personal relationship remnants, and newer versions, of his foes of the with Khomeini. A key conduit towards 1980s. In the spring of 1992, the sole institution achieving such loyalty has been a complex which was a left-over from the Khomeini era, patronage network which is bonded by elements the Third Majles, was due for renewal. Together such as subventions paid to war veterans and with President Rafsanjani, Khamenei was political martyrs’ relatives, the assignment of instrumental in the creation of a mechanism, political and economic privilege to Khamenei’s called Nezarat-e Estesvabi, which empowered clients in the armed forces and institutions, Council to reject candidacies

5- Kharej is the highest level of teaching provided by a mujtahid. In a sense, it is the “master class” of a mujtahid, which is usually delivered prized disciples on the verge of graduating. Delivering kharej also confirms the cleric’s standing as a respected and sought-after instructor, hence the insistence on the media coverage of Khamenei’s sessions. 6- See the Reuters investigation on the Setad-e Farman Imam.

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 7 for elections at all levels without the need to allowed him to sidestep the agreement and push present a valid justification. This rule, which for the resumption of uranium enrichment in was adopted in 1992 to ensure that the left wing, 2005, when he felt that Iran had something to once aligned to Mousavi, would be ejected from gain from a radical posture. Parliament, has been used repeatedly since Despite this elasticity, which enables him to then to exclude figures critical of Khamenei exert flexibility in his foreign policy decision- and his side, most particularly the reformist making, Khamenei’s overall stance regarding parliamentary candidates in 2004 and 2008. issues of major concern has also seen little Khamenei rapidly consolidated the armed sign of change over the years. His rhetoric forces, reducing the regular army to a largely on the remains a caustic one, spent force and buttressing the position and laden with pessimism over the possibility of a power of the IRGC, the leadership of which he durable rapprochement, although somewhat came to strictly control with figures who, after less stringent and uncompromising than that 1997, were bereft of loyalties except to himself. of Ayatollah Khomeini. This has allowed In foreign policy as much as domestic policy, proponents of a grand bargain with Washington Khamenei is guided by an overall principle: to further their case during the past couple of he refuses to backtrack on any decision or decades. Khamenei also exhibits loyalty and directive. He is therefore deliberately vague patronal care for his closest allies, some of whom on certain occasions and stern on others. Since have been close to him since the early 1980s. June 2009, he has uncompromisingly supported However, this patronism does not automatically the idea that the official results of the presidential translate into a capacity to convince the elections of that year were the correct ones, Supreme Leader to take their side or heed refuting all accusations of fraud and effectively their advice. During the presidential debates of forcing other leading state figures, from the 2013, , who has been close current president Rowhani to former presidents to Khamenei since at least 1981, revealed that Khatami and Rafsanjani, to keep silent about any he had been strongly opposed to the nuclear doubts. He is also unwilling or unable to backtrack stance of then-chief negotiatior, Said Jalili, but over the claims raised by the leaders of the Green had been effectively neutralised by Khamenei’s movement, Mousavi and . advocacy on his behalf. Khamenei also has an Khamenei’s other key strategy is tactical uneasy relationship with his own political past. vagueness in key ambits of decision-making, In the spring of 2012, a research institute linked such as foreign policy. According to the to the intelligence services, the Political Studies memoirs of Hassan Rowhani, he did not give, Research Institute (www.ir-psri.com), produced for example, direct and explicit approval for the first-ever political biography of Khamenei, the EU3-Iran Tehran agreement of 2004, but which only covered his life up to the Revolution rather allowed a member of his staff to convey a of 1979. Its main author was Hedayatollah tentative deal in the midst of crucial negotations Behbudi, a poet who was part of Khamenei’s with the EU3 foreign ministers in Tehran. This inner circle of intellectuals and who often took

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 8 part in poetry readings at his official residence. the interests of continuity and conservatism, The book, called Sharh-e Esm, was presented making meaningful, radical change in Iran for a single day at the annual Tehran Book Fair, extremely arduous. Khamenei is guided by the before being withdrawn from circulation due to repeated setbacks he endured during the 1980s what Khamenei’s office defined to be “numerous and is determined to prevent these figures’ factual errors”. The close coordination between return to power. From this perspective, the Behbudi and Khamenei’s office renders such a candidacy of Mir-Hossein Mousavi in 2009 can scenario improbable. It is more likely that the only be seen as driven by the desire to mount a book was taken to task for having used sources, significant challenge to his rule, rather than by such as the unpublished interview conducted the realisation, by either of the two figures, that during Khamenei’s presidential tenure released they would be able to put the past behind them by the Center for Documentation of the Islamic and establish a working relationship. On the Revolution, which the Leader didn’t deem other hand, Hassan Rowhani offered Khamenei befitting to his current status. The incident did sufficient guarantees for a technocratic term bring to light the extent to which Khamenei unhindered by attempts to shore up authority acolytes could be unaware of his inner thoughts or establish political allies in positions of and sentiments. power, a move which weakened both Mahmoud Khamenei’s relationships with the presidents Ahmadinejad and . who have served under him have often been Khamenei’s future political outlook appears fraught with tension and crisis. Typically, after an to be a continuation of his current cautious, risk- initial “honeymoon” period of variable duration, averse but ultimately highly conservative style the ties invariably have come under strain as the of governance. He appears to have consolidated presidents have chafed against the same lack his standing among the younger generations of of authority which permeated Khamenei’s own Islamic Republic zealots by asserting himself as presidency. The specific reasons for the falling the sole real successor to Ayatollah Khomeini and out between the Leader and the presidents have the only authentic interpreter of his exalted values also varied. In Rafsanjani’s case, his inability to and worldview. He is in command of the upper build strong societal and intra-elite support for echelons of the armed forces and IRGC, which are economic reform and his feeble performance at filled with younger generation officers who have the 1993 presidential elections was the basis for no other political patron or backer. However, his Khamenei’s alignment with his right-wing rivals. attempts to control the political scene have been After witnessing the relaxation of restrictions on less successful. Besides the Green Movement the political press and the publication of articles challenge of 2009-2012, the failed attempt to critical of himself, Khamenei progressively bring about generational change with the rise of reined in the pluralist media of the early Khatami Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has led to the renewed era and began implementing limitations on rise of Khamenei’s own generation, in the form free expression which continue to this day. of Rowhani and his associates. Khamenei has In this as in other spheres, Khamenei acts in also been unable to uproot the reformist factions

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 9 from their marginalized but lively presence in the political and media scene. However, as Khamenei enters the twilight of his life, it is becoming increasingly difficult for him to steer the political elite towards a consensual process for the selection of his successor, a feature which Khomeini was able to bring about with a high degree of effectiveness. The lack of a clear successor and Khamenei’s weak support within the clerical Mojtaba ranks, where he commands the loyalty of only a handful of middle-ranking Shi’ite scholars, may Mojtaba is a mid to low ranking cleric lead to uncertainty over the future incumbency of who had largely kept out of the political his position. As things stand, however, Khamenei limelight until the presidential elections of is all but assured of meeting his aim of dying in 2005, when then-candidate Mehdi Karroubi office and setting a precedent in Iranian history accused him, in an open letter, of organizing that will be tough to emulate. the systematic tampering of the first-round results, in which Karroubi dropped to third Other Prominent Members of the Leadership place and was eliminated after leading in the Office early results. Mojtaba was also alleged to have Khamenei’s main organisational base is the been instrumental in persuading his father to Bayt-e Rahbari (the Leader’s House, “Bayt” switch his backing from the former national being the usual term for the entourage and police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to administrative structure associated to high- Ahmadinejad, and therefore being instrumental ranking Shi’ite ulama), a sprawling organisation in the latter’s success against Rafsanjani in the which has evaded accountability and scrutiny run-off. Mojtaba is thought to have been within by external entities throughout the past two the more radical wing of Khamenei’s associates decades. Details on its inner workings are only during the protests of 2009, urging a heavy hand tentative, and often subject to exaggeration against the Green Movement. and spin by exiled opponents of the Islamic Despite his proximity to his father and his Republic. Several figures within the Bayt have, perceived influence, Mojtaba does not hold however, acquired public notoriety in recent formal office within the Bayt, in significant years and are influential both within the Bayt and contrast with , who held the as consultants to Khamenei on pressing matters title of chief of staff of the founder of the Islamic of state. Principal amongst these are the son of Republic, regulating contact with the Ayatollah the Leader, Mojtaba, his chief of staff, Ayatollah and directing most of his decisionmaking in Mohammadi-Golpayegani, and an IRGC officer the last years of his rule. Besides maintaining who is the main aide-de-camp of Khamenei, the physical capacity to deal with state affairs Vahid Haghanian. directly, which eluded Khomeini past 1986,

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Khamenei appears to be reluctant to involve his and the trust of the latter do not automatically immediate family in the handling of state affairs, translate into the Leader accepting the advice of and is therefore preventing Mojtaba from both such figures and rendering them executive. gaining direct political experience and building up an autonomous power base which would help him to succeed his father. Both Ayatollah Golpayegani and Vahid Haghanian are considered to be largely colourless figures who are strongly beholden to Khamenei and are dutifully involved in the running of his office. Neither of the two has a power base or appears to harbour ambitions towards authority Ali Akbar Velayati in the period following the passing of Khamenei. Other figures gravitate around the Bayt, serving Another key figure in the consultative ring Khamenei in a consultative manner. The close to Khamenei is Gholam Ali Haddad former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, a Adel. A philosopher by training, Haddad is paediatrician by training, has remained one of related to Khamenei by marriage: his daughter his closest political allies since the early 1980s is married to Khamenei’s son. Similarly to and was Khamenei’s preferred choice for prime Velayati, Haddad is a traditionalist conservative minister throughout this period. Despite his who strongly opposes reformist attempts to solid conservative credentials, Velayati has relax Islamic restrictions on social life and is become an outspoken proponent of détente with probably the leading light in the formulation of the West in recent times. After being rumoured Khamenei’s cultural policies. to have been a conduit between the Bayt and US diplomats for years, he revealed, during the heated televised debates of the 2013 presidential elections, to have been close to reaching a personal agreement with President Sarkozy of over the nuclear issue, only to be derailed by Ahmadinejad. Velayati’s caustic attacks on then-chief nuclear negotiator Said Jalili, whom he accused of confusing the negotiating rounds Gholam Ali Haddad Adel for “ classes”, also revealed the extent to which he had opposed, ostensibly in front of One of the most central figures in the Islamic Khamenei, the isolationist policies of 2005-2013. Republic’s crowded upper echelons, Hashemi Nevertheless, Khamenei’s firm backing for Jalili Rafsanjani could well stake claim to being the and the effective lack of success of Velayati’s Islamic Republic’s only real politician, capable of efforts indicate that proximity to Khamenei surviving waxing and waning political fortunes

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 11 and steadily maintaining a central role in the started off gradually. He was part, together political sphere despite over three decades of with Khamenei and other Khomeini stalwarts, unabated presence. Born around 75 years ago of the initial nucleus of the Islamic Republic in the Kerman region, Rafsanjani emerged from Party (IRP), which was set up by the Ayatollah’s the well-to-do rural bourgeoisie of his region to supporters to be independent from the other become an early religious and political disciple parties then active on the scene, such as the of Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom. As opposed Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Tudeh. After acting to Ayatollah Khamenei, with whom he has as deputy minister in the PRG, acting Interior maintained a unique, bittersweet relationship for minister in the winter of 1979-1980 and member most of the past four decades, Rafsanjani was of the Revolutionary Council, Rafsanjani settled immediately drawn into the central group of down as Speaker of Parliament in 1980, a post Khomeini’s acolytes, editing religious publications which he consolidated as a personal fiefdom in Qom before and after the exile of his mentor until his transfer to the presidency in 1989. in 1964. An active organiser, Rafsanjani endured During these 9 years, Rafsanjani emerged as the several spells in prison throughout the Sixties indispensable power broker who would often and Seventies, but was widely regarded as a fine decisively mediate between various warring political strategist. This reputation was cemented personalities and factions. Khomeini’s trust by his presence alongside Khomeini and his first in his judgement and capacities was almost prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, on the stage unbounded, as demonstrated by his decision to of the press conference in which the Ayatollah give Rafsanjani the role of acting Commander announced the creation of the Provisional in Chief of the Armed Forces and agreeing to his Revolutionary Government, on 4 February 1979. view that the war against Iraq was unwinnable, From that moment onwards, Rafsanjani became a concession that led to the acceptance of UN linked with the higher levels of state power. Resolution 598 in 1988. Rafsanjani’s political orientation has Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remained in a state of flux over the past several decades. While remaining loyal to Khomeini in the 1960s and 1970s, he exhibited signs of support for the early ideology of the Mojahedin Khalq, and helped some of their leaders meet with Khomeini in in the mid-1970s. By the time of his rise to the speakership of Parliament, Rafsanjani had developed a keen sense for sensing the direction of political expediency, and adapting to it. In the moments following Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the impeachment of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in June 1981 he immediately called on MPs to Rafsanjani’s post-revolutionary political career direct their wrath to the United States and to

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 12 press on with “Death to America” chants. Even his elevation by acting as a subservient figure so, he authorised and coordinated the secret US in the next stage of Rafsanjani’s political career, mission to Tehran, as part of the Iran-Contra that of president. He did not turn out to be affair, less than five years later. At present, correct. It was here that Rafsanjani’s systemic he is an almost outspoken supporter of direct shortcoming, the lack of either desire or ability Iran-US ties. He entrenched himself within the to create a structured political apparatus, bosom of the right-wing during most of the emerged to significantly affect the relationship Khatami years, doing nothing to stop hardline between the two. While Khamenei rapidly built repression against dissident intellectuals and up a formidable power base for himself, quickly activists. He was the subject of incessant attacks acquiring the unflinching loyalty of armed by the reformist media, who portrayed him as forces and a considerable amount of the political an eminence grise who sought to stymie the factions, Rafsanjani fell prey to antagonism pathway towards change in Iran During the on both sides of the political spectrum for his Ahmadinejad years, he changed orientation, policies, a greatly diminishing his capacity for becoming a beacon for the moderate factions economic reform, especially during his second and possibly achieving the high point of his mandate in office. popularity in 2013, when he was excluded from After his departure from the executive branch the presidential race by the . in 1997, Rafsanjani maintained considerable In short, Rafsanjani has been one of the few, if political relevance, more so than the other two only, senior politicians of the Islamic Republic former presidents of post-Khomeini Iran. He to place the evolving exigencies of the time settled at the Expediency Council, a body which over a more static ideological worldview. This mediates over disputes between the Guardian has often generated severe antagonism towards Council and the Parliament, and sided decisively him from other layers of the Islamic Republic’s with the former during periods of heightened political elite. intra-institutional confrontations in 2000- The most decisive moment of Rafsanjani’s 2004. In 2005, as the political confrontation political career came in 1989, when he picked between the neo-right wing, spearheaded by up the reins of the swift process which led Ahmadinejad, and similar radical conservatives to Ayatollah Khamenei becoming the new and the reformist wing began to heat up, he Supreme Leader. At a time when most of clumsily entered the fray of the electoral contest the political elite was left reeling, physically by running a spirited campaign. The campaign and mentally, from the shock of the founding was mostly organized at the grassroots by father’s death, Rafsanjani quickly and ably younger Iranians, some of whom mystified their constructed a case for Khamenei’s election by fellow citizens by mimicking an American- by referring to instances in which Khomeini was style campaign. Due to the alignment of said to have considered Khamenei as a worthy conservative bloc votes against him, (controlled successor. Rafsanjani’s calculus rested on the in part by Khomeini), but also because of the assumption that Khamenei would compensate public’s weariness of establishment politicians,

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Rafsanjani ultimately lost the run-off against adept at bouncing back from political Ahmadinejad. He then entered four years of setbacks throughout his career and, as the later sulking opposition, meekly but continuously Ahmadinejad years frayed the internal unity of voicing his disgust at Ahmadinejad’s policies. In the political class, he appeared to have returned 2009, he was widely rumoured to be supportive to his preferred role of senior statesman, a wise of Mousavi, and wrote a detailed letter to old figure with whom all layers of the state should Khamenei, prior to the start of polling, on the consult prior to taking significant decisions,. The strong possibility of fraud. His appeals for a extent to which he can provide cover and support swift liberation of the dozens of high-ranking for Rowhani in the bumpy road ahead remains political officials incarcerated following the to be seen, but his current status is a bonus for elections, delivered during his last Friday Prayer the current president, given the proximity of sermon in July 2009, went similarly unheeded their political views and their common career and, alongside other moderate leaders such as trajectories. Most observers are still perplexed Mohammad Khatami, he entered into a period by the complexity of his relationship with of political seclusion. Khamenei, which alternates between perceived Rafsanjani has, however, been remarkably antagonism and lukewarm collaboration.

2 – The Executive Branch

The executive branch of the Islamic Republic The Current President – Hassan Rowhani has always been the locus for political turmoil and confrontation. Successive presidents, both before and after the constitutional revision of 1989, have had to come to terms with the fundamental contradiction of the presidential position: it is simultaneously the only nationally elected institution and a role whose effectiveness is hampered by both constitutional and informal limitations. The vagueness of many constitutional prescriptions on the presidency Hassan Rowhani has led to the presidents of post-Khomeini Iran, particularly Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rowhani presents both similarities Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to resort to complex with and crucial differences from his predecessors. but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to shore up He did not rise to the presidency on the cusp of their personal power and authority. a faction within the Islamic Republic’s elite

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 14 seeking a springboard to power after time on the kept his post, albeit with a reduced majority, fringes, like Khatami, nor did rise to prominence for the first five legislatures. In Parliament, he after decades in the lower rungs of the political swiftly joined the ranks of the “neutral” MPs class, like Ahmadinejad. Rather, he has emerged close to Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the as a viable successor to Ahmadinejad due to his House who was often called to act as the power proven technocratic skills, his longterm amicable broker and referee between the warring right and ties with Khamenei, and his at least informal left factions. As Rafsanjani became the de facto pledge to devote himself to the alleviation of commander in chief of the armed forces, Rowhani economic and diplomatic problems rather than acted as his deputy and spent considerable time the pursuit of increased political authority. on the war front against Iraq in the 1980s. From Born in the provincial town of Semnan the memoirs of Rafsanjani and other reputable in 1945, Rowhani was too young to have sources, it can be gathered that Rowhani sought participated directly in the early stages of to limit the influence of the IRGC in the war Khomeini’s uprising against the Shah in the mid- effort, and sought to redefine the latter as a joint 1960s and appears to have had scant personal commitment between the conscript army and the contact with him prior to the Ayatollah’s exile to ideologically-driven Guards. He also acquired a Turkey and Iraq. His acquaintance with leading distinct knowledge of Western armaments and figures of the clerical opposition, particularly the steps that Iran would need to acquire them in Ayatollahs Beheshti and Mottahari, and his order to compete with Iraq’s superior procurement renowned oratory skills ensured a prominent routes. In an address to the IRGC and the Army position in the ranks of Khomeini supporters shortly before the start of the Iran-Contra arms by the late 1970. He was referred to as “Imam,” purchase process, Rowhani strongly argued for the possibly for the first time, in an address on the supply and deployment of Hawk missiles, which occasion on the formal ceremony to mark the were among the consignment handed over to Iran 40th day since the passing of Khomeini’s son, during Iran-Contra. His name also appears on Mostafa, in Tehran in 1977. the very restricted list of figures that were “in the In the first days of the Islamic Republic, know” regarding the visit of Robert McFarlane and Rowhani was entrusted, either directly or with his team to Tehran, although it is unclear whether the strong support of Khamenei, then deputy he had any significant role in the negotiations. defence minister, with setting up the ideological By 1989, Rowhani was a trusted confidant department of the post-revolutionary armed of Rafsanjani, a circumstance which granted forces, a position akin to that of the political him swift elevation to the head of the Supreme commissars of the Red Army during the Soviet National Security Council (SNSC), a body era. This position gave him unique insight into created during the constitutional revision of military and security matters, which laid the 1989. The SNSC’s remit was initially mostly ground for his involvement in national security limited to internal affairs, supervising as the for most of post-Khomeini Iran. Rowhani was repression of the bread riots which emerged duly elected to the First Majles in 1980, and during the 1990s in response to hyperinflation

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 15 and other economic ailments which emerged leadership and the President to embark on his during the Rafsanjani government’s ill-fated risky proposal of agreeing to the EU’s demand economic liberalisation plans. Rowhani also for the suspension of uranium enrichment. maintained his parliamentary seat until 2000, Rowhani was pushed out of office during the and was suggested as a candidate to replace brazen right-wing takeover of executive and Rafsanjani in 1997. In July 1999, Rowhani chose legislative power of 2004-2005. Despite not to reinforce his ties with Khamenei rather than tilt falling in disgrace and without being subject towards the reformists by delivering a haughty to the public admonition of Khamenei, the and stern address at an official rally to mark the Leader’s decision to break the fragile détente successful neutralisation of the student protests of with the West and resume uranium enrichment, that month. Rowhani’s subsequent interventions albeit during the final stages of Khatami in times of politically-fuelled popular unrest, and Rowhani’s periods in office, meant that including the disruptions of 2009 and 2010, have Rowhani preferred to exit from the SNSC and been uncritically supportive of Khamenei. the nuclear scene. He then retreated to the In 2003, Rowhani finally stepped into the Centre for Strategic Research, an organisation limelight of the public gaze when he was which was under the aegis of the Expediency nominated as the chief nuclear negotiator. Council headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Initially, this was intended to be a government which increasingly acted as a refuge of sorts for post, but President Khatami, then at the tail end of the considerable number of former moderate his unsuccessful attempts to persuade other state diplomats, state figures and MPs shunted out of institutions to yield to his reform plans, wanted office during the early Ahmadinejad presidency. to get rid of the role and passed it on to Rowhani. Rowhani’s standing within the state system Between 2003 and 2004, Rowhani succeeded would remain diminished until 2013, when in developing a pragmatic and highly-praised he decided to finally run for the presidency – diplomatic team, capable of instilling trust in after refusing pleadings to do so in 1997 and the Western side and moderating Iran’s stance 2005 – on a ticket of national salvation. By while maintaining the support of Khamenei then, he was well-known to the wider public and the conservative establishment. Rowhani and to political observers and analysts alike. vindicated his negotiating tactics and dismissed Besides his memoir-driven volume on nuclear accusations of “selling out” to the West in a negotiations, Rowhani published the first detailed, 1000 page exposé, called “National volume of his autobiography in 2010, and, inter Security and Nuclear Diplomacy,” which was alia, another volume spelling out his economic published to great popular interest in 2012. The strategies. These publications made Rowhani high point of the 2003-2005 process, the Tehran the best-known presidential candidate since Agreement between the EU3 Foreign ministers Rafsanjani and provided major contrast with and Iran, was signed, according to the contents either of his immediate predecessors, Khatami of this book, only after a courageous gambit by and Ahmadinejad, who had been lesser-known Rowhani, who effectively persuaded both the fringe figures at the times of their elections.

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The roots of Rowhani’s success in the with the Majles speaker, , and his presidential elections of 2013 rest in his brother Sadegh, the head of the judiciary. But ability to portray the major crises that afflicted more importantly, he has managed to obtain the the country at the end of the Ahmadinejad lukewarm, but crucial, approval of Khamenei for presidency – the nuclear issue, various serious his nuclear negotiation strategies, enabling direct economic ailments, the growing extent of public contact with the United States in a form and extent corruption – as caused by the incompetence unthinkable for presidents like Khatami and and faulty decision-making of the outgoing Ahmadinejad who lacked a working relationship government. His track record in the nuclear with Khamenei. Nevertheless, he has had to face negotiations of 2003-2005, the endorsement he growing internal opposition to his openings to received by revered figures such as Mohammad the West. Recently, he revealed how much the Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, his nimble pressure has borne on him by urging those who performance in the televised debates and oppose his negotiating tactics to “go to hell.” his dexterity at wading the factional waters The extent to which Rowhani will continue by presenting himself as acceptable to both to thrive on such a path is unclear. His entire mainstream factions, were all ingredients which mandate is grounded on a results-driven approach contributed to his final success, albeit with the which stands the possibility of either succeeding slimmest of margins of any victorious president or failing extensively. Nevertheless, Rowhani of the Islamic Republic. has been thus far capable of fending off his ultra- Rowhani has tread a cautious path during conservative opponents, who could however his first year in office. He has strenuously mount a significant challenge in the presidential avoided engaging in activities which alienated elections of 2017 should his policies fail. his predecessors from Khamenei, such as creating a structured group of supporters who Foreign Minister – Javad Zarif sought to challenge the prevailing checks and balances, allow the publication of overly critical publications, and even pressing for the liberation of the isolated Green movement leaders, Mousavi and Karroubi. Instead, he has assembled a team of like-minded technocrats who are devoted to the resolution of Iran’s endemic problems, such as the nuclear issue and the spiralling rate of inflation, without seeking political capital. The result has been an ebb in the severe intra-institutional strife witnessed in Javad Zarif previous years, particularly during the latter part of the Ahmadinejad administration. Rowhani , foreign minister has succeeded in finding a working relationship since August 2013, was born to a pious

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 17 family with connections to the Hojjatiyeh anti- Khamenei, Zarif takes a strong realist view Bahai secret society. 7 Zarif is from an upper- of foreign policy, one which includes the bourgeoisie background, a factor which enabled realisation that contact with the United States him to travel to the United States for higher and eventual long-standing détente with education without government scholarships. Washington are fundamental to the stability He quickly entered the fray of the large Islamic and progress of the Islamic Republic. In this student associations which were active in support vein, he has continuously sought contact with of Khomeini in the late 1970s, and started his American entities, from Congressional figures diplomatic career by handling day-to-day affairs such as and Arlen Specter in his UN at the Iranian consulate in after Ambassador years (2003-2008) to members the fall of the Shah until . In of civil society and academics. His easygoing the early 1980s, while pursuing his graduate attitude and heavy American accent, and his studies, Zarif entered the ranks of the Iranian proficiency in front of television screens, Mission to the UN, initially as a translator- make him palatable to Western observers and office clerk, and increasingly taking on a variety diplomatic figures. of formal and informal roles. His proficiency Besides Velayati, Rowhani has been a key in English, zealous devotion to the cause of patron of Zarif. The two worked together during the Islamic Republic, untarnished reputation the first round of nuclear negotiations with the – in his memoirs, he boasted of his insulation West, 2003-2005, and Zarif, who effectively from American culture and society by stating retired from active service after the end of his that he and his wife were unaware of the main tenure as UN ambassador, embraced the offer spices and condiments of American food, due of being new foreign minister with enthusiasm, to their lack of social interaction with ordinary and immediately set out to bring a new style Americans – caught the eye of the Foreign into action. Once entrusted with the nuclear Minister Ali Akbar Velayati during a trip to UN dossier, he immediately set out to bring a new headquarters in New York in 1984. From that style into action, compiling frequent reports moment onwards, Zarif rapidly progressed in of his activities on Facebook and building a the diplomatic corps, growing in stature under considerable media presence, especially on the wing of his powerful and influential patron. major international outlets. Zarif led the thaw While remaining steadfastly loyal to the in ties with Europe and become the first Iranian Islamic Republic and, in recent decades, to foreign minister since 1979 to publicly shake

7- The Hojjatiyeh was a highly controversial semi-secret religious society devoted to opposing the Bahai faith. It was founded in the mid 1950s by Mahmoud Halabi, a mid-ranking cleric who was alarmed by the then-noticeable rise in society and politics of members of the Bahai faith, who are deemed as heretics and apostates by the Shia community. The Hojjatiyeh gained a large following amongst the youth by the end of the 1970s, especially among the pious laity of the upper bourgeoisie, from which Islamic Republic figures such as Zarif emerged. The Hojjatiyeh espoused a deeply isolationist stance on active politics, and formally suspended its operations after ordered to do so by Khomeini in 1984. However, rumours have abounded since of the strong bond between supposed members, such as Zarif and Velayati. Former Hojjatiyeh members are considered to form an influential circle, or “old boys network”.

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 18 hands with his American counterpart. has been a pivotal While these activities have gained support figure in the Iranian oil industry, the cash cow and fame for Zarif within Iran, they have also of the Iranian state, for most of post-Khomeini exposed him to the wrath of conservatives Iran. A dour high0level manager of few (usually opposed to a rapprochement with the United meaningful) words, Zangeneh embodies the States. Despite the extent of his partial successes, techocratic spirit espoused by Rowhani and Zarif remains susceptible to impeachment. his mentor, Hashemi Rafsanjani. Zanganeh’s However, he has managed to build a network political career is marked by industrial of discreet cordial ties with a range of figures reconstruction efforts. As Energy Minister such as the Majles speaker Ali Larijani, which between 1989 and 1997, he presided over a shields him somewhat. Like Rowhani, however, considerable amount of Iran’s reconstruction Zarif has been careful not to give the impression efforts, and attracted considerable foreign of gearing up for higher political office after the capital in Iran’s oil industry during 1997-2005, end of his stint at the foreign ministry. when he served his first stint as Oil Minister. He was returned to the post in 2013 and has since resolutely set his mission as that of returning Iran’s oil output to that of the Rafsanjani and Khatami “golden” years. Whether he will be successful depends on the extent to which he can dislodge the IRGC’s growing involvement in the oil industry. He did, however, score a first success by bringing an end to the consumption of petrol produced by the IRGC’s petrochemical plants, which were deemed Bijan Namdar Zangeneh excessively polluting.

• • •

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 19 Beyond the Executive Branch – The Larijani Brothers

The Larijani brothers are currently the most currently head of international human rights prominent next-of-kin group of politicians to be for the judiciary. The middle brother, Ali, is the active in the Islamic Republic. Of the five sons current Majles spokesman after having served of the conservative Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, three in the IRGC leadership in the 1980s, running have held high office and continue to do so. The the state radio and television between 1995 and elder brother Mohammad Javad is a polyhedral 2005, and acting as chief nuclear negotiator figure who acts as one of the country’s leading from 2005-2007. Last but not least, the younger basic sciences administrators while serving in a brother Sadegh, the only active cleric of the set, variety of high-level foreign policy posts, such has been just reconfirmed as head of the judiciary as deputy Foreign Minister in the 1980s and for another five year term, having started in 2009.

The Larijani Brothers

Mohammad Javad Ali Sadegh

These three powerful figures have a few reward their loyalty with high-level posts. Both key traits in common: an unswerving loyalty Ali and Mohammad Javad present a sophisticated to Khamenei dating back to the 1980s, strong view of the West, which is informed by their alignment with the traditional conservative wing studies in the US (Javad) and their avid interest (which includes the old bazaari supporters of in Western philosophy. While Ahmadinejad Khomeini,) and an active opposition to reformist was making headlines with his tirades against factions. The Larijanis owe much of their current , the Holocaust and the West, they offered political eminence to Khamenei’s decision to a more nuanced and guarded attitude, one which

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 20 protected Iran from complete isolation. Larijani, which has considerably reduced Nevertheless, there have been instances in the intra-institutional infighting between the which Ali, the most political of the three brothers, Majles and the government. While the former has exhibited signs of autonomy. Khamenei’s at times still presents an oppositional attitude ultimate decision to back Ahmadinejad’s towards the latter, and initiates impeachment intransigence over a tentative nuclear deal that proceedings against cabinet ministers (a regular Larijani had reached with then-EU negotiator feature of parliamentary politics since the early in 2007 led to his hurried and 1980s,) the relationship is much less subject to dramatic resignation in September of that the tension that was almost a daily occurrence year. The Majles speaker’s very public spat between 2009 and 2013. Rowhani’s careful with Ahmadinejad over an alleged attempt crafting of his ties with the Larijanis underscore by a younger brother, Fazel, to pressure the their influence and likely durable presence controversial former Tehran Prosecutor, Saeed within the upper rungs of the political class, Mortazavi, to yield to bribes, proved to be highly despite their manifest shortcomings. None of embarrassing for Khamenei, who struggled to these three figures is, for example, accredited bring the dispute under control. Ali Larijani is with a considerable popular following, to the also rumoured to have called Mousavi on the extent that Ali Larijani’s only presidential evening of 12 June 2009, congratulating him attempt, in 2005, was highly unsuccessful. Ali for his victory in the presidential elections Larijani ran for the Qom constituency, rather before towing the line, like the rest of the than the Tehran one, in 2008 and 2012, most state elite, of Khamenei’s endorsement of likely due to uncertainties over his chances of Ahmadinejad. One of Rowhani’s achievements success in Tehran. Nevertheless, it is expected thus far has been that of etching out what that the Larijanis will be the flag bearers for appears to be a reciprocally valued positive a key wing of the conservative factions in the working relationship with both Ali and Sadegh foreseeable future. • • •

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The IRGC Leadership – Aziz Jafari and Qa- sem Soleimani

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps strictly to the limitations posed by the Rafsanjani (IRGC) is arguably the single most powerful administration on its political and economic entity in the Islamic Republic today. It was interference. Mindful of Khomeini’s oft-repeated founded in the weeks following the fall of the order for military figures of any rank or uniform Shah in February 1979 by several young idealists to refrain from being active in the political as an ideologically-committed National Guard sphere, Rafsanjani prevented the IRGC, which with the goal of fending off possible counter- was then facing the challenge of “returning” to revolutionary attempts and activities. Over the civilian life following 8 years of deployment on past couple of decades, the IRGC has developed the war front, from engaging in any economic into a politico-military-economic conglomerate, project beyond the narrow remit granted by his which is only outranked by the Leader’s own government. Towards the end of Rafsanjani’s economic interests and those of major religious second mandate, however, the conservative endowments, such as the Astan-e Qods Razavi majority in Parliament, with Khamenei’s likely (Emam Reza Shrine Complex)8 of Mashhad. backing, passed a bill which limited the sale of The IRGC’s history can be broadly divided the remainder of the assets of the Shah’s fugitive into two phases. The first can be described as business elite to war veterans, martyrs’ families, a general economic “quietist” period, which and their representatives, effectively paving was marked by a decisive contribution to the the way for the IRGC’s rise. Between 1996 defence of the country during the Iran-Iraq and 2014, the IRGC progressively expanded war – which effectively turned the IRGC into a their reach, assertively fighting back against large-scale “university of the Islamic Republic’s reformist experiments under the leadership of current elite. A large range of the political class, Yahya Safavi (1997-2007) and quickly grasping stemming from the current Tehran Mayor, control of large scale infrastructure projects. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, to several reformist They emerged as the only economic actor figures, to Ali Larijani and a considerable which could simultaneously take on dozens of number of MPS, emerged from the IRGC of projects, ranging from the development of the this period. During this time, the IRGC adhered South Pars oil and gas fields to hydroelectric

8- The Astan Qods Razavi is the trust which administers the property of the Imam Reza shrine of Mashhad. It has always been a wealthy endowment, its wealth grounded on religious tax associated to one of the holiest shrines of Shii . Since the Revolution, it has been headed by a close associate of Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Vaez Tabasi, who has quietly turned the trust into a multi-pronged business conglomerate which includes several cultural institutions, an influential national newspaper (Quds), dozens of economic corporations covering several sectors of the economy, including the Iranian licensee of Coca Cola. Unofficial estimates put the total value of Astan’s business concerns at 15-20 billion USD.

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com 22 dams and petrochemical plants. The inability Born in 1957, Aziz Jafari is an architect of the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations who held senior positions with the IRGC until to develop an entrepreneurial class capable of his elevation to the top post in 2007. He is contracting such works from the state also played widely considered to be politically close to Ali a leading role in the development of entities such Larijani, Baqer Qalibaf and Gholam-Ali Haddad as the Khatam al-Anbiya wing of the IRGC.9 Adel, Yahya Rahim Safavi (the former IRGC The present-day IRGC is led by two active commander in chief), and has been instrumental Guardsmen and Safavi. All three were heaily in coordinating the Guards’ reaction to the 2009 involved in the war effort against Iraq and are uprisings, where it maintained close loyalty to all in their 50s and 60s, too young for leadership Khamenei. The Supreme Leader has reciprocated in the revolutionary activities of the 1970s and this support by allowing the IRGC to expand direct association with Khomeini. Like Larijani, unchecked. Jafari has in particular expanded the they owe much of their current standing to IRGC’s intelligence efforts considerably, and Khamenei’s patronage and his preference for has developed a parallel secret service which them. This fact has led them to steadfastly back acts on its own accord on cases of national him, morally as well as materially, during major security and has the power to arrest dissidents, moments of internal crisis and confrontation, journalists or opposition politicians without the such as the 1999 student riots and the 2009 need for coordination or approval from other electoral rebellion. It has done so, with an overall entities. At the same time, however, Jafari has position which includes both inflamed rhetoric accommodated Khamenei’s request for Rowhani but guarded pragmatism in praxis. The current to be given political breathing space, and has commander in chief of the IRGC is Aziz Jafari. not overly challenged the government’s foreign policy, towards which the IRGC has manifested its opposition. Jafari will eventually have to come to terms with the Rowhani administration’s resolve to lessen the economic involvement of the Guards, particularly in the energy sector, where Khatam al-Anbiya has not been able to match their ease in winning substantial contracts with their timely execution. The qualitative Aziz Jafari

9- Khatam al-Anbiya is an engineering firm under the full control of the IRGC. It was founded In the 1980s to assist with the creation and deployment of armaments in the war against Iraq. Khatam had mostly a military engineering purpose until 1988, and in the following year was deployed in peripheral roles by President Rafsanjani. By the mid 1990s it began, however, playing a more assertive role in the national economy and progressively took over, with the approval of Khamenei and the IRGC top brass, the large-scale infrastructural projects, such as highways, dams and electrical and petrochemical plants. Khatam’s period of maximum expansion was during the Ahmadinejad years, when a combination of political favouritism and increasing lack of foreign interest and investment in Iran’s infrastructural projects

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 23 aspects of the relationship between Khamenei a detached, ultra-pragmatic figure who remains and the IRGC leadership are likely to come to outside the fray of day to day political contention the fore in these episodes. and controversy and rarely addresses the media. He is widely liked across all political factions: this was evident during the ceremony for the passing of his mother, an event which was attended by almost every ranking Iranian politician except Khamenei and Rowhani. Respect for Soleimani is grounded on his ability to achieve considerable results on behalf of causes universally endorsed by the entire political class, such as assistance and influence over Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’ites and the buttressing of the Assad regime in Damascus. Soleimani’s outsize reputation among the IRGC rank and file is also enhanced by his steady attendance of funeral sermons for his fallen soldiers. Like Jafari and other IRGC commanders, Soleimani eschews material representations of wealth, and is rarely if ever Qasem Soleimani flagged as a beneficiary of finacial corruption in the Iranian and international media. A senior IRGC officer who possesses a Soleimani’s career is likely to include further similar background to Qalibaf and Aziz Jafari promotions in the mid to long term. Rumors and hails from the same politico-military persist that he may enter politics as a presidential generation, Qasem Soleimani is endowed with candidate. He looks set, however, to replace a legendary reputation inside and outside of Iran Jafari in the next few years, particularly as it for his management of the Quds brigade, the seems that Khamenei will place 10-year limits transnational wing of the IRGC. Soleimani is on the tenures of IRGC leaders. • • •

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014 www.kfcris.com King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

Founded in 1983 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the mission of King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies is to be a beacon for human- ity as envisioned by the late King Faisal bin Abdulaziz. The Center aims to accomplish this through conducting research and studies that stimulate cultural and scientific activities for the service of man- kind, enrich cultural and intellectual life in Saudi Arabia, and facilitate collaboration with the East and the West.

The Center’s activities include lectures, seminars, conferences and roundtable discussions. It houses the King Faisal Library, collections of rare manuscripts, an Islamic art museum and the King Faisal Mu- seum. It also administers a robust Visiting Fellow Program. Since the Center’s focus is scholarly research, the Research Department was restructured in 2013 to carry out in-depth analysis in contemporary political thought, Saudi studies, regional studies, language studies and modernity studies. The Center has also been collaborat- ing with various research centers around the world within its scope of research.

The Chairman of the KFCRIS Board is HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz, and the Secretary General is Prof. Yahya bin Junaid.

Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September,2014 Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September,2014 www.kfcris.com 26

P.O.Box 51049 Riyadh 11543 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tel: (+966 11) 4652255 Ext: 6764 Fax: (+966 11) 4162281 E-mail: [email protected] Dhu Al-qadah 1435 - September 2014