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Iranian Revolution Ethicalmun IV Crisis EthicalMUN IV Iranian Revolution Chairs: Ben Greer and Lucas Saidenberg Crisis Directors: Josh Sacca, Oliver Polksy, and Alex Power EthicalMUN IV Hello Delegates, We are delighted to welcome you to EthicalMUN IV, and we look forward Iva Knezevic to two full and exciting days of debate. The topic of this committee is the Iranian Co-Secretary General Revolution and we look forward to seeing your innovative solutions and directives Theo Dassin to solve this crisis. We hope that this topic will stimulate your creativity and make Co-Secretary General for an amazing weekend. We have five experienced chairs and crisis directors who are eagerly anticipating the conference. Please take the time to thoroughly read the Julie Johnson Chief of Staff background guide and conduct research of your own so that you can have the best position papers possible. This background guide is simply a starting point for your Olivia Pollack research, and more research is necessary to prepare for this committee. For those of Chief of Staff you who are new to Model UN, this committee is a crisis committee, meaning that Spencer Sussman there will constantly be new problems (provided by our lovely crisis directors: Josh Chief of Staff Sacca, Alex Power, and Oliver Polsky) that you must solve. We want every delegate to fully represent their positions while working together to come up with a solution for this Crisis. This committee will start in January of 1978 when tensions began to boil over and thousands of students took to the streets in protest against the Shah. Anything before this is set in stone, but anything after is all up to you. Emphasis will be placed on not copying exactly what occurred in real life, as we want you to come up with interesting and creative solutions on your own. Please do not try to copy what actually occurred in committee, as the wonderful crisis staff will be introducing new crises often, many of which did not historically occur. We are very excited to hear your solutions and ideas on the complicated issues we will be dealing with over this conference. We fully welcome any questions you have, and we look forward to seeing you in May! Feel free to contact with any queries, Your Chairs Ben Greer ([email protected]) and Lucas Saidenberg ([email protected]) Iranian Revolution EthicalMUN IV Crisis Committee Procedure minute moderated caucus passes, the Like most crisis committees, perpetual moderated caucus will be the parliamentary procedure will be suspended, and the committee will slightly different from General enter the five-minute moderated Assemblies and Specialized caucus. If there are no points or Committees. The parliamentary motions on the floor, the chair will procedure used in this committee is revert to the perpetual moderated optimized for the relatively few caucus. people in our committee and the quick Relevant Points and Motions: responses needed for crises. • Point of Inquiry • Point of Information Perpetual Moderated Caucus: • Point of Personal Privilege Unlike GA or Specialized • Point of Order Committees, Crisis Committees will • Motion to Open Debate not have a speakers list, and will • Motion for a Moderated operate under a perpetual moderated Caucus caucus. A perpetual moderated caucus • Motion for an Unmoderated is a never-ending moderated caucus Caucus that runs for the entirety of the • Motion for a Round Table committee with no set topic. For this • Motion to Introduce All Papers committee, the perpetual moderated on the Dais caucus will have a 30 second • Motion to Introduce an speaking time. This perpetual Amendment moderated caucus will be suspended • Motion to divide the Question when a delegate proposes a motion. • Motion to Enter Voting For example, if a motion for a five- Procedure 1 Iranian Revolution Crisis EthicalMUN IV • Motion to Adjourn Debate inform or misinform the public according to the desires of the Written Papers committee. They will have the same Crisis Notes: Crisis notes are notes sponsor and signatory rules as used to take personal action from a directives. delegate, without the need for committee approval. A character's Like all committees, collaborating portfolio powers, therefore, binds with other delegates is strongly crisis notes. Please ensure to sign your recommended. However, in a crisis character’s name at the end of your committee, it is also encouraged that crisis note and address it to CRISIS one stays in character and acts in on the front of your folded note. accordance with their character’s motivations. Directives: Like general assemblies and specialized committees, crisis committees have documents that take committee action concerning the issues at hand. In crisis committees, this document is called a directive. The number of sponsors and signatories required on directives will depend on the size of the committee. Press Releases: Press releases are committee documents addressed to the public. They can be used to 2 Iranian Revolution EthicalMUN IV Crisis forcibly secularize the population. His reforms pushed for increased gender Historical Background equality, and the Woman's The seeds of the 1979 Awakening between 1936 and 1941 revolution were sown more than 50 was heavily reinforced by his policies years previously when the Pahlavi of modernization, which pushed to get dynasty came to power in 1925. After rid of traditional customs such as the much instability in the country, Islamic veil and gender segregation. specifically due to Soviet military In response to these policies, Reza presence, the first Shah, Reza “Shah” Shah continued to have bitter relations Pahlavi took power through a coup with the Iranian clergy during his and made an agreement with the reign, with many acts of violence Soviet Union. As part of the perpetrated against Islamic supporters agreement, the Soviets withdrew their who opposed the Shah’s policies. troops, which had threatened to take over Tehran, Iran’s capital. An Reza Shah remained in power until exception was made in the treaty so 1941 when he was deposed by British that the Soviet Union would be and Soviet invaders after being allowed to reinvade if their national accused of collaborating with the interests ever required them to. Nazis. He was replaced by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who Reza Shah enacted many reigned until his own eventual reforms of modernity and overthrow in 1979. Pahlavi continued secularization and suppressed radical similar policies of modernization and Islamism in favor of Western culture. westernization that his father had set Many of his reforms introduced up and continued to have difficult Western law with an attempt to relations with the Shia clergy of Iran. 3 Iranian Revolution EthicalMUN IV Crisis This growing resentment set in place to support the British economy. Due the building blocks for his eventual to growing nationalism and much deposition. However his reign did not resentment to constant flight of capital go uninterrupted, and this is where the (oil profits leaving the country), the United States first became involved in Iranian parliament voted on Iranian nationalizing the industry and elected affairs. Mossadegh right after, who on May 1st, 1951, brought the APIC under state control. Despite the domestic popularity of his actions, they brought outrage to the British, who asked the United States for help in restoring the ownership of the oil fields through a regime change. Despite much disinterest from Trumann, newly In 1951, pro-democratic elected Eisenhower was persuaded to Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected assist Britain in overthrowing as prime minister of Iran. He enacted Mossadegh on the pretext that he was many progressive reforms to the an ally of communism. country, such as social security, and Mossadegh meanwhile was invested in public development. expanding parliamentary powers and However, he was most renowned for reducing that of the Shah’s. The Shah enforcing the nationalization of the oil was not politically active until 1949 industry. Before the Pahlavi dynasty after an assassination attempt, in took power, Britain had already set up which he began to expand his power. the Anglo-Persian Oil Company As a result, the balance of power was (APIC), which took much of Iran’s oil 4 Iranian Revolution EthicalMUN IV Crisis challenged by the two. The dichotomy persuaded the reluctant reigning Shah between the two began to grow to join them, under the warning that despite the Shah’s support of he would be deposed too if he Mossadegh’s initiative in refused. Using a campaign of nationalizing the oil industry. propaganda and paid protesters, they quickly destabilized the country until However, the United Kingdom, the military joined the side of the with international support, Shah and overthrew Mossadegh under implemented trade embargoes and the leadership of General Fazlollah sanctions on Iran and cut off Iran’s Zahedi, who was working with the ability to export its recently-owned CIA. The Shah, who fled during the oil, thus crippling Iran’s economy. coup due to fear of backlash, returned Resentment grew against Mossadegh and restored his powers while Prime as a result, and the British and Minister Mossadegh was replaced by Americans used this opportunity to Zahedi. stage a coup. During this crisis, Mossadegh dissolved parliament and The deposition of Mossadegh increased his own powers, while and reinstatement of Mohammad reducing the Shah’s. Mossadegh lost Pahlavi brought Iran’s oil supply back further support, allied with only the onto international control. However, Tudeh party, who were communists. due to powerful public opinion in Iran, the oil was not brought back to Codenamed Operation Ajax, British control and remained under the recently formed CIA with the help Iranian possession. However, an of the British MI6 began the process agreement allowed for a consortium of overthrowing the elected of oil companies to manage the oil, Mohammed Mossadegh.
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