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Shi'ism—A Brief Sketch of the Early Years

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Shi'ism—A Brief Sketch of the Early Years Appendix I Shi’ism—A Brief Sketch of the Early Years Shi’ism is supposed to have originated in ca. 632, when at the death of the Prophet Muhammad, his father-in-law Abu Bakr was elected as the leader of the Islamic ummah as the Khalifat al-Rasul (Deputy of the Prophet), overriding the claims of the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. The issue of succession was disputed among the muhajiruns (“emigrants” who left on hijrat with the Prophet from Mecca) and the ansarun (“associates” from Medina), as a result of which the Prophet’s father-in-law Abu Bakr was ordained the Khalifah, denying ‘Ali his right of succession. Those who refused to accept Abu Bakr as the Khalifah were thence- forth known as Shi’i (partisans). Those who had supported the cause of Abu Bakr did so citing a tradition (sunnah) of the Prophet, hence they came to be known as the Sunni. The partisans (shi’i) of ‘Ali believed that the Prophet wanted ‘Ali to take over the mantle of leadership after him, and that the Prophet had been grooming ‘Ali to that end. The Shi’i believe that the Qur’an is susceptible of a literal reading, as also a deeper exoteric reading. They argue that divine inspiration had made the Prophet capable of such exoteric reading because of his masoumiyat (infallibility), which was inherited by ‘Ali and that part of his family line that arose from the Prophet’s daughter Fatima. Denying succession to the line of the Prophet, thus, was tan- tamount to denying divinely inspired infallible guidance in leadership of the community. The Shi’i accordingly refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the political order of the Khalifat (Caliphate), and came up with their own notion of infallible social, religious, and political Imamat (Leadership), with ‘Ali being acknowledged as the first Imam. Shi’i discontent subsided in 655 when the third Khalifa, Uthman ibn Affan was murdered and succession passed over to ‘Ali. However, ‘Ali’s tenure as the Khalifa did not last for long. ‘Ali encountered two challenges to his authority, nominally upon his failure to find and prosecute Uthman’s assassin. The first challenge came from a coalition headed by Aisha, widow of the Prophet and daughter of Abu Bakr, which ‘Ali beat back at the Battle of the Camels. A more significant challenge was 204 APPENDIX I mounted by the powerful governor of Syria and nephew of Uthman, Mu’awiyah. When the Prophet was preaching his message, the house of Abu Sufyan in Mecca opposed him. Abu Sufyan’s son Mu’awiyah and grandson Yazid led the forces of Mecca against the army of Islam and were trounced at the battles of Badr and Khandaq. Thereupon the house of Abu Sufyan crossed over to join the ranks of the faithful, and during the reigns of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman swept over Syria, where Mu’awiyah was appointed the military governor. When the Caliphate passed to ‘Ali, Mu’awiyah contested his succession and eventually claimed the Caliphate for himself. ‘Ali opened negotiations with Mu’awiyah with the hope of regain- ing his allegiance but Mu’awiyah insisted on autonomy for Levant under his rule. Mu’awiyah mobilized his forces and refused to pay homage to ‘Ali on the pretext that he was not represented in his election. In 657, accordingly, ‘Ali met the forces of Mu’awiyah at the field of Siffin, where the two armies spent encamped more than 100 days, most of the time being spent in abortive negotiations. After a week of combat came the laylat al-harir (the night of clamor), when, as his army was on the point of being routed, Mu’awiyah’s soldiers hoisted mushaf (either parchments inscribed with verses of the Qur’an, or complete copies of it) on their spearheads, seeking arbitration. ‘Ali settled for arbitration to prevent two Muslim armies fight- ing each other, thus allowing Mu’awiyah to leave Siffin unmolested, retain charge of Damascus, and eventually extend his authority over Egypt. A segment among ‘Ali’s own supporters, however, believed ‘Ali had betrayed the cause of Islam by settling with Mu’awiyah; they rejected the compromise and broke with ‘Ali, thus being called the Kharijiyah (seceders), causing the first split among the Shi’i. In 661, the Kharijiyah assassinated ‘Ali, upon which Mu’awiyah successfully claimed the Khalifat, moved its capital to Damascus, and founded the Umayyad dynasty. Although most of the Muslims chose to follow Mu’awiyah, the party (Shi’i) of ‘Ali maintained that the succession to ‘Ali should pass to the direct descendants of the Prophet , through his daughter Fatima and her husband, ‘Ali. The Shi’i at Kufa in Iraq openly refused to swear allegiance to Mu’awiyah and pledged their loyalty instead to ‘Ali’s elder son, Hassan, as the second Imam. Even as Mu’awiyah tried to negotiate with Hassan, he raised a huge army and eventually marched against Hassan, whose forces he met at the field of Sabat. On the eve of an encounter, as Hassan was voicing his unwillingness to shed the blood of fellow Muslims, a section of his men took umbrage at the prospect of a compromise and assaulted and injured Hassan badly. Mu’awiyah was also keen on avoiding bloodshed, and proposed fresh terms, and a badly wounded Hassan found it prudent to settle for a compromise. According to Sunni scholars, Hassan ibn ‘Ali stipulated that Mu’awiyah should fol- low the Qur’an and the Sunnah, allowing a shura fortheCaliphatetobeheldafter his death, and refrain from any acts of revenge against Hasan’s followers. According to Shi’i scholars, Hasan further stipulated that the Caliphate should be returned to him after Mu’awiyah’s death, if he was still alive, and in case he died before that then the Caliphate should be given to his younger brother Hossein ibn ‘Ali. Mu’awiyah is supposed later to have had Hassan poisoned to death (arguably by Hassan’s wife, who then married Yazid), to pave the way for the succession of Yazid, the son of Mu’awiyah. APPENDIX I 205 In 680, the succession dispute reopened with the death of Mu’awiyah and the succession of Yazid to the Caliphate. Hassan having died by this time, Hossein was proclaimed the Imam by the people of Kufa. Persuaded by his followers’ refusal to accept Yazid’s succession, Imam Hossein tried to mobilize forces of opposition to Yazid. When popular support failed to materialize, Hossein and his small band of followers were slaughtered by Yazid’s forces at the battle of Karbala on the ‘ashura (tenth day) of Muharram. The memory of this tragedy, the shahadat (martyrdom) of the Shi’i, continues to guide the paradigm of suffering and protest that character- izes Shi’ism. For the Shi’i, the original injustice that had denied ‘Ali the succession to the Prophet was repeated at Karbala. Of the four sons of Imam Hossein, only one—‘Ali ibn Hussain (supposedly the grandson of King Yazdegerd)—survived the massacre at Karbala because he was too ill to go to battle. Hailed as the fourth Imam by his followers, despite being in confinement at Medina and Damascus, he became a natural rallying point of the Shi’i in the resistance to the Umayyads. He was succeeded to the Imamat by Muhammad ibn ‘Ali Baqir, who like his father before him, remained content disseminating “truths about Islam.” The second major split occurred among the Shi’i in the seventh century. Partly owing to Imam Baqir’s quiescence in the face of Umayyad misrule, a section of the Shi’i refused to acknowledge his Imamat, and acknowledged Zayd ibn ‘Ali as the Imam instead. They became known as the Zaidi Shi’i, characterized by their position that any descendant of ‘Ali can become the Imam, and that the duty to “enjoin the good and forbid the evil” was incumbent on all Muslims at all times. The Zaidi faction rebelled against both the Umayyads and Abbasids and was able to find a Zaidi state in Tabaristan, on the Caspian. Another Zaidi state was founded in Yemen, where it lasted till the civil war in 1963. The sixth Imam, Ja’far ibn Muhammad, known as al-Sadiq, was probably the first to contribute toward the evolution of the Shi’i fiqh.HisImamat over the Shi’i coincided with an era of uncertainty in the Caliphate, as the opposition against the Umayyads became formidable and central authority weakened to allow major regional assertion. In the political vacuum thus generated, Imam Jafar al-Sadiq laid the basis of Shi’i jurisprudence in a manner that the Shi’i could refer to ques- tions of law without referring to Sunni mazahib or the laws of state. Upon the replacement of the Umayyad dynasty by the Abbsids, severe restrictions were placed upon the Imam, and he was supposedly poisoned to death by the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur. The third major split among the Shi’i took place over the issue of succession to Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq. A majority of the Shi’i believe that the younger son of the sixth Imam, Musa ibn Ja’far, was the rightful seventh Imam, who spent the better part of his life in hiding before being captured during Hajj, and was then imprisoned in Basra and Baghdad. He was eventually supposedly poisoned to death in prison. Some among the Shi’i, however, believe that the succession to the sixth Imam belonged to his elder son, Ismail, who died in 760 even before his father.
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