The Political Rise of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Its Influence on Iranian Foreign Policy Formulation

Home , Ali Akbar Salehi, Ali Akbar Velayati, Amir Hatami, Heydar Moslehi, Hossein Dehghan

The political rise of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its influence on Iranian foreign policy formulation

Bachelor thesis International Relations and Organizations

Leiden University

Philip D. Geurts, s1701533

Supervisor: Ellen van Reuler

15 – 06 – 2019

Wordcount excluding contents, biography and appendix: 8419

Contents 1. Introduction ...... 3 2. Theoretical framework ...... 6 3. Methodology ...... 10 4. The role of ideology and political factions in Iranian foreign policy ...... 13 5. Iranian foreign policy formulation ...... 17 6. Analysis: the influence of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy formulation ...... 19 7. Conclusion ...... 24 Bibliography ...... 27 Appendix ...... 34

1. Introduction

While contemporary Iran often reoccurs in Western media outlets as a country that is purportedly ruled by fanatic clerics who seek to export the Islamic Revolution abroad and who are irreconcilably antagonistic to the West, the Iranian leadership is strongly fragmented ideologically and comprises many different factions. Furthermore, the constitutionally enshrined formal institutions in the post – 1979 Iranian state have bestowed the Iranian polity with many competing power centers. This fragmented and intricate nature of Iran’s political system also manifests itself in the Iranian foreign policy decision – making process. Warnaar (2013, p. 3) for example has summarized Iranian foreign policy as “a product of negotiation and competition among various powerful individuals and institutions.” Due to the relevance of Iran internationally, a fair amount of research has been conducted to provide a thorough understanding of how Iranian foreign policy is formulated.

Amongst others, Buchta (2001) and Alsultan and Saeid (2017) have elucidated the formal structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and their role in the formulation and implementation of Iranian foreign policy, while also taking into account the relevance of informal institutions. Maleki (2001) has evaluated the foreign policy decision – making process as such, while Lim (2015) has assessed the role of different actors in Iran’s national security decision – making. Further literature on Iranian foreign policy abounds. Nevertheless, assessments of the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian foreign policy remain scarce, despite the academic consensus that the IRGC has become a dominant institution in Iranian politics from 1999 onward. 1 In various works the IRGC has been evaluated as part of a holistic assessment of Iranian foreign policy, in which it is acknowledged to have substantial influence in this area. However, it remains unclear how substantial the influence of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy formulation really is and how it exerts this influence.

A variety of authors have furthermore assessed the political rise of the IRGC, but not a possible concomitant change in foreign policy formulation as such. Safshekan and Sabet (2010) have argued that the IRGC transformed from a militia into a “vast social – political economic security complex that today permeates every aspect of Iranian society” from at least 2003 onward. Banerjea (2015) has furthermore demonstrated that the intelligence role of the elected Iranian government has been

1 For a more thorough elaboration on the rise of the IRGC see for example Alamdari, The power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from populism to clientelism, and militarization of the government; Boroujerdi, “The Reformist Movement in Iran” in Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development, Ehteshami & Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of the Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution; Golkar, Configuration of Political Elites in Post – revolutionary Iran; Kazemzadeh, Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy or Ostovar, Guardians of the Islamic Revolution: Ideology, Politics and the Development of Military Power in Iran (1979 – 2009).

3 increasingly usurped by the IRGC throughout the 21st century, which presumably became the primary intelligence institution of Iran. Rezaei and Moshirabad (2018) have analyzed the IRGC’s role in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West, demonstrating the influence the IRGC had on the course of those negotiations. Negahban (2017) has also challenged the common notion that the Supreme Leader has the final say in all matters regarding foreign policy, arguing that the IRGC has acquired the capacity to compel the Supreme Leader to accommodate their demands in his policy preferences.

Research question and structure of this article

Thus, while Iranian foreign policy as well as the IRGC have been subjected to a substantial amount of research separately, works that combine those two aspects remain scarce. More specifically, it has not been analyzed how the generally acknowledged political rise of the IRGC from 1999 to 2005 has affected Iranian foreign policy formulation. As such, the author intends to fill this gap in the existing literature on the IRGC and Iranian foreign policy by answering the following research question: how has the political rise of the IRGC from 1999 to 2005 affected Iranian foreign policy formulation? Chapter 2 and chapter 3 will outline the theoretical framework and the methodology utilized in this study respectively. Thus, further specifications on the research question as well as on the approach used to answer this question can be found in those chapters. Chapter 4 presents a brief discussion on the role of ideology and political factions in Iranian foreign policy. This discussion is pertinent as it provides a framework of classification of the different political factions, which will be used in the analysis in chapter 6. The link between the political factions and the central unit of analysis, the IRGC, will be elaborated in the chapter on the theoretical framework. In chapter 5 a brief overview and discussion of the Iranian institutions that are involved in formulating Iranian foreign policy are provided. As stated, chapter 6 contains the core of the study, namely an analysis of the role of the IRGC in Iranian foreign policy formulation before and after its purported increase in political power. Lastly, the conclusion will discuss the findings of the study as well as its academic and practical implications.

Relevance of this study for Western policymakers

An assessment of this nature is not merely intended to contribute academically, but also to provide concrete implications for Western policymakers who maintain diplomatic relations with Iran and who promulgate policy toward Iran. The importance of a thorough understanding of Iran’s intricate and opaque political system has been demonstrated in the past, as a lack of such understanding has led to undesirable policies toward Iran and the Middle East at large. An example of such misguided policy was the Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to label Iran as a part of the “Axis of Evil”, despite the

4 attempts of the ruling Iranian administration to cooperate with the US. As a result of this, adopting a cooperative attitude vis – a – vis the US was considered to be naïve and a failed project. This gave rise to a surge in popularity of the hardliners and as such led to the election of Ahmadinejad, which in its turn contributed to a further deterioration of Iranian – Western relations (Barzegar, 2010, p. 174; Ostovar, 2009, p. 160). By elucidating the influence of the ‘radical’ constituents of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy, the limitations of the more visible leadership of Iran, comprising the President, Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister, are better understood. This in its turn enables the promulgation of more constructive and adequate Western policy toward the Iranian state.

2. Theoretical framework

Debates on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and on studies on Middle Eastern foreign policy

Evaluating how the foreign policy of a specific state arises is a complex process that has been the subject of much academic debate. As such, studies of Iranian foreign policy are also embedded within a wider academic framework. More specifically, those studies are usually embedded within the wider academic framework of studies on Middle Eastern foreign policy (Warnaar, 2013, p. 11) and within the academic subfield of FPA. The framework of Middle Eastern foreign policy has traditionally been characterized by a penchant to conduct analyses on the basis of modified versions of realism, often derived from the work of the neo – realist Stephen Walt (Warnaar, 2013, p. 12).

However, more recently a number of authors have pointed toward the shortcomings of a realist framework in analyzing Middle Eastern foreign policy, and especially in analyzing Iranian foreign policy (Alsultan & Saeid, 2017; Mahdi, 2011; Warnaar, 2013). As Nia (2011) has pointed out, realist approaches ignore the influence of domestic factors on the foreign policy formulation of states, instead focusing on the international distribution of power. Such negligence of domestic factors purportedly obstructs an adequate analysis of Iranian foreign policy due to the intricate political landscape of Iran as well as due to the primacy of ideology and identity in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy (Dehshiri & Majidi, 2008, p. 102).

In consideration of those shortcomings of a realist approach regarding Iranian foreign policy, as well as in consideration of the nature of this study, this analysis is embedded in a constructivist framework, which integrates the perception of individual actors in the evaluation of foreign policy formulation (Adler, 1997, p. 322). Furthermore, proponents of constructivism theorize that those actors are guided by a “logic of appropriateness”, which contends that behavior and thus policy arise from the ambition to “do the right thing” in concordance with the worldview of the actor, rather than from the drive to maximize certain objective outcomes (Nia, 2011, p. 281). This analysis will be centered around those two tenets of constructivism. More concretely, the assumption that the ideology and the concomitant perception of individual actors influences foreign policy is central to the classification of the political factions that will be provided in chapter 4.

The subfield of FPA encompasses a variety of approaches that seek to explain how certain foreign policy decisions are made, ranging from rationalist and cognitive approaches that emphasize the role of the individual to institutional theories that take into account the role of the institutional environment in which the foreign policy decision – making process is embedded (Hudson, 2005). Within this broad academic subfield, the two – level game between the domestic and the international

6 level as put forward by Robert Putnam (1988) is arguably most relevant for the case analyzed in this study. The basic premise of the two – level game is that foreign policy decision – makers have to reconcile domestic demands with international imperatives (Putnam, 1988, p. 460). The academic salience of the two – level game for the case at hand arises from the assertion of scholars such as Hagan (2001) and Kinne (2005) that autocratic regimes are also pressured to take domestic factors into consideration when formulating foreign policy. An analysis of the influence of the IRGC could substantiate this claim, as a possible lack of increased influence despite an established stronger political presence could be an indication of domestic factors that restrict its influence on foreign policy formulation.

The IRGC and its political rise

Three factors that are pivotal to this study need to be further elaborated in order to provide an adequate background for the analysis. Firstly, the IRGC itself and its purported political rise. The IRGC is a separate military arm of the IRI that was created in 1979 in order to safeguard the existence of the regime of the IRI (Ostovar, 2009, p. 47). More specifically, the IRGC is tasked with “exporting the Revolution abroad according to the pure Islamic ideology and executing the will of the Islamic Republic” (Demirel, 2016, p. 106). A number of factors have been commonly identified that ostensibly led to the political rise of the IRGC, such as large – scale demonstrations in the summer of 1999 (Sinkaya, 2016, p. 6), a decline in popularity of the reformist Khatami regime due to an enduring economic recession and unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with the US (Safshekan & Sabet, 2010, p. 547), the increasing discontent of IRGC members with the reformist tendencies of Khatami’s regime (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1291) and Khamenei’s increasingly overt predilection to support the IRGC (Maloney, 2015, p. 277). While it is not of interest to expound on the mechanisms that have been argued to entail the political rise of the IRGC, it is germane to establish that this political rise has been generally acknowledged and elaborated among experts on Iranian politics.

The influence of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy formulation

The second factor that needs to be elucidated is the ways in which the IRGC is presumed to influence Iranian foreign policy formulation. Despite not being specifically evaluated, five different means through which the IRGC could influence Iranian foreign policy formulation can be generally identified within the existing literature. Firstly, through its alliance with the Supreme Leader Khamenei. It has been argued that the Supreme Leader is in need of a supporting base to maintain his rule. In comparison to his predecessor Khomeini, Supreme Leader Khamenei2 had relatively meagre religious

2 Khamenei has been the Supreme Leader from 1989 onward.

7 credentials, which limited his clout over the clerical establishment. As such, he strongly and increasingly relied on the IRGC which would prove to be his “natural and indispensable allies” (Wehrey, 2009, p. 80). Lim (2015, p. 151) has contended that this close connection between Khamenei and the IRGC has furthermore bestowed the latter with a disproportional strong voice within the powerful Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which has also been affirmed by Alsultan and Saeid (2017, p. 45) and by Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007, p. 82). Secondly, the IRGC has the leading role in safeguarding Iran’s national security (Lim, 2015, p. 158). This naturally endows the IRGC and its affiliated organizations with a significant influence in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This notion has been substantiated by the existence of Quds Force3 sections in many Iranian embassies (Frick, 2008, p. 123), but also by the mentioned strong influence the IRGC enjoys in the SNSC. Thirdly, the IRGC controls its own defense industry (Buchta, 2000, p. 67) as well as a substantial part of Iran’s economy (Habibi, 2015). Fourthly, it has been argued that the IRGC commands a highly influential network that steers the course of the Iranian state (Lim, 2015, p. 159). Lastly, the IRGC has a history of assassinations and similar clandestine activities that were intended to keep Iran internationally isolated (Negahban, 2017, p. 36; Wehrey, 2009: pp. 77 – 93). The limited place at the author’s disposal does not allow for a full assessment of all those instruments that could influence Iranian foreign policy formulation. As such, in chapter 3 the author will expound on the methods of influence that are analyzed in this study.

The connection between political factions and the IRGC

The final issue that is in need of some clarification is the assumed link between the political factions and the IRGC. The political factions will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. However, it is important to note that in this study the assumption is made that IRGC members generally belong to the neoconservative faction. This assumption is based on the abundance of literature on the Iranian political factions which contends that the neoconservative faction4 can be considered as the political manifestation of the IRGC and of its affiliated organizations.5 In consideration of this established close connection between the neoconservative faction and the IRGC, the categorization of Iran’s political landscape into different political factions provides an adequate variable that can be used to determine

3 The Quds Force is an elite subdivision of the IRGC that is responsible for “exporting the revolution” and that has close ties to the Supreme Leader, Frick (2008). 4 In some works they are referred to as principlists, radicals or as hardliners. 5 See for example Bryson, Causes of Variance in Iranian Foreign Policy from 1989 to 2013; Ehteshami & Zweiri, The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution; Rakel, The Political Elite in the Islamic Republic of Iran: From Khomeini to Ahmadinejad and Thaler, Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics.

8 how strong the prevalence of the IRGC in different Iranian political institutions is and how it has developed over time.

3. Methodology

As stated, the research question that this study seeks to answer is “how has the political rise of the IRGC from 1999 to 2005 affected Iranian foreign policy formulation?” Based on the discussion of the theoretical framework in the previous chapter, three components can be identified that are imperative in order to answer this question: a classification of the different political factions based on the role of ideology in Iranian foreign policy; an identification of the role of formal institutions in Iranian foreign policy formulation, and finally an assessment of the representation of the identified different political factions in those formal institutions before and after the political rise of the IRGC in comparison to the development of Iranian foreign policy.

The variable used for this analysis

The focal point of this study is the representation of IRGC – affiliates in the formal institutions that are outlined in chapter 5, rather than its influence through its economic preponderance or through its dominance in national security. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the limited space at the authors’ disposal does not allow for a holistic analysis of the role of the IRGC in Iran’s foreign policy formulation, thus compelling him to limit the analysis to one factor. Secondly, an evaluation of the representation of IRGC – affiliates in formal institutions sheds much light on the development of Iranian foreign policy in general, while putting the role of the IRGC in perspective. As will be demonstrated in chapter 5, Iranian foreign policy arises as a result of an intricate and opaque interplay between informal and formal institutions. In consideration of the fact that the general direction of Iranian foreign policy throughout the period analyzed has been subjected to much research, providing an assessment of the institutional representation of IRGC – affiliates while taking into account the dynamic between those different institutions can contribute to an understanding of how the IRGC exercises influence on foreign policy formulation.

The method used for this analysis

As mentioned above, this study encompasses three components. The first component, the classification of the political factions, is based on a convergence of a variety of scholarly works that have evaluated the characteristics of those different political factions as well as the relevance of ideology in Iranian politics. The ideological factor is necessary to expound on as the policy preferences of the different political factions arise from the different worldviews they harbor. The second component, the identification of the formal institutions involved in Iranian foreign policy formulation, is fairly straightforward. The reason for this is that this identification is built on constitutionally bestowed powers. While the author’s lack of proficiency in the Persian language does not allow him

10 to directly draw upon primary sources that allocate those powers, sufficient research has been conducted on this constitutional distribution of power that can be utilized. Lastly, the central component of this study is the analysis of the composition of those formal institutions based on the provided classification of the political factions in tandem with a brief assessment of the development of Iranian foreign policy. The representation of the different political factions in the formal institutions will be derived from an analysis of news articles and short biographical works concerning the individuals that occupy those formal institutions. Three primary criteria guide the selection of those articles. Firstly, the author aspires to select works that elaborate as much as possible on the individual that is analyzed, in order to increase the validity of the classification of this individual. Secondly, the author intends to avoid using overtly politically – oriented sources. Lastly, for more ambiguous cases at least two different sources will be used.

Caveats of this method

A number of caveats that are inherent to this approach need to be pointed out and to be taken into account. Firstly, the authors’ lack of proficiency in the Persian language limits the depth of the analysis, as most biographical works that elucidate the “true ideology” of the individuals are only available in Persian. As such, the analysis is generally based on English news articles or brief biographies. Secondly, the amount of material available differs per individual. If insufficient material for an adequate evaluation could be found, the individual will not be included in the analysis. This has been the case for 2 out of the 28 cases (7.14%). However, the data obtained demonstrate that there is little reason to believe that the exclusion of those cases have significant ramifications for the conclusions reached. Thirdly, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, the line between the different factions is not clear cut. While table 1 in chapter 4 outlines some general acknowledged criteria that are used as guidelines for the categorization, in some cases the available material permits a certain leeway in the categorization; for example, based on the material available, an individual might be classified as either a traditional conservative or a pragmatist conservative. Lastly, not necessarily all IRGC members harbor ideologies that are equal to those ascribed to the neoconservative faction.

Period of analysis

This study examines the IRGC’s influence on Iranian foreign policy in three demarcated periods: from 1989 to 1997, from 2005 to 2013 and from 2013 onward. The first period covers the first two presidencies of Rafsanjani, before the purported political rise of the IRGC that took place from 1999 onward. The second period encompasses the presidency of Ahmadinejad, which set in just after the political rise of the IRGC and which is seen as the culmination of this political rise. The third period equals the presidential terms of Rouhani (2013 - ). This period has been added to the comparison in

11 order to provide an assessment of the persistence of the presumed increase in the IRGC’s political power, as well as to provide an assessment of the IRGC’s increased political power in absence of a likeminded president.

4. The role of ideology and political factions in Iranian foreign policy

Iranian foreign policy since 1979

In 1979 the Islamic Revolution swept through Iran, in which a large movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was established. Since then, the paramount priority of the Iranian leaders has been to ensure the survival of the IRI, regardless of their political stance (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). As such, all domestic and foreign policy is directed toward supporting this goal. While there is no debate on the overall goal of safeguarding the IRI, there is a vibrant discussion on how this goal should be reached. Based on this discussion, Iran’s foreign policy after 1979 can be understood by its continuous balancing act between ideology and pragmatism. It is through a continuous contestation of those two positions by a variety of actors that Iranian foreign policy emerges (Ramazani, 2004). An understanding of the dynamic between ideology and pragmatism is imperative for this study, as it provides a framework that explains how different Iranian decision – makers perceive external developments and subsequently how their policy preferences arise.

Ideology in Iranian foreign policy

The ideological perspective on Iranian foreign policy is built on the principles that were championed by Khomeini and his followers, of which two are considered to be of overriding importance. The first of those is the primacy of Shi’ite Islamic tenets and the concomitant endeavour to export the Islamic Revolution (Dehshiri & Majidi, 2008, p. 102). This principle is manifested in the concept of velayat – e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which stipulates that the Supreme Leader is the legal leader of the umma 6 (Rakel, 2009, p. 26). This stipulation not only bestows the Supreme Leader with extensive power, but also implies that he has the responsibility to create an “Islamic world order” and to protect his Muslim brethren around the world against the presumed morally bankrupt rest of the world (Ramazani, 2004, p. 555). The other dominant ideological position builds up on this notion, and is a firm rejection of alignment with both the East and the West. Instead of integrating into the existing international system, Iran considers itself to be the leader of the suppressed states that have no place in this system as well as of the Islamic world at large (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2007). This rejection has been portrayed by Khomeini as being the result of a global dichotomy between the oppressed and the oppressors, or between justice and injustice (Abid – Moghaddam, 2007, p. 56). More specifically, the

6 The umma refers to the global community of Muslims.

U.S. and Israel have commonly been regarded as the oppressors that brought upon injustice to the Muslim community and the world at large, which therefore need to be combatted by the self - proclaimed just and divine IRI (Axworthy, 2014, p. 24).

Pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy

The pragmatic strand of Iran’s foreign policy has been portrayed in contrast to the described ideological positions and is mostly associated with former president Rafsanjani as well as with his student and current president Rouhani (Axworthy, 2014, pp. 26 -27). It has been commonly argued that Iran’s foreign policy since the emergence of the IRI has seldom neglected its pragmatic interests (Axworthy, 2014, p. 21; Ramazani, 2004, p. 555; Warnaar, 2013, p. 11). Kamrava (2011, p. 184) has even contended that “Iranian foreign and national security policies are influenced far more by pragmatic, balance of power considerations than by ideological or supposedly revolutionary pursuits.” The pragmatists adjust their foreign policy according to what is deemed most feasible for the economic wellbeing of the Iranian people. As such, they have generally favoured integration of Iran into the international system and are to varying degrees willing to seek rapprochement with the U.S. as well as with the neighbouring Gulf countries (Rakel, 2009, p. 148).

Political factions in Iranian foreign policy

The dynamic of ideology and pragmatism should not be regarded as a mutual exclusive dichotomy, but rather as a spectrum on which each actor takes a certain position. Based on this ideology – pragmatism spectrum, Iranian politics has usually been categorized in political factions. For this study the categorization of political factions as used by Wehrey (2009, p. 15) will be adopted, as this categorization distinguishes between traditionalist and pragmatist conservatives, which facilitates the analysis conducted in chapter 6.7 Wehrey thus distinguished between traditionalist conservatives, pragmatist conservatives, reformists and radicals (neoconservatives)8. Alsultan and Saeid (2017, p. 41) have described those political factions as “pseudo party institutions that include loose coalitions of groups and individuals with similar views.” While those factions reflect their members’ views on economic, socio – cultural, and foreign policy issues, contrary to political parties they lack a coherent organizational structure as well as an official platform. It should furthermore be noted that those

7 Some nuances can be made in the terminology used for Iran’s political factions. For example, Ehteshami & Zweiri (2007, introduction) distinguished between traditional conservatives, liberal reformists and neoconservatives. Buchta (2000, p. 11), in his seminal work Who Rules Iran?, divided the Iranian leadership into a left – wing and a right – wing, each of which again can be divided into a moderate and a traditional faction. Rakel (2009, p. 65) and Alsultan and Saeid (2017, pp. 41 - 43) make a distinction between conservatives, reformists and pragmatists. 8 With the political emergence of the IRGC, the hardliner or neoconservative faction has commonly been recognized as an independent faction. See for example Rizvi (2012, p. 594).

14 political factions are not homogenous groups, but rather encompass a wide range of individuals that might differ substantially in certain aspects of their ideology (Rakel, 2007, p. 165).

The traditionalist as well as pragmatist conservatives are generally characterized by their endeavour to adopt the policies of former Supreme Leader Khomeini and to further the velayat – e faqih doctrine. Regarding foreign affairs, those policies include a “neither East nor West” policy, militant “Third Worldism”, strong anti – imperialist tendencies and anti – colonialism as well as the intention to export the Islamic Revolution (Kaya & Sartere, 2015, p. 4). However, the traditionalist conservatives, commonly clergy affiliated with the religious institutions of the city of Qom, advocate absolute self – sufficiency and cultural purity (Wehrey, 2009, p. 15). Thus, they are averse to seeking rapprochement to the West. Contrarily, the pragmatic conservatives are open to some degree of rapprochement to the West, as they consider integration into the international system necessary for economic development. However, in contrast to the reformist faction, the pragmatic conservatives are opposed to democratization of politics. Rizvi (2012, p. 588) has furthermore contended that some conservatives are opposed to the IRGC’s political involvement, as this was explicitly prohibited by Khomeini.

The neoconservatives share many characteristics of the traditionalist conservatives, yet they are guided by a stronger sense of Iranian nationalism and an emphasis on militarization of the state as well as on economic progress. Furthermore, in contrast to the conservatives, the neoconservatives strive to limit the influence of the established clergy (Safhekan & Sabet, 2009, pp. 552 – 554). The neoconservative faction predominantly comprises members or former members of the IRGC (Rakel, 2008, p. 122), therefore also differing in its stance regarding the IRGC’s political involvement from some conservatives. Gold (2012) has moreover argued that the ideology of the IRGC is strongly centred around the idea of Mahdism; the conviction that the Hidden Imam (Mahdi) will soon reappear. According to the doctrine upheld by the IRGC, conflict would accelerate the return of the Mahdi, thus making the IRGC inclined to seek confrontation with those it considers its enemies.9

Based on the abovementioned characteristics of those different factions, table 1 presents the most salient norms that guide the foreign policy of the traditionalist conservative faction, the neoconservative faction and the pragmatist conservative/reformist faction respectively. The reformers and pragmatist conservatives have been clustered together as their foreign policy guidelines and goals are highly congruent and as those factions have been commonly grouped

9 See for a more elaborate explanation on the IRGC’s doctrine of the Hidden Imam Gold, “The Emergence of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Regime”, retrieved from http://jcpa.org/article/irans- revolutionary-guards/.

15 together in opposition to the traditionalist conservatives and neoconservatives. Those characteristics will be used in order to conduct the analysis in chapter 6.

Table 1 Foreign policy preferences of identified political factions in the IRI10 Traditionalist conservative Pragmatist Neoconservatives conservatives/reformists Opposition to the West, less Pragmatic approach to Firm opposition to the West, firm than the neo – relations with Western ideals of the revolution conservatives countries based on economic

considerations International isolation and self Integration into the International isolation and self – sufficiency international political system – sufficiency Limited cooperation with Arab Improving ties with Arab Confrontational approach with countries, focus on Islamic countries Arab countries, focus on unity sectarian divisions Focus on Khomeini’s ideas and Still focus on ideological Focus on Khomeini’s ideas and Islamic ideology aspects, but pragmatic Islamic ideology, but also on considerations take Iranian nationalism and precedence. Mahdism Advocate clerical rule Pragmatic conservatives Neoconservatives advocate continue of the clerical rule, reformists strive for democratization

10 Those characteristics are based on an evaluation of the mentioned works of Alsultan and Saeid (2017), Buchta (2000), Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007), Gold (2012), Kaye and Sartere (2015), Rakel (2008), Rakel (2009), Rizvi (2012), Safshekan and Sabet (2010) and Wehrey (2009).

5. Iranian foreign policy formulation

The political factions can translate their worldviews into foreign policy through the constitutionally established institutions of the IRI. In evaluating the foreign policy decision – making process the formal and informal institutions can and should not be treated as separate entities, as it is through their interaction that such policy is promulgated (Tagma & Uzun, 2012, p. 247). It has been argued that the constitutional allocation of powers regarding foreign policy formulation has not been clear – cut, which has further contributed to the importance of informal institutions in foreign policy formulation (Kazemzadeh, 2017, p. 200; Negahban, 2017, p. 34). Nevertheless, table 1 in the appendix outlines the actors that have constitutionally been granted a role in Iran’s foreign policy formulation, as well as a summary of their formally allocated capabilities regarding foreign policy formulation.

Keeping in mind the disparity between the constitutionally ascribed authority and the exercised authority (Thaler, 2010, p. 15), the following institutions thus have a formal role in the formulation of Iran’s foreign policy: the Supreme Leader, President, SNSC, IRGC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Parliament, Guardian Council and Expediency Council. However, it is important to specify how substantial the constitutional bestowed authority of those different institutions really is. Based on those constitutionally ascribed powers, a distinction can be made between institutions that can play an active role in foreign policy formulation and institutions that merely play a passive role11. While the institutions with an active role can directly influence and initiative foreign policy proposals, the latter institutions are restricted to negating foreign policy initiatives.

Constitutional active role in foreign policy formulation

As can be seen in table 1 (appendix), the institutions that have an active role in Iranian foreign policy formulation are the Supreme Leader, the President and the SNSC. Of those the Supreme Leader is the constitutional most powerful institution in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy, as he controls many appointments to institutions that also enjoy substantial constitutional power on this area and as he has the formal power to negate all foreign policy proposals. Figure 1 and figure 2 in the appendix provide an overview of the positions that are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the power the Supreme Leader holds over the Iranian military respectively. Secondly, while the President does play an active role in the formulation of Iran’s foreign policy, Alsultan and Saeid (2017, p. 35) have argued that this role is merely as a part of a network that determines Iran’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the President strongly influences the composition of the SNSC by his capability to nominate ministers

11 Those institutions are designated as those that can exercise negative power in table 1 (appendix).

(Tagma & Uzun, 2012, p. 247). Lastly, the SNSC is said to be at the heart of the national defence and foreign policy machinery (Bryson, 2017; Lim, 2015; Maleki, 2001).12 This institution was established in 1989 in order to provide a centralized national security apparatus in response to the fragmented nature of Iran’s decision – making process (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 5). While the President heads the SNSC, it is the secretary of the SNSC (who is appointed by the Supreme Leader) that wields most power (Kazemzadeh, 2017, p. 202). Decisions made by the SNSC are not effective without the approval of the Supreme Leader; however, once effective, they supersede legislation (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 5).

Constitutional passive role in foreign policy formulation

The MFA is responsible for the day – to – day implementation of foreign policy and for the recruitment of diplomats. As such, it is not responsible for formulating foreign policy, but has some influence through its capacity to implement foreign policy decisions (Kazemzadeh, 2017, p. 201). We can furthermore establish from the constitutional powers that the Guardian Council has been granted that this institution holds substantial capabilities to negate foreign policy initiatives. Arjomand (2009, p. 44) has moreover argued that, ever since Khamenei became Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council became less inclined to back its decisions with judicial and legal arguments, providing it with more leeway to negate foreign policy initiatives without properly accounting for it.

The role of the Expediency Council in foreign policy formulation is more ambiguous. Arjomand (2009, p. 45) has contended that it is a fairly powerful institution as it can independently initiate legislation which only needs to be approved by the Supreme Leader. However, Buchta (2000, p. 61) has argued that the legislative authority of the Expediency Council has been strongly curtailed after 1989 as a result of obstructions from the Parliament. Nevertheless, the advisory role of the Expediency Council (Thaler 2010, p. 30) to the Supreme Leader might strongly influence his preferences, thus bestowing the Expediency Council with a strong informal influence over Iran’s foreign policy formulation. As the members of the Expediency Council are appointed by the Supreme Leader for five – year terms (Thaler 2010, p. 31), this institution can be seen as a further asset to the Supreme Leader. Lastly, the Parliament plays a limited role in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy due to its power to ratify international treaties and policies.

12 See figure 3 (appendix) for an illustration of the dynamic between the SNSC and the other institutions involved in the decision – making process of Iranian national security issues. Furthermore, see table 2 (appendix) for the composition of the SNSC.

6. Analysis: the influence of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy formulation

Table 2 displays the composition of the formal institutions most pertinent to Iranian foreign policy from 1989 onward. The sources on which this categorization is based can be found in the footnotes of table 3 (appendix). It should be noted that the IRGC commanders themselves are not included in this analysis, despite their formal influence in the SNSC. The reason for this is that they are by definition affiliated with the IRGC and thus the neoconservative section. Thus, including those individuals would obscure the analysis. Furthermore, the chairs of the Assembly of Experts13 are included in the analysis, despite the Assembly’s lack of direct authority on matters related to foreign policy. This inclusion is due to the fact that the Assembly of Expert is the only institution in Iran that is tasked to supervise the Supreme Leader and that has the formal power to dismiss him, thus bestowing this institution with substantial indirect influence on Iranian foreign policy formulation.

13 The Assembly of Experts is an institution that consists of 86 clerics. Those clerics are elected by the Iranian people every 8 years and have the authority to elect, dismiss and supervise the Supreme Leader. For an in – depth explanation of the Assembly of Experts, see Zweiri and Mardini (2007) “The Politics of Iran’s Assembly of Experts after Meshkini.”

Table 2: Distribution of foreign policy formulation power among different factions from 1989 – 2019.14 Function 1989 – 1997 2005 – 2013 2013 – 2019 Supreme Khamenei Khamenei Khamenei Leader President Rafsanjani Ahmadinejad Rouhani Secretary Rouhani A. Larijani Jalili Shamkhani General SNSC Speaker of Nateq – Nuri Haddad – Adel A. Larijani A. Larijani the Parliamen t Minster of Velayati Mottaki Akbar Zarif Foreign Salehi Affairs Minister Torka Forouzande Najjar Vahidi Dehghan Hatami of n h Defence and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Fallahian Mohseni – Moslehi Alavi of Ezhei Intelligenc e Chair Jannati Jannati Jannati Guardian Council Chair Rafsanjani Rafsanjani Rafsanja Shahroud S. Expedienc ni i Larijan y Council i Chair Meshkini Meshki Rafsanja Kani Kani Shahroudi Assembly ni ni of Experts

14 Green: traditionalist conservative, blue: neoconservative, red: pragmatist conservative/reformist.

Table 3 Overview of distribution of foreign policy formulation power among different factions from 1989 – 2019. 1989 – 1997 2005 – 2013 2013 - Pragmatist 4 (36.4%) 3 (17.6%) 3 (21.4%) conservative Traditionalist 5 (45.5%) 9 (52.9%) 8 (57.1%) conservative Neoconservative 1 (9.1%) 5 (29.4%) 2 (14.3%) Unidentified 1 (9.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (7.1%) Total 11 17 14

Observations

A number of pertinent observations can be made from table 2 and table 3. Firstly, the relative size of the traditionalist conservative faction remains fairly consistent throughout the three periods. Secondly, the fraction of neoconservatives that were in a position to influence foreign policy formulation peaked during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. However, this stronger representation of the neoconservatives only occurred in positions that were appointed by the President. In contrast, the leadership of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council mostly remained under control of the traditionalist and pragmatist conservatives respectively. Furthermore, the Guardian Council (Alem, Elklit & Kar, 2011, pp. 19 – 21) and the Expediency Council (Arjomand, 2009, p. 45) in general have been dominated by traditionalist conservative clerics ever since their emergence. Other patterns are also discernible. For example, the Ministries of Defense and Intelligence tend to be led by someone who has an IRGC – background, thus likely by a neoconservative. On the contrary, the Foreign Ministry is often headed by individuals who have an abundance of international experience, which arguably has moderated their worldview.

Iran’s foreign policy thoughout the periods analyzed

How do those different compositions translate into Iran’s foreign policy during the respective presidencies? Bryson (2017) provides an insightful analysis of the intertwining influence of domestic and external factors on Iranian foreign policy. Based on this analysis, he has categorized the primary characteristics of Iranian foreign policy during the Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad era (Table 4). A clear contrast in the approach to the West is visible between the Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani era. The Rouhani presidency has again been argued to constitute another turnaround in Iranian foreign policy, rejecting the hardline – stance of the Ahmadinejad presidency and reverting to a more pragmatic style of conducting foreign policy (Golkar, 2016, pp. 289 - 291). Haghoo, Hashjin and Aghai (2017, p. 245) have even stated that in “Rouhani’s administraton there is no longer any trace of the

21 revolutionary behaviour of Ahmadinejad’s era.” Interestingly, many high – ranking clerics ardently supported the pragmatist and experienced cleric Rouhani in his election, running contrary to the interests of the neoconservatives (Golkar, 2016, p. 289; Negahban, 2017, p. 35).

Table 4 Foreign policy orientation of the IRI during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad.15 Presidency Anti – Americanism Anti – Zionism Islamic Leadership Rafsanjani (1989 – Low High Medium 1993) Rafsanjani (1993 – Low High Medium 1997) Ahmadinejad (2005 – High High Low 2009) Ahmadinejad (2009 – High High Medium 2013)

Implications for the role of the IRGC in Iran’s foreign policy formulation

A number of implications for the IRGC’s influence on Iran’ s foreign policy formulation can be derived from the data above. Firstly, the political rise of the IRGC in the period of 1999 to 2005 only partially led to an increase in formal influence of the IRGC on Iranian foreign policy formulation. More specifically, while the neoconservatives were more strongly represented in Ahmadinejad’s presidency, this did not endure during the presidency of Rouhani, indicating that the rise of the IRGC in the political sphere was strongly connected with the presidency of Ahmadinejad and as such to a certain degree of a temporary nature. This notion is further corroborated by the general trends of Iranian foreign policy, which has been argued to take a moderate turn under Rouhani’s auspices.

Secondly, the strong institutions of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council, which have wide – ranging negative and initiative powers respectively, have consistently remained under the control of the traditionalist and pragmatist conservatives. As such, even during Ahmadinejad’ s presidency the leeway of his neoconservative appointees was limited. Much literature 16 refers to the nuclear negotations during Ahmadinejad’s presidency that were stalwarted by the hardliners in order to

15 Derived from Bryson (2017, pp. 38, 71), Causes of variance in Iranian Foreign Policy from 1979 to 2013. 16 See for example Tagma & Uzun (2012), Explaining the Shift in Iranian Nuclear Policy; Kazemzadeh (2017), Foreign policy decision – making in Iran and the nuclear program or Farhad & Moshirabad (2018), The Revolutionary Guards: from spoiler to accepter of the nuclear agreement.

22 demonstrate a purported increase in power of the neoconservatives. However, as the characterization of the different political factions in chapter 4 indicates, such a stance does not necessarily contradict the interests of the traditionalist conservatives. Moreover, during Ahmadinejad’s second presidential term, increasing disagreements between the neoconservatives and the traditionalist conservatives began to emerge, which subsequently eroded the influence of the neoconservatives (Golkar, 2016, p. 287). This dynamic between the neoconservatives and the traditionalist conservatives, with the latter remaining dominant, had already been speculated by Ehteshami and Zweirit in 2007 (pp. 74 – 75).

The third implication, which runs somewhat contrary to the findings of Negahban (2017), is that the Supreme Leader still holds paramount power in the area of foreign policy formulation due to his influence on the composition of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council. This has been particularly visible when substantial disagreements between Khamenei and the traditional conservatives on one hand and Ahmadinejad and the neoconservatives on the other hand arose in 2011 (Golkar, 2016, p. 287), which led to a reduction of the latters’ influence. While Negahban provides a detailed reasoning for the presumed vast influence of the IRGC on foreign affairs, he did not take into account the strong constitutional power of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.17 The relevance of those institutions in Iranian foreign policy is further substantiated by the fact that Khamenei granted the Expediency Council greater powers in the fall of 2005 in order to counterbalance the radical approach of Ahmadinejad (Rakel, 2009, p. 76).

17 An analysis of the use of the negative power of the Guardian Council regarding foreign policy initiatives would provide more insight into the exact extend of the Supreme Leader’s and thus the limits of the IRGC’s powers. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it would provide for an insightful follow – up research.

7. Conclusion

The primary goal of this study has been to assess to what degree the political rise of the IRGC between 1999 and 2005 has affected Iran’s foreign policy formulation. While the IRGC influences Iranian foreign policy formulation directly and indirectly through a variety of means, this study has focussed on scrutinizing the composition of the Iranian institutions that have formally been bestowed the power to initiate or negate foreign policy initiatives. The data provided have indicated that the IRGC’s role in the formal institutions has indeed peaked during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. However, the actors representing the IRGC still seemed subject to restrictions emanating from the constitutionally powerful Guardian Council and Expediency Council, which remained dominated by the traditional conservatives. Furthermore, despite the presumed close alliance between Khamenei and the IRGC, the growing tensions between Ahmadinejad and the neoconservatives on one hand and Khamenei and the traditionalist conservatives on the other hand during Ahmadinejad’s second presidency suggests that there are also limits to this alliance. Rouhani’s cabinet also displayed a return to the Rafsanjani – era, being filled with pragmatic technocrats rather than ideological militants and displaying foreign policy that is generally classified as being rather moderate. The sum of those findings gives reason to not overstate the increase in influence of the IRGC on foreign policy formulation beyond Ahmadinejad’s presidential terms.

Notwithstanding those indications that the formal influence of the IRGC on Iran’s foreign policy formulation remains limited despite the political rise of the IRGC, many authors have argued that the informal clout of the IRGC has strongly influenced Iran’s foreign policy. Lim (2015) has provided an insightful diagram regarding the ostensible power position of different individuals in Iran’s national security decision – making (figure 4 appendix). Of the sixteen most influential individuals except Khamenei himself, only Velayati has no IRGC background. This ostensible informal power of the IRGC has been supported by other claims that the IRGC prevails over all other informal power centers in Iran (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2007, p. 82; Frick, 2008, p. 121). While a more detailed evaluation of the mechanics of the informal networks in the influence of the IRGC bears much merit, it has been beyond the scope of this study to conduct such an evaluation. However, in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the possible changed and changing role of the IRGC in Iranian foreign policy formulation, this topic should be scrutinized in further research.

Academic implications of this study

In spite of those informal political leverages that remain unelucidated, the demonstration of the IRGC’s limits on formal foreign policy formulation has given rise to a number of important implications. Firstly, this analysis has been useful in indicating certain limits to the authority of the IRGC in the sphere of foreign affairs in general. As Keynoush (2012, p. 134) has noted, those limits do not necessarily need to arise from opposition by other political factions, but can arguably also be self – imposed in consideration of the survival of the existing political system. This would furthermore align with the in chapter 4 mentioned predominating notion that pragmatism prevails, even in an organization that is as strongly permeated with ideology as the IRGC. Concomitantly to suggesting the limits to the IRGC’s influence on Iranian foreign affairs, this study has been useful in putting forward the notion that the constitutional established institutions that fall under the direct or indirect purview of the Supreme Leader remain dominant in outlining the course that Iranian politics is taking.

Building up on this, the second important implication of this study has been the steadfastness of the constitutionally enshrined institutions that are loyal to the Supreme Leader. Those findings run somewhat contrary to the common assertion that the IRGC became the dominant political power within Iran at the beginning after the 21st century. While this study has not been extensive enough to demonstrate that the IRGC’s influence in foreign policy formulation has not expanded, the outlined composition of the institutions strongly suggest that the IRGC’s formal influence peaked during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, but was quickly curtailed by the countering influence of the traditionalist conservatives and by the election of Rouhani. The question then becomes to what degree those institutions dominated by the traditionalist conservatives will undergo change in the upcoming years, especially considering the old age of their constituents, an impending generational change and the increasing likelihood of Khamenei’s death.

This study has also offered some implications for the studies of Middle Eastern foreign policy and on FPA at large. More specifically, this study has been strongly indicative of the limits of an approach that focusses on one factor, in this case the representation of the IRGC in formal institutions, thus ascribing to the increasingly prevailing notion within those fields that a holistic assessment is necessary in order to derive more steadfast conclusions. Lastly, while not being specifically assessed in this research, the findings indicating certain restrictions on the influence of the IRGC on foreign policy formulation are possibly congruent with the findings of authors such as Hagan (2001) and Kinne (2005) on the domestic conditions that presumably also restrict authoritarian regimes. This would mean that the IRGC could have restrained its own power in consideration of potential domestic restrictions, providing for another topic that could prove insightful if researched in detail.

Implications for Western policymakers

What can those findings contribute to the understanding of Iranian foreign policy by Western policymakers and diplomats? The upcoming years will likely entail a vast change in Iran’s political landscape, due to the generational change mentioned above and due to a concomitant change in the institutions that have been dominated by the traditionalist conservatives. If the informal networks of the IRGC are as extensive as they have generally been argued to be, it seems probable that the neoconservatives will gradually replace the traditionalist conservatives in those institutions. Should this be the case, then there would be little counterbalance to the influence of the neoconservative faction. As such, it seems advisable for Western policymakers to take this upcoming change into consideration in their engagement with Iran. Another lesson that can be derived from this study is that it further demonstrated the complexity of the system that gives rise to Iranian foreign policy. While this is not a new insight in itself, the findings of this study suggest to not overstate the influence of one faction or institution in Iran, especially in consideration of the possible domestic restrictions and counterbalancing measures of other factions that those factions are subjected to.

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Appendix

Table 1 Constitutional allocation of power in foreign policy decision – making process: 18 Formal capacities regarding foreign policy Official ability to exercise formulation19 negative power Supreme Needs to approve all foreign policy proposals and Yes leader outlines the grand strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) with the input of his advisors (Alsultan & Saeid, 2017, pp. 33 - 34). According to Buchta (2000, p. 47), the Supreme Leader has ten special advisors that are specialized in certain areas.

Appoints representatives to every important formal institution, which are intended to enforce the authority and policy preferences of the supreme leader (Buchta, 2000, p. 48).

Appoints the commanders of the armed forces, half of the Guardian Council as well as the entire Expediency Council (figure 1).

President Appoints ministers, thus has a strong influence on No the composition of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) (Buchta, 2000, p. 23).

Chairs the SNSC (Alsultan & Saeid, 2017, p. 35).

18 This table is based on the works of Alsultan and Saeid (2017, pp. 29 - 40), Arjomand (2009, pp. 36 – 55), Buchta (2000, pp. 6 – 11, pp. 22 – 64), Lim (2015) and Thaler et al. (2010, pp. 21 – 35). 19 This category encompasses the capabilities that are bestowed to the respective institutions according to the 1989 constitution of Iran.

Supreme Official central decision – making body regarding No National foreign policy (Lim, 2015, p. 154). Security Council Once approved by the supreme leader, its (SNSC) decisions are final (Alsultan & Saeid, 2017, p. 36).

Encompasses high - level representatives of all institutions pertinent to Iranian foreign policy and security. Iranian Formal representation in the SNSC (Alsultan & No Revolutionary Saeid, 2017, p. 44). Guard Corps Constitutional task to “protect the revolution and its achievements”, which allows for much leeway in its interpretation and thus could allow for a stake in Iran’s foreign policy formulation (Lim, 2015, p. 159). The Foreign Formal representation in the SNSC (Alsultan & No Ministry Saeid, 2017, p. 37). Parliament Ratification of policy and treaties (Alsultan & Yes Saeid, 2017, p. 45).

Approves (and can dismiss) the cabinet appointed by the president (Alsultan & Saeid, 2017, p. 45).

Formal representation in the SNSC. Guardian “Under Article 98 of the constitution, the council Yes Council has the authority to interpret the constitution and can block legislation that it deems un – Islamic or in violation of the constitution” (Thaler, 2010, p. 19).

Has furthermore supreme oversight over all parliamentary and presidential candidates, which

need to be approved by the Guardian Council (Thaler, 2010, p. 19).

Expediency Determines policy guidelines of the Iranian state Yes Council at large by serving as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader (Arjomand, 2009, p. 38).

Broker of disagreements between Parliament and Guardian Council (Arjomand, 2009, p. 38).

Has the ability to independently create legislation that only needs to be approved by the Supreme Leader (Arjomand, 2009, p. 45).

Figure 1 Positions appointed by the Supreme Leader. From Buchta (2000, p. 8), Who Rules Iran?

Figure 2 Formal hierarchy of Iran’s military. From Demirel (2016, p. 111), Assessing the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ extraterritorial activities in attaining Iran’s foreign policy goals.

Figure 3: Decision – making process of Iranian national security issues. Derived from Lim (2015, p. 157), National Security Decision – Making in Iran.

Abbreviations

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security

QF Quds Force

SLO Office of the Supreme Leader

SNSC Supreme National Security Council

Table 2: Composition of the Supreme National Security Council. Derived from Alsultan and Saeid (2017) and Buchta (2000). Function within the SNSC Appointed/elected President Chairman Elected by the Iranian electorate, but only after approval of Guardian Council and parliament Minister of Foreign Affairs Appointed by president, needs approval of parliament Minister of Interior Appointed by president, needs approval of parliament Minister of Intelligence and Appointed by president, Security needs approval of parliament Commander of the IRGC Appointed by supreme leader Commander of Artesh Appointed by supreme leader Chief of the Supreme Command Appointed by supreme leader Council of the Armed Forces Secretary of the SNSC Appointed by president Representative of Supreme Appointed by supreme leader Leader Speaker of Parliament Elected by parliament Head of judicial branch Appointed by supreme leader Planning and Budget Appointed by president Organization representative

Table 3: Political affiliation of individuals that occupied positions relevant to Iranian foreign policy formulation from 1989 to 2019. Name Political Faction IRGC affiliation Sources

Ahmad Jannati Tradtionalist No Memri, 2006; conservative The Iran Primer, 2016

Ahmad Vahidi Neoconservative Chief commander Qods Lake, 2009; Force Payvand, 2009

Akbar Hashemi Pragmatist conservative No - Rafsanjani20

Akbar Torkan Pragmatist conservative No Prabook (date unknown)

Ali Akbar Nateq – Nuri Traditionalist No Memri, 2008; conservative Smyth, 2015

Ali Akbar Salehi Pragmatist conservative No Boroujerdi, 2011

Ali Akbar Velayati Traditionalist No Asharq al – conservative Awsat, 2013

Ali Fallahian Traditionalist No Esfandiari, 2013; conservative BBC, 2001

Ali Khamenei21 Traditionalist Yes - conservative

20 No further analysis required, as his political affiliation has been expounded on in nearly every work that touches upon Iranian politics. 21 Also regarding Khamenei an abundance of literature can be found on his political affiliation. He is generally classified as belonging to the conservative/traditionalist conservatives, despite his close connections to the IRGC.

Ali Larijani Pragmatist conservative Yes, former Samaha, 2013; commander Sahimi, 2009

Ali Meshkini Traditionalist No Blair, 2007; The conservative Inquirer, 2007

Ali Shamkhani Traditionalist Yes, former navy Memri, 2003; conservative commander Wright, 2013

Amir Hatami - - -

Gholam - Ali Haddad – Traditionalist No BBC, 2004; Adel conservative Reuters, 2013

Gholam – Hossein Neoconservative No Stratfor, 2009; Mohseni – Ezhei Human Rights Watch, 2005

Hassan Rouhani22 Pragmatist conservative No -

Heydar Moslehi Traditionalist Yes, Supreme Leader’s Prabook (date conservative representative to the unknown); Basij division of the Sahimi, 2009 IRGC Hossein Dehghan Neoconservative Yes, IRGC air force Memri, 2017 commander

Mahmoud Neoconservative Yes - Ahmadinejad23

Mahmoud Hashemi Traditionalist No Sahimi, 2016 Shahroudi conservative

22 Rouhani is commonly identified as a pragmatist conservative and as being close to Rafsanjani in ideology. 23 Ahmadinejad is generally considered to be the central figure of the neoconservative faction.

Manouchehr Mottaki Pragmatist conservative Liaison officer between Glenn, 2009 the IRGC and the Iranian Foreign Ministry Mohammad – Reza Pragmatist conservative No Shone, 2011 Mahdavi Kani

Mohammad - - - Forouzandeh

Mohammad Javad Zarif Pragmatist conservative No Khanlari, 2014

Mostafa Mohammed – Neoconservative Yes, commander of the Iranwatch, 2009; Najjar Middle East Justice4Iran, Department 2019

Sadeq Larijani Traditionalist No Samaha, 2013; conservative Hadian – Jazy, 2019

Saeed Jalili Neoconservative Yes, member of the Erdbrink, 2013; Basij George, 2013

Mahmoud Alavi Traditionalist No The Iranian conservative Primer, 2013; Kahn, 2018

Figure 4: Key individuals in Iran’s national security decision – making. Derived from Lim (2015, p. 159), National Security Decision – Making in Iran.