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BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The Year of the Political Epic" BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The Year of the Political Epic"

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BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" Contents 1. Introduction - Surprises - Turnout and legitimacy 2. The State - Supreme Leader - President - Guardian Council - Majlis - Expediency Council - Assembly of Experts 3. Election Law - Amendments - Campaigning - Vetting 4. Media Policy - State TV - Provincial TV - Curbs on media - Televised debates - "Electioneering" 5. Presidency - a poisoned chalice? - Bani-Sadr - Raja'i - Hashemi-Rafsanjani - Khatami - Ahmadinezhad 6. Candidates - Principle-ists - Ahmadinezhad supporters - Reformists 7. Facts and Figures - Election Timetable Jeffrey Coonjohn, Senior Policy Advisor (Anti-Corruption) www.jjcoonjohn.com / [email protected] BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" 1. Introduction The 11th Iranian presidential election is due to take place on 14 June 2013, a year which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i has described as the "year of the political and economic epic". The election is seen by many as a possible turning point for the country's domestic and foreign policy. Apart from the ongoing nuclear stand-off with the West, Iran faces major economic challenges as it comes to grips with far-reaching US-EU sanctions. The 2013 election will mark the end of President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad's turbulent two terms in office. Iranian law limits the presidency to two consecutive terms only. The last presidential election in 2009 was marked by widespread protests following the controversial victory of Ahmadinezhad. He was declared winner with a reported 63 per cent of the votes. Opposition Green candidate Mirhoseyn Musavi and reformist Mehdi Karrubi disputed the figure and put Ahmadinezhad's victory down to vote-rigging and "election engineering". Both are now under house arrest. Since the last poll, reformist parties in Iran have been banned and many reformist figures imprisoned. A number of pro-reform groups have threatened to boycott the forthcoming election, just as they did with the 2012 parliamentary poll. The 2013 election looked set to be dominated by the conservatives or "Principle-ists". The term Principle-ist ("Usul-garayan") has been in vogue in Iran's political and media narrative since the 2005 presidential election, which saw Ahmadinezhad defeat Hashemi-Rafsanjani in the second round of the poll. It is used to describe a number of groups or individuals who are united by absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader. Back in 2005, Ahmadinezhad was considered to fall under this broad umbrella. But since then, a rift has developed between Iran's president and the Supreme Leader, so that now most Principle-ists can be characterized by their dislike of Ahmadinezhad and his protege Esfandiyar (alternative spelling Esfandiar) Rahim-Masha'i and their nationalist "Iranian School". Jeffrey Coonjohn, Senior Policy Advisor (Anti-Corruption) www.jjcoonjohn.com / [email protected] BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" Ahmadinezhad's fate appears to follow a familiar pattern: virtually all Iranian presidents have eventually fallen out with the Supreme Leader. But the Principle-ists did not agree on who will be their standard bearer. They now fear that their core vote may be split. And in what many see as an unexpected turn of events, the veteran Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani threw his hat into the ring in the final hours of candidates' registration. Previously, he had made it clear that he would not stand without a green light from Khamene'i. It appears that the Supreme Leader has decided that it would be politically expedient to allow Rafsanjani to stand. Surprises Iranian presidential elections have a habit of surprising political observers. Back in 1997, the reformist Mohammad Khatami defeated the traditional conservative Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, the establishment's favoured candidate, in a landslide. After Khatami's two terms, it was the turn of Ahmadinezhad, who many had dismissed as a lightweight, to defeat Rafsanjani in the 2005 poll. And 2009 saw the incumbent's victory lead to months of unrest in the country. These protests are referred to by Iran's conservative media and leaders as the "sedition". Musavi, Karrubi, Khatami - and sometimes Rafsanjani - are referred to as the leaders of the "sedition". With this in mind, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the poll. But Rafsanjani's eventual last-minute decision to stand, as well as the unpredictability of Ahmadinezhad and Masha'i, means that the Principle- ists will not have the easy ride that they assumed. Overall, the country's current political line-up can be split into three broad groups: - The conservatives or the so-called Principle-ist supporters of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamene'i; - the government camp around President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad; and - the reformists. The period 2009-2013 has also seen a crackdown on media activities by the Iranian establishment. Journalists have been arrested and many Jeffrey Coonjohn, Senior Policy Advisor (Anti-Corruption) www.jjcoonjohn.com / [email protected] BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" pro-reform publications have been banned. A number of hardline newspapers and websites have started a smear campaign against the foreign media, especially BBC Persian. Iran has also tried to cut access to a number of "illegal" virtual private networks (VPNs). VPNs are widely used in the Islamic Republic to access websites that are filtered by the authorities. Many Iranian users have recently complained about the slowing of Internet speed and problems with connectivity. This indicates possible concern among the ruling establishment that there could be an outbreak of demonstrations after the poll, similar to those that followed the 2009 election. Local council elections and Assembly of Experts by-elections are also scheduled to take place on 14 June. This is the first time that these elections will be held alongside the presidential election, and it is likely that the Iranian authorities have decided to hold all three elections on the same day in order to get a high turnout at the polls. Turnout and legitimacy One vital aspect of Iran's strategic narrative is that the ruling Islamic order is based on popular will. According to this narrative, all posts, including those of the Supreme Leader, the president and parliament are elected, directly or indirectly, by popular vote, as allowed by Islamic canons and within the rule of law. This demonstration of public trust in the establishment is of utmost importance to the authorities, hence Iran has held a major election in practically every year since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The authorities claim that the apparently high voter turnout testifies to the popularity of the Islamic Republic and gives legitimacy to the system. Accurate participation figures are not available. According to the Interior Ministry, the rate of voter participation in previous presidential elections were: 2009, 85 per cent; 2005 62.8, per cent); 2001, 67.77 per cent. Jeffrey Coonjohn, Senior Policy Advisor (Anti-Corruption) www.jjcoonjohn.com / [email protected] BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" 2. The State Supreme Leader - Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is Iran's overall leader and highest authority. He succeeded Ayatollah Khomeyni in 1989 after eight years as president. As Vali-ye Faqih (supreme jurisconsult), his authority overrides all others. He is responsible for appointing the head of Iran's judiciary, six of the 12 Guardian Council members (who are responsible for the vetting of election candidates), the commanders of the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders across the country, and the heads of Iran's state TV and radio companies. He also confirms the president's election. The Iranian constitution specifies that the Supreme Leader must possess a number of qualities including scholarship, justice, piety, political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage and administrative capabilities. President - Mahmud Ahmadinezhad Mahmud Ahmadinezhad has been president of Iran since 2005. He was previously a regional governor and mayor of Tehran. He rose through the ranks of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq war and has a PhD in engineering and planning. His re- election as president in June 2009 was disputed by rival candidates and sparked a series of protests against the declared outcome of the poll. Iran's constitution states that the president is the second-highest official in the country after the Supreme Leader. He is responsible for implementing the constitution. The president is elected for a four-year term and can only be re-elected once. Guardian Council The Guardian Council is in charge of overseeing legislation passed by the Majlis (parliament), and ensuring that it complies with Islamic laws and the constitution. The council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts. It is comprised of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader, Jeffrey Coonjohn, Senior Policy Advisor (Anti-Corruption) www.jjcoonjohn.com / [email protected] BBCM Iran Presidential Election Guide 2013 "The year of the Political Epic" and six lay Muslim jurists approved by the Majlis. The current secretary of the Council is the elderly hardliner Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. Majlis The Majlis, or Islamic Consultative Assembly, is the Iranian parliament. It is comprised of 290 members who are elected by popular vote every four years. Its powers include passing legislation, summoning and impeaching ministers as well as the president, ratifying international treaties and approving the national budget. These powers are verified by the Guardian Council, which must ensure all laws passed by the Majlis conform to Islamic law and the Iranian constitution. A number of seats in the Majlis are reserved for non-Muslims, one each for Zoroastrians, Jews, Assyrians and Chaldean Christians, plus a further two seats for Armenian Christians.
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