Iran's Influence in the Americas: Full Report

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Iran's Influence in the Americas: Full Report Iran’s Influence in the Americas the in Influence Iran’s a report of the csis americas program Iran’s Influence in the Americas full report 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Author E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Stephen Johnson Johnson March 2012 ISBN 978-0-89206-703-9 CSIS Ë|xHSKITCy067039zv*:+:!:+:! CHARTING our future Blank a report of the csis americas program Iran’s Influence in the Americas full report Author Stephen Johnson March 2012 CHARTING our future About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and de- velop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s pre- eminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo credit: Presidents Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the Iranian president’s visit to Venezuela January 11, 2012. The two nations are strengthening relations. All rights reserved by Pan-African Wire File Photos, http://www.flickr.com/photos/53911892@ N00/6680218863/sizes/l/in/photostream/. © 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Johnson, Stephen. Iran’s influence in the Americas / Stephen Johnson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-89206-703-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Latin America—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations—Latin America. 3. Iran—Foreign relations—1997– I. Center for Strate- gic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.). Americas Program. II. Title. F1416.I72J65 2012 327.8055--dc23 2012001243 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org contents Preface v Acknowledgments vi Executive Summary vii Abbreviations xvii 1. Introduction 1 2. Understanding Iran’s Relations with the Americas 3 The Shah Era—Security Concerns and Economic Needs 4 The Islamic Revolution 4 Iran–Latin America Relations during the 1980s 6 The Rafsanjani Presidency 7 The Khatami Presidency 8 The Ahmadinejad Presidency and Iran’s Rising Profile in Latin America 10 3. Iran and the Middle Eastern Presence in the Americas 13 Minorities within Minorities 13 Assimilation 16 Potential Inroads—Hezbollah and Radical Clerics 17 4. Iran’s Soft Power 20 Strategic Communication in the Americas 20 Aid as Public Diplomacy 26 5. Strategic Investments and Trade 28 Joint Ventures 28 Bilateral Trade 31 Key Sanctions 41 6. Support for Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere 45 Hezbollah’s International Reach 45 Projection in Latin America and the Caribbean 47 | iii 7. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions 54 Atoms for Peace 54 Shutdown and Restart 55 Self-sufficiency in Uranium 57 Nuclear Diplomacy in the Americas 59 8. Selected Countries and Regional Ties 61 Argentina 61 Bolivia 64 Brazil 68 Caribbean 72 Colombia 74 Cuba 75 Ecuador 77 Mexico 80 Nicaragua 82 Paraguay 85 Peru 87 Uruguay 87 Venezuela 89 9. Conclusions and Policy Options 101 Conclusions 101 Policy Options 102 Final Observations 103 Appendix: Iran’s Engagement in the Americas, 1979–2011 105 About the Author 111 iv | iran’s influence in the americas preface Measuring a nation’s activities in any region is difficult. Relations are typically multidimensional and far deeper than the senior leader rhetoric that makes the evening news. There are lengthy planning meetings in foreign affairs ministries, determinations of mutual interest, hidden agen- das, apprehensions, misunderstandings, gaffes, successes, and disappointments that rarely meet the eye. In Iran’s outreach to the Americas, there is evidently more: a desire for status in the international community, a quest for allies willing to help it develop its nuclear program (as an instrument of national power), and a declared objective to blunt U.S. influence close to its shores, even as the United States exercises its influence in the Middle East and Asia. On the part of some American states, there is a commercial interest in boosting trade while holding Iran’s government at arm’s length. For a small handful of states, relations with Iran have helped strengthen their own efforts to counter U.S. influence and validate their models of personal, centralized control. Three problems present themselves to anyone conducting such a study: First, accurate information is not easily obtainable. Authoritarian governments rarely com- municate their endeavors beyond partial facts, self-serving publicity, and disinformation. Some interpretation must go into evaluating events and statements to be able to discern patterns and intentions. Trade numbers are really snapshots in time that vary by source and by when compil- ers collect the data. Moreover, it is tempting to cherry-pick certain facts and ignore others. Not all figures coincide. Second, busy, complex relationships are never easy to categorize and cross-reference in a way that is meaningful to all observers. Funding a hospital may be an example of economic aid yet have more significance as a public relations project. And third, new information keeps adding to layers of what is known, so chronologies must be constantly updated, including the ones published here. For the purposes of this report, Iran’s activities have been categorized by brief studies of his- tory, possible cultural affinities, strategic communications, economic links, relations with its main terror proxy, nuclear diplomacy, and country-to-country ties. The chronologies contained in these chapters slightly overlap and may be updated, so that a year from now, this report might reach a different set of conclusions. What is important is that it presents enough information to permit readers to make a thoughtful, informed assessment of a situation that could affect the security of the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. | v acknowledgments The author is grateful to the following institutions and individuals for their assistance: the Depart- ment of Defense, National Defense University, and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, for the opportunity to carry out this project and for advice and counsel along the way; Shireen T. Hunter, visiting professor in the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, for her contri- butions to the conceptualization and structuring of this study, as well as her advice and construc- tive criticism; and Michael Graybeal, CSIS Americas program coordinator, Caitlin Watson, CSIS Americas Program research assistant, and the intern scholars of the CSIS Americas Program, without whose help this study would have been impossible. vi | executive summary Through trade, assistance, and bilateral cooperation, the nations of the Americas are more glob- ally connected than ever before. Not just to former colonial powers, but to such faraway places as Afghanistan, China, India, Russia, and Singapore. In 2007, Colombian police were training Afghan counterparts. China’s commerce with Latin America and the Caribbean has grown from about $12 billion in 2000 to some $176.8 billion in 2010.1 India’s trade is on track to double from $23 billion in 2010 to $50 billion in 2014.2 Russia has more extensive commercial and political ties in the hemisphere than it did during the Cold War. And Singapore is now Venezuela’s fifth-largest trading partner. Yet, another foreign power has made inroads and is provoking worries that for now are larger than its actual impact. It is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Once a U.S. ally during the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979), and then hostile to the United States following the shah’s overthrow in 1979, Iran has sought foreign part- ners to project an image of global power, expand trade, intertwine its finances more tightly into the international banking system, and forge political alliances. By most measures, it has been only partly successful, managing to have a small amount of influence with a handful of governments. Although that may not present an existential threat to the United States, it could mean trouble for the hemisphere if Iran decided to raise tensions through renewed support for terrorism or devel- opment of a nuclear weapon. Considering such possibilities, it is important to understand the motives of Iran and its partners in exploiting links, as well as the assets and liabilities of such relationships for each side as Iran tries to gain a foothold. An evaluation of its outreach to the hemisphere before the Islamic Revolution, its outreach efforts since then, the role of its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, and the state of its nuclear program are critical to understanding possible implications for the United States. Overestimating a potential Iranian threat could lead to reactions more damaging than anything Iran could do by degrading U.S. relations with neighboring governments and publics. Underesti- mating a potential threat could send the wrong message about U.S.
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