DOCSLIB.ORG

Contents CHAPTER 16

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Contents CHAPTER 16 Contents CHAPTER 16 ....................................................................................................................................... 494 Sanctions, Export Controls, and Certain Other Restrictions........................................................... 494 A. IMPOSITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS ..................................... 494 1. Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 494 a. General ................................................................................................................................ 494 b. Implementation of UN Security Council resolutions ............................................................... 497 c. U.S. sanctions and other controls.......................................................................................... 497 d. Humanitarian mechanism to increase transparency of permissible trade with Iran ............... 511 2. Syria......................................................................................................................................... 513 3. Turkey’s actions in Syria ........................................................................................................... 513 4. Cuba ........................................................................................................................................ 516 5. Venezuela ................................................................................................................................ 518 a. General background and new executive orders (E.O. 13857 and E.O. 13884) ........................ 518 b. E.O. 13692 ........................................................................................................................... 521 c. Visa restrictions .................................................................................................................... 524 d. E.O. 13850 ........................................................................................................................... 525 e. E.O. 13884 ........................................................................................................................... 531 6. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea .................................................................................... 531 a. General ................................................................................................................................ 531 b. Nonproliferation................................................................................................................... 532 7. Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 534 a. Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act Sanctions ............... 534 b. Sanctions in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine ............................................................. 536 8. Nonproliferation ...................................................................................................................... 538 a. Country-specific sanctions .................................................................................................... 538 b. Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (“INKSNA”)............................................... 539 9. Terrorism ................................................................................................................................. 539 a. UN and other coordinated multilateral action ...................................................................... 539 b. U.S. targeted financial sanctions .......................................................................................... 541 c. Annual certification regarding cooperation in U.S. antiterrorism efforts ............................... 550 10. Cyber Activity and Election Interference ............................................................................... 550 a. Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities ....................................................................................... 550 b. Election Interference ............................................................................................................ 551 11. The Russia Magnitsky and Global Magnitsky Sanctions Programs and Other Measures Aimed at Corruption and Human Rights Violations ......................................................................................... 551 a. The Russia Magnitsky Act ..................................................................................................... 551 b. The Global Magnitsky Sanctions Program ............................................................................. 553 c. Designations under Section 7031(c) of the Annual Consolidated Appropriations Act ............. 560 12. Targeted Visa Restrictions and Sanctions Relating to Threats to Democratic Process and Restoration of Peace, Security, and Stability .................................................................................... 566 a. China (relating to Xinjiang) ................................................................................................... 566 b. Nicaragua ............................................................................................................................ 567 c. Nigeria ................................................................................................................................. 570 d. Mali .................................................................................................................................... 570 e. South Sudan ......................................................................................................................... 573 f. Democratic Republic of the Congo ........................................................................................ 574 13. Transnational Crime ............................................................................................................. 575 B. EXPORT CONTROLS ..................................................................................................................... 575 1. Additions to Entity List: Huawei ............................................................................................... 575 2. Debarments ............................................................................................................................. 576 3. Consent Agreements................................................................................................................ 576 a. Darling Industries ................................................................................................................. 576 b. L3Harris Technologies, Inc. ................................................................................................... 577 c. AeroVironment ..................................................................................................................... 577 4. Litigation .................................................................................................................................. 578 a. Stagg v. Department of State................................................................................................ 578 b. Washington v. Department of State ..................................................................................... 578 c. Thorne v. Department of State ............................................................................................. 579 Cross References ................................................................................................................................. 580 CHAPTER 16 Sanctions, Export Controls, and Certain Other Restrictions This chapter discusses selected developments during 2019 relating to sanctions, export controls, and certain other restrictions relating to travel or U.S. government assistance. It does not cover developments in many of the United States’ longstanding financial sanctions regimes, which are discussed in detail at https://www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx. It also does not cover comprehensively developments relating to the export control programs administered by the Commerce Department or the defense trade control programs administered by the State Department. Details on the State Department’s defense trade control programs are available at https://pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public. A. IMPOSITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS 1. Iran a. General The State Department issued a fact sheet on April 4, 2019 regarding the U.S. campaign to apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to change its behavior. The fact sheet is available at https://www.state.gov/maximum-pressure-campaign-on-the-regime-in- iran/ and excerpted below. ___________________ * * * * The U.S. sanctions have cut off Iran’s access to billions of dollars in oil revenue and are driving its exports lower than ever before. Since last May, 1.5 million barrels/day of Iranian crude have been taken off the market and purchases of Iranian crude will soon be at zero. 494 495 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Starting with the re-imposition of our sanctions on November 5, 2018, Iran’s access to revenue from the sale of crude oil was immediately restricted. Overall, our sanctions have denied the regime direct access to as much as $10 billion in oil revenue since
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • IRAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the Islamic Republic of Iran
    IRAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Islamic Republic of Iran is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy and political leaders vetted by the clergy dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei’s writ dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis. The unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majlis passes to ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also screens presidential and Majlis candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control. Demonstrations by opposition groups, university students, and others increased during the first few months of the year, inspired in part by events of the Arab Spring. In February hundreds of protesters throughout the country staged rallies to show solidarity with protesters in Tunisia and Egypt. The government responded harshly to protesters and critics, arresting, torturing, and prosecuting them for their dissent. As part of its crackdown, the government increased its oppression of media and the arts, arresting and imprisoning dozens of journalists, bloggers, poets, actors, filmmakers, and artists throughout the year.
    [Show full text]
  • Artículos University of New Brunswick, Canada Política
    REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA / VOLUMEN 41 / N° 2 / 2021 / 425-447 VENEZUELA: AUTOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND SPLINTERED ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION*1 Venezuela: consolidación autocrática y liberalización económica fragmentada ANTULIO ROSALES CienciaArtículos University of New Brunswick, Canada Política MARYHEN JIMÉNEZ University of Oxford, United Kingdom ABSTRACT In 2020, Venezuela has gone through a process of autocratic consolidation. This con- solidation has taken place amid substantial economic reforms that have allowed the government of Nicolás Maduro survive sustained international and domestic pressure. In this article, we analyze this process of autocratic consolidation. We ex- plain how, by focusing on the establishment of an “interim-government” in 2019, the Venezuelan opposition has been unable to coordinate an inclusive strategy to successfully bring about a democratic breakthrough and instead became further divided. We address the economic transformations witnessed in the country as policies of fragmented liberalization through opaque privatizations and an uneven multi-currency system, which have resulted from a deep recession, the collapse of the oil economy and sanctions. Finally, we discuss the implications of these poli- tical and economic processes for the social fabric of the country. We highlight that despite the government’s attempts at criminalizing autonomous activism, the re- lative strengths of civil society allowed the survival of minimal democratic spaces that have spurred dialogue and resistance. Keywords: autocracy, Nicolás Maduro, opposition, liberalization, Venezuela. RESUMEN En 2020, Venezuela pasó por un proceso de consolidación autocrática. Esta consolidación ha ocurrido en medio de reformas económicas sustanciales que han permitido al gobierno de Nicolás Maduro subsistir a la presión nacional e internacional. En este artículo analizamos el proceso de consolidación autocrática que se ha concretado en el último año.
    [Show full text]
  • IMAM KHOMEINI's VIEWS Dr. Ghulam Habib
    IMAM KHOMEINI’S VIEWS ON EDUCATION, UNIVERSITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FRONT COVER TEACHERS AND ACADEMICIANS Edited by Dr. Ghulam Habib International Association of Muslim University Professors IMAM KHOMEINI’S VIEWS ON EDUCATION, UNIVERSITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TEACHERS AND ACADEMICIANS Edited by Dr. Ghulam Habib International Association of Muslim University Professors CONTENTS PREFACE ...........................................................................................................................i SECTION I THE GREAT VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE The Aim of Education and Training .......................................................................... 3 Encouragement to Acquire Knowledge .................................................................... 8 Knowledge and Faith - Belief and Professional Expertise .................................. 15 SECTION 2 UNIVERSITIES BEFORE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION Colonial Culture and Lack of Real Progress ........................................................... 51 Suppression and Attacks on Universities ................................................................ 95 SECTION 3 UNIVERSITY AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION Universities and Anti-Revolutionary Groups ....................................................... 103 The Need for Cultural Revolution ......................................................................... 120 Establishment of Headquarter for Cultural Revolution ...................................... 156 SECTION 4 THE MISSION OF UNIVERSITIES Manufacturing Human Beings ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin : a Comparative Analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica Michael W
    Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School 6-28-2000 Political corruption in the Caribbean basin : a comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica Michael W. Collier Florida International University DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14060878 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Latin American History Commons, Political History Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Collier, Michael W., "Political corruption in the Caribbean basin : a comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica" (2000). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2408. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2408 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Miami, Florida POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JAMAICA AND COSTA RICA A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS by Michael Wayne Collier To: Dean Arthur W. Herriott College of Arts and Sciences This dissertation, written by Michael Wayne Collier, and entitled Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A Comparative Analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. Anthony P.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons
    International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) President: Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels Belgium Tel : +32 2 400 1071 [email protected] www.isjcommittee.com EXAMINING 10 WARNING SIGNS OF IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 20,2014 Dr. Alejo Vidal Quadras, Former Vice‐President of European Parliament, Professor of Atomic and Nuclear Physics: “An objective, thoroughly researched report on the core issue of the nature of Iranian nuclear program and its status”. Bob Jospeh, Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior White House Security Council staff on weapons of mass destruction: “A critically important report at a critically important time”. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security: "A timely and well document report with alarming findings on Iran's nuclear program." Contents Executive summary Chapter 1: SPND (organ in charge of weaponization) Chapter 2: Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program Chapter 3: Secret enrichment of uranium Chapter 4: Enrichment using laser technology Chapter 5: High explosives tests and trigger mechanism Chapter 6: Neutron initiator Chapter 7: Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere) Chapter 8: Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site Chapter 9: Research on nuclear warhead Chapter 10: Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
    Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2008-2009 107 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1. General trends The Venezuelan economy exhibited less buoyant growth in 2008 than in previous years: GDP increased 4.8% compared with average annual growth of 9.7% in 2004-2007. The economy slowed down even further in the first quarter of 2009, with GDP increasing just 0.3% with respect to the same period in 2008, and economic activity is projected to stagnate in 2009, with GDP growth at around 0%. Plunging international oil prices have slashed foreign exchange earnings (which are largely dependent on petroleum exports), and heavier restrictions and longer waiting times have been established for the purchase of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.1 The government’s purchasing power has meanwhile diminished because the exchange rate was kept constant and inflation remained notably high. In March 2009, the government announced a set of oil prices and oil production (average price estimates for measures to mitigate the effect of the international crisis the Venezuelan oil basket were revised downwards from and the drop in oil prices on the domestic economy. The US$ 60 to US$ 40 per barrel, and production volumes main measures include: an increase in the VAT rate from from 3.5 million to 3.1 million barrels per day); and the 9% to 12% as of 1 April 2009); salary cuts for senior expansion of the public debt by 28 billion bolivar fuertes. government officials; a reduction in what is designated Despite the public spending cuts, the government announced sumptuous or superfluous spending; a 20% increase in that there would be no reductions in social expenditure.
    [Show full text]
  • To:$M.R$Ahmad$Shahid$ Special$Rapporteur$On$The
    To:$M.r$Ahmad$Shahid$ Special$Rapporteur$on$the$human$rights$situation$in$Iran$ $ Dear%Sir,% % such%as%equal%rights%to%education%for%everyone,%preventing%the%dismissal%and%forced%retirements%of% dissident%university%professors,%right%of%research%without%limitations%in%universities%and%to%sum%up% expansion%of%academic%liberties.%Student%activists%have%also%been%pursuing%basic%rights%of%the%people% such%as%freedom%of%speech,%press,%and%rallies,%free%formation%and%function%of%parties,%syndicates,%civil% associations%and%also%regard%of%democratic%principles%in%the%political%structure%for%many%years.% % But%unfortunately%the%regime%has%rarely%been%friendly%towards%students.%They%have%always%tried%to%force% from%education,%banishments%to%universities%in%remote%cities,%arrests,%prosecutions%and%heavy%sentences% of%lashing,%prison%and%even%incarceration%in%banishment,%all%for%peaceful%and%lawful%pursuit%of%the% previously%mentioned%demands.%Demands%which%according%to%the%human%rights%charter%are%considered% the%most%basic%rights%of%every%human%being%and%Islamic%Republic%of%Iran%as%a%subscriber%is%bound%to% uphold.% % The%government%also%attempts%to%shut%down%any%student%associations%which%are%active%in%peaceful%and% lawful%criticism,%and%their%members%are%subjected%to%all%sorts%of%pressures%and%restrictions%to%stop%them.% Islamic%Associations%for%example%which%have%over%60%years%of%history%almost%twice%as%of%the%Islamic% republic%regimeE%and%in%recent%years%have%been%the%only%official%criticizing%student%associations%in% universities,%despite%their%massive%number%of%student%members,%have%been%shut%down%by%the%
    [Show full text]
  • Demographics, Laboratory Parameters and Outcomes of 1061 Patients with COVID-19: a Report from Tehran, Iran
    Journal Pre-proof Demographics, laboratory parameters and outcomes of 1061 patients with COVID-19: A report from Tehran, Iran Mihan Pourabdollah Toutkaboni, Elham Askari, Nastaran Khalili, Payam Tabarsi, Hamidreza Jamaati, Ali Akbar Velayati, Atosa Dorudinia, Mitrasadat Rezaei, Seyed Alireza Nadji, Abdolreza Mohamadnia, Neda Khalili PII: S2052-2975(20)30129-3 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nmni.2020.100777 Reference: NMNI 100777 To appear in: New Microbes and New Infections Received Date: 17 June 2020 Revised Date: 27 September 2020 Accepted Date: 29 September 2020 Please cite this article as: Toutkaboni MP, Askari E, Khalili N, Tabarsi P, Jamaati H, Velayati AA, Dorudinia A, Rezaei M, Nadji SA, Mohamadnia A, Khalili N, Demographics, laboratory parameters and outcomes of 1061 patients with COVID-19: A report from Tehran, Iran, New Microbes and New Infections, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nmni.2020.100777. This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Demographics, laboratory parameters
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Transnational Terrorist Networks
    כרמ ז ע ז ר י רקחל א י אר ן ץרפומה ירספה ﺰﮐﺮﻣ یرﺰﻋ ﺑ ﺮ یا ﺎﻄﻣ ﻟ ﻌ تﺎ ا ﯾ ﺮ نا ﻠﺧو ﺞﯿ ﭘ رسﺎ The Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies The Persian Gulf Observer Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf à à à Iran’s Transnational Terrorist Networks Issue No. 37 (January, 2020) Attached please find the 37th issue of Persian Gulf Observer, titled " Iran’s Transnational Terrorist Networks" by The Ezri Center's research fellow, Dr. Yossi Mansharof. The Persian Gulf Observer: Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf is published periodically by The Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies at the University of Haifa, expressing the views and analysis of the Ezri center's researchers on various issues concerning the Persian Gulf region and the countries which lay by its shores. You are most welcome to follow the Ezri Center's tweets at: https://twitter.com/EzriCenter , be our friend on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Ezri-Center-for-Iran-and- Persian-Gulf-Studies/141080069242626 Watch and listen to conferences and lecturers at the Center's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZdzvlhv7a8nxLjYZdaz68Q and visit our site: http://gulfc.haifa.ac.il/ להל ן גה י ל י ו ן ה- 37 לש Persian Gulf Observer ובו מאמר כש ו תרת ו " ךרעמ רטה ו ר רטה נ ס - אל ו מ י רפה ו - נאריא י : ילכ קשנ קשנ ילכ : י נאריא טרסאט ג י ל י ו ם קפ ו הד " אמת "דר ףמוישריס ונ ,תעמ רמקחי מ זכרב .ירזע The Persian Gulf Observer: Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf פתמ ר םס דתב י ר ו ת קת ו תפ י ת "ע י י" זכרמ ירזע רקחל ןאריא ץרפמהו סרפה י אב ו נ י סרב י תט ח י הפ , ו וב גצומ םי מאמר י העד , רפ י - טעם לש ירקוח זכרמה לע גמ ו ו ן מל זרה רו ש ע מםיונאש המרוזא הץרפ יסרפ הדשוהמת וניו ונכת יפוחל ו .
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Southern District of Florida
    Case 1:07-cv-22693-PCH Document 352 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/20/09 16:20:32 Page 1 of 60 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 07-22693-CIV-HUCK MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ OSORIO, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. DOLE FOOD COMPANY, et al., Defendants. _______________________________________/ ORDER DENYING RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENT This is an action to enforce a $97 million Nicaraguan judgment under the Florida Uniform Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Florida Recognition Act). FLA. STAT. §§ 55.601-55.607 (2009). Plaintiffs are 150 Nicaraguan citizens alleged to have worked on banana plantations in Nicaragua between 1970 and 1982, during which time they were exposed to the chemical compound dibromochloropropane (DBCP). DBCP is an agricultural pesticide that was banned in the United States after it was linked to sterility in factory workers in 1977. Nicaragua banned DBCP in 1993. Defendants are Dole Food Company and The Dow Chemical Company, both Delaware corporations.1 Dow manufactured DBCP from 1957 until 1977, and Dole used DBCP on its banana farms in Nicaragua until the farms were expropriated by the Sandinista regime that came to power in 1979. The judgment in this case was rendered by a trial court in Chinandega, Nicaragua. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs approximately $97 million under “Special Law 364,” enacted by the Nicaraguan legislature in 2000 specifically to handle DBCP claims. The average award was approximately $647,000 per plaintiff. According to the Nicaraguan trial court, these sums were awarded to compensate Plaintiffs for DBCP-induced infertility and its accompanying adverse psychological effects.
    [Show full text]
  • The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: a Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr
    רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו רטל ( למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: A Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr. Raz Zimmt November 5, 2020 Main Argument The Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has become a major intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic, having increased its influence and broadened its authorities. Iran’s intelligence apparatus, similar to other control and governance apparatuses in the Islamic Republic, is characterized by power plays, rivalries and redundancy. The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC, which answers to the supreme leader, operates alongside the Ministry of Intelligence, which was established in 1984 and answers to the president. The redundancy and overlap in the authorities of the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization have created disagreements and competition over prestige between the two bodies. In recent years, senior regime officials and officials within the two organizations have attempted to downplay the extent of disagreements between the organizations, and strove to present to domestic and foreign audience a visage of unity. The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (ILNA, July 16, 2020) The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, in its current form, was established in 2009. The Organization’s origin is in the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC, established shortly after the Islamic Revolution (1979).
    [Show full text]