Iran Chemical Chronology 2008-2004 | 2003-2002 | 2001-2000 | 1999-1998 | 1997-1996 1995-1990 | 1989-1988 | 1987 | 1986 | 1985 | 1984 | 1983-1929 Last update: October 2008 This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2008-2004 23 January 2008 Speaking in Brussels Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalil states: "I assure you that the (chemical) weapons have no place in our defense doctrine." The context is made in the context of a discussion about Iranian actions during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and is intended to support the proposition that Iran made no use of chemical weapons during that conflict. [This assertion may contradict a statement made at the OPCW in 1998 that Iran possessed CW in the latter stages of the war. See 18 November 1998.] — "Jalili: Chemical weapons have no place in Iran's defense doctrine," IRNA, 23 January 2008, www2.irna.ir. 5 February 2008 In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of National Intelligence addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons Mr. McConnell says: "We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems." — J. Michael McConnell, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 February 2008, www.dni.gov. 27 February 2008 Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General Michael D. Maples states: "We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS. produce chemical warfare agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. — Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 27 February 2008, www.dia.mil. 3 March 2008 The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its assessed chemical warfare program." [This language differs slightly from that of the 2004 report. It does not refer to "efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents."] — Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 3, www.dni.gov. 3 March 2008 The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "We judge that Iran maintains a Chemical Warfare (CW) research and development program which began in response to Iraqi use of CW during the Iran-Iraq Qar during the 1980s. ... [Iran] continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance a CW program. We judge that Iran maintains a small, covert CW stockpile." [This language differs significantly from that of the 2005 report by reintroducing the idea of an Iranian CW stockpile in violation of the CWC.] — Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 3, www.dni.gov. 8 April 2008 In its national statement to the 2nd CWC Review conference in the Hague, Iran highlights concerns over CW possessor states' slow progress, and possible need for extensions beyond the final allowable treaty deadline, in fulfilling their obligations to totally destroy their CW stockpiles. The statement observes that: "Failure to meet this deadline [April 2012] is a clear and serious case of non-compliance. It would also raise the concern that domestic policies have resulted in preferences for retaining certain stockpiles as 'Security Reserves.'" In addition the statement calls on member states to take "concrete measures to bring to justice those who assisted Saddam in development and use of chemical weapons." Finally the Iranians expressed their dissatisfaction with Western efforts to refocus the OPCW's industry verification activities away from Schedule 1, 2, and 3 facilities and onto Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) noting that: "[a]ttempts at redefining the hierarchical risks envisaged Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS. in the Convention for three schedules of chemicals would endanger the focus of the verification regime of the Convention." — Statement by H.E. Bozorgmehr Ziaran Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the OPCW Before The Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 8 April 2008, www.opcw.org. 8 July 2008 The U.S. government designates a number of Iranian entities and individuals as being of proliferation concern under the terms of Executive Order 13382. As a result all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person are prohibited and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. Although Parchin Chemical Industries is designated for its import of solid rocket motor fuel precursors the company has been previously accused of involvement in the production or development of chemical warfare agents. — Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities, 8 July 2008, www.state.gov. 11 January 2007 In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons General Maples says: "Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability." — Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 January 2007, http://intelligence.senate.gov. 20 to 23 January 2007 Eight doctors from the 'Organization of Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons,' a Swedish NGO, visit Iran to study the long-term health effects of chemical weapons exposure by examining Iranian soldiers and civilians who were injured during Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980s. — "Swedish NGO in Tehran to conduct research on victims of chemical weapons," IRNA, 20 January 2007, www2.irna.ir. 11 February 2007 Addressing 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Germany, Mr. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, states: "Repeatedly and frankly we have announced that in Iran's national security doctrine there is no room for atomic and chemical weapons as we consider them against Islamic laws." — "No room for