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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE, Vol. 155, Pt. 13 July 17 July 17, 2009 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE, Vol. 155, Pt. 13 18221 Luetkemeyer Pastor (AZ) Sires ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE Hussein Berro, a Lebanese citizen and mem- Luja´ n Payne Skelton The SPEAKER pro tempore (during ber of Hezbollah, as the suicide bomber who Lungren, Daniel Perlmutter Slaughter the vote). There are 2 minutes remain- primarily carried out the attack on the E. Perriello Smith (NE) AMIA; Lynch Peters Smith (NJ) ing in the vote. Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Maffei Peterson Smith (WA) Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant to Maloney Pingree (ME) Snyder b 1453 the request of the State Prosecutor of Argen- Markey (CO) Polis (CO) Souder So the bill was passed. Markey (MA) Pomeroy tina, issued an arrest warrant for Ali Akbar Space The result of the vote was announced Marshall Posey Speier Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former leader of Iran Massa Price (NC) Spratt as above recorded. and the current chairman of Iran’s Assembly Matsui Quigley Stark A motion to reconsider was laid on of Experts and of Iran’s Expediency Council, McCarthy (CA) Rahall Stupak the table. for his involvement in the AMIA bombing McCarthy (NY) Rangel Sutton and urged the International Criminal Police McCollum Rehberg Tanner f McCotter Organization (INTERPOL) to issue an inter- Reichert Teague McDermott Reyes PERSONAL EXPLANATION national arrest warrant for Rafsanjani and Terry McGovern Richardson detain him; Thompson (CA) Mr. EDWARDS of Texas. Mr. Speak- McHugh Rodriguez Whereas, on November 9, 2006, Argentine Thompson (MS) McIntyre Roe (TN) er, earlier this afternoon, on vote 576, I Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, pursuant to Thompson (PA) McKeon Rogers (KY) intended to vote ‘‘yes,’’ and on 577, my Tiberi the request of the State Prosecutor of Argen- McMahon Rooney Tierney intention was to vote ‘‘no.’’ tina, also issued arrest warrants for Ali McMorris Ros-Lehtinen Fallahijan, a former Iranian Minister of Se- Rodgers Ross Titus f Tonko curity and Intelligence, Ali Akbar Velayati, McNerney Rothman (NJ) CONDEMNING THE ATTACK ON Meek (FL) Roybal-Allard Towns a former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohsen Meeks (NY) Ruppersberger Tsongas THE AMIA JEWISH COMMUNITY Rezaei, a former commander of Iran’s Is- Melancon Rush Turner CENTER IN BUENOS AIRES, AR- lamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Michaud Ryan (OH) Upton GENTINA Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander of the Miller (MI) Salazar Van Hollen elite Al-Quds Force of the IRGC, Hadi ´ Miller (NC) Sa´ nchez, Linda Velazquez Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask Soleimanpour, a former Iranian ambassador Visclosky Miller, George T. unanimous consent that the Com- to Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani, a former cul- Walden Minnick Sanchez, Loretta mittee on Foreign Affairs be dis- tural attache´ at the Iranian Embassy in Bue- Mitchell Walz Sarbanes nos Aires, Ahmad Reza Asghari, a former of- Mollohan Scalise Wamp charged from further consideration of Moore (WI) Schakowsky Wasserman the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. ficial at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Moran (VA) Schauer Schultz 156) condemning the attack on the Aires, and Imad Moughnieh, a leading oper- Waters ations chief of Hezbollah; Murphy (CT) Schiff AMIA Jewish Community Center in Murphy (NY) Schmidt Watson Whereas, on March 5, 2007, the Executive Murphy, Patrick Schock Watt Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, Committee of INTERPOL unanimously sup- Murphy, Tim Schrader Waxman and for other purposes, and ask for its ported the issuance of Red Notices for Murtha Schwartz Weiner immediate consideration in the House. Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh and for Wexler Nadler (NY) Scott (GA) Iranian officials Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Napolitano Scott (VA) Whitfield The Clerk read the title of the con- Rezaei, Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rabbani, and Nunes Serrano Wilson (OH) current resolution. Oberstar Sestak Wittman The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there Ahmad Reza Asgari, thereby allowing arrest Obey Shea-Porter Woolsey objection to the request of the gen- warrants for those individuals to be cir- Olver Sherman Wu culated worldwide with an eye to their arrest Ortiz Shuler Yarmuth tleman from California? and extradition; Pallone Shuster Young (AK) There was no objection. Whereas, on November 7, 2007, the General Pascrell Simpson Young (FL) The text of the concurrent resolution Assembly of INTERPOL upheld the Execu- is as follows: tive Committee’s decision to support the NAYS—97 H. CON. RES. 156 issuance of six Red Notices in connection to Aderholt Garrett (NJ) Moran (KS) the AMIA case; Bachmann Gingrey (GA) Myrick Whereas, on July 18, 1994, 85 people were Whereas, on February 12, 2008, Hezbollah Bachus Gohmert Neugebauer killed and 300 were wounded when the Argen- operative Imad Moughnieh reportedly was Bartlett Goodlatte Nye tine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) was killed in Syria; Bilirakis Heller Olson bombed in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Whereas in June of 2008, the Government of Bishop (UT) Hensarling Paulsen Whereas extensive evidence links the plan- Blackburn Hoekstra Saudi Arabia hosted an international Mus- Pence ning of the attacks to the Government of lim conference that was reportedly attended Blunt Inglis Petri Iran, and the execution of the attacks to Bonner Issa by Iranian officials Ali Akbar Hashemi Pitts Bono Mack Jenkins Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, sup- Rafsanjani, against whom an Argentine ar- Platts Brady (TX) Johnson (IL) ported by Syria, sponsored by Iran, and des- Poe (TX) rest warrant has been issued, and Mohsen Broun (GA) Johnson, Sam ignated by the Department of State as a For- Rezaei, against whom both an Argentine ar- Brown (SC) Jordan (OH) Price (GA) eign Terrorist Organization; Putnam rest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice Burgess Kind Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State have been issued; Burton (IN) King (IA) Radanovich Rogers (AL) Prosecutor of Argentina, an office created by Whereas the Government of Saudi Arabia Calvert Kingston the Government of Argentina, concluded Campbell Kline (MN) Rogers (MI) reportedly made no attempt to detain or ar- Cantor Kucinich Rohrabacher that the AMIA bombing was ‘‘decided and or- rest Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or Carter Lamborn Roskam ganized by the highest leaders of the former Mohsen Rezaei during their time in Saudi Chaffetz Latta Royce government of . Iran, whom, at the same Arabia, and the two departed Saudi Arabia Cole Lewis (CA) Ryan (WI) time, entrusted its execution to the Leba- without incident; Conaway Linder Sensenbrenner nese terrorist group Hezbollah’’; Whereas, on May 22, 2008, Argentine pros- Conyers Lummis Sessions Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State ecutor Alberto Nisman filed a request with Culberson Mack Shadegg Prosecutor of Argentina concluded that the Davis (KY) Manzullo Argentine Judge Ariel Lijo for the arrest of Shimkus AMIA bombing had been approved in advance Carlos Saul Menem, who was president of Ar- Deal (GA) Marchant Smith (TX) Doggett by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, gentina at the time of the AMIA bombing, Matheson Stearns Duncan McCaul Iran’s then-leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Sullivan and four other former Argentine high offi- Emerson McClintock Rafsanjani, Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Ali Thornberry cials in connection with the AMIA case; Fallin McHenry Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s then-Minister of Whereas Mr. Nisman claimed in his request Flake Mica Tiahrt Wilson (SC) Security and Intelligence Ali Fallahijan; for an arrest warrant that Menem and the Foxx Miller (FL) Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State Franks (AZ) Moore (KS) Wolf other four officials had attempted to cover Prosecutor of Argentina stated that the Gov- up the involvement of a Syrian-Argentine NOT VOTING—16 ernment of Iran uses ‘‘terrorism as a mecha- businessman, Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, nism of its foreign policy’’ in support of ‘‘its in the AMIA bombing; Ackerman Costello Paul final aim [which] is to export its radicalized Whereas Argentine investigators have stat- Barrett (SC) Davis (AL) Taylor vision of Islam and to eliminate the enemies ed that prior to the AMIA bombing, Mr. Barton (TX) Graves Welch of the regime’’; Kanoore Edul was in contact with at least Boehner Lucas Westmoreland Castor (FL) Miller, Gary Whereas, on October 25, 2006, the State two men who have been identified as sus- Coble Neal (MA) Prosecutor of Argentina identified Ibrahim pects in the AMIA case; VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 079102 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 0688 Sfmt 0634 E:\BR09\H17JY9.001 H17JY9 TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BOUND RECORD.
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