The Reality of the Siberian Internment: Japanese Captives in the Soviet Union and Their Movements after Repatriation

Tomita Takeshi

This chapter examines the major points of research in recent decades regard- ing the so-called “Siberian Internment” of Japanese prisoners of war (POWS) as seen from both Japanese and Russian sides. It will identify the principal issues that still remain under-researched and require further clarification. Also out- lined are the main arguments from the Russian position regarding internment. There are both differences and similarities between the Japanese and Russian positions, and the clarification of these points is the necessary first step in cre- ating a dialogue surrounding the various versions of this complicated history in Russia and Japan.

1 Historical Backdrop and Causes of Internment

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union entered into war against Japan, even though the neutrality pact between the two countries remained in force until April 1946. While Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, to which the Soviet Union was also party, the Soviet Army continued military operations until September 5, 1945. The USSR was expeditious in wish- ing to occupy all of the territories extending as far south as Shikotan Island in the Kurile range that the Allies secretly promised it at the Yalta Conference of February 4–11, 1945. Furthermore, in direct contravention of Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration that stipulated, “the Japanese military forces … shall be permitted to return to their homes,” the Soviet Union State Defense Committee ordered on August 23, 1945, the forced transport of over 500,000 of Japanese of- ficers and soldiers to Soviet territory, where they would remain for several years. These actions by the Soviets were in violation of international law, the Potsdam Declaration, and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which neither the USSR nor Japan had joined at the time. The Japanese side was not entirely free of blame, however. It had actu- ally provided the Soviet Union with an excuse to start the internment. One theory states that the Japanese “offer of a labor force” was allegedly made to the Soviets at the ceasefire negotiations at the border village of Zharikovo

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_016 306 Tomita on August 19, 1945, but this allegation has been difficult to prove in the ab- sence of any substantial evidence. The August 26 “Report on the Termination of Hostilities in the Kwantung Army Area” documents a meeting between the Kwantung Army Special Envoy Lieutenant Colonel Asaeda Shigeharu with a general of the Soviet Transbaikal front, during which the Japanese representa- tive verbally conveyed the details of the Japanese offer of a labor force to his Soviet counterpart (Shirai 2010, 144–45). This proposal was the revival of the “Offer of Labor Force as Compensation,” which Konoe Fumimaro had intended to present to the USSR in return for Soviet mediation of the terms of Japan’s peace with the Allies. But Konoe’s Moscow trip never materialized. The Soviets had nonetheless managed to acquire information about this proposal before- hand through intelligence channels. It would not have been surprising in any case had the USSR decided to commence the internment program even with- out the Japan offer of “human compensation,” given the fact that the Soviet Union was already detaining and exploiting German and other Axis prisoners of war on its territory (Vsevolodov 2010, 72–73). On August 16, three Soviet officials, Minister of the Interior Lavrentiĭ P. Beria, staff member of the Supreme High Command Nikolaĭ A. Bulganin, and Chief of Staff Alekseĭ I. Antonov, issued a decree ordering the Red Army to de- tain Japanese servicemen in Manchuria. The State Defense Committee order of August 23 overrode the Beria-Bulganin-Antonov Directive and instructed the commander-in-chief of Soviet Far Eastern Army, Aleksandr M. Vasilevskiĭ, to transport the Japanese to the USSR. This order is still disputed and contin- ues to provoke controversy within historians. One interpretation maintains that Stalin overturned the earlier decision not to intern the Japanese in the USSR after the US president Harry S. Truman rejected his request to occupy the northern part of Hokkaido. The historians Elena L. Katasonova and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi propose different views. Katasonova believes that the decision to commence internment was Stalin’s “retaliation for his enormous political de- feat” at being rejected by Truman. Hasegawa claims that the “500,000 Japanese POWs physically fit for hard labor” was compensation for the Soviets’ unfulfilled occupation of northern Hokkaido (Katasonova 2003, 273, Hasegawa 2011, 468). Historians even today do not have access to the archival documents that could resolve the debate. During a visit to the Russian State Archives of Socio- Political History (RGASPI) in March 2013, I was permitted to see the records of the USSR’s State Defense Committee; however, the Beria-Bulganin-Antonov Directive of August 16 was not among the documents (RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 457, l. 58–64). It could be probably concluded that the directive was an ur- gent order issued without passing through committee deliberations. My search for the stenographic records of the State Defense Committee meetings also bore no fruit. The Russian historian, Oleg V. Khlevnyuk, an authority on the