Central AsianSurvey (1999) 18(4), 463–499

Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians (NW Caucasus) GEORGEHEWITT

Demography Althoughthe data fromthe last (Soviet) census (1989) in these parts ofthe Caucasus are alreadya decadeold, they at least providea basis fordiscussing ethnic divisions. Table 1. (a) Figuresfor the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (capital5 Tbilisi).Mainpopulation of Georgia (1979and 1989 )

1979 1989 1979 1989

Wholepopulation 4,993,182 5,400,841 100% 100% ‘Georgians’ 3,433,0113,787,393 68.8% 70.1% Armenians 448,000437,211 9.0% 8.1% Russians 371,608341,172 7.4% 6.3% Azerbaydzhanis255,678 307,556 5.1% 5.7% Ossetians/Ossetes160,497 164,055 3.2% 3.0% Greeks 95,105 100,324 1.9% 1.8% Abkhazians 85,285 95,853 1.7% 1.8% (b) TheAbkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (capital 5 Sukhum).Mainpopulation of Abkhazia (1979and 1989 ) Wholepopulation 486,082 525,061 100% 100% Abkhazians 83,097 93,267 17.1% 17.8% ‘Georgians’ 213,322239,872 43.9% 45.7% Armenians 73,350 76,541 15.1% 14.6% Russians 79,730 74,913 16.4% 14.2% Greeks 13,642 14,664 2.8% 2.8% Ukrainians 10,257 11,470 2.1% 2.2% (c) TheAdzharian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (capi- tal 5 Batumi).Mainpopulation of Adzharia (1979and 1989 ) Wholepopulation 354,224 392,432 100% 100% ‘Georgians’ 283,872324,806 80.2% 82.8% Russians 34,544 30,042 9.75% 7.7% Armenians 16,101 15,849 4.5% 4% Greeks 7072 7379 2% 1.9% Ukrainians 5402 5943 1.5% 1.5% Belorussians 481 712 0.13% 0.2%

GeorgeHewitt is Professorof Caucasian Languages,School of Oriental and African Studies,London University, London, UK.

ISSN0263-4937Print; 1465-3354 Online/ 99/040463-37 Ó 1999 CentralAsian Survey GEORGE HEWITT

Table 2. TheKabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (capital5 Nal’chik).Mainpopulation of Kabardino-Balkaria (1979and 1989 )

Percentage 1979 1989 growth % in 1989

Wholepopulation 666,546 753,531 13.1% 100% Kabardians 303,604363,351 19.7% 48.2% Russians 234,137240,721 2.8% 31.9% Balkars 59,71070,571 18.2% 9.4% Ukrainians 12,13912,826 5.7% 1.7% Ossetians/Ossetes9710 9996 2.9% 1.3% Germans 9905 8569 2 13.5% 1.1%

Table 3. TheKarachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (capital5 Cherkessk). Mainpopulation of Karachay-Cherkessia (1979and 1989 )

Percentage 1979 1989 growth % in 1989

Wholepopulation 367,364 414,970 13% 100% Russians 165,604175,923 6.2% 42.4% Karachays 109,196128,746 17.9% 31% Cherkess 34,43040,230 16.8% 9.7% Abazas 24,24527,475 13.3% 6.6% Nogays 11,87212,933 9.4% 3.1% Kabardians 756 1030 36.2%] 0.25%

Table 4. TheAdyghe Autonomous Oblast (capital5 Maykop).Mainpopulation of Adyghea (1979and 1989 )

Percentage 1979 1989 growth % in 1989

Wholepopulation 404,390 432,046 6.8% 100% Russians 285,626293,640 2.8% 68% Adyghes 86,38895,439 10.5% 22.1% Ukrainians 12,07813,755 13.9% 3.2% Armenians 6359 10,46064.5% 2.4%

Elucidation ofethno- linguistic terms Theterm ‘Georgian’has beenused since ca.1930within Georgia/formerUSSR as ageneraldesignation (superordinate ) forspeakers ofall fourof the South Caucasian (Kartvelian) languages,namely Georgians proper, Mingrelians, Svans

464 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

and Laz (althoughthis last ethno-linguistic grouplives almost in its entirety in the Laztraditional homeland,which today is incorporatedwithin Turkey, runningfrom the Turko–Georgian border along the Black Sea coast towards Rize)—there are also large numbersof ethnic Georgianswho have ended up on the Turkishside ofthe border.I myself donot use the term ‘Georgian’in what Ideemto be this deliberately misleading enlargedsense (NB:this obfuscation ofethnic categories doesnot apply in Turkey ),preferringthe term ‘Kartvelian’, the same term as is usedwidely by linguists torefer tothe relevant language- family which,as far as onecan determine, is anisolate, seemingly being unrelatedto anylanguage/ language-family spokeneither todayor in the past. Mutual intelligibility amongthese foursister- tonguesis onlypossible between Lazand Mingrelian. It will beimportant to bearin mindthe ethno-linguistic distinctions withinthe Kartvelian family duringthe discussion below. Theother indigenous language- family with whosespeakers weshall be concernedin this section is NorthWest Caucasian.This small family consists of Abkhaz (the most divergentdialect ofwhich is Abaza ),Circassian andUbykh (extinct since 1992 ).Acommonsynonym for Circassian is Cherkess—in Turkey the term ‘Cherkess’has the widersense of‘ NorthCaucasian’ . Linguistically speaking,the Circassian language,which is universally knownto its native speakers as ‘Adyghebze’, canbe dividedinto a western andan eastern groupof dialects; somewhatconfusingly, the western dialects aloneare commonlyre- ferredto as ‘Adyghe’, andthis is the sourceof the nameof Adyghea (Adyghe AutonomousOblast ),wherethe majority ofwestern Circassian speakers remain- ingin the Caucasian homelandare concentrated—afurther 10,000 or sospeakers ofthe western dialect Shapsughare foundaround the Black Sea townof Tuapse (‘TwoRivers’ in its Circassian eytmology ) in Russia’s KrasnodarRegion. Eastern Circassian comprises the twodialects ofKabardian and Bes (le)ney. Whenthe Soviet administrative divisions wereset upin the NWCaucasus, eastern Circassians living outside Kabardino-Balkariawere styled ‘Cherkess’— hence‘ Karachay-Cherkessia’. As ageneralrule, all dialects ofCircassian are mutually intelligible, althoughit is easier forwestern dialect speakers to understandeastern Circassian thanvice versa.Similarly, althoughspeakers of the twoAbkhazian dialects still to befound on their Abkhazianancestral lands (namelyAbzhywa, base forliterary Abkhaz,and Bzyp ) can,with some difŽculty, communicate with speakers ofAbaza, it is easier forspeakers ofthe Abazadialects (namelyAshkharywa and T’ ap’anta, base ofliterary Abaza ) to understandthe speechof (Bzypor Abzhywa ) Abkhaz.There is nomutual intelligibility betweenCircassian andAbkhaz- Abaza.It has notbeen Ž nally demonstratedto universal satisfaction that NWCaucasian is related to anyother languageor language- family, althoughsome thinkthat the long-extinct Anato- lian Hattic (plus whateverthe contemporaryKasks might havespoken ) may havebeen related. Thereis, however,growing acceptance of the theorythat NW Caucasian derives fromthe same proto-languageas the otherNorth Caucasian language-family ofNakh- Daghestanian. All the otherethno- linguistic groupsmentioned in the abovetables are

465 GEORGE HEWITT deemedto benon- autochthonousto the Caucasus,speaking either Indo-Eu- ropean (SlavonicRussian, Ukrainian,Belorussian; Armenian;Greek; German; IranianOssetic ) orTurkic languages (namelyAzeri; Nogay;Karachay and Balkar,which two, linguistically, are regardedas essentially dialects ofone language)—there is asmall communityof speakers ofSemitic Assyrian in Georgia,where speakers ofIranian Kurdish are also found.Georgia also has small communities ofChechens,all the 5000or so speakers ofChechen-Ingush’s sister-language,Bats, as well as small numbersof speakers ofDaghestanian languages.

DeŽning historical moments Onecannot understand the currentaspirations ofthe communities to bedis - cussed belowunless onetakes accountof the individualhistorical phenomena that havelargely determinedthem. Forthe Kartvelians that momentcame perhapswith the annexationby Russia ofthe central andeastern Georgiankingdoms in 1800, following the Tsar’s cynical failure toimplement the 1783Treaty of Georgievskby refusingto come to confrontthe Persians whenthey sacked Ti is (Tbilisi) in 1795—remaining Kartvelian speakingterritories sooncame underRussian sway (althoughFree Svanetia succumbedonly in the late 19thcentury ).Overthe years,particularly in latter decades,Russia has beendemonized as everready to thwart Georgian independenceby any and all deviousmeans imaginable,so that duringthe later Soviet era Georgiarivalled onlythe Baltic states fordepth of anti- Russian sentiment. TheNW Caucasian peoplesin their entirety viewthe endof the 19thcentury Caucasian War (21 May 1864) as the start oftheir greatest tragedy (namely the Exile 5 Russian maxadzhirstvo ),whichsaw all the Ubykhsplus most ofthe Circassians andAbkhazians forced into exile in Ottomanlands (stretching from modern-dayKosova, mainly throughTurkey, into Palestine, Jordan,Syria and Iraq).Onlyrump Circassian andAbkhazian populations remained in the NW Caucasian homeland,giving rise to their demographicweakness there today,as attested bythe abovetables. Thepresence, predominantly in Turkey of a huge N(W) Caucasian diasporais animportant butlargely neglectedfactor in the appreciationof regional affairs. However,in the case ofthe Abkhazians, determinedefforts this centuryby (Menshevik,Bolshevik, or post -Soviet nationalist ) Tbilisi and/orthe Kremlin toimplement avicious assimilatory process of‘ kartvelianization’, culminating in the Georgian–Abkhazian war of 1992–93, have opened up a major fault-line betweenthe NWandthe S. Caucasian peoples. TheKarachay- Balkars share with the Meskh (et)ians (usually referredto somewhattendentiously, albeit bythe preferenceof many of them themselves, as the ‘Meskhetian Turks’) the appallingfate ofhavingbeen deported to Central Asia duringthe war (1943–44).While the Karachay-Balkarswere allowed to returnhome from the late 1950s,Georgia has neversanctioned the returnof the

466 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS bynowperhaps more than 400,000 Meskh (et)ians tothe south-western regionof Meskheti onthe Georgian–Turkish border. The righting of this historical injustice seems tobe uppermost in the minds ofthese peoplestoday.

Circassians TheNW Caucasus has beenthe quietest andthus the least reportedof the Caucasian regionssince the disintegration ofthe USSR.This doesnot mean that it is free fromproblems. Howeverunderstandable from a narrowlinguistic pointof view the creation oftwoliterary Circassian languagesmay have been (althoughthe inconsistencies betweenthe twoin representingidentical soundsintroduced into the Cyrillic- basedorthographies devised in the late 1930sprovide ammunition to chargesof ‘divideand rule’ ),the splitting ofthe Circassian populationinto three adminis- trative units, combinedwith anattempt to forcea unionin twoof them between Circassians, onone hand, and a similarly dividedKarachay- Balkar population, onthe otherhand, looks suspiciously like astrategy tohinder rather thanhelp consolidationof ethnic self-awareness amongboth communities. Thecollapse of the Soviet Unionhas allowedcalls fromboth the native andthe Turkicgroups forcorrective action tobecome more vocal. Prior to 1991it was noteasy forwesterners to gainaccess to the NW Caucasus.Those who managed it legally tendedto bemembers ofthe Circassian diasporavisiting their relatives fromhomes in the Near/Middle East. Already under perestroika some repatriation to Maykopand Nal’ chik from the diaspora was notonly taking place butactually supportedby the Soviet government, interested, nodoubt, in boththe knowledgeof the non-Soviet worldand especially the business acumensuch immigrants might bringwith them.Hopes invested in this process havebeen set backŽ rst bythe drastic decline in living standards across the wholeformer Soviet space (especially severe in the non-Russian periphery ) that followedthe fragmentationof the USSRand secondlyby worries aboutpersonal safety, givenboth the Kremlin’s readiness to resort to suchbrutal forceduring the Chechenwar (1994–96) andthe prevailing lawlessness that seems particularly acute in districts close to Chechenia.So far returnees havenumbered around 500 to Kabardino-Balkaria,300 to Adyghea, anda mere fewdozen to Karachay-Cherkessia.However, the Circassian intelli- gentsia, bothat homeand abroad, has remainedactive in pushingfor Circassian unity,founding in 1991the International Circassian Association. TheirŽ rst president was the late KabardianYuri Kalmykov, who was fora time Minister ofJustice in Yeltsin’s cabinet.Although required to sign the decreesanctioning military activity in Chechenia (onlyafterwards was discussion ofthe move permitted!),heobjected,resigned and died of a heart attack notlong thereafter. Thecurrent president is Boris Akbashev,and the Association heldits IVth Congressin Krasnodar25– 27 June 1998. The Association’ s commitment to the Abkhaziansis indicated bythe stated intention tohold the VthCongress in Sukhumin 2000.Present in Krasnodarwere not only the Presidents ofAdyghea

467 GEORGE HEWITT

andKabardino-Balkaria (AdygheAslan Dzharimovand Kabardian Valerij Kokov,respectively ) butalso the headof the Krasnodaradministration, Nikolai Kondratenko,the Prime Minister ofKarachay-Cherkessia, Anatolij Ozov,and the Vice-President ofAbkhazia, Valerij Arshba.Also inattendance was the Mufti ofAdyghea and Krasnodar Region, Askarbi Hachimizor, although it shouldbe stressed that Islam is oflittle relevanceamong NW Caucasians (includingthe Abkhazians )—at least, amongthose resident in the Caucasus itself. Thetitle ‘Allah’s Mountains’ (I.B.Tauris, 1998 ),chosenfor his recent bookon the Chechenwar and the N.Caucasus in generalby freelance journalist Sebastian Smith, is misleading inthis regard. TheCircassians, like the Abkhazians,are members ofthe Unrepresented Nations andPeoples’ Organization (UNPO,TheHague ).Thanksto UNPO’ s help,Circassians havetwice participated inconferences of the UNWorking Committee forHuman Rights andits sub-committee forNational Minorities’ Rights inGeneva, where on 28 May 1998 T. Kazanokovwas able toraise the questionabout the restoration ofboth the commonname for the Circassian ethnosand Circassian surnames forall compatriots resident inSyria andTurkey; healso requestedthe right to returnto their motherlandfor all Circassian expatriates. Prince Ali benAl- Hussein ofJordan, where Circassians formthe palace guard,has takena keeninterest oflate in promotionof Circassian rights, havingvisited the Circassian regionsof the N.Caucasus in October,journeying fromAmman entirely onhorseback and by boat to retrace the routeto Jordan takenby the early migrants—his motherwas Circassian. ACaucasian Cultural Society was foundedin Turkey,where estimates place the numberof Circassians anywherebetween 2 and4 million, in 1967.Turkey has witnessed in recent years aproliferation ofpublications dealingwith cultural andlinguistic problems of (especially NW ) Caucasian peoples.A Circassian internet site has been organizedby amemberof the small communityin Israel. Itcanbe expected that pressure formeasures to guaranteethe survival ofthe Circassian language (under threat ofdemise bothamong the diasporaand even in the Caucasian homeland ) will continueto comefrom committed individuals,and there is surely aworthy role to beplayed here by Western organizationssuch as UNESCOor the EU’s cultural fund—recall the muchtrickier project overseenby the Councilof Europe (representative Alison Cardwell ) to preparea common (objective!) textbookto beusedin the schools ofGeorgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, anapproach to suchfunders is likely to bemade in the nearfuture from The Cherkess Fund,the brainchildof a Kabardianbusinessman andwriter from Jordan.The Fund is mindedto investigate the possibilities ofcreating acommon formof written Circassian notonly to bridgethe dividecaused in the Caucasus bythe existence ofthe twoliterary languagesbut to producea unifyingbond between all the Circassian peoplesand, in orderto makesuch a formof Circassian attractive to Circassians unfamiliar with the Cyrillic script, the Roman script is envisagedas servingas base forthe orthography. Theleaders ofAdyghea and Kabardino- Balkaria are formercommunists whohave managed to retain power—Vladimir Khubiev,head of Karachay-

468 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

Cherkessia andan ethnic karachay,was actually appointedby Yeltsin andhas beenthe headman in the district foralmost 20years.. It is unlikely,given their close ties to Moscow,that anywill alter past practice byinitiating undertakings openlyunfavourable to the interests ofMoscow, particularly at atime when ordinarypeople across their territories are facedwith serious daily difŽculties just to feedthemselves andtheir families andwhile whateverŽ nancial resources exist emanate fromMoscow. However, it is signiŽcant that Dzharimov (b.1939 andan economist bytraining ),supportedby leaders ofother N. Caucasian regions,secured (3 July 1998) ratiŽcation bythe Russian governmentfor a resolution onthe urgentrepatriation ofCircassians fromKosova. Also, on 1 Augustthe Žrst contingent (numbering72 ) arrivedin Adyghea,heralding the end of135years ofexile forthis small community.Barriers to cooperationbetween the three Circassian N.Caucasian areas havebeen removed, and the teachingof andin Circassian forthe Žrst fourschool-grades has beenreintroduced (at least inKabardino-Balkaria ). Thenegligible increases revealedby a comparisonof the Žguresfor the Russian populationsin ourthree NWCaucasian territories between1979 and 1989suggests that some out-migration must havebeen taking place evenbefore nationalism becamesuch a signiŽcant force,both in Russia andparts ofthe Caucasus.One can imagine that, as aresult ofreaction to Žrst the rough expulsionfrom post-Soviet Moscowof ‘ those ofCaucasian nationality’who werethought to beexploiting‘ Russian’ (!) citizens in the capital’s markets and secondlythe slaughter oflargely civilians in the Chechenwar, Russian out- migration will haveaccelerated overrecent years—indeed, the Kabardiansare almost certainly nowan absolute majority inKabardino- Balkaria. Karachaysand Balkars whocan afford it oftensend their childrento Turkey foreducation. Both peoples enthusiastically participate in pan-Turkiccultural events.

Kabardino-Balkaria Hometo Europe’ s highest mountain (Elbrus),the economyis predominantly farming-based,although mountain health resorts also contribute.Despite per- iodic calls forsecession, the Balkars, like their close relatives tothe west, the Karachays,are predominantlyinterested in gainingcompensation from Moscow forthe Central Asian exile (to whichthey were subjected duringthe waralong witha variety ofother peoples from the Caucasus andnearby regions, such as the Crimean Tatars, the VolgaGermans and, before the war,the Koreans ) and putall real efforts intosecuring this. Increasededucational places forBalkars are onesign of their achievements inthis regard.The republic’ s premier is aBalkar. Inspite ofthe greater opportunitiesto developthe local languages,even in the Kabardian-languagepapers Circassian Word and Circassian Council only cul- tural matters are addressed.Political discourse is dead.This is partly in reaction tothe Chechenwar and partly becauseof the prevailingwholesale corruption. Thelong- servinghead of state, V.Kokov,was re-elected in 1997largely onthe

469 GEORGE HEWITT principle ‘hangon to nurse for fear ofsomething worse’ ; heis adviser to the chairmanof Russia’ s FederationCouncil. Nal’ chik’ s petrol-stations are under Kokov’s control,and his 22-year-oldson heads the main factorythere. On 19 April 1998 Pravda publishedan article onthe extent ofcorruption, naming the headsof various ministries andthe fabulousamounts spent ontheir private homes.There is widespreadand growing indignation at the waythose able todo sohave been unrestrainedly feathering their ownnests since the restraints that keptsuch activity to generallyacceptable levels duringthe Soviet periodhave withered.Kokov is said to runthe republiclike apolice state. Russo–Kabardian relations continueto begood, and the governmentdoes not wish to upset its cosy relations with Moscow,on which the economyis whollydependent. However, as was anticipated, less moneyfor the provinceswas forthcomingfollowing the appointmentof Sukhum-bornS. Kirienkoas Russia’s short-term Prime Minister. At that time Russian Minister ofEconomics, Y. Urinson,arranged for the upgradingof a mountainplant in the republicto extract molybdenumand tungstenfor processing in Nal’chik but since then,as the worldplainly saw in August,the entire economyhas sharplydeteriorated, so that the situation is todayno better underPremier YevgenijPrimakov. Market-trading (e.g. in Nal’chik, Baksan, Majskij ) is oneof the fewways ordinary people can make money. Thelocal parliament naturally approvedthe law forrepatriation (sc. of the predominantlyTurkey- baseddiaspora ) proposedby the Circassian national movement.Most high-quality goodsavailable inNal’ chik are infact produced bydiaspora members, including a jeweller belongingto Kabardiansfrom the UnitedStates. Oneprominent Turkish Kabardian built nofewerthan 86 mills in the region,and  ourhas evenbeen used for bribery, but 2 million dollars owed to the mill-builder remain unpaid.Kokov has introduceda law to encourage foreigninvestment, suchthat joint enterprises with aminimuminvestment of 50,000dollars will befree oftax for4 years.However, the dangerof losses throughcorruption hangs over any business venture.As anindication that Moscowdoes not oppose horizontal agreements within the Russian Federation, Kabardino-Balkaria signeda bilateral agreementwith Astrakhanon 2 April 1998. LocalImam Pshikhachevwas re-elected butwith little enthusiasm forhim personally.Even monies collected forthe buildingof amosquedisappeared from aCircassian-ownedbank. Islam is nogreat force,and the possibility ofmoves to spreadWahabism is viewedwith real apprehension,as is the intention of those suchas Chechenwarrior Shamil Basaev toturn the wholeN. Caucasus intoa bastion ofIslam.

Karachay-Cherkessia Inadditionto the Turkic-speakingKarachays and the East Circassian Cherkess, the regionis hometo the Abazinians/Abazas,whose ancestors Žrst migrated fromAbkhazia across the KlukhorPass around AD 1400,the Žnal wave

470 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

followingaround AD 1700.Abazinians tend to betri-lingual in Abaza,Kabardian andRussian. TheDombai, Teberda and Arkhyz valleys boast famousskiing and health resorts. Radio-and optical telescopes are located inthe Zelenchukregion, and in Soviet times alarge cement-worksalong with machine-building,electrical, fuel,chemical andmetal- workingplants operatedin lowland-parts.Very few reports emanate fromthe region.Vladimir Khubievserves as parliamentary chairman.There are movesto create apresidency,and elections are duein April 1999.The 66- year-oldunelected effective holderof the post,Vladimir Khubiev, is unpopularas aresult ofthe deterioration inthe region’s economyduring recent years.One favoured candidate is aleadingCircassian, 51-year-old Stanislav Derev,a businessman,mayor of the capital, Cherkessk,and founder of Mercury,the most active productioncompany in the area.However, another namecurrently touted as aserious contenderis 57-year-oldGeneral Vladimir Seme¨nov,whose father is Russian andwhose mother is Karachay—Russians are reckonedto represent 40%of the regions’s population,while the Karachayform 39%. Cherkesskwas the venuein November1997 for the Žrst session ofthe inter-republicanlegislative bodythat followedthe earlier signingin Nal’chik of anagreement between the three Circassian areas to create anInterparliamentary Council.

Adyghea Themajority ofthe West Circassian populationthat lives onhere as a rump-reminderof the original native inhabitants speakeither the Bzhedughor the Temirgoidialect (base ofliterary Adyghe )—there are also afewAbadzekhs/ Abzakhs.In terms ofdemographic balance, the Adyghes’position vis-a`-vis the Russians closely parallels that obtainingin Abkhazia prior to August 1992 for the Abkhazians vis-a`-vis the Kartvelians. Again,very little newsreaches the outside world. Therepublic’ s major industryis foodand food- processing,the outputof whichincreased by12.5% between 1994 and 1995. On the 250,000hectares of arable land (incorporating90 collective farms and1400 private farms ) grow grain,sun owers, sugar-beet, vegetables andthe world’s northernmosttea; meat andmilk are also produced.Horse-breeding, a national pridefor generations, is beingrevived. Various joint ventures (involving inter alia UKandFrench companies) werefunctioning in 1996,at whichtime hopewas expressedfor investment inthe MaykopCentre forProduction of High Quality Insulin. Anexchange in the 1997press suggests the presenceof potentially explosive tensions betweenCircassians andRussians. Megapolis-Kontinent (No. 14, 1997) publishedan article entitled ‘Russian House:triumph of national idiocy’ (reprintedin the AdygheKhabze Tradition (No. 6, 1997)) in whichRussian nationalist, Sergej Pletne¨v,used arguments reminiscent ofthose marshalled by Georgiannationalists inthe late 1980sagainst the Abkhazians’ (17.8% of

471 GEORGE HEWITT

Abkhazia’s population ) enjoymentof national rights intheir ancestral home- land—Adyghes, as onlya 22%minority butwith permanentrights to elect an ethnic Circassian to Adyghea’s presidency,were creating, he argued, a racist (namelyanti- Russian ) enclavewith separatist tendencies that threatenedthe integrity ofthe KrasnodarRegion. A response,‘ Theidiocy of chauvinist accounting’by the director ofthe AdygheState Museum,Almir (Alec) Abregov (Abredzh),was appendedto the reprint.Among the argumentsadduced was the observationthat Russia, as heir to the Tsarist state that was responsible forthe decimation ofthe Circassian population,should not only facilitate the repatri- ation ofethnic Circassians wishingto return to the homelandbut also handback lands appropriatedfrom their ancestors anddo everythingnecessary to compen- sate forthis near-genocide. Aroadthrough the mountainsfrom Maykop to the Black Sea was started in Soviet times buthalted at nearlyits highest pointwhen it was realized that this wouldlink Circassians inAdyghea directly with the ca.10,000 Shapsugh Circassians remainingaround Tuapse— consequently, communication requires a trip that takes onenorth around the mountainsand then south again.

TheConfederation of Caucasian (Mountain) Peoples AnAssembly ofMountainPeoples ofthe Caucasus,uniting peoples’ representa- tives rather thanregional governments, was instituted in Abkhazia’s capital in August1989 under the leadership ofKabardian academic YuriShanibov chie y at the time to providesupport for the Abkhazians,who were coming under ever greater threat fromrampant Georgian nationalism. Itassociated some 16ethnic groupsfrom Abkhazia through the N.Caucasus toDaghestan (includingboth N. andS. Ossetians butnot any of the Turkicpeoples ).Transformedinto the Confederationin November1991, it was to providecrucial psychologicaland material support (thankslargely toChechen and Circassian volunteersand weaponryprovided from the N.Caucasus ) tothe Abkhazians,thereby helping them to winthe warwith Georgia (1992–93)—to avoidbeing stopped at the Russo-Abkhazianborder, Ž ghters crossed the mountainsinto Abkhazia around Wathara,from where they were bussed down to the coast alongthe track built byGerman prisoners ofwar in WorldWar II. TheConfederation was also very active (priorto the warin Abkhazia ) in arbitrating betweenN. Ossetians and Ingushand between Akin Chechens and Daghestanis. Shanibov eventually declaredopenly that the ultimate goalwas to reestablish N.Caucasian indepen- dence.However, the Russian onslaughtin Chechenia, buttressed bythe sort of dangerous (andfactually ridiculous ) self-deceptionexempliŽ ed by Russian academic D.Danilov’s assertion that ‘the NorthernCaucasus is actually an inalienable part ofRussian territory’ (p.137of Coppieters, 1996 ),notsupris - inglysaw its activities diminish. Byno means as prominentas before1994, it still exists (minus the designation‘ Mountain’),until recently underthe chair- manshipof the ChechenYusup Soslambekov. At the beginningof April 1998 ActingInterior Minister ofRussia, S.Stepashin,accused it ofseeking to found

472 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

aN.Caucasian Islamic state, althoughActing Deputy Premier, R.Abdulatipov (aDaghestani ),preferredto downplay the Islamic threat. Accordingto its foundingconstitution, Islam has norelevance to it. Georgiansview it with suspicion,undoubtedly because of its role in the Abkhazianwar. During the intense Žghtingin Abkhazia’ s Gal District at the endof May 1998, Confeder- ation representatives inSukhum were reported to haveoffered military assist- ance,although this was turneddown by the Abkhaziangovernment, who wished todemonstrate totheir opponentsas well as to the Russians that theywere quite capableof defending themselves. Howeverappealing the idea ofan independently constituted confederationof all the (?North) Caucasian peoplesmight beto some inthe longerterm, in the shorter/mediumterm some formof growing consolidation between the NW Caucasians (Abkhaz-Abaziniansand Circassians ) is muchmore realistic. This wouldbe motivated bytheir close genetic andhistorical ties as well as bya shareddetermination that their languagesand cultures must notsuffer the same fate that overtooktheir confre`res,the Ubykhs.While there is respect forthe determination andŽ ghtingskills ofthe Chechens,there is great apprehension aboutthe socio-religious tendencies manifesting themselves inboth post-war Checheniaand neighbouring Daghestan. In Chechenia, for its part,a certain resentment is reportedover the lack ofsupportthey were given during their war with Russia byfellow N.Caucasians, especially overthe lack ofanysigniŽ cant presenceof Ž ghters fromAbkhazia in returnfor the supportAbkhazia received fromChechens in their earlier warwith Georgia—the fact that Abkhazia continued/continuesto face aserious threat fromGeorgia is ignored;indeed, its borderwith Russia was actually closed whenthe Chechenwar began. What happensin the 2001discussions betweenChechenia and Russia overCheche- nia’s futurepolitical status will bewatched with keeninterest throughoutthe region. However,the N.Caucasus was notas exposedto foreignin uence during the Soviet periodas Georgia (includingAbkhazia ),andN. Caucasians oftentend to project the reservation frequentlyassociated with mountainpeople, so that many in Abkhaziaoften assert that thinkingin the N.Caucasus seems some 20years behindthat to the southof the mountains.This gap,plus that existing between home-populationsand the diasporacommunities (particularly those in Turkey ) arising outof different educationalsystems andinculcated ideologies,will take time andeffort toovercome.

Abkhazia Atthe same time duringthe late Gorbachevperiod as variousautonomies within the Russian Federationwere declaring ‘ sovereignty’over their territories and beingawarded republican (butnot independent ) status, Abkhazia (and S. Ossetia) decidedto follow suit— Adyghea, for instance, gainedrepublican status in 1991.This moveby Abkhazia as well as its post-Gorbachevrestitution ofits 1925Constitution, whichdeŽ ned Abkhazia’ s status as aunion-republicwith

473 GEORGE HEWITT

special treaty-ties toGeorgia from 16 December 1921 to February1931 (when it was furtherdowngraded to a mere autonomousrepublic within Georgia— from4 March1921 to 16December 1921 Abkhazia had existed briey as a fully independentunion- republic,recognized by Georgia on 21 May 1) have bothregularly been misinterpreted inthe West as declarations ofindepen- dence—just oneexample of the gross misunderstandingsof the Abkhazian questionthat havedistorted western perceptions.The fact that, onthe Abkhazianside, noformal declaration ofindependence has everbeen made andthat, onthe Georgianside, there has beenno formal annulment (as happenedin the case ofS. Ossetia ) ofAbkhazia’ s autonomousstatus has been suggestedas abasis onwhich to build a future modusvivendi, alongthe lines ofthe proposalfor a federative relationship drawnup by lawyer T’ aras Shamba (olderbrother of Abkhazia’ s currentForeign Minister, Sergei ). This was publishedin the paper Abkhazija (29June– 4 July1992; for the translation see Hewitt 1993 )—T’aras Shambais also president ofthe International Associ- ation ofthe Abkhazian-AbazaNation, founded in October 1993. The fact that the Abkhazianauthorities wereapparently still willing to considernegotiating sucha relationship evenafter the whollyunnecessary suffering in icted upon them duringthe Georgianoccupation and subsequent events shouldhave been seen as ameaningfulconcession on their part,but they have been given not the slightest credit forthis stance bythe international community.It has been mootedthat theymight havebeen mistaken notto have declared full indepen- denceimmediately after expellingthe invaderat the endof September 1993 forthis, it is argued,would have strengthened their positiononce negotiations hadstarted. Equally,if onerecalls that acontingentof Abkhazian Ž ghters followedthe routof their opponentsas far as the Mingrelian capital of Zugdidi,some feel that theyshould have held on to this territory within Georgiaproper and used it as abargainingchip to guaranteethe security of their borderwith Georgiaalong the R.Ingur.However, there are indications that the governmentof Abkhazia currently sees Abkhaziaas nothingother than afully independentcountry. Sergei Shambawas quite adamanton this pointin the summer of1998 asseverating that, althoughArticle 1ofthe Constitution (ratiŽed on 26 November 1994 ) refrains fromusing the term ‘independent’ (cf. ‘TheRepublic of Abkhazia (Apsny) shall bea sovereigndemocratic state basedon law’ ), Article 3 (namely‘ TheRepublic of Abkhazia, as asubject of international law,shall enter treaty-relations with otherstates’ ) effectively makes Abkhaziaindependent of Georgia— interestingly, whenTatarstan signed its special agreementwith the Russian Federationon 15 February 1994, it agreedto dropthe words‘ sovereignstate’ and ‘ subject ofinternational law’ fromits constitution (Segodnja,16February 1994, quoted by Sire ´n,1998, p 151).This interpretation ofAbkhazia’ s present status has beenconŽ rmed by bothPresident Vladislav Ardzinba (b.1945) andSpeaker of Parliament, Sok’rat’ Adzhindzhal (Dzhindzholia ),aformerteacher. Exasperation is universal throughoutAbkhazia at Georgia’s unwillingness to abandonthe disingenuousnessand double-dealing with which,the Abkhaziansassert, they

474 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

(unliketheir neighbours’new western friends ) havesadly becomeonly too familiar. Thetwo main problemsto beresolved before any Ž nal solution canbe achievedin the Georgian–Abkhazian con ict remain (i) the political status of Abkhazia vis-a`-vis Georgia (whichhas beenthe veryroot of the problemsince the latest are-upin the late 1980sof this post-1931festering wound ), and (ii) the questionof the refugees. Somefundamental clariŽ cations must Žrst bemade with referenceto the refugees.During the warmany Abkhazians were forced to go into exile either in safe(r) areas ofAbkhaziaor in Russia. Since non-Kartvelians in general (and notjust Abkhazians ) weretargets forthe nationalist rabblethat constituted the Georgian‘ troops’, the same couldbe said ofAbkhazia’ s large Armenianand Russian communities. TheGreek government sent aship toevacuate ethnic Greeks (see Clogg,1994 ),andsome Jews weretaken out to Israel. When references are madeto the refugeesfrom Abkhazia by Georgians or in inter- national documents,all the abovecategories are convenientlyforgotten. Al- thoughreferences to the (remaining) refugeesalmost withoutexception name them ‘ethnic Georgians’, there are actually (sc. accordingto ourdeŽ nition ) relatively fewactual Georgiansamong them— the vast majority are Mingrelians, while bothSvans (whoŽ rst appearedin signiŽcant numbersin Abkhazia when theytook over mountain areas abandonedby the native populationpost-1864 ) andGeorgians proper Ž gureto arelatively small degree.Since byno means everylast Kartvelian left Abkhaziain the hasty ight that occurred before the arrival ofthe AbkhazianŽ ghters andtheir allies (see Overeem,1995 ), it follows that (a) noact ofethnic cleansing (achargecommonly levelled at the Abkhazi- ans) canhave taken place, for this implies adeliberate act implemented byforce orthe threat thereof,and (b) nowherenear the Žgureregularly quoted by Georgiansources andtheir sympathizers forthese refugees (namely250,000, 300,000or even 350,000 ) canpossibly re ect reality—more recently Reuters has begunto use the muchsaner Žgureof 160,000, and the currentpopulation of Abkhaziais estimated at around300,000. Despite signiŽcant Kartvelian pres- ences (sc. followingthe importations byMingrelian Lavrent’i Beria, bornnear Sukhum,in the 1930–40s ) in OchamchiraDistrict, GulripshDistrict, Sukhum andaround Gagra, the bulkof the compactKartvelian populationof Abkhazia resided in the southernmostGal District. Thereis anargument over the original ethnicity ofthose settled in this region (see D.Mu¨ller’s paperin Hewitt, 1998 ), butthere is nodoubt that it was occupiedalmost exclusively byMingrelian speakers at the start ofthe war.However, since most ofthese sympathizednot with Shevardnadzebut with his oustedpredecessor, the late Mingrelian Zviad Gamsakhurdia,Gal Mingrelians remainedlargely alooffrom the warand the incidents ofhuman rights abuses committed bythe occupyingforces (as chronicledin the 221-page BelajaKniga Abxazii 1992–1993 );forboth these reasons the Abkhazianauthorities were/are happyfor Gal Mingrelians to return. This means that the furtherimputation ofethnic cleansing supposedlycarried out against this populationin the Žghtingof May 1998 is questionable (although it

475 GEORGE HEWITT cannotbe denied that some reprobateelements seem tohave accompanied those hasteningto defend their homelandin the hopeof booty. That so many homes weretorched in the villages wherethe battle was at its most intense was explainedby an international military observer,who did not wish to be identiŽed, when he notedthat the best wayto rootout a dug-inenemy (as indeed the inŽltrators were ) is to deprivehim ofthe coverprovided by buildings— had there beenno inŽ ltration, there wouldhave been no second wave of refugees. Theagreement signed between Abkhazia and Georgia in Moscowon 4 April 1994in the presenceof the UNSecretary Generaland leading western ambas- sadors was followedby the signingof aquadripartite understandingon the return ofthe refugees.The latter gavethe Abkhaziansthe right tovet applications from prospectivereturnees andto reject those knownto haveacted militarily or criminally against Abkhazia.Accused of deliberate slowness in the vetting process the Abkhazianspointed out that, eventhose whoseapplications were approvedregularly failed toturn up at the Ingurbridge at the appointedtime, whichdemonstrated a lack ofreal eagerness to return.At the same time nothing was donethen or has beendone since to preventunofŽ cial returnees to the Gal District. Georgiahas fromthe start beenclamouring for an instant mass return ofthe exiles, whichis andwill remain bothunacceptable to the Abkhaziansand basically unrealistic—aUNHCR spokesman at aconferencein June1998 has beenquoted as sayingthat anylarge- scale returnof refugees is outof the questionuntil somethingis doneabout the catastrophic state ofthe Abkhazian economy,an elementary lesson apparentlyquite lost onthose foreverclamouring aboutthe needto arrangean immediate mass return.Given the hatreds sownby the war (buttressing the mutual animosities that antedatedhostilities ), if such a mass returnwere to occur,the scale ofbloodshed would simply beunimagin- able—there is ahugeamount of weaponry in the handsof the ordinary populationof Abkhazia,although (rather uniquelyin suchsituations ) one sees no overtevidence of this onthe streets oftowns or villages, andeveryone knows perfectly well howto use the hardware—lawlessness becamequite widespread in the early post-warperiod but has since beencontained. Given the enforced isolation ofAbkhaziamost talk, even5– 6 years on,centres aroundthe events of the war,reinforcing the feelings ofenmity towardsformer neighbours, whose presencewill simply notbe tolerated onAbkhazian soil forthe foreseeable future.This is anundeniable fact oflife that has to berecognized by inter- national players andimpressed bythem uponthe Georgianauthorities, forthe kindest thingto dofor the Kartvelian exiles is toimplement aresettlement programmefor them in Georgia,predominantly in Mingrelia (assuming there is space available there )—indeed,this measure shouldhave been undertaken years ago.The acknowledged out ow of population from Georgia, especially strong amongnon-Kartvelians (suchas the Russians ),since 1991surely means that there is plentyof roomto accommodate those displaced fromeither Abkhaziaor S.Ossetia, if onlythe Georgiangovernment were to applyitself to the problem. Ofcourse,traditionally Georgianshave not been noted for magnanimity towards their Mingrelian cousins and,as longas theycan use the (inated numbersof )

476 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS refugeesto attract moreaid from the international community,they will notbe inclined toeffect appropriatehumane measures. As amarkof the Abkhazians’genuine wish to dosomething positive for the Gal Mingrelians, onecan mention the institution inthe summer of1995 ofan intermitten tly publishednewspape r Gal2 which,in additionto articles in Russian andAbkhaz, also includedmaterial in Mingrelian,the Žrst time that Mingrelian has beenused for the beneŽt ofordinaryspeakers since 1938 whenthe languagew aseffectively bannedas aliterary languagein G eorgia— apart fromthe occasional scholarly publicationforlinguists orfolklorists, it is onlypost- Soviet private publishinghouses that havestarted to print the occasional workin Mingrelian forthe Mingrelian manin the street. The existence ofan albeit part-Mingrelian publicationonthe Abkhazianside of the borderreportedl yarousedgreat interest amongcertain sectors ofthe Mingrelian populationinMingrelia itself. Sadly, Gal has notappeared since 1997,although Ardzinba agreed in September1998that sucha publicationis ofcrucial importance forkeeping G alresidents informedof whatSukhum is tryingto doto secure their well-being.Personal disagreements betweenthe Gal District’s headof adm inistration, Ruslan Kishmaria, andthe editor of Gal,NugzarSalaq’ aia, aGal Abkhazianthoroughlyand impressively com- mitted to improvingthe self-awareness andthus self-respect ofA bkhazia’s Mingrelians, madeit difŽcult forArdzinb ato resolve matters—perhaps the solution will beto appointa neweditor. Salaq’ aia andArdzinb ahaveboth recognizedthat moreshould have been done through the media in generalto makethe Gal residents better awareof the facts behindthe Georgian– Abkhazianconict. The4 April 1994Agreement itself, whichallows Abkhaziato haveits own constitution, agand state emblem,is seen bythe Abkhaziansas the only documentof real importancethat has beensigned by bothsides since the endof the war—CIS (essentially Russian ) peacekeeperswere subsequently introduced topatrol aSecurity Zonealong the R.Ingur;UNOMIG’ s contingentwas also increased.Since the Abkhaziansregard it as grantingto them fully equalstatus to the Georgians,they absolutely refuse to accept whatthey see as attempts by Georgia,supported as usual bythe international community (especially the much reviled groupingknown as the Friends of [the UNSecretary General’s Initiative for] Georgia),to backtrackon the commitments it there undertook.Conse- quently,the Abkhazianshave stated eversince thenthat the best the Georgians canhope to achieveis aunion-state consisting ofAbkhazia and Georgia as absolutely equalpartners— what any settlement alongthese lines wouldmean for futureconstitutional arrangementsbetween S. Ossetia andTbilisi, onthe one hand,and Adzharia and Tbilisi, onthe other,is unclear.A S.Ossetian delegation in Londonin November1997 stated that leaders in Abkhazia,S. Ossetia and NagornoKarabagh were in touch with oneanother and that nonewould sign any Žnal agreementindependently of the others forfear that, shouldany one of them sign,greater concessions might bemade to the others shortly thereafter—those whoconstantly notonly allude tothe better relations existing betweenS. Ossetia

477 GEORGE HEWITT andTbilisi butalso suggest that the S.Ossetian problemmight thus becloser to aŽnal settlement seem unawareof this factor. TheAbkhazians resent andutterly reject the accusation frequentlymade against them that theyare the onesresponsible forlack ofprogress in negotia- tions with Georgia.With regardto this, Sergei Shambabegan an interview in the summer of1998 by speaking of what had taken place oneyear earlier. SubsequentlyI translated the details froman information sheet issued bythe AbkhazianForeign Ministry, andI nowquote the relevant passage: On 13 June 1997 the Sides began discussion of anew draft-Protocol, proposed by the mediator, the Russian Federation. Article2 of this Protocol, pertaining to the mutual relations of Georgia and Abkhazia, wasbased on agreementsachieved earlier,in particular on provisions inthe 4April 1994 Declaration and reects the limit of the compromise to which the Abkhazian side isready to proceed. This document wasagreed by the Sides in the presenceof the Foreign Ministers of Abkhazia and Georgia through the mediation of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Atthe concluding stageof the discussion-process the Russian Federation’s Foreign Minister and the President of the Republic of Abkhazia wereboth involved.

Afterreaching agreementon all clausesof the Protocol lateat night, those present noted the successfulcompletion of their work and Žxed the 18 June 1997 asthe date for signing the Protocol. However, the Georgian side once again declined to sign it, seeking to alterthe whole document. Then, on 19 June 1997, the Republic of Abkhazia’s Minister of Foreign Affairswrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairsof Georgia setting out the alterations to the Protocol’s clauseswhich the Abkhazian side wasagain ready to accept.In fact,the Abkhazian side acceptedthe introduction of amendmentsto 7out of the 9clauses. Consequent upon this, on 14 August 1997 atthe initiative of the Russian Federation’s Minister of Foreign Affairsthere took placein Tbilisi ameeting between the presidents of Georgia and Abkhazia. Ajoint Declaration wasannounced inaccordancewith which the Sides committed themselvesanew to refrain from the useof forceor the threat to use it against eachother and declaredtheir readinessto settleall disputed questions exclusively by peacefulmeans. This declaration lowered the acutenessin the tension in mutual relations between the Sides. Following the presidential meeting there took placevisits of Georgian and Abkhazian governmental delegations, alternating between Sukhum and Tbilisi, the outcome of which wasthe creation of ajoint commission for deciding practicalquestions. Activation of the bilateral dialogue gave grounds to hope for achieving progress in the talks’process. However, the September round, which took placein Sukhum, again failed to reconcile the positions of the Sides. Itshould be noted that this round wasconducted in the presenceof the UNSecretaryGeneral’ s specialrepresentative and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation; the changes introduced into the Protocol as wellas the Attachment to it pertaining to the question of the return of the refugeesand composed with regard to the amendmentsof the Georgian side werediscussed. Signing of the discussed document would have enabled the sides to proceed to the Žnal stageof a wide-ranging settlement.However, the uncompromising nature of the Georgian side’s position yet again causedthe signing to be postponed. Thoseconvinced by the Georgianline aboutRussian involvementin Abkhazia speakof the unreliability ofRussian support.They suggest that, after Shevard- nadzewas forcedto seek protectionfrom the threat ofGamsakhurdia’s advance

478 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

onGeorgia’s secondcity (Kutaisi) inthe wakeof the Abkhazianvictory in 1993 bytaking Georgia into the CIS,Russia droppedAbkhazia and invested greater effort into buildingits relation with Tbilisi. Suchpeople further argue that Russia remains in controlof events in Abkhazia,ever ready to ‘playthe Abkhazian card’in orderto keepGeorgia under control. The question for those advocating this argumentto answer is: ‘Howdifferently shouldthe Abkhazianshave acted/beacting, given the veryreal dangersposed to them bythe chauvinism whippedup by the unofŽcial leaders like Gamsakhurdiaand his fellow Mingre- lians, the late MerabK’ ost’ava and the late Gia Ch’ant’ uria orby a host of academics, primarily historians andlinguists, whosevenomous outpourings against the Abkhaziansand other non- Kartvelian minorities havelargely deter- minedGeorgia’ s ethnic policyever since?’ There is evidenceto suggest that Yeltsin knewin advance of Shevardnadze’ s planto invade Abkhazia on 14 August1992 and gave approval by silence followingthe start ofthe military (mis)adventure.Russia’ s ForeignMinister at the time ofthe warwas Andrej Kozyrev,a protege´ofShevardnadze and no friendof Abkhazia.Towards the end ofthe warRussian DefenceMinister, Pavel Grachev,proposed to introduce troopsinto Sukhum to keep the rival forces apart.This wouldhave effectively partitioned Abkhazia,which was notin the interests ofthe Abkhazians.How- ever,it was notthey but Shevardnadze who rejected the offer,clearing the way forthe imminent Georgiandefeat. The attitude ofthe Kremlin authorities throughouthas hardlybeen characterizable as pro-Abkhazian.Whatever support from Russia(ns) that Abkhaziahas enjoyedhas comefrom sources outside the executive,voluntary helpers orweaponry (widelyavailable froma dispirited and poorlypaid Russian military ) purchased (unlikethat accruingto the Georgians thanksto the divisionof spoils onthe breakupof the USSR ) for cash—on Russian military involvementduring the warsee Billingsley’s level-headed articles in either TheHarriman Review ,Vol.10, No. 4, 1998 3 or Hewitt (1998). Manyin the Dumaare sympathetic to Abkhazia’s plight,crystallizing general sentiment throughoutRussia, whichis well awareof whatit means to bethe butt ofGeorgian antipathy. TheAbkhazian border with Russia overthe R.Psouwas closed formales of Žghtingage from the commencementof the Chechenwar in 1994.At the time Abkhazianswere able to use Abkhazianpassports totravel byboatto Trebizond, fromwhere freighters also deliveredgoods into Abkhazia—estimates putthe numberof ethnic Abkhaziansliving in Turkeyat aroundhalf amillion. However,the passengerboat was stopped,thanks to Georgian pressure, in late 1995.Also, a total blockadeof Abkhaziawas imposedin January 1996 after the CIS summit assented to Shevardnadze’s demands.When pressed to lift the blockadeas agoodwillgesture towardsAbkhazia, the ofŽcial Georgianresponse is that there are so manyleaks that Abkhaziais effectively free fromrestrictions already.It is true that goods (includingpetrol— often watered- downwith damagingconsequences for carburettors! ) still enter the portof Sukhum from Turkeyand that some trade is carried on (thanksto bribery ) overthe Psou. However,this is just aboutmanaging to keepAbkhazia a oat. The blockade is

479 GEORGE HEWITT biting,and many people are facedwith tremendoushardship. What goods do penetrate fromabroad are pricedbeyond the means ofmost potential purchasers. Abkhazia is (?unofŽcially ) part ofthe rouble-zone,refusing to haveanything to dowith the Georgian lari,so that the dire straits in whichthe Russian economy nowŽ ndsitself are necessarily ampliŽed here. Little workis available, and wagesare naturally insufŽcient tocater forthe needsof the wage-earner.Red Cross parcels, distributed quarterly,are keenlyawaited byrecipients, suchas pensioners. Thesituation is particularly bleakin the OchamchiraDistrict, whichis where the bulkof the actual Žghtingoccurred, and thus the physical damagehere is by far the worst in the republic.There is nopointlisting herethe natureand extent ofinvestment requiredto put Abkhazia back on its feet, forthe 107-page United Nations Needs Assessment Mission toAbkhazia producedas part ofthe UN DevelopmentProgramme in March1998 has alreadycarried this outmost efŽciently andimpressively; regrettably (andscandalously ) it has hadrestricted distribution, andso many are unawareof the desperate state in whichthe country Žndsitself— one particularly alarming observationconcerned the veryreal dangerof contamination to Sukhum’ s water supplywith all the implications that wouldhave for the health ofthe capital’s citizenry. WhatI cando is highlight some examples ofthe plightof the countryon the basis ofsome personal observationsfrom the summer of1998. Schoolingis notionallyfree, but nobody pays the teachers, andso parents of schoolchildrenhave to provide cash paymentsthemselves. Someparents are unableto dothis or,sometimes, evento buyshoes andclothing for their children.In such cases, the childrensimply receive noschooling. Since there is oftenno prospectof paidemployment for those completingtheir education,there is adangerthat lack ofincentives will result in anapathy towards study. Specialist treatment andmedicines are in short supplyfor those, including children,who were affected psychologicallyby the war—there havebeen instances ofmentally unbalancedchildren, untreated for years, killing their parents.Importation of evenmedical andhumanitarian supplies is onlypossible with the express permission ofthose imposingthe blockade.Assuming that youngmales manageto cross the borderinto Russia, the dangeris that they mightnever return. Since Abkhazianpassports are unrecognizedoutside Russia, noone attempting to leave Russia with suchdocuments is permitted todo so. Acquisition ofRussian documentsis, if at all possible, verycostly (andoften not entirely legal ) and,while Georgianpassports wouldbe readily providedat the consulate inSochi, the psychologyof most Abkhaziansis suchthat they atly refuse evento considerthis optionfor travel outside Russia. Almost 3years of blockadehave tended to instil somethingof a siege mentality—after telephone links werererouted via Tbilisi, theywere cut forabout 12 months; resentment is strongagainst all those whoare deemedresponsible forin icting continuing punishmenton acountrythat was the victim ofaggressionfrom a neighbourand notthe instigator ofmilitary action,as it is paintedand, since Georgiais seen to enjoysuch uncritical backingfrom the West, suchfeelings couldeasily be

480 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS transformedinto anti-westernism. Thereis notone scintilla ofevidence that the blockadecould be leading to a greater willingness toaccede to Georgian demands—on the contrary,positions are noticeablyhardening. Abkhazia’s President, Vladislav Ardzinba,is bytraining aspecialist in Hittite whoworked at Moscow’s Oriental Institute, whereYevgenij Primakov was the director—the twomen apparently enjoy a goodrelationship, whereasthe present Russian premier,who was broughtup in Tbilisi, hada Georgianas his Žrst wife, andspeaks Georgian (in additionto Arabic and English ),is reportednot to be so close toShevardnadze. Ardzinba Ž rst came to prominencewhen he was chosento head the AbkhazianResearch Institute (deliberately burnedto the groundalong with its priceless archivein the autumnof 1992 ) onthe deathof AcademicianProf. G. Dzidzaria duringthe late-1980s.It was thennatural that heshouldhave been selected as adelegate toGorbachev’ s Congressof People’s Deputies.His defenceof the rights ofminorities (notjust within Georgia ) deliveredin eloquentRussian attracted widepraise andattention— he is often chargedin ritualistic Georgianabuse with ignoranceof Abkhaz, but this is just oneof the deliberate untruthsspread about Abkhazia and leading Abkhazians— andit was directly as aconsequenceof this that hebecameever more involved in politics; hestill nominallyheads the Research Institute, shouldhe wishto give uphis political role orbe voted out of ofŽ ce. His popularityamong ordinary citizens is undeniable.There are, however, those preparedto voicesome discontent aboutthe direction inwhich the countryseems tobe being taken— there is regrettably andfor whatever reason not much open discussion ofthese matters inthe press oron TV, withwhich many people express opendissatis - faction forits lack ofinteresting content,and in sucha climate rumoursrather thanfacts shape (?distort) people’s judgements.Questions are askedabout how members ofthe Ardzinba‘ clan’seem to succeedin makingmoney and why such leaders as K’onst’ant’ in Ozganfrom Gudauta or Sergei Bagapshfrom Ocham- chira (bothformer district Party bosses ) are still inprominent governmental positions; Sergei Shamba,like Ardzinbahimself, is anacademic, speciŽ cally an archæologist, anda formerleader ofthe AbkhazianNational Forum (Aydgylara ‘Unity’)—hesuccessfully defendedhis doctoralthesis in Yerevan,capital of Armenia,in November1998, much to the annoyanceof Tbilisi, fromwhere the president ofthe GeorgianAcademy of Sciences, Albert’Tavkhelidze, wrote in vainto his Armeniancolleagues tourge cancellation ofthe procedure.However, evensuch critics as there are donot advocate closer rapprochementwith Tbilisi—on the contrary,they are moreradical thanArdzinba has shownhimself vis-a`-vis relations notonly with Georgiabut even with Russia. Inresponse,Ardzinba argues that Abkhazia’s position is still so dangerousand the communityso small that evena hint at divisionof opinion might lead to disaster if cunninglyexploited by Georgia. He himself is conŽdent that hecan steer amiddle coursebetween Russia andTbilisi, playingone off against the otherwhile cultivating everbetter relationships with western visitors. Theearly stance ofwestern states (notablyAmerica ) that demandedno contact ofanysort with the Abkhazianauthorities orthose seen as their representatives has

481 GEORGE HEWITT

mercifully passed,and good relations seem tohave been established withsuch ambassadors as those fromthe UnitedKingdom, Germany and France— former Frenchambassador Bernard Fassier’ s appointmentto Minskwas judgedto bea suitable rewardfor his entirely unhelpfuland unsympathetic attitude to Abkhazia’s problems!Unfortunately Ardzinba, well -readand self-conŽ dent, is notwell versedin western ways (might apossible explanationbe soughthere for governmentalreluctance to breakwith Soviet normsand promote greater freedomin the media? ),andon a purelypersonal level some visitors Žndhis style somewhatdidactic andperemptory. However, Abkhazia cannot be equated with its leader—that said, nooneshould doubt that forthe time beingArdzinba certainly articulates the aspirations ofmost ofhis countrymen.It remains to be seen if hewill contest the 1999presidential elections orwho will bethe other candidate(s).Evenif Ardzinbacan, given time, achievethe aims stated above, the questionis whetherhe and Abkhazia have that time. Thereare so many imponderables:will the blockadecontinue, or will pressure within Russia (whetherwe are talking ofthe N.Caucasus orsympathizers within Russia proper) cause ashift ofopinion, inclining the governmentto be morefavourable to Abkhazia?Will Georgiacontinue along the same pointless path,or will foolhardyradicals suchas TamazNadareishvili orBoris K’ak’ubava persuade anotherfutile butbloody resort to arms? Might the West achievea much-to-be- desired greater neutrality inthis matter andŽ nally exercise some inuence for the beneŽt of everyone in the region?The Abkhazians, like the Chechens,have demonstratedthat theydo not respond to pressure,especially whenit is quite withoutjustiŽ cation. Inthe meantime, the speedand effectiveness ofthe Abkhazianresponse to the dangerposed in late May1998 when, as widelyanticipated, the Georgianside tried toseize controlof the Gal District incelebration oftheir IndependenceDay (26 May), in icted (in Ardzinba’s words ) aneven more crushing defeat onthe aggressorthan that ofthe 1992–93 war. As forthe questionof Georgian governmentalcomplicity in the longcampaign of incursions into the Gal District andterrorist activity conductedthere bysuch partisan groupsas the White Legionand Forest Brothers,one reads the followingin the latest Amnesty International reporton Georgia (August 1998):

The Abkhazian side has claimedfrequently and bitterly that guerrilla forcesoperating in Abkhazia have the support of the Georgian government, which does not actwith sufŽcient rigour to clampdown on the activity of those who launch their attacksfrom Georgian controlled territory. Russian ofŽcials from the CIS peacekeeping forces, also target of guerrilla activity, have madesimilar claims. For example, afterŽ ve soldiers from the CIS peacekeeping forcewere killed by amine on 12 July this year, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued astatementtwo days latercondemning the killings asan actof terrorism by Georgian guerrillas and said that ‘any attemptsto present the White Legion or the Forest Brothers asorganisations that have nothing to do with the Georgian specialservices are an attempt to ignore reality’. The Georgian Interior and Security Ministries issued astatementon 16 July rejecting the accusations, and the Georgian government has persistently denied having any links with or

482 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

support, Žnancial or otherwise, to the armedgroups. To Amnesty International’s knowl- edge, however, no criminal proceedings have been initiated against any suspects although somehave ahigh proŽle locally, or in the press. In the westerntown of Zugdidi, for example, closeto the Inguri river border, mensaid to be local commandersof the White Legion reportedly move openly around the town and surrounding areas,with the tacit approval of the local authorities. Membersof armedgroups aresaid to have given press interviews during the May Žghting in Gal,and the leaderof the White Legion, Zurab Samushia, is regularly quoted by domestic and international media.He was, for example, interviewed and photographed by the British daily the Guardian in June while he was recuperating in Tbilisi from aleg wound sustained in the Žghting. Inthat interview Zurab Samushia claimedthat the White Legion had ‘executed’47 membersof the the CIS peacekeeping forces. There have also been claimsthat the Georgian security ministry has been involved in training membersof armedgroups, including in sophisticated sabotage techniques. In November 1996, for example, UNOMIGobservers discovered aparamilitary group of some50 men, ‘many of whom wereinternally displaced persons with connections to known insurgent groups’, in acampin the restrictedweapons zone on the Georgian side of the Inguri river. UNOMIGwas initially refused accessto investigate but waseventually allowed to visit the unit aftermaking protests. The Georgian security serviceinformed UNOMIGthat the unit ‘had been formed to control amnestiedcriminal elementswho had committed crimesin Abkhazia’and who wereat that timeliving in the Zugdidi area.They had been given the choice of either joining the unit or being expelled. Some individual Georgians in authority have also been linked with the guerrilla forces. The White Legion, for example, is said to have links with TamazNadareishvili, the chairmanof the Abkhazian parliament in exile.

OfŽcial Georgianassociation with these terrorist groupsis sowell knownin the regionthat Georgianjournalist, Ak’ak’ i Mikadze,writing in Vremja (7, of 3 June 1998),boldlystated:

The Ministry of Internal Affairsand the Ministry of State Security actively support the partisan groupings operating in the GalRegion. For example, Žghters from the division called‘ Forest Brothers’ofŽ cially receivewages of 200 lari (about 150 dollars ),whilst their commander, criminal authority David Shengelia receives300 lari (about 220 dollars ). The division supposedly numbers about 700, for whom wagesand allowancesare set aside from the budget, whereas,as conŽrmed by our interviewer, you can’t in actualfact locate even 100 individual members.

Shevardnadzeemployed his well-knownwiles notonly to outmanœuvre the warlords (DzhabaIoseliani andsometime DefenceMinister T’engizK’ it’ovani ) whoousted his predecessorand invited himhimself backto Georgia but actually to imprison them—Ioseliani’ s trial foralleged involvementin the August1995 supposedassassination- attempt onShevardnadze (in which,as luck (?) would haveit, noone was seriously injured ) Žnishedin November1998 with an 11-yearsentence. This forces oneto conclude that, if hereally wantedterrorism in Abkhazialaunched from Georgian terrritory to cease, hecould bring this about.At the endof October 1998 Germany was expectedto supplyGeorgia with acoastal patrol-boat,receiving a furtherone from Turkey— similar aid has

483 GEORGE HEWITT also beenproffere dbyAm erica. Additionally, America is reportedto be granting$5.2 million forthe purchaseof helicopters, the Žrst three ofwhich are to bedelivered in 1999.T heUS State Department is also said to have signeda joint agreement forthe serial productionatthe Kutaisi aircraft works ofaMercuryairplane tobepurchasedby the Frontier DefenceForces. In the light ofrelations with Abkhazia,these developments must beseen as worrying,especially whencoupled with the military training promisedby variouswestern governments. Thepaper Droni reportedin its issue of November14–17 1998that since 1995G eorgiahas incurreda debtto Russia tooof $22 million forthe training ofGeorgian ofŽ cers. Instead ofbeing gaoled for incitement to racial hatred,T amaz Nadareishvili servedfor some years after his exile fromAbkhazia as a deputy-premier ofGeorgiaand continues to enjoyVIP treatment ashetravels the worldto press his argumentfora military solution tothe conict. There canbe nodoubt,however ,that Abkhaziansare still morethan able tocounter openchallenges. T heattitude foundthrough outthe Abkhazianpopulationis oneof im placable deŽance— Abkhazia is their landand, regardless ofthe pressures towhich they are subjected,they seem quite preparedto die in its defence. Lifting ofthe blockade,viable settlement with Georgia,and suitable investment couldrelatively quicklyrestore Abkhazia,with its favourable climate andnatural resources,to its formerposition as aBlack Sea riviera. Tourism is always likely to bethe main sourceof income, for Abkhazia boasts most ofthe main resorts onthe Caucasian Black Sea coast—undoub t- edlyone compellin greasonfor G eorgiato try tokeep control over potentially lucrative proŽts. Sukhum’sairport at Drandais acknowledgedto bethe best in the Caucasus,having been upgrade dtointernatio nal standards beforethe Soviet collapse, althoughit has lain idle since 1993.A 1995feasibility study into the possible development ofSkurcha, to the northof Ochamch ira, reportedlysuggestedit hadthe potential to outrankthe moresouthern ports of Poti (Mingrelia) and Batumi (Adzharia).All this wouldfacilitate the creation in Abkhaziaof a free economic zone,as envisagedby the govern- ment.Maize, tea, citrus fruits, grapes,nuts, bay- leaves, timber (chestnut,oak, pine,box, beech, walnut, yew ,bamboo ) andtobacco are the chief agricultural crops,although many mines still makeaccess tothe Želds in some areas (e.g. aroundK’ yndygh ) impossible. Water resources (mineral andplain ) are virtually limitless. Thereare deposits ofcoal, marble, granite, barite, lime- stone andoil, with potential forextracting copper,arsenic, zinc,gold and silver. Discussions havetaken place onthe constructionofa subsidiary pipeline (Novorossijsk–A bkhazia–Poti– Ceyhan ) that wouldassociate Abkhazia (jointly with Russia andGeorgia ) with the beneŽts (assuming that anyactually accrue ) owingfrom the exportof Caspian oil. However,this economic‘ carrot’, asit isseen inTbilisi, isaloneunlikely to entice Abkhazia backinto Georgia’s fold.

484 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

Georgia Logicwould seem todemand that, byany standards, Georgia should be at the veryheart ofCaucasian affairs andrepresent the fulcrumfor the Caucasian policyof foreign states— it has road-and rail- links to Russia, Armeniaand Azerbaijan,two (non-rail) frontier-crossings with Turkey,outlets to the Black Sea,and its capital lies at the verycentre ofTranscaucasia. The country, in its internationally recognizedborders, consists of70,000 km 2 (Abkhaziaencom- passes 8700km 2 5 12.5%of the territory of‘ Georgia’) with natural resources comprising: tourist attractions, agricultural land (800,000hectares ofarable land, 322,000with permanentcrops, growing grapes, tea, citrus fruits, bayleaves, vegetables),forests, mines (manganese,copper, iron, zinc, oil, mercury,and barium),wines andmineral waters, plus suchindustries as: metal processing, electrical equipment,chemicals, food,textiles, iron-casting,steel (-piping), pro- ductionof vehicles andsynthetic yarn;additionally, the Georgiansare the largest ofthe indigenousCaucasian peoplesand, unlike any of the others,can boast 15 centuries ofliterary tradition. Of9308 small enterprises 91.7%had been privatized byOctober1996, although there is noprivate ownershipof land.The latest Žguresfor GDP growth-rateof 11% (1996–97) makeGeorgia the fastest- growingeconomy in the region.The amount of investment, largely connected with the TRACECA (TransportCorridor Europe– Caucasus– Asia ) project,as for instance detailed in Georgia:1998 Country ProŽ le ,suggests that the West has alreadystarted to treat Georgiain this favourableway, complementing the political–diplomatic gains achievedby Georgia in the wakeof Shevardnadze’ s return (March 1992). Russia remains Georgia’s main tradingpartner in terms ofboth imports and exports—Georgia’ s total exportsin 1996were US$199.2 million vs.total imports ofUS$647.2 million. SpeciŽcally, in1996 Georgia exported US$56.9 million-worthof primarily food,coloured metal productsand printed materials, representinga 28.5%share ofexports,to Russia; this was followedby US$25.9 million-worthof primarily electrical energy,ammonium nitrate andcoloured metals to Turkey ( 5 13%share ofexports ).This comparedwith US$127.3 million-worthof imports ofprimarily natural gas,food and electrical energy from Russia ( 5 19.4%share ofimports );this was followedby US$80.4 million-worthof imports ofprimarily foodand electrical appliances fromTurkey ( 5 14.2%share ofimports ).Britain representedthe highest-rankingwestern countryto receive Georgianexports (mainly benzineand related productsand nitrates),whilst the UnitedStates was the highest-rankingwestern countryfrom whichimports werereceived (donationsand food, each representing about one-third ofthe US$48.3million- worthof imports ).Thetrade-turnover with Russia forthe Žrst 10monthsof 1998was $145million, representing14.7% of Georgia’s total foreigntrade, which is 2.3%higher than the volumeof trade with Georgia’s secondpartner, Turkey. Ofcourse, the underlyingsituation is distinctly less healthy.After the disintegration ofthe USSRandbecause of internal conicts the Georgian

485 GEORGE HEWITT

economysimply collapsed—used to ‘ playingthe system’in Soviet times, which partly explainedthe relative wealth that was always soconspicuous in Georgia in comparisonwith the otherrepublics, Georgians no longer had a system other thantheir ownto exploit,and Georgia actually becamealmost the poorestof the formerunion- republics.Only in 1995did matters start to improve;this was the yearwhen the newcurrency, the lari,was introducedunder the controlof the WorldBank and IMF at arate of1.12 to the USdollar (September1995 ); in October1998 it fell to1.43, sliding still furtherto 2.105to the dollar at the start ofDecember.This means that recent annualimprovements have been set against aremarkablylow base-point. As of1 October1996 705 production- plants (one-third ofthe total ) stoodidle. Annualincome in 1996was just $665.Only 116,000tourists visited Georgiain 1996and, although 1997 saw athreefold increase, the totals are well belowŽ guresfor the 1970s,when Georgia (princi- pally the Black Sea coastal resorts ) attracted Russians anddenizens of other socialist countries in droves.There is ahugetrade deŽcit, whichmeans that Georgiacannot meet its debts,particularly those owedto Turkmenistan/ Russia forfuel supplies. Inconsequence,there are critical problemsstill with electricity supplyand heating in winter. Russia’ s owneconomic crisis cannotbut have a serious (anddeleterious ) effect onGeorgia’s economiccondition, which again is starting tobe described as catastrophic. On14 November 1998 the Finance Minister, Mikhail Ch’k’ uaseli, resignedover government disunity andfailure to implement his ‘pre-crisis’plan. This resignation highlights the voluminousand growingbudget deŽ cit. Beforehe resigned, the Minister claimed that budget revenuesdo notexceed 100,000 lari ($75,000) daily,whereas expenditure stands at 2million lari. Minister ofState (formerambassador to Moscow ) Vazha Lortkipanidzeadded at the same meeting that the budgetshortfall forthe Žrst 10 monthsof 1998 was 160million lari ($120million ).Thus,the government currentlyowes $9 million in wagesto publicsector employeesand no less than $35million in pensions—the currentliving- wagein Georgiaamounts to 85.5lari (ca. $57) permonth, whereas 70% of Tbilisi residents are estimated tofall short ofthis income.As the RadioFree Europe/RadioLiberty CaucasusReport , Vol. 1/38 (18November 1998 ) goeson to say:

This shortfall is Žrst and foremost the result of chronic tax-evasion, which has proven resistant both to changes in the tax-code proposed by Ch’k’ uaseli severalmonths ago and warnings from the IMF. Inits annual reviewof Georgia’s economy in July, the IMF had advised the country’s leadership to mobilise additional tax-revenues and expressed satisfac- tion with the government’s professed commitmentto eliminateall outstanding payments’ arrearsby the end of this year—an objective which now looks utopian. An IMF mission is currently in Tbilisi and will makerecommendations to the Fund’s directors on disburse- ment of the Žnal tranche (worth $38–40 million ) of an ESAF loan.

Col.Avtandil Davitadze, head of the Žnancial departmentat the Ministry of Defence,has stated that the FinanceMinistry will shortly owethe Defence Ministry morethan 22 million lari (ca.$14.5 million ).The1997 defence budget totalled 79million lari (ca.$52.7 million ),reducingin 1998 to 74 million lari

486 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

(ca.$50 million ),while the draft budgetsuggests that it mayshrink in 1999to 65million lari (ca.$43 million ).At the same time the size ofthe armyis expectedto fall from30,000 to 25,000. This state ofaffairs wouldbe bad enough in astable countrywith a governmentcommanding the conŽdence of its citizenry. This is far fromthe case in Georgia. Ethno-territorial wars haveleft bothAbkhazia and S. Ossetia de facto independentand effectively beyondthe controlof Tbilisi, althoughS. Ossetia has recently beenreported as beinginterested in joiningthe lari-zone.Although noŽghtinghas occurredin the southwesternprovince of Adzharia (Ach’ara), this toois tightly administered bylocal strongman,Aslan Abashidze,who came to powerthere duringthe Gamsakhurdiaperiod. He enjoys excellent relations with Turkey (andindeed with the Russian troopsstationed there still );the Adzharian borderwith Turkeyat the village ofSarpi is said to bequite open,small- traders beneŽting greatly from owsof goods in bothdirections, whereasAdzharia’ s borderwith Georgia proper is reportedto be rather morestrictly controlled. Relations betweenAbashidze and Shevardnadze are decidedlyfrosty, the former nothaving set footin Tbilisi since Shevardnadze’s return,even though he is a memberof the central parliament. Thedaily English-languagedigest ofGeor- giannewspapers provided by the Caucasian Institute forPeace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) includedthe followingfor 27 October 1998 from an article that dayby Mikhail Esartia in Resonance (294):

Aslan Abashidze, the leaderof Adzharia, told journalists yesterday that before the mutiny [by Ak’ak’ i Eliava and his armygroup from Senak’i, Mingrelia ] in Western Georgia Temur Shashiashvili, the governor of the Imeretiregion, had offered the President to order the armyto decimatethe population of the Mingrelia province [NB:this incidental hint atthe nature of the tension between Mingrelia and Georgia proper, for which vide infra—author].Abashidze promised tomakepublic the record of this conversation, tapped, in his words, by ahigh-ranking ofŽcial in Tbilisi. For his part, Mr. Shashiashvili claimed Abashidze’s accusations to be adelirium. The ‘Adzharian lion’, he said, seemedupset by the defeatof the mutineers in Western Georgia and by the afŽliation of Imeretito the Assembly of European Regions—Adzharia has been the only Georgian memberof this organisation so farand Abashidze used this factto increasehis popularity. If Abashidze indeed provides the record, the newspaper argues, he isgoing to fall into atrap, asthe Adzharian leaderand his teammay be sued for unsanctioned tapping of the president’s talks.

Inthe 15November 1998 elections ahuge94% of the electorate in Adzharia reportedlycast their vote,awarding all 30seats onthe Batumi councilto Abashidze’s party (TheUnion of GeorgianTraditionalists ).The33- year-oldson ofliterary critic GuramSharadze, a prominentmember of Abashidze’ s partyin Tbilisi, was foundshot deadin his Tbilisi at some monthsago; the authorities claim it was suicide, thoughthe victim’s father is convincedit was apolitical murder.The nature of future relations betweenAdzharia and Tbilisi when Abashidze (or,for that matter, Shevardnadze ) is nolonger in poweris an

487 GEORGE HEWITT imponderablequestion. Though Abashidze cannot really bestyled aseparatist, nevertheless the autonomousstatus Adzhariahas enjoyedhas fostered arangeof vested interests, andthe populationis predominantlyMuslim, somethingwhich Gamsakhurdiaonce threatened to ‘rectify’, therebycreating herea strong reaction ofresentment towardsthe central authorities. Theremote Dzhavakhetiregion (capital 5 Akhalkalaki ),somewhatto the east ofAdzharia, is populatedalmost exclusively byethnic Armenians—in between Adzhariaand Dzhavakheti lies Meskheti (capital 5 Akhaltsikhe ); this whole border-zonewas contested betweenGeorgians and Armenians during the period oftheir independenceafter the Russian Revolution (speciŽcally in 1920 ), and Georgiaseems to havegained control thanks to asecret agreementwith the withdrawingTurks, who, given the thencatastrophic relations betweenTurks andthe survivingArmenians, naturally didnot want to see Armeniansstrength- eningtheir holdover any neighbouring territory. Relations withTbilisi have beenstrained (to say the least ) since Gamsakhurdiaattempted to impose Georgianprefects in this district. Reports also indicate that Shevardnadze’s collusion with the GeorgianOrthodox Church over its movesto seize controlof local Armenianchurches and graveyards has hardlyendeared the Dzhavakhetian Armeniansto the present Georgianregime— the GeorgianChurch took over the Catholic cathedral inthe Adzhariancapital some time ago.It is ArmenianTV broadcasts that are watchedin Dzhavakheti,while the yingof Armenian  ags has also beenreported, and many local Armeniansare part ofthe soldiery at the Russian base inAkhalkalaki. In early autumn1998 Georgian troops were forced by (?armed) local Armeniansto withdrawfrom the area becauseno prior notiŽcation hadbeen given of the plannedmanoeuvres, as is requiredby an understandingwith Tbilisi. Inrecent monthsthere havebeen reports that Abashidzehas beentrying to effect aunionof some sort betweenAdzharia and Meskhet-Dzhavakhetito widen his base ofappeal, possibly with aviewto his contesting the 1999presidential elections. Givena free choice (that is to say in conditionswhere such a decision wouldnot lead towar between Armenia and Georgia,as it surely wouldat the moment ),wouldthe populationof Dzhavakheti chooseto remain part ofGeorgia?In issue 1ofvolume3 of CaucasianRegional Studies (1998) VoitsekhGuretski devotedan article to ‘Thequestion of Javakheti’. Hepoints out that the currentadministrative regionknown as Samtskhe-Dzhavakhetiincorporates historical Dzhavakheti,where Armenians represent over90% (some estimates goas highas 97% ) ofthe populationand, betweenDzhavakheti and Adzharia, Meskheti, whereArmenians form about one-third ofthe total population.Georgian is notwidely known, while local Georgianstend also to speakArmenian. In 1988 a national-popularmovement, Dzhavakhk,was formed;its goalfrom the beginning‘ was at least to obtain autonomy,if notto unite the regionwith Armenia’. Themovement feels that the creation ofthe currentadministrative unit was aimed at weakeningArmenian predominancewithin Dzhavakhetialone. The most radical members of Dzhavakhkare inuenced by the Dashnak (tsutyun) Party (ofŽcially non-existent in Georgia),whichdemands union with Armenia.However, David Rstakyan,

488 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS oneof Dzhavakhk’ s leaders, denies that suchis the present aim ofthe movement,which he declares to besolely concernedwith securingArmenian cultural rights in this part ofGeorgia (whatof their rights elsewhere,such as in the capital, Tbilisi? )—there has beenan out ow of population from this rather inclement locality in search ofeconomicbetterment. Onthe otherhand, Guretski stresses that ‘ignoringthe demandsof the Armeniansby the Georgianauthorities canlead to civil disobedience’. If Georgiais reconstructedon federal lines, it remains to beseen whatspecial arrangementswould be offered to Armeniansin these south-western areas. Interestingly, Armeniaitself opposesany form of separatism forDzhavakheti, including the splitting-offof Dzhavakheti from the Samtskhe-Dzhavakhetiadministrative unit,because the currentarrangement gives Armeniadirect access to Adzharia,with whichit enjoysgood relations, andthus to the Black Sea via Batumi. Erevancannot afford to have open con ict with anotherneighbour, given its relations with bothAzerbaijan and Turkey. Inthe Dmanisi–Bolnisi– Marneuli area furtherto the east live the majority of Georgia’s Azerbaijani population,which is notnoted for its knowledgeof Georgianor its affection forGeorgian culture in general.Pipelines toArmenia pass throughthis area andhave often been blown up. Much of the anti-minority rhetoric in early 1989was directed against the local Azerbaijanis andtheir high birthrate (perceivedto beat levels dangerousfor Kartvelian majority-status ), and there werein fact deaths inethnic clashes herein early July1989, although these werenot widely reported abroad as events inAbkhazia quickly overshadowed them. Thereis far fromuniversal harmonyin some otherKartvelian provincestoo. Svaneti(a),the northwesternmountain fastness has,like Chechenia,been re- portedto bea conduitfor the drugtrade. Mingrelia, the atland in the westernmost part ofGeorgia proper is, however,perhaps Shevardnadze’ s main trouble-spot.Although most ethnic Svansand Mingrelians (plus anyLaz that live inGeorgia ) might bereasonablycontent to be classiŽed as ‘Georgians’ (e.g. forcensus purposes ),the ethnic componentin the Gamsakhurdia–Shevardnadze split shouldnot be overlooked,although Georgians themselves arguethat this is nothingmore than a political problem.Just as eventhose Georgianswho know ofandaccept the crimes committed byStalin cannotentirely escape asneaking regardfor the local lad,christened IosepDzhughashvili, who achieved such world-prominence,so it cannotbe accidental that the main strongholdof Zviadism remains his native regionof Mingrelia (althoughZviad Gamsakhurdia, like his famousnovelist father,K’ onst’ant’ ine, and other Mingrelian intellectuals ofthe inter-waryears was nevera Mingrelian nationalist )—Gamsakhurdia’s widow,Manana Archvadze, underlined this emphatic local supportfor her late husbandduring the Žrst weekof January 1999, when she repeatedthe (widely believed) accusation that Shevardnadzewas directly responsible forZviad’ s death.After Gamsakhurdiawas overthrown,the Mkhedrioni (Cavalry) Ž ghters underDzhaba Ioseliani wenton a murderousrampage in various parts of Mingrelia to rootout his supporters—Ioseliani’ s boastingon Georgian TV of whathe and his followers haddone in Ts’alendzhikha was nauseatingin the

489 GEORGE HEWITT

extreme.This aspect ofGeorgia’s civil warof early 1992was largely ignoredor poorlyreported in the West, perhapsbecause the ethnic dimensionwas not properlyappreciated, but there remains throughoutMingrelia anunderstandably stronglegacy of bitterness towardsShevardnadze and his Tbilisi clique.Despite the predictable knee-jerk reaction ofblaming ‘ some hostile foreignpower’ (sc. Russia) forthe assassination attempt onShevardnadze in Tbilisi in February 1998,it eventuallytranspired that the plotters wereZviadists, led byMingrelian GochaEsebua (tobe shot while attendinga funeralin April 1998 ). In like fashionthe Octobermutiny in western Georgia (Žrst reportedto bethreatening the captureof Georgia’s secondcity, Kutaisi, butthen apparently and somewhat suspiciously Žzzling outin acoupleof days! ) was master-mindednot by that same ‘hostile foreignpower’ but by a Mingrelian armycommander based in Senak’i, Ak’ak’ i Eliava (aone-time supporterof Gamsakhurdia, and still at large).Oneof the reasons that the Mingrelian languagehas, since the mid-1930s, beensuppressed (in the sense ofnotbeing awarded literary status andthus never taughtin schools orused for publishing of materials forthe beneŽt ofordinary Mingrelians ) is the fear that encouraginglanguage rights wouldinevitably lead to political separatism—this was openlyadmitted in the introductionto a privately publishedcollection ofMingrelian colloquial expressions byAna Chikvanaiain 1998.Any Mingrelian whodared in the closing daysof commu- nism to speakout in defenceof their Mingrelian (as opposedto the imposed Georgian) identity came in forviolent contumely (notto say,in some cases, actual physical assault ).Consequently,one does not really knowthe extent of anysuch desires amongthe Mingrelian community,whose numbers anecdotally are putat anywherebetween 500,000 and 1,500,000— even the likely Žgureof 750,000represents asizeable proportionof Georgia’ s 198970.1% Kartvelian population.It wouldnot, however, be an unreasonable supposition that the ongoingdissatisfaction with Tbilisi’s attitude to this regionmight easily lead to increasing manifestations ofethnic self-assertion. Infact, Iwas toldin Abkhazia in the summer of1998 by an Abkhazian Mingrelian that there are indeed Mingrelians overthe borderin Mingrelia properwho are interested notonly in revivingthe fortunesof the Mingrelian language (after the lead takenin Abkhaziawith the Gal newspaper) butpossibly even in acting onthe political frontto raise Mingrelia’s proŽle (althoughnot necessarily inthe sense ofaiming at total independence )4.Personally Ifeel that, howeverparadoxical it might appearat Žrst glance,such a movewould actually beinthe interests ofGeorgia as a whole (andcertainly in the interests ofGeorgian– Abkhazian relations in particular),forthe countryseems tome tobe a paradigmcase forthe creation ofa federal structure—Mingrelia, Svaneti (a),Adzharia,Dzhavakheti, the Azer- baijani area,Imereti, Kartli andK’ akheti (a) as anabsolute minimum should be constituent butseparate parts ofsucha reconstituted state. Theestablishment of aMingrelian buffer-zonebetween Abkhazia (whethertotally independent,a fellow-memberof the CISorpart ofsuch a newlyconŽ gured Georgian (con)federation) andGeorgia proper would be the best means ofrelieving Georgian–Abkhazian tensions, forthe Abkhazianshave never regarded Mingre-

490 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS lians as Georgiansand state openlythat theycan more easily buildrelations with them thanthe moredistant (?andnationalistically inclined ) Georgians.If, as some suggest, (real) federalism is nowacceptable to manypoliticians in Tbilisi, perhapsherein lies the seed ofhope for Georgia’ s futureand any attendant prosperity. Corruption,widespread throughout the USSR,was endemicin Georgiaand onereceives the impression that little has changed,just as the introductionof a veneerof democracy to appealto western observershas beensaid bysome native commentators to havedone little to alter underlyingrealities. Theyearly USState Departmentreports onGeorgia consistently refer totransgressions of judicial process—Iquote from the latest (January1998 ) issue: Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the courts wereoften inuenced by pressure from the executive branch. This pattern continues, with judicial authorities frequently deferring to the executive branch, particularly atlower levels of the court system. Investigators routinely plant or fabricateevidence and extort confessions in direct violation of the Constitution. Judges aregenerally reluctant to exclude evidence obtained illegally over the objection of the Procuracy. Local human rights observers also report widespread judicial incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to prosecutors and judges, which also leadsto denial of justice. Inaddition, the mistreatment ofprisoners is regularlychronicled in Amnesty International’s reports onGeorgia; and in response to Georgia’s request to be grantedfull membershipof the Councilof Europe, short- sightedly approvedby the delegationdespatched to assess the countryin the middle of1998,the British Helsinki HumanRights Groupstressed the followingin their letter tothe Councilon 24 April 1998:

Other reports issued in recentmonths by both non-governmental organizations and ofŽcial bodies have, wenote, been strikingly severein their criticismof the Georgian authorities concerning that areathat has long been of concern to us: namely, civil liberties and human rights. See,for example: USState Departmentreport on Human Rights Practicesin 1997; International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1997 annual report; Conclusions and Recommendations of the UNCommitteeAgainst Torture (November 1996);Concluding Observations of the UNHuman Rights Committee (March 1997). Mentioningthe speciŽc cases ofK’arlo Dzhich’onaia, Tamaz Gorelishvili and ZazaTs’ ik’ lauri, the Groupconclude: Wecan only shareGeorgia’ s aspirations, based on its history and culture, to join the family of European nations. But due to its extremely grave recenthuman rights record, we hold serious reservations about its present eligibility for membership of the Council of Europe. Asthe trial ofMkhedrionileader, Dzhaba Ioseliani, was comingto aclose at the start ofNovember 1998, the paper Sakartvelos Gazeti (149,11 November ), quotedby CIPDD, reported this incident: OnNovember 10—Police Day—Temur Mgebrishvili, the commanderof the specialpolice

491 GEORGE HEWITT

force, and his policemen beat Alek’o Tskit’ishvili, areporter of the ‘Resonance’newspaper, who tried to enter the Supreme Court building, wherethe Mkhedrioni trial wascoming to an end. The reporter wasconveyed to the Mtats’minda district police station and detained for three hours, while Mr. Mgebrishvili beat him in the presenceof duty ofŽcers. That evening the NGO‘Liberty Institute’and journalists launched aprotest action, demanding the dismissalof Mgebrishvili.

Onthe same day Resonance itself (309) reported (cited fromCIPDD’ s daily digest):‘While the police suppressionof the mass-media is strengtheningdaily, Shevardnadzecongratulates the police,calling them apillar ofthe state …’ Thereis widespreaddisillusion with the Tbilisi leadership andpolitical class in general,as the poorturnout in the 15November 1998 local elections indicated; with the (?suspicious ) exceptionof Adzharia, barely more than the one-third ofthe electorate requiredby law tolegitimize the ballot botheredto vote,with just 20% (the largest share ) ofTbilisi voters casting their ballot in favourof Shevardnadze’ s Citizens’Union of Georgiaparty. The newspaper Alia (19–20 November 1998 ),as quotedby CIPDD, gave the preliminary results of the local elections forthe provinces (i.e. outside Tbilisi ),accordingto the Central Election Commission, as: Citizens’Union of Georgia 585 mandates; Unionfor Democratic Revival 238;National Democratic Party 183;Labour Party 167; Socialist Party 141;Popular Party 95;Union of Georgian Traditionalists 61; Lemi 39;Bloc ‘National Accord’38; Sportive Georgia 30; Bloc ‘ Georgia— MerabK’ ost’ava Society’ 17; Greens 6; FreedomParty 1.The Ž nal results are expectedon 5December.The newspaper 7 Days (27–29 November1998 ) stated that the Central Election Commission bya voteof 15 to 9 (with twomembers absent) hadapproved the followingdivision ofthe 55places onthe Tbilisi City Council: Citizens’Union of Georgia 20; Labour Party 12;Socialist Party 9; Unionfor Democratic Revival 4;PopularParty 4;National Democratic Party 3; Unionof Georgian Traditionalists 3. As the paper Droni (132,17– 18 November ),as cited byCIPDD, put it: ‘The local elections inGeorgia marked the endof the national movement’, arguing that the peopledemonstrated their indifferencetowards the pro-westernpolicy of the rulingparty, which made them abandonthe national (?nationalist ) ideals for whichthey had fought. Of course, the citizeny was misguidedin the Žrst place to haveallowed itself tobe taken down the roadof nationalism byits mixture ofincompetent and/ ordevious leaders overrecent years.While similar charges maybe levelled against the Kremlin,at least Russia cantake some pridein the presenceof intellectuals, suchas Sergei Kovale¨vandthe late Galina Starovoitova,prepared to speakout against the policies ofthe government (e.g. overthe Chechenwar )—Georgia’s shame is that, far fromanyone of in uence raising avoicein protest at the dangersof treading the nationalist path,the intelligentsia either said nothingor eagerly jumped aboard the nationalist bandwagonthemselves. Thecountry is palpablyin desperate needof a better educationalsystem, less insular andmore objective (namelynon- nationalist ) in its outlook.Perhaps there will belittle fundamentalimprovement in Georgian

492 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

society until this is introducedand a rulinge ´lite rearedon Soviet ideologyfades intohistory. Many (?most) western leaders and/ortheir advisers evidentlythink highly of the currentGeorgian leader anddeem him at least to beworthyof support.Those whothink this wayshould not examine merely Shevardnadze’s term as Soviet ForeignMinister in isolation butconsider the entirety ofhis career,including boththe preceding13 years hespent in chargeof Georgia and the 6years since his return; theywould also dowell to resist beingbowled over by Georgian bonhomie andhospitality (nogreater, incidentally, thanthat foundamong Caucasian peoplein general ) andrecall that, eventhose whohad the acumento see throughthat other (notorious) Georgianpolitician, Josef Stalin, foundhim, ona personallevel, to bea manof supreme charm. An Abkhazian politician visiting Londonin 1993 remarked that Shevardnadzewas anideal executorof others’decisions butno man himself to lead anindependent state. This latter judgementis surely borneout by the facts. Theonly world leader to back Yeltsin’s murderoustactics inChechenia was, quite predictably (given his pro-Kremlin orientation displayedthroughout his career ),EduardShevardnadze. As soonas it becameclear, however,that Russia hadeffectively beendefeated in that campaign,the Žrst to welcomeChechen leader, Aslan Maskhadov, outside Checheniawas …EduardShevardnadze— little wonderthe sobriquet awardedto this manby his fellow-countrymenfor his lack ofprinciple during his tenureof ofŽ ce as GeorgianParty Boss was tetri melia (White Fox). Realpolitik forChechenia required that it achievea means ofegress that avoided Russia and,since Georgiais the onlynon-Russian region it borders,the Chechen leadership choseto ignore the previouspro- Russian (?anti-separatist ) stance of the Georgianleadership andengineered agreement on the constructionof anew roadlinking Chechenia with Georgia.The Chechen section ofthis was com- pleted quite promptlybut the Georgianshave havered, alleging fear ofa new routefor the passage ofnarcotics. However,there canbe nodoubt that Georgia has totally lost anyrespect it might oncehave commanded across the wholeN. Caucasus becauseof its treatment ofthe Abkhazians,speciŽ cally the inicting onthem ofthe whollyunnecessary war of 1992–93. For this Shevardnadzemust shoulderthe blame. Howdid it happen?Shevardnadze had no excuses fornot understanding the natureand depth of Abkhaziansuspicions towardsGeorgians as aresult oftheir constant attempts overthe years todominate Abkhazia and introduce there the Georgianlanguage. At the time ofthe promulgationof the Brezhneviteconsiti- tutions in the late 1970sthe languageissue came to the forein anumberof Soviet regions,including Georgia proper (Georgianvs. Russian ) andAbkhazia (Abkhazvs. Georgian ).Thesituation within Abkhaziabecame extremely tense, requiringShevardnadze, as Party GeneralSecretary, to visit Sukhumand pacify local emotions byreferring to the mistakes committed byTbilisi duringthe Stalin–Beria period.However, not having learnt his lesson, Shevardnadze,faced withongoing rebellion amongMingrelia’ s Zviadists, seems tohave gambled that perhapsthe onlyway to win universal Kartvelian approvalwould be to divert

493 GEORGE HEWITT

attention fromintra- Kartvelian disputes towardsa commonfoe, and the most convenientfoe available happenedto bethe Abkhazians.The gamble conspicu- ouslyfailed at appallingcost to the victims ofthe aggression,to the aggressors themselves, as well as to the republicwhose frontiers these aggressors were supposedlyprotecting. After the Georgianforces wereexpelled from Abkhazia, Shevardnadze’s baconwas pulledfrom the further ames ignited byGamskhur- dia’s suddenreturn to Mingrelia fromChechenia only thanks to the receipt of ‘humanitarian’Russian aid,proffered after anothervolte-face that tookGeorgia into the CIS—Gamsakhurdia’ s revolt crumbled,and he perished under mysteri- ouscircumstances overthe 1993–94 New Year. Theone thing Georgia desperately needsas anabsolute preconditionfor securingthe desiderata commonto all the states emergingfrom the Soviet shadow (namely,peace and prosperity ) is stability, andthe keyto this is Abkhazia.Georgia’ s rail-link toRussia has beencut eversince the Abkhazian war,as the sole line runsthe lengthof Abkhazian territory— the motorway (M27) stretching alongsideit is also the onlyhighway connecting Georgia to Russia that is openall yearround— the cutting ofthese direct, permanentlinks to Russia was perhapseven more damaging to Armenia (in its conditionsof blockadeby Turkey and Azerbaijan ) thanto Georgiaitself. Closure ofthe northernrailway has necessitated the wasteful buildingin the renovatedport of Poti ofa special rail-dock,so that wagonscan be rolled ontoships foronward transmission across the Black Sea tosuch ports as Odessa.In fact, apart from the oil terminal at Supsain Shevardnadze’s homeregion of Guria,Poti (current capacity 5–6 million tons peryear ) is the onlyport under the direct controlof Tbilisi, andPoti is in Mingrelia! This is becausethe remainingport is Adzharia’s capital Batumi (currentcapacity 4–5 million tonsper year ).Giventhe demon- stration bythe Abkhaziansof their superiormilitary prowessin boththe warof 1992–93 and the large-scale skirmishes ofMay 1998 in Gal, Poti might prove anattractive andattainable target shouldanother rash military adventurebe essayed byTbilisi or,indeed, should the AbkhaziansŽ nally lose forbearancein the face ofthe continualterrorist attacks ontheir territory mountedfrom neighbouringGeorgia. The security ofSupsa, a little furtherto the south,or of anyextended pipeline fromBaku via Georgiadown to the southernTurkish port ofCeyhan,in which Georgia is investing suchgreat hopes,must always beopen to doubtif the Abkhazianquestion cannot be resolved— recall that there are an estimated half amillion ethnic Abkhaziansin Turkey. References to Abkhaziain the currentConstitution ofGeorgia (e.g.‘ Article 55.1. TheParliament ofGeorgia,in accordancewith the Parliamentary Regula- tions, forthe term ofits authorityand by secret ballot shall elect achairmanof Parliament anddeputy chairmen, including one deputy chairman from the Abkhaziandeputation and another from the Adzhariandeputation. Candidates forthe post ofdeputy chairmen shall benominated by the deputationsof their respective autonomousregions’ ) are utterly meaningless, giventhe total absence ofany authority over Abkhazia wielded by Georgia. Since it is the relationship with the Abkhaziansthat represents the nadirin all the relationships contracted

494 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS

betweenGeorgians and the non-Kartvelianminorities that constituted 29.9%of Soviet Georgia’s 1989population, if that onecould be repaired, a crucial precedentwould be established forimprovement all around,an indispensable Žrst step inturning Georgia into a mature moderndemocracy. Sadly, there are strongindications that withoutsome external guidance (?pressure) in the right direction,this is unlikelyto happen.Many Georgians are pursuingtoday the same anti-Abkhazianrhetoric that has becomethe normsince the late 1980s— withall the attendant dangers.Even those Georgianswho are preparedin private to acknowledgefrankly mistakes in recent/present policytowards Abkhazia, oftencloak any public pronouncements in verbiage which still managesto be offensiveto the Abkhazians.When challenged to explainwhy they do this, they regularlyrespond that this is essential tomake their criticisms acceptable to a Georgianaudience. To my mind, this is amost revealingstatement aboutthe natureof Georgiansociety, andit is somethingwhich external (?andsuperŽ cial ) observerswith noknowledgeof Georgian (andthus nocapability toread all this forthemselves ) cannotpossibly appreciate.It is regrettable that policy-makers (in the UnitedKingdom and United States especially, forexample ) fail to overcomethis shortcomingby tending to listen to those whoseadvice conŽ rms their apriori pro-Georgianprejudices. Successful regionalpolicies haveto take cognizance (inthis ofall regions ) ofmorethan the aspirations ofjust the titular peoplesof the internationally recognizedrepublics.

TheWest’ s role It is time that policytowards the Caucasus andits peopleswas predicatedon fairness anda genuinewish tohelp establish there afoundationfor a peaceful andprosperous future rather thanon the cronyismand rigid adherenceto the trite principle ofterritorial integrity that seem to havedetermined policy in recent years.A state remains aviable entity foronly as longas it retains the global respect andconŽ dence of its citizens. TheN. Caucasus fell to Russia’s imperial expansionas recently as 1864,and the central authorities, whetherTsarist or Soviet,have hardly gone out of their waysince toearn the devotionand Ž delity ofthe multiplicity ofethnic groupsresident there.The late AndrejSakharov describedGeorgia in the summer of1989 (in ‘Ogone¨k’) as oneof the USSR’s ‘little empires’, andit was ahugetragedy for the Soviet Union’s minorities in generalthat Sakharovdid not live longer,for he was perhapsthe oneŽ gureto whomthe West might havelistened whenthe collapse ofthe Unionbrought in its train so manydangers for those notlucky enough to have been granted administrative frontiers that fortuitously happenedto demarcate union-republics (as opposedto autonomousrepublics orregions ),foronly union-borders were allowedby the international communityto delimit the newstates that wereto jointhe world’s family ofnations.Boris Yeltsin andEduard Shevardnadze were rapidlyappraised by ‘experts’in foreign ministries the worldover as the typeof leader weshould cultivate andsupport. In the case ofShevardnadze, this meant that his returnto his formercommunist Žefdomin March1992 brought

495 GEORGE HEWITT immediate diplomatic recognitionand access tothe ‘clubs’of the IMF,World Bankand UN— andall this tookplace despite the fact that the legitimately elected, althoughincreasingly unbalanced,president ZviadGamsakhurdia had beenousted in acoupa fewweeks earlier. Instead ofwaiting forthe new leadership to establish whatcredentials it couldmuster in the Octoberelections all the carrots weregiven away, and along with them wentany possibility the West might havehad of controlling the excesses ofGeorgia’ s continuing nationalism. Shevardnadzecelebrated his country’s admittance to the United Nations byinvading Abkhazia within amatter ofdays. Also, of course, to a West alreadypreoccupied with Yugoslaviawhat Tbilisi didin Abkhaziawas purelyits internal affair. Inthe case ofYeltsin, blasting his oppositionout of the parliament buildingby tanks onthe streets ofMoscow proved a minorincident incomparison with the Žrepowerhe employed to massacre thousandsin Grozny andvarious Chechen villages. Interviewedon British radioDouglas Hurd, then British ForeignSecretary, could only think to say in defenceof his ‘friend’that Yeltsin haddefended freedom in Russia whenhe took to the topof a tankin August1991. President Clinton was movedto offerthe outrageouscomparison ofthe Chechencampaign with America’s owncivil war (evidentlyignorant of the true comparisonwith America’s genocidalIndian wars ).This is noway for supposedlycivilized states to conducttheir foreignpolicies for,as things stand, western policy-makers share agooddeal ofthe guilt forthe sheddingof blood in the Caucasus since 1991.Indeed, by continuingto offer blanket support to the Tbilisi authorities whenthey are provento be engagedin promoting terrorism in Abkhazia,western governmentscannot easily divest themselves ofsome re- sponsibility forthe deaths andinjuries resulting fromthese terrorist acts. One exampleof doublestandards that exhibits adistinct pro-Georgianbent in western policyis seen in the insistence that the Abkhazianstake backthe bulkof the Kartvelian refugees before anyŽ nancial assistance is givento repair Abkhazia’s shattered infrastructure (includingthe housing-stock ),while Tbilisi’s assertion that the Georgianeconomy is in suchdire straits that it cannotcontemplate accommodatingthe Meskh (et)ians seekingto resettle their dispossessed homes is readily approved—when the juniorBritish ForeignOfŽ ce minister, Joyce Quin,was recently askedin aprivate letter whythe countries constituting the Friends ofthe Secretary-General’s initiative forGeorgia make no representation onbehalf of the Meskh (et)ians, herreply was that the Friends operateexclu- sively with referenceto the Abkhazianproblem. The international community says nothingof reparations dueto Abkhazia to cover the damagein icted onthe republicby Georgia’ s invasion,and Abkhazian insistence that anytalk of refugeesshould also take accountof the Abkhaziandiaspora, descendants of those coercedinto exile inthe 1860–70s, is airily dismissed. Ofcourse, it wouldbe preferable not to have to start fromhere, but the Caucasus lies onthe edgeof the Europeancontinent, and it behovesthe EUto offerassistance tofellow Europeans.This shouldnot take the formof proffering anyfurther state- sanctionedbeneŽ ts (suchas membershipof the Councilof Europeto Georgia 5) buta morebalanced approach to regionalproblems. The

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necessity of (i) withdrawalfrom colonized regions, (ii) correct treatment of minorities and (iii) observanceof human rights must beinstilled in bothMoscow andTbilisi. Trainingprogrammes and exchanges should be instituted to teach inter alia: the meaningof democracy, civil society andthe rule oflaw; techniquesin Žnance,business managementand commerce; conict resolution; race relations; understandingthe role ofNGOs and the needfor them to be independentof, without being hostile to,local government (s);the absolute necessity foreducation to be objective andfree fromnational bias (cf. Hewitt, 1998a).Awholerange of practical skills notfamiliar to post-Soviet societies must beintroduced, and help must bemade available forthe creation ofnew schooltextbooks (possibly in newlydevised scripts forsome ofthe minor languages) andthe training ofteachers. All this shouldbe available to represen- tatives fromall the regionsand ethnic groupsdiscussed inthis report. Properpolicies towardsa regioncan only be devised if that regionis understood.The West, in myopinion, has mademany serious mistakes for whichit needsto atonein the Caucasus.If this project helps tolay the foundationfor the introductionof corrective measures, the exercise will have beenworthwhile.

Note onGeorgian government- personnel Thecurrent Minister forState Security is Gen.-Lieut.Vakht’ ang Kutatelidze (b.1955) (havingreplaced Gen.-Lieut. Dzhemal Gakhok’ idze, who in turn replacedShota K’ viraia in1997 );on12 May 1998 Gen- Lieut Davit Tevzadze tookover from Gen.- Lieut.Vardik’ o Nadibaidzeas Minister ofDefence; the Minister ofthe Interior is K’akhaTargamadze; Valeri Chkheidzeis headof Georgia’s State Departmentof Frontier Defence;Dzhamlet’ Babilashvili is Chief Prosecutor; SulkhanPapashvili (b.1966) has beenappointed to headthe State SafeguardService; ZazaMazmishvili has movedfrom being chief ofthe president’s bodyguardto head the anti-terrorism centre at the State Security Ministry, while Gia Tsatsanashvili is acting headof the presidential bodyguard.

Notesand references 1.For the justiŽ cation of thetreaty-relationship with Georgia offered by the contemporary leader ofAbkhazia, Nest’or Lak’ oba, see p.24of the 1987 collected edition of his articles andspeeches (N.A.Lakoba: Stat’ i i Rechi,Alashara, Sukhum ). 2.Since this move was inconformity with what I hadbeen privately advocating for some time beforethis, Iam reluctantto see itas apurelycynical political gesture. In 1991Abkhazia undertook to publish Gedevan Shanava’s Mingrelianverse-translation of the Georgian national epic, Shota Rust (a)veli’s ‘TheMan in the Pantherskin’— whenK’ ak’a Zhvaniahad tried to have his own translation published in 1966 to coincide withthe 800th anniversary of the poet, his request was deniedin Tbilisi! 3.Consider, for example, the following: ‘ Itis difŽ cult to prove Georgian accusations of universal Russian supportfor Abkhazia. On many occasions Russian actions beneŽ ted Georgia more thanAbkhazia’ (p. 8), orlater onthe same page:‘ Supportfor the Abkhaz seems almost random.If thisis thecase, thenone can positthat other factors were critical tothefailure of Georgian forces inAbkhazia.Georgian accusations of Russianintervention must be weighed against the need for assistance anda scapegoatin the face ofan ill-plannedmilitary adventure with a terriblyunprepared military’ . Suggestionsthat the Abkhazians must havehad Russian assistance simplybecause oftheir small numbersin comparison to the size oftheforce

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capable ofbeing mustered bytheir Kartvelian opponents are simplisticin themselves andfail totake into accountsuch factors as: (a) thesupport received bythe Abkhazians from other non-Kartvelian minorities withinAbkhazia, from North Caucasian volunteers,from members ofthediaspora communities across the Near East,and (yes) fromsympathetic individuals in the Russian military wishing to offer assistance to fellow-targetsof Georgian sentiments of ethnic superiority; (b) themilitary skills acquired by Abkhazians doingtheir military service, whileavoidance of conscriptionwas always somethingof a sportamong certain sectors ofGeorgian society during the Soviet era; (c) theFACT that the Abkhazians were Žghtingin defence oftheirhomeland against a clear invader (despitewhatever theass ofinternationallaw may have tosay aboutthe applicability of thisdesignation to theKartvelian forces operatingin Abkhazia in 1992–93 ). 4.Given the reaction to those Mingrelians who spoke out in the late 1980sagainst being globally classiŽ ed as ‘Georgians’, itis notsurprising that this highly sensitive issue isnot widely discussed— certainly, casual western visitorsto the region who have no knowledgeof Georgian and/ orMingrelian would probably have noinkling of any such tensions. Equally, given the way thatMingrelian language and culture have been downplayedover the decades, itis understandablethat many Mingrelians openly cleave toGeorgian language,culture and identity, as thisis theway topersonal advancement. Closer to home one could, for example,point to those Welshmen who see noadvantage in preserving Welsh language and culture, preferringto have their offspring taught only English. The difference (sc. withrespect tothe issue here underdiscussion ) between thesituation in Wales andMingrelia is that,whereas thosewho hold a contrary opinionin Wales can speakout in favour of preserving their language and culture without fear ofviolence fromthe English or fellow Welshmen, achieving such successes as aWelsh-languageTV channel, Mingrelianpreservationists by nomeans enjoyparallel freedom.While there isnosuggestion that separatist tendenciesmight be aboutto burst forth in Mingrelia, it would equally be misguided to assume thatthere is nopotential for such unrest in this part of the republic. 5.Bearing in mind that Russia was admittedto the Council of Europe actually during its pursuit of the murderouswar inChechenia, we can say thata furthernail has nowbeen hammered intothe Council’ s cofŽn bythe recommendation that Georgia be allowed full status from January 1999— one of the feeble conditionsof entryto this ‘ club’is thatthe problem of theMeskh (et)iansbe resolvedwithin a time-frame of 3 years.

Bibliography R.Clogg‘ Turmoilin the land of the Golden Fleece: theGreeks andthe war inAbkhazia’ , The Greek American,1994,26 March, pp 1, 8. B.Coppieters (ed.) ContestedBorders in the Caucasus (Brussels:VUB Press, 1996 ), 205 pp. P.Henze ‘Thedemography of the Caucasus accordingto 1989 Soviet Census data’ , CentralAsian Survey, 1991,Vol. 10, No.1/ 2,pp 47– 170. B.G.Hewitt ‘Abkhazia:a problemof identity and ownership’ , CentralAsian Survey ,1993,Vol. 12, No. 3, pp 267–323. B.G.Hewitt ‘Demographicmanipulation in the Caucasus (withspecial reference toGeorgia )’, Journal of RefugeeStudies ,1995,Vol. 8, No.1, pp 48– 74. B.G.Hewitt ‘Yet athirdconsideration of “ Vo¨lker,Sprachen und Kulturen des su¨dlichenKaukasus” ’, Central AsianSurvey ,1995a,Vol. 14, No. 2, pp 285– 310. B.G. Hewitt (ed.) TheAbkhazians. A handbook (London:Curzon Press, 1998 ), 288 pp. B.G.Hewitt ‘Therole of scholars in the Abkhazians’ loss of trust in the Georgians and how to remedy the situation’, inMehmet Tu¨tu¨ncu¨ (ed.) Caucasus:war and peace. The new world disorder and Caucasia (Haarlem: SOTA,1998a ),pp115– 125. B.G.Hewitt. & Z.Khiba AbkhazNewspaper Reader (withsupplements ) (Maryland:Dunwoody Press, 1998 ), xxvi 1 309 pp. P.Overeem ‘Reportof a UNPO coordinatedhuman rights mission to Abkhazia and Georgia’ , CentralAsian Survey,1995,Vol. 14, No.1, pp 127– 154. P.Sire´n‘Thebattle for Grozny’ , inB. Fowkes (ed.) Russiaand Chechnia. The permanent crisis. Essays on Russo–Chechen relations (London:Macmillan, 1998 ), pp 87–169.

498 ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA AND THE CIRCASSIANS . ) 8 8 9 1 o t p u ( s u s a c u a C e h t n i s e g a u g n a l f o n o i t u b i r t s i D . 2 p a M

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