Fifteen Minutes of Fame Long Gone: Circassian Activism before and after the Sochi Olympics Bo Petersson and Karina Vamling Faculty of Culture and Society, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden [email protected], [email protected] Fifteen Minutes of Fame Long Gone: Circassian Activism before and after the Sochi Olympics In this article we discuss the effects of the Sochi Olympics on the indigenous Circassian population in North Caucasus. The Circassian situation was paradoxical in the sense that whereas this indigenous group fiercely opposed the organization of the Winter Games in Sochi, the Games themselves denoted a rare opportunity for them to make their voices heard internationally. During the run-up to the Olympics they all of a sudden had a global audience for their claims for recognition of their cause. This was quite simply their ‘fifteen minutes of fame’, a rare and short-lived period of celebrity and worldwide attention. The paper will look into whether the anti-Sochi activism helped to unite Circassians in the diaspora and abroad around common claims, and to what extent the Circassians managed to use media attention to make their cause more widely known by international society. Keywords: Sochi Winter Olympic Games, Circassians, Circassian diaspora, genocide, recognition. Before the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 there was an intense discussion on Russia’s record on democracy and human rights, and whether it was appropriate to organize such a mega-event in an authoritarian setting. Similar voices were heard before the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008. However, some kind of media logics always seems to dictate that once the Games start (see Ekberg and Strange, this issue), critica l discussions are over and done with, and after the event the attention is gradually shifted to the next mega-event to follow. With regard to Sochi, as for all sites of major sports events in non-democratic settings, continued critica l attention is however called for to assess politica l developments even, and perhaps especially, after the conclusio n of the Games. Against this background, we will in this paper discuss how the organization of the Sochi Olympic s influenced the indigenous Circassian population in North Caucasus, the activis m for their cause and the global attention given to their demands. 2 The Circassian situatio n was paradoxical in the sense that whereas this indigenous group for the most part intensely opposed the organization of the Winter Games in Sochi, the Games themselves denoted a rare opportunity for them to make their voices heard internationally. During the run-up to the Olympics they all of a sudden had a global audience, large segments of which were ready and prepared to listen while they communicated their claims for recognition of their cause (Hansen 2014). This was quite simply their fifteen minute s of fame, a rare and short-lived period of celebrity and worldwide attention (Petersson and Vamling 2013). Earlier research has indicated that marginalized and socially excluded groups as a rule do not profit from the organization of mega-events on their home ground (Minnaert 2012). Were the Circassians then any differe nt in this regard? In this paper we will give special attention to the extent to which Circassian activity before the Sochi Games helped Circassians in the homeland and in the diaspora to articulate their claims, and to what extent the Circassians managed to use media attention to make their causes more widely known by the international society. For the sake of clarity, it should be added that we, when using the graphic expression of fiftee n minute s of fame, have in mind precisely the brief period of rather unprecedented global attention for the Circassian cause. We certainly do not suggest, however, that the Circassian issue has lost its topicality, has been removed from the international agenda, or has been successfully resolved. Background and Setting Historically the Circassians fiercely opposed the Russian conquest of their part of the Caucasian region for more than one hundred years and up to Russia’s final victory in 1864. Sochi was the last Circassian capital, and it has become a sacred place and a site of great symbolic value for the indigenous population and the Circassian diaspora. This is why so many Circassians were vocally critical of the idea of bringing the Olympic Games to Sochi (Bullo ugh 2012). Especially provocative for them was the fact that the downhill competitions 3 of the Games were to be located in the mountains, at Krasnaya Polyana, the very site where the Russians organized their victory parade in May 21, 1864. The grounds of Krasnaya Polyana hold many Circassian remains from those battles, which gave rise to Circassian protests under the slogan: ‘No Olympics on our ancestors’ graves’ (Persson 2013). It added further insult to injury that the Olympic year of 2014 coincided with the 150th anniversary of the end of the Russo-Circassia n war and the ensuing mass deportation of Circassians. In the last years of the war alone at least 625,000 Circassians out of a total population of 1.5 millio n are believed to have died (Richmo nd 2013, 92). According to one estimate, as much as a stunning 90% of the Circassian population was killed during the 101 years between 1763 and 1864 in connection with the Russian campaign (Zhemukhov 2012, 505). Richmond (2013, 91) suggests that only in 1864 was the number of Circassians that were driven to the Black Sea coast for further deportation to the Ottoman Empire between 600,000 and 750,000. Among these the death tolls from starvation and sickness were staggering. Substantial Circassian diasporas are today found in several countries, above all Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the US. In the homeland, situated in the Russian Federation, Circassians live in three areas of the North Caucasus: the republics of Adygeya, Karachaevo- Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkar ia. They are also found in North Ossetia and Stavropol krai and in some scattered villa ges on the Black Sea Coast 1. According to the 2010 census (Vserossiiskaya perepis naseleniya 2010), the total number of Circassians (Adyghe, Cherkess Kabardians and Shapsugs) in the Russian Federation is today 719,000. The Circassian diaspora is several times bigger, but there are no reliable figures based on censuses (Besleney 2014). Estimate s of the Circassian population in Turkey, which is the main country of Circassian diaspora settlement, vary considerably; Hansen (2013) mentio ns a span between 1 In the years 1924-1945 this included a fourth Circassian autonomous territory, the Shapsug Cherkess.net National District (Polovinkina, undated). 4 two and five millio n, whereas several other experts narrow the number down to between two and three millio n (Kaya 2014, 51; Papşu 2005; Besleney 2014, 31). After the conquest in the mid-19th century the Russian strategy was to give the Circassians the option to resettle to Cossack-controlled areas on the plains north of the Caucasus or to emigrate. However, as Kreiten (2009, 219) notes, ‘it was quite clear to Russian officials in the Caucasus that the Circassians would not leave their homeland voluntarily, but only when threatened with extermination.’ Following the Russian victory, most Circassians were forced into exile to the Ottoman Empire and remaining minor groups were dislocated to other places far away from their origina l settlements. Measures were taken early on to prevent exiled Circassians from returning. Already in 1861 rules were set up to counter return migratio n to the Caucasus: ‘The purpose obviously was to exclude as many return candidates as possible by introducing a whole catalogue of conditions which could not easily be met’ (Kreiten 2009, 222). The largest groups of Circassian emigrants to present-day Turkey came to live in the central and northwestern parts of the country. Thanks to their compact settlement in certain rural villa ges the Circassians for several generations largely managed to mainta in their language and culture. Contacts between Circassians in the homeland and in the diaspora became increasingly diffic ult in the early 1920s after the development of the new Soviet state and its increasing isolatio n, suspicion, repression and closed borders (Jaimouk ha 2001, 75-76). During the 1930s many Circassian leaders and intellectuals in the homeland became victims of Stalin’s purges. Under WWII the Circassian lands came under Nazi occupation (Jaimoukha 2001, 76-79). The Circassians’ two co-titular groups, the Balkars and Karachais, were deported to Central Asia in 1944 (but were later rehabilitated under Khrushchev in 1957). Major politica l changes, basically favorable for the Circassians, took place in the region in the late 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. From having been expelled from 5 their homeland, and thereafter regarding it as almost inaccessible, the prospect of return started to seem realistic for diaspora Circassians. Glasnost, perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up the borders and allowed for reinvigorated contacts with homeland Circassians. Popular politica l organiza tio ns were beginning to emerge in the North Caucasus, such as the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples, to which the Circassian Musa Shanibov was elected the first president (Besleney 2014, 91-92). Following the first international event in Ankara in 1989 to commemorate the exile, the International Circassian Association (ICA) was established in Nalchik in 1991, and became an important politica l actor and basis for transnational Circassian networking (Besleney 2014, 119). At much the same time Caucasian and Circassian associations became more active in Turkey, where legislative changes were introduced in 2002 which gave organizations the right to get in touch with and join associations in foreign countries (Özgür 2011).