Conflicts in the North Caucasus

Central Asian Survey, (1998), 17(3), 409-441. Conflicts in the North Caucasus SVANTE E. CORNELL* Although the conflicts that have attracted most international attention in the post- cold war era have been those of the Transcaucasus, another area of both potential and actual turmoil is the North Caucasus. The first example of serious conflicts in the area, naturally, is the war in Chechnia. However, the existence of this war, and its astonishing cruelty and devastation, has been instrumental in obscuring the other grievances that exist in the area, and that have the potential to escalate into open conflict. These can be divided into two main categories, which however spill over into one another. The first type of conflicts are those among the peoples of the region; the second type is conflicts between these peoples and Russia. Doubtlessly, the main example of the unrest in the North Caucasus has been the short but bloody war between the Ingush and the Ossetians. However, this war distinguishes itself only by being the only one of the conflicts in the region that has escalated into war. Among the other known problems, three issues call for special attention: First and perhaps most pressingly, the bid for unity of the Lezgian people in Dagestan and Azerbaijan; Second, the latent problem between the Turkic Karachai and the Circasssian peoples in the two neighbour republics of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria; and thirdly the condition of the most complex of all the North Caucasian republics: Dagestan. It seems logical in this study to start with the most well-known of these issues: the war that raged in November 1992 in the Prigorodniy raion between the Ingush and the North Ossetians. The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict As many—not to say most—of the conflicts in the Caucasus, the grievances between the Ingush people and the Ossetians is squarely to be attributed to the actions of Russia in the region. It is distinctive as its roots are quite recent, dating back only to the middle of this century. Background to the Conflict There are no records of specific conflict or hostilities between Ingush and Ossetians. Of course, mutual suspicion may have existed to a certain degree, based * Svante E. Cornell is at Uppsala University, Departments of Peace and Conflict Research and East European Studies. 0263-4937/98/030409-33 © 1998 Society for Central Asian Studies SVANTE E. CORNELL on a few demographical circumstances. The first is that the Ingush, like all other indigenous Caucasian peoples, are mountaineers; they historically have their home in the mountains, from which they have resettled to the valleys and towns only later in this century, partly due to Russian coercion.1 By contrast, the Ossetians are so- called ‘foothillers’, people that live in the hills or in the plains, at lower altitudes— just like other non-indigenous peoples, the Turkic Kumyks, Karachai and Balkars. As in other parts of the Caucasus, foothillers and mountaineers are mutually suspicious of each others’ life-styles, customs, and habits. Nowhere, however, have such tendencies resulted in organized violence—not to speak of war. Generally, Caucasian peoples are interested in keeping out of trouble as long as nobody intervenes in their internal affairs. This can be seen also in the so reputedly blood- thirsty Chechens, the ethnic ‘cousins’ of the Ingush; no evidence can be brought up to support the argument that the Chechens or any other North Caucasians have taken up arms against any power with friendly intentions. Hence the mutual suspicion between Ossetians and Ingush rather led to them both minding their own business than anything else. A second element is ethnicity. As noted above, the Ingush are indigenous to the Caucasus, while the Ossetians are ‘immigrants’—albeit early ones, settling in the 2 Caucasus in the sixth century AD. The two peoples speak unintelligible languages, Ossetian being distantly related to Persian. This fact, at least until Russification, meant that the two peoples had difficulties in communicating with one another, which usually took place through the use of a Turkic language, often Kumyk. And difficulties in communications is a factor which accentuates rather than attenuates tensions. A third point is religion. The Ingush are Sunni Muslims, with a strong Sufi influence, in particular in the form of the Qadiriya Tariqat; however Ingushetia was the last region of the Caucasus to be converted to Islam, due to its inaccessible location in the central Caucasian mountains. By contrast, most Ossetians are traditionally Orthodox Christian, although a Muslim minority exists, (only in the North) which seems to be relegated to the former feudal upper class. Thus the two peoples had no developed brotherly relations throughout history; however they were never at each other’s throats either. What was to complicate their coexistence was foreign involvement. With the Russian advance in the North Caucasus, the Ossetians soon became Russia’s main ally in the region, and to a great extent converted to Christianity; however the Ingush did not fiercely resist the Russian advance either, a fact which differentiated them from their Chechen kin. The Soviet Era In the beginning of the Soviet era, both Ossetians and Ingush were part of the Mountain (‘Gorskaya’) republic, which was subsequently dissolved in 1924. As the Ingush were allocated their own autonomous Oblast in 1924, the presently disputed territory was a part of Ingushetia in its entirety and from the beginning; this did not change when the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast (later ASSR) 410 CONFLICTS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS was created in 1934. Naturally, the delineation between Ingushetia and North Ossetia was precarious, as the border passed through the densely populated areas surrounding the city of Vladikavkaz (Ordzhonikidze)3, North Ossetia’s present capital and historically a city also heavily populated by the Ingush. The root of the problem was however the events of the second world war, when the Ingush were among the peoples deported to Central Asia and Siberia. As the Chechen- Ingush ASSR was abolished in June 1946, its territory was broken up and distributed among its neighbours.4 Most importantly, the Prigorodniy raion of Vladikavkaz, which surrounds the city on the North, east, and South, was given to North Ossetia. The region, prior to the deportations, had accounted for almost half of Ingushetia’s territory.5 When the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was reinstated in January 1957, it actually gained some territory, to the North; however the Prigorodniy raion remained within North Ossetia. As the returning Ingush came to their former settlements, they found Ossetians living in their homes, which had themselves been (at least partially) forcibly resettled there.6 As the Ingush tried to buy back their homes, they were counteracted not only by the local Ossetians but even more by the North Ossetian authorities, who did their best to prevent the Ingush from returning to their places of residence. Even in later years, legal instruments were instituted to make their return impossible: in 1982 and 1990, decrees were signed limiting the issuing of the compulsory Propiski in the Prigorodniy.7 However, the Ingush defied all obstacles, and continued to move into the Prigorodniy, settling there both legally and illegally. The 1989 population census recorded almost 33’000 Ingush living in the entire North Ossetian ASSR, 17’500 of which in the Prigorodniy.8 In reality, there were much more Ingush in the region. In certain areas of the Prigorodniy, they formed a huge majority of the population.9 The relations between Ingush and Ossetians were not harmonious at this time, either. Sporadic violence on ethnic grounds existed, and in January 1973, the Ingush staged a demonstration in Grozny regarding the Prigorodniy issue, forcing a candidate member of the Politburo to come and address the crowd.10 Generally speaking, the Ingush were frustrated by their career and academic lives being hindered in North Ossetia because of their ethnicity. In October 1981, widespread unrest erupted after the murder of an Ossetian taxi- driver by his Ingush passengers. As a response, the Ossetians demonstrated to expel all Ingush from the Prigorodniy; the Ingush, meanwhile, prepared themselves to defend their homes. The reaction from Moscow was immediate; troops were sent in to restore order, and a curfew was instituted. The intervention succeeded in suppressing the demonstrations, hence preventing an escalation of the conflict. The North Ossetian republican leadership was blamed for having allowed the unrest to take place, and was replaced; a Russian (presumably less biased in the conflict) replaced the Ossetian republican head. However, the new leadership did not take any measures to solve the underlying problems—hence the problems were only allowed to worsen with time. And with Perestroïka, the general lighter atmosphere led to their breaking out, like so many 411 SVANTE E. CORNELL other problems in the Union. In particular, the Ingush activists were now more free to voice their claims without for that sake having to fear the harsh repression of the Brezhnev era. The fall of the Soviet Union and the escalation of the conflict In September 1989, the second congress of the Ingush people was held in Grozny, which reaffirmed the Prigorodniy’s being an unalienable part of Ingushetia, while advocating the re-establishment of a separate Ingush territorial entity, apart from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Meanwhile, the North Ossetian leadership only stiffened their opposition to any territorial solution. These events also mirror the increased isolation of the Ingush in 1991, as the Chechen-Ingush ASSR seemed to turn into a Chechen-dominated and anti-Moscow institution, under General Dudayev’s leadership. Hence the Ingush had double reasons to distance themselves from Chechen claims to independence: first, they were not represented in the all- Chechen congress which later replaced the Zavgayev government and feared to be ignored in a Chechen state; and secondly they would have few hopes of regaining the Prigorodniy unless they kept good relations with Moscow.

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