The Circassian Question WP Russian Colonial History in the Caucasus and a Case of “Long-Distance Nationalism”
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Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co The Circassian Question WP Russian Colonial History in the Caucasus and a Case of “Long-distance Nationalism” Uwe Halbach S On 21 May 2014 Circassians all over the world marked the 150th anniversary of the expulsion of their ancestors from their North Caucasian homeland. The links between this unresolved legacy of Russian colonial history and President Putin’s prestigious Winter Olympics in Sochi have reinvigorated Circassian activism. While different objectives and methods coexist within the movement, the demand for acknowledge- ment of the wrongs inflicted on their forebears is shared by both the remaining Cir- cassian population in the North Caucasus and Russia (about 700,000) and the world- wide diaspora (several million). What challenges does this present for Russia? Sochi 2014 confronted the world with karia (1992) and Adygea (1996) used the the hitherto largely neglected “Circassian term “genocide” in resolutions on historic question”. Although the Olympic city and violence against the Circassians. What they its North Caucasian neighbourhood had were referring to was the deliberate expul- been the Circassians’ historical homeland sion of what was then the largest North until 1864, the host nation neglected to Caucasian nationality, following its 1864 include them in the planning of the Games. defeat in the Russian-Circassian War. This contrasts, for example, with the Cana- dian approach to its indigenous population for the previous Games in Vancouver. When Emergence of a National Movement President Vladimir Putin presented Sochi’s The choice of Sochi reignited a Circassian bid in 2007, his speech to the IOC men- movement that had emerged in the early tioned numerous nations and cultures that 1990s but subsequently lost momentum. had shaped the Caucasian Black Sea coast The most significant development in the since classical antiquity, but not the Cir- early post-Soviet period occurred between cassians. The first time he spoke of the August 1992 and September 1993, when original inhabitants of the area was shortly the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia before the Games opened, to complain erupted into open warfare. This brought that forces hostile to Russia were exploiting forth a solidarity movement, the Confedera- the “Circassian card”. By contrast, the par- tion of the Peoples of the Caucasus, which mobi- liaments of the republics of Kabardino-Bal- lised large parts of the North Caucasus, Dr. Uwe Halbach is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division. SWP Comments 37 This paper is a product of the EC funded FP7 project “Intra- and Inter-Societal Sources of Instability in the Caucasus and August 2014 EU Opportunities to Respond”. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission. 1 especially the residual Circassian popula- sions in the Balkans and the Middle East. tion, to fight against Georgian forces in Although figures for groups of Caucasian Abkhazia, and played no small role in their origin in modern Turkey are based on defeat. Hundreds of Circassian volunteers estimates, it is known that there are more joined the fighting. The remaining Cir- people of North Caucasian, especially Cir- cassian population in the North Caucasus cassian and Abkhazian, origin in today’s lives largely in the republics of Adygea Turkey than in their original home regions. (capital: Maykop), Karachay-Cherkessia Although several hundred Circassian (Cherkessk) and Kabardino-Balkaria (Nal- villages can still be found in central and chik). Kabardino-Balkaria has the highest western Anatolia, as a whole homogenous proportion of Circassians (Kabardians) in diaspora settlements of single Caucasian its population, with 55 percent. During the nationalities in generally dissolved in the post-Soviet phase Circassians in all three course of urbanisation. In the post-Soviet republics competed with representatives period the large Caucasian diaspora came of other nationalities for local political to play a role in Ankara’s relations with and economic resources, for example with Russia and the South Caucasus. When the Turkic Karachays and Balkars and with Abkhazia conflict flared up, organisations ethnic Russians. The 1999 presidential in Turkey called for support and solidarity elections in Karachay-Cherkessia repre- for the struggle of their Abkhaz “brothers” sented an ethno-political watershed, fol- and the volunteer forces from the North lowed by weeks of demonstrations against Caucasus. Later Chechnya became a point the disputed victory of the Karachay can- of reference for Caucasian solidarity groups. didate. Yet another spur for a Circassian The Chechen wars fell in a period of warm- national movement came in 2005, when ing relations between Russia and Turkey the Kremlin announced plans to revoke that saw the two Black Sea powers – which Adygea’s autonomy and merge it into Kras- fought more than a dozen wars in the nodar Krai. The central demands of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – activists are for Circassians in the North growing closer in the fields of business, Caucasus diaspora to be permitted to energy and tourism. This placed narrow return, and for the historical Circassian limits on Ankara’s solidarity with diaspora settlement areas to be amalgamated into groups agitating against Russia. The same a single autonomous territorial unit. also applies to relations with Georgia, which also blossomed in the spheres of commerce and tourism. The Diaspora Circassian diaspora groups are also of The mobilisation that began in 2007 some relevance in Middle Eastern states reached well beyond the North Caucasus, and societies. Up to 100,000 North Cau- into the worldwide diaspora in which 90 casians are estimated to live in Jordan, percent of Circassians live today. The largest largely Circassians, but also Chechens and community is in Turkey, as the successor to others. Here the Circassian minority is the Ottoman Empire to which most of the especially strongly rooted in government, Circassian deportees were sent. In Turkish, business and the military and close to the “Çerkes” is often used to describe all groups royal family. The Circassian community in with Caucasian roots in modern Turkey, Syria, which also numbers about 100,000, amounting to a figure of several million. is currently endangered by the civil war. As far as Circassians in the stricter sense Circassians in Egypt occupy a special his- are concerned, the Ottoman authorities re- torical position. They arrived there not settled the deportees of 1864 among Arme- through deportation from Russia in the nians and other minorities in western and nineteenth century, but as Mamluks, a central Anatolia and in Ottoman posses- military caste that played a leading role SWP Comments 37 August 2014 2 in Egypt from the fourteenth century. The policy. After annexing the Crimea, the Circassian community in Israel comprises Kremlin offered all citizens of the former only about 3,500 members, but stands out Soviet Union Russian citizenship as long for its homogenous settlements and preser- as they were able to speak Russian. The vation of the native tongue. The younger language restriction naturally excludes generation of the Western diaspora (for diaspora Circassians. At the same time, example in the United States and Germany), Russian-speakers from eastern Ukraine on the other hand, generally no longer are currently being resettled in the North speaks Circassian. Islam has not to date Caucasus, despite concerns about the secu- been central to national identity, though rity situation there. young Circassians in the North Caucasus, like their peers in other Muslim nationali- ties there, have come under the influence International Networking of radical Islamist networks. In Kabardino- The first International Circassian Congress was Balkaria, for example, the group Yarmouk held in Nalchik in May 1991. It set up the has emerged as a jihadist formation. It is International Circassian Association (ICA), whose the memory of the 1864 deportations that elected members represent Circassian com- is central to Circassian identity. munities in the three north-west Caucasian republics and the diaspora. They comprise numerous organisations from Turkey, Return to the Homeland? Russia and other countries, including Cir- In the early 1990s Russian Caucasian cassian councils (Adyghe khase) from the three republics with residual Circassian popula- North Caucasian republics, from Krasnodar tions established ties to the diaspora and Krai, from Moscow and from Abkhazia, supported returnee programmes. But aside charities from Turkey, the Middle East, from a few thousand returnees the contact California and New Jersey, and a Tscher- remained largely restricted to tourism by kessische Kulturverein (Circassian Cultural diaspora Circassians in the historic home- Association) from Germany. land. Nor was a broader returnee move- The ICA sees its main task as coordinat- ment to be expected, given that Circassian ing cultural relations between Circassian immigrants in many places have been communities across the world. It has, how- relatively well integrated for several gen- ever, not pursued that goal with great erations. The current exception is Syria, vigour. Its offices are staffed largely with where the escalating civil war represents members of the bureaucratic elites of the an acute threat to ethnic and confessional three Caucasian