Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding

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Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Social Media Influence Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe Todd C. Helmus, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega, Zev Winkelman C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2237 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9957-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover image: Nikita Buida/Freepik Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Russia is engaged in an active, worldwide propaganda campaign. As part of this campaign, Russia disseminates propaganda to Russian speakers in the Baltics, Ukraine, and other nearby states through a variety of means, including traditional and social media. In some cases, it has used this outreach to sow dissent against host and neighboring governments, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. The purpose of this project was to better understand the nature and effectiveness of pro-Russia outreach on social media and identify countermessaging opportunities. To gain this understanding, RAND Corporation researchers conducted a study that drew on multiple ana- lytic research methods. These methods sought to accomplish the fol- lowing objectives: • Understand the nature of Russian propaganda on social media. • Identify pro-Russia propagandists and anti-Russia activists on Twitter. • Assess the degree to which Russian-speaking populations in a selection of former Soviet states have adopted pro-Russia propa- ganda themes in their Twitter language. • Consider challenges confronting U.S. and European policy- makers and offer recommendations for reducing Russian influ- ence in the region. In accordance with the appropriate statutes and U.S. Depart- ment of Defense regulations regarding human-subject protection, the iii iv Russian Social Media Influence researchers used human-subject protection protocols for this report and its underlying research. The views of the sources that these pro- tocols rendered anonymous are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel- ligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Approach ............................................................................ 3 CHAPTER TWO Russian Propaganda on Social Media ........................................ 7 Context and Aims of Russian Propaganda ...................................... 7 Means of Employment ...........................................................11 Impact ..............................................................................14 Russia’s Social Media Operations in the Near Abroad .......................14 Russia’s Social Media Operations in the Far Abroad .........................17 Trolls and Bots ................................................................... 22 Summary and Implications ......................................................25 CHAPTER THREE Pro- and Anti-Russia Propaganda Communities on Twitter ........... 27 Approach .......................................................................... 28 Findings ........................................................................... 30 Summary and Implications ..................................................... 43 v vi Russian Social Media Influence CHAPTER FOUR Resonance Analysis of Pro-Russia Activists ................................47 Theoretical Foundation ...........................................................47 Approach .......................................................................... 48 Findings: Resonance Across Time and Geography ...........................57 Summary and Implications ......................................................58 CHAPTER FIVE Key Challenges to Responding to the Russian Information Threat ...61 Approach ...........................................................................61 Findings ............................................................................62 Summary and Implications ......................................................73 CHAPTER SIX Recommendations ...............................................................75 Highlight and “Block” Russian Propaganda...................................75 Build the Resilience of At-Risk Populations ...................................79 Expand and Improve Local and Original Content ...........................81 Better Tell the U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and European Union Story...................................................... 88 Track Russian Media and Develop Analytic Methods .......................91 APPENDIXES A. Additional Technical Details .............................................95 B. Additional Community Lexical Characterization ................... 99 C. Pro-Russia Propaganda Lexical Analysis ............................ 109 D. Interview Protocol ........................................................ 117 References ....................................................................... 121 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. Russian “Active Measures” on Social Media......................12 2.2. Zero Hedge Referrer Network .....................................13 3.1. Core Network of Mentions Among Russian-Speaking Eastern European Twitter Users ...................................31 3.2. Community-of-Communities Network Analysis ................32 3.3. Pro-Ukraine Activist Community Geotagged Tweets ......... 36 3.4. Pro-Russia Activist Community Geotagged Tweets ............ 38 3.5. Political Community Network .....................................39 3.6. The ro-RussiaP Activist Community ............................. 42 3.7. The ro-UkraineP Activist Community ........................... 43 4.1. The Corpora in Our Analysis ..................................... 50 4.2. Resonance with the Pro-Russia Activist Signature ..............58 A.1. Topic-Resonance Detection Calibration ......................... 97 A.2. Partisan-Resonance Detection Calibration ...................... 98 Tables 3.1. Metacommunity Keywords ........................................33 3.2. Community Lexical Analysis...................................... 34 3.3. Mentions Between Pro-Russia and Pro-Ukraine Activist Communities ........................................................ 40 3.4. Botometer Results for Pro-Russia and Pro-Ukraine Activist Communities .........................................................41 3.5. Top Influencers in the Pro-Russia Activist Community ....... 44 3.6. Top Influencers in the Pro-Ukraine Activist Community ..... 44 vii viii Russian Social Media Influence 4.1. Known-Partisan Validity Test, as Percentages of Communities ........................................................ 54 4.2. Analyst’s Mean Rating of Computer-Labeled Accounts ........57 B.1. Top Ten Most Overpresent Word Pairs ......................... 104 C.1. Select Keywords from Pro-Russia Propaganda Signatures .... 114 Summary The purpose of this study was to examine Russian-language content on social media and the broader propaganda threat posed to the region of former Soviet states that include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Moldova and Belarus. In addition to
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