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Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. 1 115TH CONGRESS " ! S. PRT. 2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 115–21 PUTIN’S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY A MINORITY STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JANUARY 10, 2018 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 28–110 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER seneagle Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware CORY GARDNER, Colorado TOM UDALL, New Mexico TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey TODD WOMACK, Staff Director JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk (II) VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. CONTENTS Page Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1: Putin’s Rise and Motivations ............................................................... 7 Ascent to the Top .............................................................................................. 8 Return of the Security Services ....................................................................... 10 The Kremlin’s Paranoid Pathology ................................................................. 13 Chapter 2: Manipulation and Repression Inside Russia ...................................... 15 Influencing Ideology, Politics, and Culture .................................................... 17 Controlling the Public Narrative ..................................................................... 24 Corrupting Economic Activity ......................................................................... 31 Chapter 3: Old Active Measures and Modern Malign Influence Operations ...... 35 A Brief History of Soviet Active Measures ..................................................... 37 Modern Malign Influence Operations ............................................................. 37 The Kremlin’s Disinformation Platforms ....................................................... 40 Chapter 4: Weaponization of Civil Society, Ideology, Culture, Crime, and Energy ................................................................................................................... 47 The Role of State Foundations, GONGOs, NGOs, and Think Tanks ........... 47 The Kremlin’s Cultivation of Political Extremes ........................................... 50 The Use of the Russian Orthodox Church ...................................................... 53 The Nationalization of Organized Crime ........................................................ 54 The Export of Corruption ................................................................................. 57 The Leveraging of Energy Supplies for Influence .......................................... 58 Chapter 5: Kremlin Interference in Semi-Consolidated Democracies and Tran- sitional Governments ........................................................................................... 65 Ukraine .............................................................................................................. 67 Georgia .............................................................................................................. 73 Montenegro ....................................................................................................... 77 Serbia ................................................................................................................. 81 Bulgaria ............................................................................................................. 89 Hungary ............................................................................................................ 94 Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in Consolidated Democracies .......................... 99 Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia ............................................... 100 Nordic States: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden ............................. 109 The Netherlands ............................................................................................... 113 United Kingdom ............................................................................................... 116 France ................................................................................................................ 121 Germany ............................................................................................................ 127 Spain .................................................................................................................. 133 Italy ................................................................................................................... 137 Chapter 7: Multilateral & U.S. Efforts to Counter the Kremlin’s Asymmetric Arsenal .................................................................................................................. 141 Collective Defenses Against Disinformation and Cyber Attacks .................. 141 European Energy Diversification and Integration ......................................... 144 EU and U.S. Efforts to Sanction Malicious Actors ........................................ 145 U.S. Efforts to Create Alternative and Accurate Quality Programming ..... 148 Assessing the State Department’s Global Engagement Center .................... 149 Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................... 153 (IV) VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5905 Sfmt 5905 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. iv Page APPENDICES Appendix A: 1999 Apartment Building Bombings ................................................ 165 Appendix B: Alleged Political Assassinations ....................................................... 171 Appendix C: Russian Government’s Olympic Cheating Scheme ......................... 175 Appendix D: Russia’s Security Services and Cyber Hackers ............................... 181 Appendix E: Attacks and Harassment Against Human Rights Activists and Journalists in Russia ........................................................................................... 187 Appendix F: Flawed Elections in the Russian Federation Since 1999 ................ 191 Appendix G: Harsh Treatment of LGBT Individuals and Women in the Rus- sian Federation ..................................................................................................... 193 Appendix H: Disinformation Narratives, Themes, and Techniques .................... 195 Appendix I: Letter from Senator Cardin to European Ambassadors .................. 199 VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5905 Sfmt 5905 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER Embargoed for Media Publication / Coverage until 6:00AM EST Wednesday, January 10. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, January 10, 2018 DEAR COLLEAGUES: For years, Vladimir Putin’s government has engaged in a relentless assault to undermine democracy and the rule of law in Europe and the United States. Mr. Putin’s Kremlin employs an asymmetric arsenal that includes military invasions, cyberattacks, disinformation, support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization of energy resources, organized crime, and corruption. The Kremlin has refined the use of these tools over time and these attacks have intensified in scale and complexity across Europe. If the United States fails to work with urgency to address this complex and growing threat, the regime in Moscow will become further emboldened. It will continue to develop and re- fine its arsenal to use on democracies around the world, including against U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020. Following attacks like Pearl Harbor and 9/11, U.S. presidents have rallied the country and the world to address the challenges facing the nation. Yet the current
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