DOCSLIB.ORG

Russian Regional Report (Vol. 9, No. 1, 3 February 2004)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russian Regional Report (Vol. 9, No. 1, 3 February 2004) Russian Regional Report (Vol. 9, No. 1, 3 February 2004) A bi-weekly publication jointly produced by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich (http://www.isn.ethz.ch) and the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) at American University, Washington, DC (http://www.American.edu/traccc) TABLE OF CONTENTS TraCCC Yaroslavl Conference Crime Groups Increasing Ties to Authorities Gubernatorial Elections Sakhalin Elects New Governor Center-Periphery Relations Tyumen Oblast, Okrugs Resume Conflict Electoral Violations Khabarovsk Court Jails Election Worker Procurator Files Criminal Cases in Kalmykiya Elections Advertisements Russia: All 89 Regions Trade and Investment Guide Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations ***RRR on-line (with archives) - http://www.isn.ethz.ch/researchpub/publihouse/rrr/ TRACCC YAROSLAVL CONFERENCE CRIME GROUPS INCREASING TIES TO AUTHORITIES. Crime groups are increasingly working with public officials in Russia at the regional, and local levels, making it difficult for those seeking to enact and enforce laws combating organized crime, according to many of the criminologists who participated in a conference addressing organized crime hosted by Yaroslavl State University and sponsored by TraCCC, with support from the US Department of Justice on 20-21 January. The current laws on organized crime are largely a result of Russia's inability to deal with this problem, according to Natalia Lopashenko, head of the TraCCC program in Saratov. Almost the only area of agreement among the scholars, law enforcement agents, and judges was that the level of organized crime is rising. Figures from the Interior Ministry suggest that the number of economic crimes, in particular, is shooting upward. Since Russia's legislation does not offer specific ways to deal with organized crime, regional and local officials often have to figure out their own approach. In many cases, such officials find it more effective in terms of maintaining stability to work cooperatively with organized crime leaders to handle local situations rather than simply trying to arrest them. It is difficult to enforce the laws against organized crime because prosecutors must show concretely who did what and define the consequences of these actions. Such tasks are extremely complicated when criminals have high-level protection from state officials. Vladimir Yakushin, rector of the Volga University in Tolyatti, advocated making it easier to prosecute crime groups and their leaders under Russian law. In particular, he suggested holding the head of a crime group responsible for all the actions of the group. His views were not widely supported, however, because it would relax the law's current focus on concrete crimes in favor of addressing the "bigger picture." Part of the problem is that the law has a very difficult time defining what exactly a crime group is. Existing legislation is poorly worded and in places even contradictory. Practitioners employ various terms such as "group," "society," and "band" to define organized crime, but it is not always clear how to distinguish among these terms. Among the factors that can be employed are intent to commit a crime, number of members, presence of weapons, prior agreements, structure, long-term and stable ties, and ability to communicate and coordinate effectively. But there is no consensus. Critics like Lopashenko questioned the Russian Supreme Court's decision to require that organized crime groups be defined as "stable," noting that such a requirement did not always make sense. She advocated preparing a special law on organized crime, but others, such as Yaroslavl University's Lev Kruglikov pointed out that Yeltsin's early 1990s decree on organized crime had produced no concrete results. Kruglikov claimed that new legislation would not likely be more effective and suggested working within the framework of existing law. Moreover, the adoption of separate legislation on organized crime would only increase the possibility for inconsistencies with the Criminal Code. A related question to defining crime groups is determining who is a member of such groups and what level of legal responsibility they bear for crimes the group commits but in which they were not direct participants. It may be necessary to define different levels of membership and, accordingly, different levels of responsibility. For example, if a crime groups commits a murder, are all members guilty of this murder? Additionally, if group members meet with public officials to coordinate actions, should those public officials also be held criminally responsible for the group's actions? The crime groups have concrete goals of gaining wealth and political power. If governors, for example, faced clear sanctions against working directly with criminals, they would be more careful in their relations, some argued. Applying legal definitions to real world cases is never easy. Yurii Zuev, a judge in the Yaroslavl Oblast court, recalled one of Yaroslavl's most famous crime cases from several years ago involving a gang that killed about two dozen taxi drivers in a crime spree. Since the crimes took place over the course of four days, the court determined that the perpetrators represented an "organized" group. In another case, however, an investigator tried to show that a group was organized because one of its members used a pager. The court did not accept this as evidence of "organization." Oblast judges try to follow the general course as they perceive it as being defined in Moscow. However, since there are many different opinions at the federal level, oblast judges often find their decisions overturned. Amendments adopted to the Criminal Code in December 2003 have proven to be controversial. Among other things, these amendments removed the state's capacity to confiscate property from convicts and replaced this penalty with fines up to one million rubles, even if the profit from the crime was much higher. Speakers such as Maksim Feoktistov, deputy dean of the Kuban State University Law Department, thought such a change would allow criminals to get away with their gains. On the other hand, Lopashenko backed these changes, pointing out that judges rarely confiscated property in the past, or were unable to enforce property confiscation sanctions if adopted, even though the crime rate was rapidly growing. She argued that the change merely brought the law into line with de facto practices. Yaroslavl has ten functioning organized crime groups, according to deputy head of the department for combating organized crime in the oblast Vladimir Glazkov. There has not been a major crime case in the region for about three years, though in 2002 there were about 70 crimes of an organized character registered. Most of the crimes are connected to the energy sector or the production of illegal alcohol. Glazkov pointed out that the battle against crime requires strong political will. He noted that earlier there had been a lot of pressure to remove the region's thieves-in-law (vory v zakone), Russia's recognized crime leaders, but that now that pressure did not exist. Currently there is one vor v zakone in the region, but the authorities do not move against him because they believe that he does a good job keeping the situation under control and maintains a form of order. Removing him would be risky because it might lead to the rise of a more energetic or cruel crime boss. Generally, the organized crime groups gained most of their initial capital in the privatization and economic chaos of the early 1990s. Now these people own their own businesses, such as casinos, or buy stock in local enterprises, where they work as directors. In effect, many of them have legalized their capital and now function in the regular economy, for example joining the boards of legitimate businesses. These practices raise new questions, such as whether the organized crime backgrounds of such investors influence their activities as businessmen and in what ways. Preliminary research suggests that in some cases such ties will influence business activities, but more work needs to be done. The authorities keep tabs on such business activities and particularly investigate bankruptcy battles, to see how such techniques are being employed to gain new assets. Many of Yaroslavl's crime bosses live in Moscow and only visit Yaroslavl occasionally. Essentially, they try to live as publicity-shy aristocrats and seek to avoid conflict with one another. Organized crime groups are increasingly gaining the ability to take over cities and even regions. Tolyatti, the home to Russia's largest and notoriously corrupt automobile manufacturer, is one visible example. But others exist, for example, in small Siberian towns, where thieves in law are often in control. Such criminal-politicians are often popular because they ensure the provision of basic social services, such as the payment of pensions. Removing them can lead to new turf battles and shooting wars. Therefore policies aimed at dealing with organized crime groups must be more sophisticated than simply arresting crime leaders. Removing such figures is not always effective because usually another will appear to fill the vacuum. A more comprehensive solution is needed. - Robert Orttung in Yaroslavl GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS SAKHALIN ELECTS NEW GOVERNOR. Sakhalin Oblast, the resource rich island region on Russia's east coast, lost long-serving Governor Igor Farkhutdinov and much of its political
Load more

Recommended publications
  • "Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"
    AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW "Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks" By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze* Story about the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative to change the make-up of the boards of state-owned firms, especially energy companies. In late March of this year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev demanded that high-ranking officials – namely, deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers that co-ordinate state policy in the same sectors in which those companies are active – step down from their seats on the boards of state-run energy companies by July 1. He also said that October 1 would be the deadline for replacing these civil servants with independent directors. The deadline has now passed, but Medvedev‟s bid to diminish the government‟s influence in the energy sector has run into roadblocks. Most of the high-level government officials who have stepped down are being replaced not by independent managers, but by directors from other state companies in the same sector. Russia‟s state-owned oil and gas companies have not been quick to replace directors who also hold high-ranking government posts, despite or- ders from President Dmitry Medvedev. High-ranking Russian officials have made a show of following President Medvedev‟s order to leave the boards of state-run energy companies, but government influence over the sector remains strong. This indicates that the political will needed for the presidential administration to push eco- nomic reforms forward may be inadequate. 41 www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011 Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Interethnic Relations in Russian Central Asia (19Th – Early 20Th Centuries)
    Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences 12 (2018 11) 1968-1990 ~ ~ ~ УДК 323.11(574)“18/19” Interethnic Relations in Russian Central Asia (19th – Early 20th Centuries) Eduard G. Kolesnik, Michael G. Tarasov, Denis N. Gergilev and Nikolai R. Novoseltsev* Siberian Federal University 79 Svobodny, Krasnoyarsk, 660041, Russia Received 02.09.2018, received in revised form 24.10.2018, accepted 07.11.2018 The article views the interethnic relations in Semirechye, one of the regions of the Russian Central Asia. During the first half of the 19th century, this territory became part of the Russian Empire. These were the Cossacks who played the main role in its accession and colonization. Initially, the government strongly encouraged the Cossacks and, thus, ensured the growth of their number both by creating favorable conditions for life and service and by including the representatives of other social groups (peasants and soldiers) in the Cossack population. The conquest of Semirechye being over, economic objectives but not military and police ones became prioritized for the region’s Russian-speaking population. The Cossacks were unable to solve these tasks due to the congestion with the official duties. This led to the situation when in their colonization policy the authorities began to give preference to the peasants of the region, deterioration of the Cossacks’ socio-economic situation and strengthening of the indigenous population’s position being the consequence. The result of this policy was the aggravation of inter-ethnic relations in the region. This culminated in the Turkestan uprising of 1916, which led to numerous victims among all ethnic groups in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • This Central Play and Contrast
    VOLUNTEERS, ENTREPRENEURS AND PATRIOTS: YOUTH AS NEW SUBJECTS OF STATE POLICY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA An NCEEER Working Paper by Julie Hemment University of Massachusetts National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 1828 L Street NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 [email protected] http://www.nceeer.org/ TITLE VIII PROGRAM Project Information* Principal Investigator: Julie Hemment NCEEER Contract Number: 828-07 Date: September 30, 2014 Copyright Information Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale. * The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended).
    [Show full text]
  • Econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kästner, Antje Working Paper From chaos to pragmatism? The domestic dimension of Russian foreign policy 1991-2008 Discussion Paper, No. 19/2008 Provided in Cooperation with: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn Suggested Citation: Kästner, Antje (2008) : From chaos to pragmatism? The domestic dimension of Russian foreign policy 1991-2008, Discussion Paper, No. 19/2008, ISBN 978-3-88985-409-4, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/199304 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen
    [Show full text]
  • An Interdisciplinary Survey of South Siberia
    Alexis Schrubbe REEES Upper Division Undergraduate Course Mock Syllabus Change and Continuity: An Interdisciplinary Survey of South Siberia This is a 15 week interdisciplinary course surveying the peoples of South-Central Siberia. The parameters of this course will be limited to a specific geographic area within a large region of the Russian Federation. This area is East of Novosibirsk but West of Ulan-Ude, North of the Mongolian Border (Northwest of the Altai Range) and South of the greater Lake-Baikal Region. This course will not cover the Far East nor the Polar North. This course will be a political, historical, religious, and anthropological exploration of the vast cultural landscape within the South-Central Siberian area. The course will have an introductory period consisting of a brief geographical overview, and an historical short-course. The short-course will cover Steppe history and periodized Russian history. The second section of the course will overview indigenous groups located within this region limited to the following groups: Tuvan, Buryat, Altai, Hakass/Khakass, Shor, Soyot. The third section will cover the first Russian explorers/fur trappers, the Cossacks, the Old Believers, the Decembrists, and waves of exiled people to the region. Lastly, the final section will discuss contemporary issues facing the area. The objective of the course is to provide a student with the ability to demonstrate an understanding of the complex chronology of human presence and effect in South-Central Siberia. The class will foster the ability to analyze, summarize, and identify waves of influence upon the area. The overarching goal of the course is to consider the themes of “change” versus “continuity” in regard to inhabitants of South Siberia.
    [Show full text]
  • Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands
    Religion, State & Society, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000 Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands FELIX CORLEY The Russian Orthodox Church may be the dominant and most visible religious group in the Russian Federation, but its performance in different regions of the country has been patchy. Even in regions that share common features - geographic, ethnic, economic and social - the Church has made a big impact in some, but little headway in others. Here we look at how the Church has fared in the postsoviet era in four Russian heartland provinces - Astrakhan', Yekaterinburg, Saratov and Omsk. I In all these regions the Orthodox Church has failed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the end of restrictions on religious activity a decade ago and it is now suffering because of what many perceive as the authoritarian and backward-looking leadership offered by the local bishops. The article looks at what common features the Orthodox Church in these regions has and examines the consequences of failure to present a dynamic witness. Saratov1 Saratov had a vibrant circle of Orthodox intellectuals by the end of the 1980s, thanks in part to the benign influence of the local hierarch, Archbishop Pimen (Khmel­ evsky). Consecrated bishop in 1965 and appointed to the diocese of Saratov and Volgograd (as it was then), Pimen had had a chequered career, joining the Zhirovitsy Monastery in Belorussia during the Nazi occupation. In the 1950s - in a sign of trust from the Soviet authorities - he served in the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem. On his return to Russia he served in the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery in Zagorsk, for some of the time as deputy head.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology Or Internal Dissent?
    The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology or Internal Dissent? Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eileen Marie Kunkler, B.A. Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2010 Thesis Committee: Goldie Shabad, Adviser Trevor Brown Copyright by Eileen Marie Kunkler 2010 Abstract In 2008, three political clubs were officially formed within the United Russia party structure: the Social-Conservative Club, the Liberal-Conservative Club, and the State-Patriotic Club. Membership of these clubs includes many powerful Duma representatives. Officially, their function is to help develop strategies for implementing the government‟s Strategy 2020. However, a closer examination of these clubs suggests that they also may function as an ideology incubator for the larger party and as a safety valve for internal party dissent. To answer the question of what the true function of these clubs is an attempt will be made to give: a brief overview of Unity‟s and Fatherland-All Russia‟s formation; a description of how United Russia formed; a summary of the ideological currents within United Russia from 2001-2009; a discussion of the three clubs; and a comparative analysis of these clubs to the Christian Democratic party of Italy and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Based on this evidence, it will be argued that primary purpose of these clubs is to contain intra-party conflict. ii Dedication Dedicated to my family and friends iii Acknowledgements I wish to thank my adviser, Goldie Shabad, for all of her help, advice, and patience in working on this project with me.
    [Show full text]
  • Conference Paper (Aburamoto)
    Paper presented at the 5th East Asian Conference on Slavic Eurasian Studies on August 10, 2013 The Role of Regional Elites in Establishing the “United Russia”: Saratov, Samara, and Ul’yanovsk from the Mid-2000s to 2011 Mari Aburamoto JSPS Research Fellow 1. Introduction Russia’s ruling party, “The United Russia” (abbreviated as UR) has provoked the interest of a number of scholars and observers. Some have even described UR as a dominant party (Gel’man 2008, Reuter and Remington 2009). In the 2011 Duma election, however, the situation changed slightly: UR’s mobilization capacity appeared to reach its limits and votes for UR radically decreased compared to the election of 2007. How can this change be explained? UR’s deterioration trend has long been observed in Russia’s regional and local elections. The decline in UR’s popularity should therefore be observed by focusing on the regional and local levels (Panov and Ross 2013). In order to understand the real changes afoot in regional politics, this paper focuses mainly on the configuration of the regional elite groups. Such an approach is also appropriate for understanding the nature of UR. For, as Reuter and Remington (2009) point out, UR’s rise to power was facilitated by organizing the support of regional elites. This paper reveals that the role of regional elites and the elite alignment in each region—that is, the (non-)existence of conflicts between the governor and the mayors and the relative strength of communists as a leading opposition group—both affect UR’s relative strength in each region.
    [Show full text]
  • Program of the Sessions San Diego, California, January 9–12, 2013
    Program of the Sessions San Diego, California, January 9–12, 2013 AMS Short Course on Random Matrices, Part Monday, January 7 I MAA Short Course on Conceptual Climate Models, Part I 9:00 AM –3:45PM Room 4, Upper Level, San Diego Convention Center 8:30 AM –5:30PM Room 5B, Upper Level, San Diego Convention Center Organizer: Van Vu,YaleUniversity Organizers: Esther Widiasih,University of Arizona 8:00AM Registration outside Room 5A, SDCC Mary Lou Zeeman,Bowdoin upper level. College 9:00AM Random Matrices: The Universality James Walsh, Oberlin (5) phenomenon for Wigner ensemble. College Preliminary report. 7:30AM Registration outside Room 5A, SDCC Terence Tao, University of California Los upper level. Angles 8:30AM Zero-dimensional energy balance models. 10:45AM Universality of random matrices and (1) Hans Kaper, Georgetown University (6) Dyson Brownian Motion. Preliminary 10:30AM Hands-on Session: Dynamics of energy report. (2) balance models, I. Laszlo Erdos, LMU, Munich Anna Barry*, Institute for Math and Its Applications, and Samantha 2:30PM Free probability and Random matrices. Oestreicher*, University of Minnesota (7) Preliminary report. Alice Guionnet, Massachusetts Institute 2:00PM One-dimensional energy balance models. of Technology (3) Hans Kaper, Georgetown University 4:00PM Hands-on Session: Dynamics of energy NSF-EHR Grant Proposal Writing Workshop (4) balance models, II. Anna Barry*, Institute for Math and Its Applications, and Samantha 3:00 PM –6:00PM Marina Ballroom Oestreicher*, University of Minnesota F, 3rd Floor, Marriott The time limit for each AMS contributed paper in the sessions meeting will be found in Volume 34, Issue 1 of Abstracts is ten minutes.
    [Show full text]
  • Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications
    Order Code RL32272 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Updated February 11, 2005 Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Summary Russia’s then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military and civilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin’s rise to power and continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute this conflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and a presidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to the region. Since Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. Such a government will use its own forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawal of most Russian troops from the region. This “Chechenization” of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts, constitute the main elements of the Russian government’s campaign to wind down the fighting. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federal control and include rebuilding assistance and elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Chechnya Weekly: Volume 9, Issue 19 (May 16, 2008)
    Chechnya Weekly Volume 9, Issue 19 (May 16, 2008) Kadyrov Keeps the Heat on the Yamadaevs By Andrei Smirnov In what appears to be an ongoing campaign by Chechnya's pro-Moscow administration against the Vostok Battalion of the GRU (Russian military intelligence), investigators with the republic's law-enforcement bodies are looking into the battalion's possible involvement in the murder of the Arsamakov brothers (Chechnya Weekly, April 17 and 24; May 1). Kavkazky Uzel on May 8 quoted a Chechen law-enforcement source as saying that investigators who are looking into the Vostok Battalion's activities have information about the possible involvement of battalion members in the kidnapping and subsequent brutal murder of Yusup and Yunus Arsamakov and their driver, who disappeared in early February of 2007. "Investigators have testimony from several former servicemen of the GRU's spetsnaz battalion Vostok that sheds light on the fate of Yusup and Yunus Arsamakov, brothers of the Moscow Industrial Bank president Abubakar Arsamakov, and their driver Khamzat Magomadov, who disappeared last year on the territory of the republic's Shatoi district," a Chechen law-enforcement source told Kavkazky Uzel. "They [the ex-Vostok servicemen-CW] claim that the Arsamakovs and Magomadov were murdered by spetsnaz and that their bodies were taken out of Vedeno district and burned. That information is being checked." As Kavkazky Uzel reported, in addition to the disappearance and murder of the Arsamakov brothers and their driver, investigators this past week charged
    [Show full text]
  • Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam As a Tool of the Kremlin?
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 99 Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin? Marlène LARUELLE March 2017 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the few French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European and broader international debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-681-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2017 How to quote this document: Marlène Laruelle, “Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 99, Ifri, March 2017. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Ifri-Bruxelles Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 1000—Brussels—BELGIUM Tel.: +32 (0)2 238 51 10—Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).
    [Show full text]