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Eurasian Union Could Endanger the Neighborhood and U.S BACKGROUNDER No. 2804 | JUNE 14, 2013 Russia’s Eurasian Union Could Endanger the Neighborhood and U.S. Interests Ariel Cohen, PhD Abstract The formation of a Eurasian Union (EAU) is the next in a series of Rus- Key Points sian initiatives to reassert control over the former Soviet space. The Eurasian Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, if it follows the ■■ The formation of a Eurasian Union course that Russia will set, could threaten regional stability and under- (EAU) is the next in a series of Rus- mine economic and political freedom in Eastern Europe and Central sian initiatives to reassert control over the former Soviet space. The Asia. The EAU will also likely influence the sovereignty, independence, EAU could threaten regional stability and political orientation of neighboring countries. The U.S. should and undermine economic and politi- work with its allies and friends in Europe and Asia to balance the Rus- cal freedom in Eastern Europe and sian geopolitical offensive and protect U.S. and Western interests. Central Asia. ■■ Moscow promotes bilateral and n the fall of 2011, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed regional integration to keep its Iforming a Eurasian Union (EAU) with Kazakhstan and Belarus. neighbors in Russia’s orbit, strength- In November 2011, the presidents of these three countries signed an ening Russian influence over their agreement to launch the Eurasian Union and make it fully opera- politics and constraining their ability tional by 2015. to develop relations with outside Stretching from the Polish border to the Pacific, the length of the powers. former Soviet Union, the new Eurasian Union will be the nucleus of ■■ The U.S. should prepare for involve- a larger transnational entity. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are ment in the heart of Eurasia after the uniting their economies, legal systems, and customs services to cre- drawdown of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. should not ate a stronger Eurasian global player. They are coordinating their abandon the field to Russia or China. militaries through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Putin is pushing for more coordination of their secu- ■■ Washington should work with regional powers bilaterally and with rity services. This geopolitical consolidation will likely affect their its allies, from Japan and Korea, to neighbors’ sovereignty, independence, and political orientation. Turkey and the European powers Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine multilaterally, particularly to prevent the Eurasian Union from closing market access and expanding state sectors. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2804 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ■■ The U.S. should also boost regional The Heritage Foundation geopolitical, linguistic, religious, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE and historical expertise in the U.S. Washington, DC 20002 government. (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2804 JUNE 14, 2013 MAP 1 Eurasian Union Members Potential members RUSSIA Unwilling to join BELARUS POLAND UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN ROMANIA Black Sea GEORGIA Caspian UZBEKISTAN Sea KYRGYZSTAN ARMENIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN AZERBAIJAN CHINA IRAQ IRAN Medterranean Sea AFGHANISTAN B 2804 heritage.org may be considered for future membership in the The Eurasian Union: Eurasian Union. Putin’s Top Geopolitical Priority A Eurasian Union that evolves into a Russian Vladimir Putin famously said in 2005 that the sphere of influence would adopt a mercantilist collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopo- approach to the global economy. It will likely monop- litical catastrophe of the 20th century and a genu- olize regional security, could threaten regional sta- ine tragedy for the Russian people.1 While focusing bility, and undermine economic and political free- on the post-Soviet erosion of Russian power and the dom in Central Asia and beyond. U.S. policy should rise of the U.S., NATO, China, and India on the glob- hedge against such efforts and make the case that an al stage, the Russian leader disregarded the quest of open economic environment offers a greater pros- the 14 former Soviet states for independence. In an pect for regional development. Such an approach article in Izvestia in October 2011, Putin proposed would serve U.S. interests and create a better envi- forming a Eurasian Union as part of his presiden- ronment for a peaceful and prosperous Central Asia. tial election campaign.2 He envisioned integrating The U.S. should organize an interagency effort to Russia and ultimately all of the former Soviet repub- promote good governance and rule-based market lics, except the Baltic states, by removing barriers economics as well as to combat efforts to close mar- to the flow of goods and people within a common kets to the West. economic space and by harmonizing domestic and external policies and legislation. He wrote: 1. Associated Press, “Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy,’” MSNBC, April 4, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7632057/ns/world_ news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/ (accessed April 24, 2013). 2. Vladimir Putin, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making,” Izvestia, October 3, 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/ news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3- (accessed April 24, 2013). 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2804 JUNE 14, 2013 It is crucial that the Common Economic Space responsibility is to ensure smooth operation of the [the precursor of the Eurasian Union] is rooted common market by enforcing rules and regulations in coordinated action in key institutional areas and to carry out initiatives for further integration. such as: macroeconomics, ensuring competition, The commission has jurisdiction over tariff and non- technical regulations, agricultural subsidies, tariff regulation (e.g., sanitary controls), customs transport, and natural monopolies tariffs. Later, administration, technical regulation, competition this framework will also include common visa policy, energy, transport, intellectual property pro- and migration policies, allowing border controls tection, migration, and other areas. between our states to be lifted. In fact, we are The commission’s employees are formally adapting the experience of the Schengen [visa] “supranational bureaucrats” who supposedly take Agreement that benefits Europeans as well as no instructions from their member states and act everyone who comes to work, study, or holiday in in the interests of the EAU as a whole. The commis- the EU.3 sion’s headquarters is located in downtown Moscow, although its future headquarters might be relocated The high-level leadership, speed, large staff, to Astana upon Kazakhstan’s insistence. Unlike the and considerable funding set the Eurasian Union EU, the EAU Commission will make decisions by apart from past integration efforts. In 2010, Russia, majority vote, not by consensus. Of course, Russia Kazakhstan, and Belarus implemented a uniform will dominate the decision-making process with its external customs tariff and adopted a customs code. 57 percent vote, while Belarus and Kazakhstan have In 2011, they lifted internal border controls. In July 21.5 percent each. 2012, they inaugurated the Single Economic Space and a Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow The Military Dimension to administer it. The commission is headed by The Eurasian Union can be seen as a “soft power”— Victor Khristenko, former Russian Vice Premier primarily economic—project. Russia hopes to trans- and Minister of Industry and Energy, and 85 per- late its relatively large population, power, wealth, cent of its personnel are citizens of Russia. The and size into greater influence around its periph- presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan ery. With 600 years of empire building behind them, signed the agreement to launch the Eurasian the Russian leaders are well aware that they must Union in November 2011. It will be fully functional back up this influence with a hard power (military in 2015, and then, as Khristenko said, “longer-term and security) component. The Collective Security action” can be considered, presumably leading to Treaty Organization (CSTO) charter signed in further integration.4 2002 entered into force in 2006, when its members appointed a secretary general to lead the organiza- Not Like the European Union tion. The CSTO includes the other Customs Union The Eurasian Union is based on two major members—Belarus and Kazakhstan—as well as sev- documents: the Customs Code and the Codified eral potential members: Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Agreement on the Customs Union and Common Tajikistan. Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in Economic Space, which spell out the legal rules and July 2012. norms for the functioning of a common market. This As a military alliance, the CSTO is dominated is a major break with past integration efforts, which by the Russian armed forces, which maintain mili- generated hundreds of vague, fragmented agree- tary bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. ments that largely remained unimplemented. Russia also controlled until recently the Gabala The key institution is the Eurasian Commission, radar station in Azerbaijan; three military bases in which was launched
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