ANAÏS MARIN THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA. MYTHS AND REALITIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY INTEGRATION © 2020 Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis www.vilniusinstitute.lt ISBN 978-609-8281-00-2 COVER: Presidential Press and Information Office

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...... 1 THE UNION STATE AT TWENTY ...... 2 A dead-born vanity project ...... 3 Irreconcilable views ...... 3 From stalemate to ultimatum… and back to square one ...... 5 DEBUNKING THREE BROTHERHOOD MYTHS ...... 7 Myth #1. “Belarus is Russia’s closest military ally” ...... 7 Brothers in arms ...... 7 Cracks in the façade ...... 8 Belarus’ security dilemma and entrapment ...... 9 Disputes over armaments ...... 10 Diverging diplomatic priorities ...... 12 Myth #2. “Belarus is already an integral part of the Russian army” ...... 13 Socialisation ...... 14 The Regional Group of Forces ...... 14 Joint military exercises ...... 15 Russia’s military presence in Belarus ...... 16 The Joint Air Defence System ...... 17 Airbase, what airbase? ...... 18 Myth #3. “Belarus is about to lose its sovereignty” ...... 19 The Belarusian military-industrial complex (VPK) – an easy prey for Russian investors? 19 Zapad military exercises: positioning troops to occupy Belarus? ...... 20 Absorbing Belarus: a solution to Putin’s 2024 succession problem? ...... 21 Not a myth: Belarus is extremely vulnerable to Russia’s ‘sharp power’ offensive ...... 22 REALITIES: THE WORST IS NEVER CERTAIN ...... 24 Belarusian vulnerabilities ...... 25 Russian intentions ...... 28 NATO’s dilemmas ...... 29 CONCLUSIONS ...... 32 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 34 Recommendations for NATO neighbours ...... 34 Recommendation for the EU’s Eastern Partnership instruments ...... 37

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

INTRODUCTION lengthier border with a mightier Eastern neigh- bour; it would also make them more vulnerable Twenty years after the formal launch of the to being territorially cut from the rest of NATO, Union State of Belarus and Russia, the (re-)inte- should Russia attempt to reconnect the Kalinin- gration between the two countries has seemed grad exclave to the Russian mainland by “bridg- to accelerate throughout 2019. Although this ing” the Suwałki gap.1 This scenario, and any development appeared to announce a paradigm subsequent land aggression against Poland and/ change, and gave way to much speculation on or Lithuania, would have to use Belarusian terri- the threat it poses to Belarus as a sovereign tory as a bridgehead, given that the roads and state, most of these alarmist forecasts depart railroads that lead to Kaliningrad all run through from assumptions which are grounded in myths Belarusian territory. It would therefore require rather than in realities. that Russia fully trusted in, or was able to force- For the past decade Russia has been recon- fully guarantee, Belarus’ cooperation.2 sidering the so-called “oil for kisses” deal that How instrumental would the Union State of prevailed since the mid-1990s, whereby it Belarus and Russia be for that purpose? granted Belarus generous subsidies in retribu- Whereas further integration between the two tion for its geopolitical loyalty. Yet Belarus re- polities now appears as an unlikely prospect, fused to side with Russia in its ongoing confron- does it mean that their military alliance does not tation with Ukraine and the West, citing the neu- pose a security threat for the region? The objec- trality pledge enshrined in its Constitution. Dis- tive of this paper is to provide a sober assess- satisfied with its junior partner’s failing loyalty, ment of the politico-military union between Bel- since 2015 Russia has been cutting subsidies, arus and Russia as it stands now, with a focus on making the resumption of financial support con- the myths that ought to be debunked regarding tingent upon the Belarusian leadership commit- the level and effectiveness of integration ting to deeper economic, political and military reached between the two allies in the military, integration within the Union State. So went the defence and security fields so far. anthem. The paper is articulated as follows. First, it re- While stepping up pressure to “coerce” Bela- calls the recent reactivation of negotiations over rus into accepting this “deeper integration” the future of the Union State of Belarus and Rus- agenda, Russia has also displayed a more asser- sia, and their subsequent failure to result in tive tone with regards to their common EU and deeper integration. Given that the Belarusian NATO neighbours. This sparked concern leadership has uncompromisingly declined the throughout the region that subjugating Belarus Russian demand to grant the Union State supra- might be but the first stage of a Russian Grand national institutions and prerogatives, the most Plan meant to redraw the geostrategic map of likely outcome for years to come might well be north-Eastern Europe. The Baltic States in partic- a continuation of previous policies – albeit with ular have become wary of the consequences, for much less exceptions and subsidies for Belarus. their own security, of a possible Russian absorp- Short of a full-fledged economic embargo or a tion of Belarus: not only would it give them a military aggression, there is not much Russia

1https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- 2https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- lyse231-EN.pdf fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 1

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN could do to force a still sovereign state into sup- well as supranational governing bodies, includ- porting its geopolitical ambitions. Whether Vla- ing a bicameral Parliament. None of these insti- dimir Putin hosts such bellicose intentions at all tutions have come to light, however. remains an open question. This is because the format foreseen remained Secondly, the paper analyses a triptych of that of an inter-governmental union of equal widely spread myths regarding the integration sovereign states, in which presidents retained process. In a nutshell, these myths mistakenly their respective prerogatives. Over the years, bi- assume that a) Belarus is Russia’s closest military lateral cooperation intensified and integration ally; b) the Belarusian army is already part of the “deepened” only in some consensual fields, Russian army and c) Belarus is on the verge of while stalling in most others. Where the harmo- losing its sovereignty. Whereas NATO strategists nisation of national rules and procedures was have long adhered to these assumptions, over easy and mutually beneficial, a unification of the past years they came to acknowledge that sorts has indeed taken shape, and these spheres most of them were invalid, and misleading. have recently “integrated” further. Businesses in The third section overviews the circum- the industrial, transport and agricultural fields stances that make regional security volatile, no- that rely on traditional connections between the tably due to a) Belarus’ vulnerabilities to a force- two countries see an advantage in this process. ful (re-)integration with Russia, b) Russia’s possi- The free movement of people, equal treatment ble intentions for that matter and c) NATO’s of workers, students, patients, pensioners, and weaknesses and dilemmas on its North-Eastern museum visitors are among the most visible flank. The final section wraps up our main find- achievements of the Union State in the eyes of ings regarding the Union State’s might and via- citizens. bility and concludes with policy recommenda- Among the elites, there is a wide consensus tions for neighbouring countries. that the most “integrated” spheres are to be found in the security and defence fields. As early THE UNION STATE AT TWENTY as 1998 the Supreme Council of the Union State The 1999 Treaty establishing the Union State – the highest policy-making body, composed of of Belarus and Russia proclaimed as its main pur- heads of states, prime ministers and the speak- pose the unification of the peoples of both coun- ers of national parliaments – adopted a Concept tries “in a democratic law-ruled State”, with the of Common Defence Policy and a Security Con- aim of guaranteeing peace, democracy, friend- cept. The following year, in response to NATO’s ship, welfare, prosperity and security to both new strategic concept, Defence Ministers signed countries. On paper, the Treaty also foresaw the several additional agreements, including on establishment of a single economic, social and joint military research and arms procurements.3 legal space, a joint budget, as well as closer co- Since 2001 the establishments of Belarus and ordination of foreign and defence policies. It Russia have been operating under a Joint Mili- projected the creation of joint management in- tary Doctrine.4 stitutions (including a single currency emission On its website the Belarusian Ministry of De- centre), a single Constitution, flag and hymn, as fence lists the following fields as the “key lines of military cooperation with Russia”: legal and

3https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/szyszlo.pdf, cf. 4https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/szyszlo.pdf, p. p. 23-25. 25. 2

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN regulatory harmonisation, support of the Re- introduction of a single currency, once a found- gional Group of Forces, cooperation in the field ing stone of the Union State project, soon be- of air defence, joint military-scientific activities, came its main steppingstone.7 Twenty years on, cooperation in the field of arms control obliga- the monetary unification stage remains the tions, and the training of Belarusian service main bone of contention. Others appeared in members in military schools of the Russian De- the course of the latest negotiation rounds how- fence Ministry. 5 ever, on fiscal issues notably. As a result, in 2020 Whereas most experts consider that military the Union State still looks like an empty shell cooperation was always immune to political and with little prospect for consensual institutionali- trade disputes, even this aspect of the relation- sation: harmonisation of national legislations ship has been a source of mutual frustration, would imply mutual concessions which the part- bargaining, and trade-offs however.6 ners are unwilling to make.

A dead-born vanity project Irreconcilable views Soon after it was launched, the unification Russian and Belarusian views on the purpose project lost traction in the eyes of Belarusian and outlook of an integrated Union State di- president Aliaksandr Lukashenka, who had been verge to an extent that makes them almost ir- its most vocal advocate up until then. In the reconcilable. Russia wishes the Union State to meantime, Boris Yeltsin had resigned and become a geopolitical actor, with supranational handed the keys of the Kremlin over to Vladimir management bodies that it could dominate, and Putin. Once the latter made it clear, in 2002, that integrated capacities in all possible fields. Such a the only way the Union State could integrate fur- neo-imperialistic endeavour would serve as an ther would be for the constitutive regions of the incubator for the further re-integration of the Republic of Belarus to merge into the Russian former Soviet space, or even a potential All- Federation following the German reunification Slavic Union: the idea has floated that the Union model, Aliaksandr Lukashenka did his utmost to State could include new members from non- delay and obstruct the process. Hither on, the contiguous areas, such as Serbia, Macedonia, implementation of the Treaty and the institu- Montenegro, or self-proclaimed republics (Ab- tionalisation of the Union State into a polity with khazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Donetsk and supranational features were virtually frozen. Luhansk, etc.). Belarus has no interest in such an The two countries re-established customs enlargement, which would make the Union controls as early as 2001, de facto suspending State redundant with other multilateral organi- the planned creation of a Customs Union. The sations, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, latter came into being in 2010 only, as a result of thereby limiting the privileged status that Bela- a trilateral integration (together with Kazakh- rus currently enjoys on par with Russia within stan) of customs control and management the Union State. within the Single Eurasian Economic Space. The

5 https://www.mil.by/en/military_policy/coopera- russia-security-and-defence tion_RF/#pvo 7http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LFPR-15-16- 6https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/2013-04- Zulys.pdf 29/trading-sovereignty-outcome-belaruss-integration- 3

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

What Minsk and Moscow agree on, however, border). His Russian interlocutors reply that this is that the Union State should serve as a deter- could be envisaged only once political integra- rent against NATO enlargement. In fact, integra- tion is fulfilled and the joint managing bodies of tion proceeded in an incremental way: the pro- the Union State are entitled to make and imple- cess slowed down or accelerated depending on ment such a decision. the level of perceived threat stemming from Apart from diverging views as to whether NATO’s own actions in the region. Following the economic or political integration should come “loss” of Ukraine in 2014, showcasing the Union first, Belarus and Russia disagree on the institu- State as a foreign policy success became all the tional outlook and functioning of the Union more vital for Putin’s domestic rating: while Rus- State. Citing article 3 of the 1999 Treaty, Belarus sia was isolated and bashed by Western sanc- claims the Union State is a union of equals, and tions, Belarus appeared as its sole remaining ally sees the equality principle as determining for in the region. further unification. The Union State should thus The Belarusian side holds almost diametric- guarantee Belarusian business entities equal ac- ally opposite views about the objectives of inte- cess to the Russian market, without exceptions gration. Minsk wishes the Union State to first in- or non-tariff barriers preventing them from tegrate economically, which is a convenient way competing with Russian business on an equal to postpone political integration – and the con- footing. cessions that go with it. Even though Lukashenka Lukashenka’s claim for parity was and re- did sign legally binding agreements that entailed mains unacceptable for Putin, since it would a transfer of part of Belarusian sovereignty to amount to granting the Belarusian president the Union State, he never intended to honour veto rights over Union State decisions, and thus them. In fact, praising the Belarusian-Russian potentially over Russia’s own policy priorities brotherhood and Union State was a way for him too.9 Should the proportionality principle prevail to pay lip service to Russia’s integrationist pro- instead, asymmetry would result in significant ject, so as to avoid implementing it in practice. concessions from Belarus in terms of preroga- Apparent support aimed at consolidating the im- tives and autonomy. This, in turn, is unacceptable age of Belarus as Russia’s strategic buffer in Eu- for Belarus: Lukashenka has repeatedly claimed rope, to extract benefits in rewards for contrib- that sovereignty is “sacred” and that it is not for uting to Russia’s security. sale. The Belarusian leadership claims that it has Faced with this deadlock, a gradual but in- long fulfilled its political-military obligations by complete harmonisation of legal, technical and being an exemplary ally and never considering regulatory conditions for bilateral cooperation any alternative to its Russia orientation.8 On the has been taking place. Meanwhile, diplomatic other hand, Lukashenka blames Russia for failing relations have been marred by trade disputes to deliver on integration promises, since Mos- (gas wars, milk wars, and a potash war). The cow keeps adjourning the establishment of a “multilateralization” of integration dynamics single energy market. Lukashenka demands that within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has Russian gas and oil be sold to Belarus at Russian offered a platform since 2015 for solving some domestic prices (plus transport costs from the of them – thanks notably to the EEU Court –

8https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/096681 9https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79876 36.2014.899769; p. 568 4

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN thereby relieving Belarusian exporters from Rus- They were further exacerbated during the post- sian business pressure and abusive State control ing of Mikhail Babich as Russia’s ambassador to limitations against Belarusian products. Yet Minsk (from August 2018 to April 2019), where many trade issues remain unsolved. For the past this former presidential envoy to the Volga re- five years, there have been recurrent disputes gion turned diplomat was accused of treating over Belarus circumventing the Russian em- Belarus like a mere subject of the Russian Feder- bargo on Western food products and over the ation.14 terms of supplies of Russian hydrocarbons and As a result of all these disagreements, the Un- credit assistance to Belarus. ion State came to be seen as a dead-born vanity Lastly, political tensions have been growing project and an institutionally empty shell. For al- due to the activation of Russian “soft power” most two decades this state of affairs appeared projection inside Belarus proper. Pro-Kremlin to be in the interests of both parties. Sporadic (dis)information is very influential in Belarus, reminders about integration supposedly un- where TV channels are dominated by Russian folding under the auspices of the Union State content.10 As elsewhere in the “contested neigh- was a convenient way for Belarus to continue bourhood”11, a multitude of Russian govern- extracting a rent from its Russian partners, and mental and quasi-governmental NGOs have for the Kremlin to appear as able to retain Bel- mushroomed in recent years, including non-in- arus in its sphere of influence. In 2019 this de- digenous Cossack communities. The Russian Or- ceitful bargain hit a wall however. thodox Church has become more influential too, especially in the regions.12 This all contributes to From stalemate to ultimatum… disseminating Russophile worldviews and narra- and back to square one tives, which Lukashenka has turned less fond of For twenty years Russo-Belarusian relations since the Russian aggression on Ukraine. developed in a sinusoidal way, with periods The simultaneous rise of Russian soft power, when pragmatism prevailed, albeit with eco- and Belarusian nationalism, sparked a war of nomic frictions, followed by periods when trade words on symbolic issues, for example after Bel- disputes gave way to trade-offs, and rhetorical arus “nationalised” (in its red-green colours) the calls for more integration and institutionalisa- Saint-George ribbon memorialising the Soviet tion of the Union State.15 This changed in 2018- victory in the Great Patriotic War13, or after 2019 however, when Russia decided to shake Lukashenka banned Immortal Regiment march- the status quo. es in Belarus. Disputes over the extent of Bela- Ironically, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka rusian cultural autonomy from the Russian himself started the scandal that prompted Rus- World are epitomised by the mutual enmity re- sia to step up pressure. After Russia introduced ported to characterise inter-personal relations between Putin and Lukashenka themselves.

10http://east-center.org/information-security-belarus- georges-ribbons-at-v-day-celebrations/ challenges/ 14https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/05/02/russian-gov- 11https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/agents- ernment-recalls-ambassador-to-belarus-after-misnk-offi- russian-world-proxy-groups-contested-neighbourhood cials-complained-he-treated-the-country-like-a-federal- 12https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/civil-soci- subject ety-under-russias-threat-building-resilience-ukraine-bela- 15https://jamestown.org/program/four-scenarios-for-bel- rus-and-moldova arus-in-2025-2030/ 13https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-bans-st- 5

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN a new taxation system for its oil exports16, Luka- The two presidents met almost once a month, shenka requested compensation for the losses but the most they could agree on, in Sochi in this “tax manoeuvre” entailed for the Belarusian September, was an action programme and a list oil-processing industry. On 13 December 2018, of roadmaps covering technical and regulatory while on a visit in Brest, Russian Prime Minister aspects of “deeper” cooperation and harmoni- Dmitry Medvedev replied by issuing an ultima- sation in some 30 spheres, ranging from sanitary tum: for Belarus to be eligible to compensation, rules in the agro-industrial field to tariffs for mo- and further economic support, it should first im- bile phone roaming.18 plement past agreements regarding the Union In spite of intense bargaining and arguing, State.17 and whereas contradictory announcements had In his speech, Medvedev outlined two possi- shed doubts over what was indeed being ble futures for the Union State: a continuation of discussed, by December 2019 it appeared that the status quo, with inert integration implying no consensus could be found on three of the the necessary “marketization” of Russia’s rela- roadmaps, on oil, gas, and taxes respectively. tions with Belarus, or deeper integration under Russia insisted on a package deal, asking that all the auspices of unified supranational bodies, the roadmaps be enshrined in law before Russia presented as the only option guaranteeing Bela- even considered granting Belarus loans or rus further economic benefits. compensations. Belarus for its part refused to Russian demands did not come out of the even discuss the 31st roadmap which allegedly blue. For several years Russian voices had been provided for the establishment of supranational claiming that Belarus was acting as a “parasite” bodies (a fiscal administration and single curren- (living on Russian subsidies) and a “traitor” (re- cy emission centre). Answering the questions of fusing to side with Moscow against Kyiv, and in- journalists on 17 November, the Belarusian stead engaging in a rapprochement with the president complained about the fact that Mos- West). The Medvedev ultimatum signalled that cow had been adding, year after year, new cond- Russia would tolerate no more flirting with the itions for conducting integration talks. “I won’t EU, the US and NATO, and no more delaying of endorse or sign a document if it contradicts the the integration process: Belarus had to start de- Constitution and fundamental principles of our livering on earlier commitments, and this chan- society. The most important principles are sov- ge would have to be irreversible. ereignty and independence”, he added.19 Negotiations intensified in 2019, including at As a result, there was not much to celebrate top ministerial and presidential levels, with 8 on the Treaty’s 20th anniversary. The last round December, marking the 20th anniversary of the of talks on 7 December failed to deliver any Treaty establishing the Union State, as a target breakthrough.20 The next day Vladimir Semash- date for signing official documents during a ko, Belarus’s ambassador to Russia, said that the planned Summit. This never happened however. issue of compensating Belarus for losses from

16Known as peretamozhka in Russian, this manoeuvre con- Belarusian ones did not. The financial loss has been esti- sisted in transferring the burden of taxation from export- mated to 9-10 billion dollars for Belarus over a decade. ers (customs duties levied upon crossing the Russian bor- 17https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/12/belarus-russia- der) to producers at the source (tax on oil extraction). As from-a-strategic-deal-to-an-integration-ultimatum/ a result, purchasing Russian oil became more costly for 18https://news.tut.by/economics/666171.html Belarus. Its refineries also suffered serious loss in compet- 19https://vpk-news.ru/articles/53964 itiveness since Russian own crude oil processing factories 20https://eurasia.expert/pochemu-belarus-i-rossiya-ne- received compensation from the Russian budget, whereas podpisali-dorozhnye-karty-integratsii/ 6

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN the tax maneuver would not be resolved in achieved in these areas. This implies debunking 2020-2021. On 25 December, a Russian govern- three sets of myths. ment official admitted that discussions on the 31st roadmap were postponed at least until Myth #1. “Belarus is Russia’s closest 2023, meaning that the Union State would not military ally” evolve into a politically integrated, suprana- Belarus’ strategic alignment with Russia pre- tional organism, before 2024 at best.21 By then dates the establishment of the Union State. Russia is expected to deliver on its own promises Since the early 1990s, Belarus and Russia have for a single Eurasian energy market. been sharing the view that bilateral cooperation In Belarus the negotiation process received was necessary in order to deter the common very little publicity. In fact, the government jus- NATO enemy. Hence the two countries are tified the lack of transparency by stating that widely recognised as two of the closest allies in what was being discussed was too technical to post-Soviet Eurasia. interest the population, and that leaks would cause unnecessary panic. This alarmed the ex- Brothers in arms perts’ community, which for lack of information Belarus and Russia traditionally regard mili- could only speculate about the goal and out- tary cooperation as a major element of their na- come of the process. The fact that negotiations tional security. They have also been indefectibly unfolded in almost absolute secrecy fuelled supportive of one another on the diplomatic suspicions that Russia had decided to use all scene for over a decade (1992-2008). In line with the levers at its disposal to pressure Belarus the 1997 Charter of the Union State (art. 8 para. into adhering to Putin’s vision of integration, 2), joint measures and tight coordination al- meaning that Lukashenka would have to sur- lowed to “formulate common positions on inter- render. This sparked fears that the days of Bel- national issues of mutual interest”, as illustrated arus as a sovereign state were counted. by their similar voting patterns at the UN Gen- DEBUNKING THREE BROTHERHOOD eral Assembly. MYTHS The 1999 Treaty underlines the necessity for close cooperation in the military field, but does Experts contend that integration between not mention integration as such. It listed the fol- Belarus and Russia in the security, military and lowing spheres as belonging to the joint compe- defence fields has always been the most ad- tence of the Union State and its members (arti- vanced, since it was the least vulnerable to dip- cle 18): joint defence policy, coordination of ac- lomatic tensions. Cooperation in these fields is tion in the field of military construction, devel- vital for both parties, which depend on one an- opment of the armed forces of the state parties, other for their security. Since political integra- joint use of military infrastructure, and adoption tion appears to have been durably put on hold of other measures in support of the defence ca- again, the question arises whether this setback pabilities of the Union State. Policy coordination will affect future relations in the military and se- in the field of international cooperation on mili- curity fields. Before addressing this issue, it is tary and border issues, including the implemen- worth assessing the current state of integration

21https://www.rbc.ru/poli- tics/25/12/2019/5e01e55a9a7947dc19f6ca1f 7

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN tation of international treaties on arms reduc- ity has been contingent upon the level of per- tion and arms limitation signed by the state par- ceived support for its own foreign policy objec- ties, is also foreseen. tives, and this has changed in the 2010s. Even if A legacy of the common Soviet past, the Rus- Belarus had no choice but to remain strategi- sian-Belarusian alliance appears as natural and cally aligned with Russia, it defaulted on politi- necessary. Already before the Union State was cal loyalty. In fact, a characteristic feature of proclaimed, according to Alena Vysotskaya bilat- Belarusian foreign policy since 2015 is its grad- eral relations were characterised by functioning ual but steady autonomisation. military cooperation, intra-alliance unity (coher- ence), and a high level of coordination of na- Cracks in the façade tional foreign and security policies.22 Since 2001, The first signs of a crack in the political alli- the military establishments have operated un- ance appeared following the 2008 Russian- der the umbrella of a Union State Military Doc- Georgian war and Minsk’s refusal to recognise trine, an updated version of which has been the subsequent independence of breakaway re- adopted in 2018. This document, and the way publics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Minsk re- the Ministers of Defence of both countries sisted Russian pressures and opted for distanc- praise it, would tend to prove that the parties ing itself from Moscow, citing Belarus’ respect have no disagreements on security matters.23 for Georgia’s territorial integrity and other inter- The Union State indeed provided a solid national law principles (non-interference in do- frame for consolidating their strategic alliance. mestic affairs and peaceful conflict-manage- Belarus has been the main beneficiary however: ment). The same principles were evoked for re- for lack of resources, and for lack of alternatives, fusing to side with Russia against Ukraine since it can only rely on Russia to provide it with secu- 2014. rity guarantees. Russia’s military doctrines have In 2014 for example Lukashenka adopted a consistently stated Russia’s defence commit- position compliant with Belarus’ neutrality ment to its Belarusian ally. Russia regards an pledge. He refused to endorse the annexation of armed attack on a Union State member or any Crimea de jure, but he recognised it as being part actions involving the use of military force against of Russia de facto. He publicly called Russia to Belarus as an act of aggression against the Union respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and State as a whole, which would expose the ag- showed Kyiv support in attending President Po- gressor to retaliatory measures. roshenko’s inauguration ceremony. This was an In turn, Belarus is endowed with the respon- affront for Putin, and so was the way sibility to protect Russia against an aggression Lukashenka ridiculed Russian justification for from the West. To fulfil this duty, it has received the annexation, when he argued that Mongolia financial compensations, and the possibility to could just as easily lay claim to parts of Russian acquire Russian military equipment at discount territory24, or Belarus – to Smolensk. prices or even free of charge. Russia’s generos- When war erupted in Eastern Ukraine, Luka- shenka carved out a neutral stance, saying he

22https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668 armiyami/ 136.2014.899769; p. 560 24https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bela- 23https://www.belvpo.com/101752.html/, rus/union.htm https://www.sonar2050.org/publications/drujit- 8

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN would never allow Belarusian territory to be This phobia was a key factor explaining the re- used to attack another state. Criminal liability cent attempts at reinvigorating the Union State. was introduced against Belarusian mercenaries Yet even if Russia cannot consider Belarus as an fighting on either side. Three years later the Bel- indefectible ally anymore, it is reassured by the arusian President publicly stated that “right now fact that Belarus’ situational neutrality is not fraternal Ukraine is fighting for its independ- sustainable, and lacks credibility: in the eyes of ence. We cannot afford to fight. We are a peace- NATO adversaries, Belarus is usually seen as a loving people”.25 This, of course, contradicts the mere extension of the Russian strategic space. Russian official storyline that the conflict in Don- bass is a civil war in which Russia is not involved. Belarus’ security dilemma and entrapment It also damages the image of the Union State as Although it is commonly assumed that the an effective military alliance. strategic alliance between Minsk and Moscow is Belarus’ independent stance regarding the impermeable to bilateral disputes, several of the situation in and around Ukraine was an unpleas- recent disagreements over foreign policy priori- ant surprise for the Kremlin, especially when ties have included an explicit military dimension Lukashenka added insult to injury by denying as well. This was particularly visible in 2009, Novorossiya any legitimacy, or when he criti- when Lukashenka boycotted the June summit of cised Moscow’s attempts at imposing Russian the CSTO, which he was supposed to chair and World on Belarus.26 In so doing, however, where member states planned to formalise the Lukashenka slowly laid the ground for the lifting establishment of a Collective Operative Reaction of Western sanctions against his own regime, Force (CORF). This has been seen as an attempt starting in 2015. Not only Ukrainians appreci- to blackmail Russia into solving the milk war ated Belarus’ apparent neutrality; EU and US sparked by a ban preventing Belarus to export diplomats praised Lukashenka’s personal efforts its dairy products to Russia at the time. As Alena at turning Minsk into a mediation platform for Vysotskaya put it, “By linking the cessation of conducting the peace talks that led to the adop- the milk war and the resolution of an issue fall- tion of the Minsk 1 and 2 agreements.27 Building ing within the remit of military integration, the on this diplomatic success, in May 2018 Lukash- Belarusian leadership was (re-)introducing the enka even offered to host a “Helsinki-2” confer- military–economy trade-off into the relation- ence for discussing, in Minsk, the future of the ship. At the same time, the whole Belarusian po- European security architecture.28 sition was presented as a case of entrapment re- Lukashenka’s freeriding ambitions and reluc- garding the CSTO.” 29 tance to support Putin’s foreign policy adventur- The notion of entrapment characterises well ism have exacerbated the Kremlin’s fear of los- the position Belarus is in. According to this no- ing control over its unpredictable neighbour. tion, too much commitment to an ally creates a dilemma, since it might imply participating in a

25https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/01/27/broth 28https://jamestown.org/program/successful-interna- er-ukraine-is-fighting-for-its-independence-lukashenko- tional-security-gathering-in-belarus-brings-together-east- a56954 and-west/ 26https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-russia-won-t-swal- 29https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668 low-belarus-further-integration/29797813.html 136.2014.899769 27https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/from_sanc tions_to_summits_belarus_after_the_ukraine_crisis3016 9

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN conflict one prefers to avoid. Given the suffering also breached when Minsk displayed support for they endured during WWII, what Belarusians Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in the Nagorno- fear the most is being dragged into an armed Karabakh conflict. Lukashenka’s refusal to align conflict, getting trapped “in someone else’s with Russia’s pro-Armenian position – in a bid to wars”, as Lukashenka put it in 2019. On the court Turkey too – implied that Belarus gradually other hand, too little commitment to the mili- lost its status as Russia’s “closest ally” in the tary alliance might result in being abandoned in post-Soviet realm: since it joined the Eurasian case hostilities with an adversary break out. 30 Economic Union in 2013, Armenia could equally Lukashenka has turned this security dilemma claim the title, and is already enjoying the privi- into an asset for blackmailing Russia for almost leges that come with it, for example in the field two decades: constructing an entrapment of arms procurements. mechanism, he threatened to defect (by exiting the CSTO for example), unless the Russian ally Disputes over armaments became more supportive (read: more tolerant of CIS and CSTO agreements on military-tech- Belarus’ autonomy, or more generous). “This nical cooperation entitle member states to trade was seen as a means of activating the intra-alli- armaments and defence equipment for the ance security dilemma, and prompting a reac- same price they charge their own armed forces; tion from Moscow. Under pressure to hold the for most post-Soviet countries it means purchas- alliance together, it was reasoned that the Rus- ing Russian military equipment at a discount sian leadership would seek to accommodate the price, in barter schemes or with less bureau- most pressing Belarusian concerns by increasing cratic hurdles. Military cooperation between economic support”.31 Belarus and Russia is not what it used to be This blackmailing strategy was again obvious however. Given that Belarus now strives to in 2016-17, when Lukashenka indicated that Bel- achieve more independence and self-sufficien- arus’ collective defence obligations towards cy in the defence sphere, Russia’s previously CSTO member states (article 4 of the Collective generous material support is much harder to Security Treaty) extended only to the Western come by.32 region (meaning: Russia) – in other words, that Belarus has not benefited from significant he did not feel compelled to provide Belarusian discounts on the bill (600 million USD) for the 12 troops to defend CSTO allies in Central Asia or SU-30SM aircrafts that it bought from Russia in the South Caucasus. Whereas this was compli- June 2016 to replace its Soviet-times MiG-29. ant with Belarus’ long tradition of not sending its Siarhei Bohdan, a respected Belarusian military soldiers to fight abroad, Lukashenka’s principled expert, interpreted it as meaning that “the refusal to help fellow autocrats crackdown on Kremlin is in no haste to arm Minsk; Belarus “terrorist”-labelled popular uprisings in Central must purchase arms like any other country. (…) Asia or Armenia contravened Russian ambitions Minsk paid Russia [170 million USD] even for regarding the CSTO’s future role in the region. second-hand S-300PS – despite the fact that the The Union State requirement that Belarus Kremlin could hardly have sold them at a decent and Russia coordinate their foreign policies was

30https://mwi.usma.edu/strategic-enabler-point-vulnera- 136.2014.899769; p. 569 bility-role-belarus-russias-military-plans/ 32https://belarusdigest.com/story/belaruss-new-russian- 31https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668 arms-what-minsk-has-given-in-exchange/ 10

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN price anywhere.”33 By relying exclusively on co- protect you, I must … buy a gun from you? Is that operation with the Russian military-industrial normal?”.35 complex (voenno-promyshlenny kompleks, VPK In the end, Belarus is paying the high price for in Russian), Belarusian producers have also de- its willingness to break free from Russia. The prived themselves of an opportunity to acquire sudden urge to appear as neutral forced Minsk advanced technologies from outside of Russia. to diversify its portfolio of international partner- There is a wide consensus among the Belarus- ships.36 Back in 2010, when Russia reduced its oil ian military expert community that, instead of deliveries – in a move interpreted as meant to providing their country with modern aircrafts push Belarus to open the capital of its refineries and surface-to-air missile systems (at discount to Russian investors – President Hugo Chavez prices), Russia has knowingly let its ally’s air came to the rescue, shipping some Venezuelan forces and air defence capacities decay in order crude oil to Belarus via Odessa. The personal to coerce it into accepting the opening in Belarus friendship between Lukashenka and Chavez also of a Russian airbase (under Russian command) helped Belarus position itself within the Non- instead. Whereas Belarus’ air defence system is Aligned Movement, a strategy which still serves unable to sustain an attack of more than two Belarus’ interests in coalition-building within the blows, Russia has indeed stopped helping Bela- UN system for example. Inside the post-Soviet rus to mend it. bloc, Belarus has increased military and defence Russia refused for a long time to sell Belarus cooperation with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, with S-400 air defence missile systems, preferring to which it holds joint military exercises. Another deploy its own to Kaliningrad. The two divisions vector is the MENA region, where military coop- that were eventually sent to Belarus in 2016 are eration with the United Arab Emirates in partic- said to be unarmed: Belarus has no funds to pur- ular has intensified over the past decade.37 chase the missiles. Armenia on the other hand The most significant step towards a truly could purchase Iskander at a friendlier price multi-vector foreign and security policy, how- than the standard international market price of ever, stems from Belarus’ quickly evolving rela- half a billion USD (which is slightly less than the tions with China, now the main “third player” in Belarusian yearly military budget).34 Belarus has Belarus.38 In 2013 Belarus signed a comprehen- been asking for Iskander for several years, but sive strategic partnership with China. Even Russia is not willing to subsidise the purchase. though it is clearly not bringing as much divi- On 7 October 2016, President Lukashenka com- dends as Lukashenka hoped and claimed it plained about Russia’s uncompromising stance would39, defence cooperation with China al- on the price tag for these tactical ballistic missile lowed Belarus to acquire, within only two years, systems, saying “So it turns out that in order to the tactical missile technology that Russia re- fused to supply it with.40 As a result of advanced

33https://belarusdigest.com/story/new-arms-for-belarus- 37https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-is-strengthen- and-russias-military-plans-in-the-region/ ing-military-cooperation-with-uae/ 34https://sputnik.by/de- 38https://www.jstor.org/sta- fense_safety/20191028/1043077015/Krepkiy-oreshek- ble/resrep17442.11?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents chem-otvetit-Belarus-na-ugrozy-NATO.html 39https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- 35https://belarusdigest.com/story/new-arms-for-belarus- est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- and-russias-military-plans-in-the-region/ lyse231-EN.pdf 36https://belarusdigest.com/story/ostrogorski-centre- 40https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-li- belarus-becomes-neutral-to-survive/ fri/russieneivisions/minsk-beijing-what-kind-strategic- 11

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN industrial cooperation with Chinese arms-mak- January 2020 visit to Minsk, and the appoint- ers, in 2015 Belarus was able to present its first ment of an US ambassador after a 12 year break. multiple-launch rocket system, named Polo- Belarus’ rapprochement with the EU is poi- nez.41 Initially, Ukraine signalled an interest in soning its bilateral relationship with Russia too. purchasing this weapon, but so far only Azerbai- Moscow did not appreciate Minsk’s February jan bought it, in 2018. This closer military coop- 2017 initiative to unilaterally grant visa-free re- eration with both China and Azerbaijan causes gime for the short stay in Belarus of citizens of Russia much displeasure. 80 countries, including the US and all of the EU member states.43 In response, Russia reintro- Diverging diplomatic priorities duced border controls at its land border with Be- Last but not least, the Belarusian-Russian alli- larus, claiming that its partner’s lax visa policy ance in the political-military field is being chal- could facilitate the illegal entry of potentially lenged by the allies’ divergent attitudes towards dangerous foreigners on Russian soil.44 the West. Whereas Moscow’s relations with the In general, since 2008 and especially since EU and the US significantly deteriorated since 2014 the political alliance between Minsk and the annexation of Crimea, Minsk has consist- Moscow has suffered from growing mutual dis- ently sought to achieve a normalisation of its trust. Russia’s encroachments on Ukrainian ter- own relations with Brussels and Washington. ritorial integrity, and undeclared war in Don- This strategy started bearing fruits, if only in bass, have raised concerns that Belarus could be terms of regime-survival in the face of Western next on the list of neighbouring territories where sanctions: since 2015-2016, Lukashenka is not Russia might want to intervene. The feeling that seen as, and punished for, being “the last dicta- no brotherly alliance could protect Belarusians tor in Europe” – Putin is. In fact, Belarus’ status from an invasion has spread among the elite and in the eyes of Western diplomats radically the wider public, with a rally-around-the flag ef- changed. Prior to a visit to Minsk, in October fect in defence of Belarusian sovereignty.45 This 2018 US Assistant Secretary of State A. Wess arguably served Lukashenka’s regime-survival Mitchell argued that “Today it is the national interests too. sovereignty and territorial integrity of frontier This changing geopolitical environment also states like Ukraine, Georgia, and even Belarus, encouraged Belarus to review its own Military that offer the surest bulwark against Russian Doctrine. The new version, adopted in 2016, neo-imperialism.”42 Such an evolution in Wash- acknowledges the emergence of new, “asym- ington’s approach explains why the normalisa- metric” threats to security (hybrid threats, in a tion of US-Belarus relations has accelerated in Western jargon) – without specifying where recent years, culminating with Mike Pompeo’s they would come from. The 2016 Military Doc- trine mostly reiterates Belarus’ traditional prior- ities, and remains defensive in nature.46 Yet partnership, p. 17-18. 44https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- 41http://www.military-today.com/artillery/polonez.htm est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- 42https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanti- lyse231-EN.pdf cist/state-department-official-sounds-warning-on-rus- 45https://brill.com/view/journals/bela/9/1/article- sian-chinese-influence-in-central-and-eastern-europe/ p27_3.xml 43https://jamestown.org/program/visa-free-travel-bela- 46https://www.aca- rus-dawn-new-era-disinformation-wars/ demia.edu/30212426/Friends_Will_Be_Friends_The_Ne w_Military_Doctrine_of_Belarus 12

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN some analysts consider that the letter and spirit itary alliance should not be taken for granted ei- of the text clearly depart from previously held ther. In fact, some Western security advisers assumptions that a military threat could only started calling NATO planners to pay more at- come from the Western vector (NATO).47 In fact, tention to the role the “Belarus factor” could Belarus started to make military preparations play for bridging dividing lines in Europe52, and which appear more relevant in the event of a to stop assuming that Belarus would merely be conflict with Russia than with a NATO member implementing Russia’s military plans in the state.48 event of an armed conflict on NATO’s north- President Lukashenka even hinted that Rus- eastern flank.53 The third section of this paper sia might pose a threat to Belarus’ security when will come back to this issue. he urged, in May 2015, the Belarusian army to build-up its strength so as to be capable of “be- Myth #2. “Belarus is already an integral ing thrown from Brest to Vitebsk in half a night part of the Russian army” to strike a blow”.49 Armed forces development The conventional wisdom holds that, Belarus priorities for the period to 2020, which were an- being a subordinated ally of Russia, its army nounced in February 2018, included the en- would already be integrated in Russia’s neigh- hanced capacity to respond to hybrid threats bouring Western Military District. The belief that and information warfare, with “selective” re- the Belarusian armed forces are merely an ex- armament oriented towards developing special tension of the Russian army, and that “no inde- operations forces, territorial defence and missile pendent thought or action should be expected” defence capacities, according to Dzianis Melya- from it, is particularly strong in Poland and Lith- ntsou.50 This too would illustrate a new under- uania.54 Unlike the State security (KGB) or police, standing in Belarus that an aggression from Rus- the Belarusian army is believed to display lim- sia cannot be excluded. ited loyalty to Lukashenka personally55, meaning In a December 2019 interview to Ekho Mos- that, faced with the influx of Russian “little green kvy, Lukashenka even expressed confidence that men”, it might swap allegiance and welcome a NATO would not let Russia violate Belarus’ sov- Russian military takeover of the country. ereignty: “if such threat arises from Russia, the While this possibility cannot be excluded, global community will get drawn into a war. such a scenario builds on misleading assump- NATO countries won’t allow it, because they will tions about the extent of Belarus’ military inte- consider it as a threat to them”.51 This might be gration with Russia. The relation between the wishful thinking, but it is nonetheless a useful re- two armies is not equivalent to the one that pre- minder that the Belarusian-Russian political-mil- vails for example in the case of South Ossetia,

47https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-prepares-to- 51https://echo.msk.ru/news/2559701-echo.html adopt-new-military-doctrine/ 52https://www.clingendael.org/sites/de- 48https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- fault/files/pdfs/Report_The_Belarus_factor.pdf pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- 53http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaParame- fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again ters2018.pdf 49https://belarusdigest.com/story/ostrogorski-centre- 54https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- belarus-becomes-neutral-to-survive/ pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- 50www.liia.lv/en/publications/security-of-the-baltic-sea- fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 55 region-revisited-amid-the-baltic-centenary-the-riga-con- https://belarusdigest.com/papers/belarusianarmy.pdf; p. 8. ference-papers-2018-741, p. 181-2. 13

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN which signed an agreement in 2015 permitting narrow this scheme to those officers who had the full integration of its army into the Russian the least chance of ever becoming generals. In a Armed Forces. Despite a high level of mutual un- similar effort to better control its military elites, derstanding and military interoperability, ac- Belarus, like Kazakhstan, has established its own quired thanks to numerous joint exercises, the General Staff school. Whereas air force and air armies of Belarus and Russia should not be seen defence engineers must undergo initial and con- as fully “integrated” however. tinuous training in Russian military academies and faculties, since 1995 all Belarusian pilots Socialisation have been trained in Belarus proper, with some The Belarusian army and Ministry of Defence of them going to Russia only for upgrading their are considered to be pro-Russian because most technological competences following the acqui- Belarusian militaries have been socialised and sition of new Russian aircrafts. Lukashenka has educated in Russian military academies, where also “reportedly begun purging Belarus's secu- they were permeable to Red Army narratives rity apparatus of suspected fifth columnists who and Russophile views about the world and the showed excessive enthusiasm for the Kremlin's historical mission the Russian empire played in imperial projects”.58 it. However, Belarusian experts now contend Another example of Belarus’ efforts at limit- that Lukashenka has improved military educa- ing the socialisation of its military staff in Russia tion in the national universities and specialised is that Belarus recently set up its own national institutions so that less officers will need to go cryptographic school, as part of a considerable to Russia for training, and fall under the spell of effort to provide the State with a secured gov- “Russian World” ideology.56 ernment communications system. This step has It is true that due to the small size of its army been welcomed as one that minimizes depend- (60,000 men, of which 12,000 in civilian duties), ence on external partners – read: Russia – in and to its limited defence budget (USD 715 mln communications security.59 These efforts all il- in 2018), Belarus cannot deliver quality educa- lustrate the commitment of the Belarusian tion and training for highly specialised military leadership to “Belarusianise” its army and ma- competences. On average, it sends some 70-100 ke it less vulnerable to Russian influence. This young specialists each year to Russian military is still a work in progress, the most visible ef- education facilities. Military expert Andrei fects of which are limited to the highest and Parotnikau sees it as a potential security breach, most strategic echelons of military power. since the low level of basic education of these young, easy to influence recruits makes them The Regional Group of Forces vulnerable to indoctrination, or to recruitment Following the adoption of a Concept of Com- by Russian military intelligence services.57 mon Defence Policy in 1998, Belarus and Russia Higher ranking officers regularly visit Russia signed an Agreement on the joint provision of for upgrade training. Since 2006 however, the regional security in the military sphere, which Belarusian Ministry of Defence has strived to detailed the composition and functioning of a

56https://belarusdigest.com/story/the-belarusian-army- 58https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bela- scaled-down-but-better-trained-and-autonomous/ rus/union.htm 57 Interview with Andrei Parotnikau, Warsaw, 30 January 59https://nmnby.eu/yearbook/2019/en/index.html, p. 31 2020. 14

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN joint contingent, the Regional Group of Forces theory, and troops were regularly called to exer- (RGF), to be established as a regional compo- cise under single operative command, it took nent of the CSTO. years for Belarus and Russia to negotiate and On paper, the RGF is composed of 10 divi- sign background agreements on the joint use of sions on permanent alert: the Belarusian armed military infrastructure (airfields, communication forces are entirely involved, alongside the 20th lines, arsenals, maintenance workshops, etc.), army of the Russian Western military district – and the sharing of the burden of providing it minus nuclear forces. Decisions regarding the with logistical support (2004) and military sup- functioning and command of the RGF belong to plies (2011). It is only on 30 October 2017 that the exclusive competence of the Union State (ar- Russia ratified the main founding document of ticle 17 of the 1999 Treaty), meaning they re- the RGF62. Experts contend that the build-up of quire a consensus between the leadership of the NATO’s presence in the region, and the Europe- two countries.60 This, of course, opens the door ans’ project of establishing a “military for bargaining, but it does not guarantee that Schengen”, incentivised the acceleration of the the Russian voice will necessarily have the last unification process, however. word. For now, the RGF remains a virtual creation Joint military exercises however, because article 2 of the above-men- Apart from the joint strategic exercises Zapad tioned Agreement places the RGF under a joint (“West”), which were held in USSR since the governing body only in wartime, and it specifi- 1970s and resumed with Belarusian participa- cally mentions wartime “for both sides”. As An- tion in 2009, the two countries routinely organ- drei Parotnikau underlined, “What is considered ise Shchit Soyuza (“Union Shield”) exercises and wartime for one country is not necessarily such a multitude of smaller snap exercises together. for the other”.61 This implies in practice that, for The scale of Zapad exercises has boosted the im- Belarus to lose its exclusive authority over the age of the Russian-Belarusian military union. troops that it seconds to the RGF, Belarus itself The last editions held on Belarusian soil, in 2013 would have to be at war with the same enemy and 2017, illustrated the high mobility of the as Russia. Whereas the solidarity clause exists in Russian armed forces, on long distances and at the framework of the CSTO, there is none at Un- fast speed, as well as their high level of interop- ion State level that would compel Belarus to erability with their Belarusian counterparts. The come to Russia’s rescue in case of an armed ag- scenarios were designed to raise concern in gression, not to mention the obligation of mili- neighbouring countries – and they succeeded in tary solidarity with Russia, should the latter be spreading panic too. Zapad 2013 – the biggest the one starting hostilities. joint exercise to date, with 22,000 participants, The formalisation of the existence of the Re- of which 10,000 from the armed forces of Bela- gional Group of Forces has been a long and diffi- rus – simulated an incursion in Belarus of for- cult process, marked with bilateral disputes, set- eign-backed “terrorist” groups from the Baltic backs and scandals. Whereas the RGF existed in States; rumour has it that the exercise ended with a mock nuclear strike on Warsaw.

60https://bsblog.info/voennoe-sotrudnichestvo-belarusi- 62https://sputnik.by/defense_safety/20171101/1031694 s-rossiej/ 915/dlya-chego-minsku-i-moskve-soglashenie-o- 61http://www.sn-plus.com/ru/page/politics/9139/ sovmestnoj-vojskovoj-gruppirovke.html 15

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

As for Zapad 2017, it was implicitly designed rately, and Russian forces boycotted the cus- to train both armies for a hypothetical conflict tomary dinner held after the exercise – some- with NATO. The exercise formally mobilised thing Glen E. Howard underlined was unheard of “only” 12,700 troops, of which, for the part that in Belarus-Russian defence cooperation. This unfolded on Belarusian soil, 5,500 soldiers from distancing, in his view, “could be a turning point Belarus and 3,000 from Russia – a number that in ties that shows the limitations of Moscow’s Belarus had curtailed in order to respect its CFE ability to bully and intimidate Belarus” 67. Not obligations, in spite of Moscow’s last minute de- only did it prove crucial for Belarus’ effort to stay mand to bring in more forces (an entire tank for- away from Russia’s confrontation with NATO mation).63 It is believed however that this STRA- powers, thereby sparing Belarus the damage of TEX was part of a much larger operation to test Western sanctions: it also improved Belarus’ im- coordination, control and command, since three age as a reliable contributor to regional security additional tactical-operational exercises took and stability.68 place almost simultaneously in Russia (in Mur- mansk, the Southern and Central military dis- Russia’s military presence in Belarus tricts respectively), totalling an estimated 60- Another caveat when it comes to assessing 70,000 participating troops.64 the level of integration between the two armies Specific aspects of preparations for the 2017 concerns territorial presence. The Constitution exercise have alarmed analysts in Belarus, who of Belarus forbids the permanent stationing of thought the military movements could lay the foreign combat units on its territory. Unlike Ar- groundwork for Russia taking action against Bel- menia, Belarus does not host any Russian mili- arus itself, or remaining in the country at the end tary base. So far, it resists Moscow’s pressure for of the exercise – as happened in 2008 and 2014 the establishment of a permanent Russian air- when Russia held exercises near the Georgian base on its territory. True, on 12 March 2014, and Ukrainian borders.65 Consequently, Belarus Lukashenka asked Russia to deploy military air- strove to make Zapad 2017 as open and trans- crafts to Belarus, as a response to NATO’s ex- parent as possible. pected military build-up near its borders. The Lukashenka irritated Putin by announcing next day 6 Su-27SM3 fighter jets and three mili- Belarus would abide by the 2011 Vienna Docu- tary transport aircraft were redeployed to the ment of the OSCE on Confidence and Security Babruysk airfield, and on 15 March 2014 a long- Building Measures66, and it indeed sent a timely invitation to military observers from five neigh- bouring NATO countries – much to the Russian general staff’s discontent. Unlike in 2013, the two presidents watched the exercises sepa-

63https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up- 66https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publica- loads/2019/09/Howard-Why-Belarus-Matters- tions/witness-zapad web.pdf?x54374 67https://jamestown.org/wp- 64https://www.cairn.info/revue-strategique-2019-1- content/uploads/2019/09/Howard-Why-Belarus- page-213.htm?contenu=resume Matters-web.pdf?x54374 65https://belarusdigest.com/story/will-russia-occupy-bel- 68https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working- arus-in-2017/ papers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 16

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN range radar detection aircraft arrived at the Bar- State from potential aircraft or missile incur- anovichi airfield.69 These aircrafts stayed in Bel- sions from NATO countries. Its own air defence arus on a 3 months rotation base, but within a capacity being limited or outdated (in 2012 Bel- year they had all been sent back to Russia.70 arus withdrew from service almost its entire Russian non-armed staff is present in the two fleet of Su-24 and Su-27 planes) this is a task that military facilities that Belarus has been leasing the Belarusian army fulfils mostly thanks to Rus- (free of charge) to Russia pursuant of an agree- sian support – which has been assessed as mini- ment signed in 1995 and which is due to be re- mum however.72 negotiated by mid-2020. One is the Volga early- Russian–Belarusian cooperation in the area warning radar station (in Hantsavichi, near Bar- of air defence de facto pre-existed the signing of anovichi in the Brest oblast’), which the Russian a Joint Air Defence agreement in February 2009, army uses since 1964 for tracking intercontinen- but it suffered from the fact that this treaty took tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from the long to adopt, and even longer to ratify: the Bel- north-Atlantic area. This facility became less vi- arusian president withheld the signature of a de- tal for Russia’s air defence since the completion cree approving ratification until February 2012. in 2011 of an equivalent radar station in Pioner- This delay was caused by a long-lasting dispute ski (Kaliningrad oblast’). The other leased facility as to who would be nominated as the Com- is the 43rd communication centre of the Russian mander of the JADS: Lukashenka insisted that it Navy, situated in Vileyka (near the Lithuanian should be a General from the Belarusian air border), which hosts a very low frequency trans- force, a demand that Russia agreed to in 2016 mitter (VLFT) for secure communication be- only. Pursuant of the agreement, and even tween the General Staff of the Russian fleet and though Putin asked the Russian Parliament to try nuclear submarines on duty in the Atlantic, In- and amend this provision, “Officials in Moscow dian and Pacific oceans.71 These facilities employ do not have the final say in whether Belarusian about 1200 and 250 specialists respectively, air defence reacts and fires on a foreign in- some of which are citizens of Belarus, and a ma- truder; Minsk simply consults with Moscow”.73 jority – without uniforms or weapons. The JADS of Belarus and Russia was meant to be a prototype for the establishment of regional The Joint Air Defence System defence systems at CSTO level (in Central Asia, Even if Belarusian and Russian Air Defence and the Caucasus). Yet it could hardly be claimed Forces are indeed integrated under the single to serve that purpose, given the constant bar- umbrella of a Joint Air Defence System (JADS), gaining surrounding the issue. For years Moscow cooperation in this field is far from satisfactory. has refused to give Minsk sophisticated weap- In its capacity as the military outpost of the Un- ons such as the Su-30, whereas Belarus did not ion State on the Western front, Belarus is ex- have the means to purchase these costly air- pected to protect the air space of the Union crafts from its own budget.74 As the Soviet-era

69https://www.sn-plus.com/ru/page/politics/9722/ 72https://belarusdigest.com/story/does-the-single-air-de- 70https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu- fence-system-bring-belarus-closer-to-russia/ rope/2015/12/27/russian-airbase-belarus-remains- 73https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up- limbo/ loads/2019/09/Howard-Why-Belarus-Matters- 71https://sputnik.by/defense_safety/20171101/1031694 web.pdf?x54374, p. 15. 915/dlya-chego-minsku-i-moskve-soglashenie-o- 74https://belarusdigest.com/story/second-hand-arms- sovmestnoj-vojskovoj-gruppirovke.html from-russia-massive-belarusian-army-exercises-belarus- 17

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN fighter jets of the Belarusian fleet were becom- and according to Alexander Lanoszka “This re- ing obsolete, a growing hole emerged in the re- luctance persists despite how Belarus has seen gional air defence system – which, as Siarhei an expanding NATO presence on its Western Bohdan argued, should have been filled with so- borders since the 2016 Warsaw Summit”.76 phisticated weaponry from Russia, had Belarus Against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian been valued as a military ally. “Speculating on conflict, the argument was also that Belarus did this danger, Moscow tried to stop relying on the not want to serve as a rear base for a potential Belarusian air force altogether” 75: it reactivated airborne attack on Kyiv. 77 Peaceful good-neigh- the 689th aviation regiment in Kaliningrad to en- bourhood being the backbone of Belarus’ neu- hance Russia’s forward air defence against trality pledge and of its foreign policy, Belarus NATO. In parallel, the Kremlin refused to rearm must avoid provoking its neighbours. From a Bel- the Belarusian air force at Russian taxpayers’ ex- arusian standpoint there is no need for such a penses, and put pressure on Minsk to accept base, as it doesn’t make “practical, political or hosting a Russian air base in Belarus instead. military sense”, as Foreign Minister Vladimir Ma- key bluntly put it recently.78 Airbase, what airbase? Chatham House expert Keir Giles has argued The way this pressure was exerted, and Bela- that the standoff over the Russian airbase was rus’ resistance to it, challenges mainstream per- part of a consistent pattern of Russia announc- ceptions of Belarus as an extension of Russia’s ing “joint” defence initiatives which had in fact military territory. In April 2013, Russia an- not been endorsed by Minsk. In 2016 for exam- nounced that it will establish an air base in Bela- ple Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu an- rus in 2015, claiming that this had been agreed nounced the creation of a “joint military organi- with the Belarusian leadership. A few days later, zation of the Union State”, including notional President Lukashenka presented a watered unification of the two countries’ armed forces. down version of the agreement, arguing that it This unilateral statement was not even com- mainly concerned the delivery of Russian Su-27P mented on by Belarus. Other examples include aircrafts... In the following years, Russian media Russia repeatedly stating its intention to deploy regularly reverted to the topic, while Russian of- missile systems on Belarusian territory, as a ficials were making ever more insisting claims more or less routine response to US and NATO that Belarus had no choice but to agree. initiatives. “But yet again, despite Russia pre- Yet the Belarusian leadership consistently de- senting this move as a joint initiative, it is firmly clined the offer, asking Russia to finance the resisted by Belarus”.79 modernisation of the Belarusian air forces in- The same goes for the military-industrial and stead. Notwithstanding statements about loy- defence fields: in spite of the tight connection alty to Russia, Belarusian leaders have been un- and interdependence between the military-in- willing to host forward-deployed Russian forces, dustrial complexes of Belarus and Russia, for now the former retains a sovereign control over

security-digest/ russian-airbase-minsk-strengthens-its-air-force/ 75https://belarusdigest.com/story/belaruss-new-russian- 78https://vpk-news.ru/articles/53964 arms-what-minsk-has-given-in-exchange/ 79https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- 76http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaParame- pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- ters2018.pdf; p. 81. fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 77https://belarusdigest.com/story/thwarting-plans-for-a- 18

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN its strategic assets, and the latter has to acknow- to 1995. Belarus for its part produces several of ledge that integration could hardly proceed any the high tech components (optics, electronics, further, at least under the current Belarusian telecommunications) used for manufacturing, leadership. repairing or upgrading Soviet- or Russian-made military equipment, including tanks, aircrafts Myth #3. “Belarus is about to lose its and radars. sovereignty” The Belarusian VPK is extremely dependent not only on Russian state procurement orders Over the past 25 years, the threat of a Russian for such products: as a sub-supplier, it also de- absorption of Belarus has recurrently been pends on Rosoboronexport, the Russian state in- waived by the Belarusian authorities to justify termediary agency for VPK exports, to provide their request for Western concessions with as spare parts and services for traditional third few democratic conditions attached as possible. country customers of Soviet-Russian technol- Each time Russia decided to limit its economic or ogy.80 Entering the world market as a segment political support for the Belarusian government, of the Russian VPK, Belarusian defence enter- as is the case in the current phase, rumours of prises do not receive direct payments from them an imminent takeover have resurfaced. The fear in hard currency: barter exchanges of raw mate- of such a scenario became particularly palpable rial and services remain widespread among the when mass media disseminated sensational VPK enterprises of the Union State. The poten- forecasts according to which the famously un- tial to modernise and diversify the Belarusian sustainable economic system of Belarus would VPK by developing direct military cooperation be on the brink of collapse, as in 2011 for exam- with new customers beyond the CIS is limited to ple. It re-emerged in 2019 under the backdrop some niche products in which Belarus has devel- of opaque bilateral negotiations over “deeper oped a competitive advantage, such as the man- integration”: most analysts came to speculate ufacturing of strike drones81, pointer-tracker op- on Belarus’ vulnerability to Russian encroach- tronics technology, war games simulators and ments on its sovereignty. Rumours of this kind software, as well as special textiles to equip the fuelled conspiracy theories that can be classified soldier of the future. The main customers are in four complementary categories. MENA countries (the UAE, Qatar, Syria), Azerbai- The Belarusian military-industrial complex jan and Ukraine, as well as some “friendly” coun- (VPK) – an easy prey for Russian investors? tries in Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia) and Asia. Factories, companies and repair plants of the Dependence is a reciprocal relation, how- Belarusian military-industrial complex (VPK) ever. Russia fully depends on Belarus for provid- have been tightly interlocked with the Russian ing its own VPK and army with chassis for mobile VPK ever since the Soviet times. Russia is Bela- missile complexes such as Topol-M, Iskander, S- rus’ main provider of defence products, which it 300 and S-400, as well as the multiple launch has long been supplying at preferential terms, rocket system Uragan. This makes the Belarus- pursuant of a bilateral agreement on advancing military-technological cooperation dating back

80https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/2013-04- 81https://sputnik.by/columnists/20180302/1033990072/ 29/trading-sovereignty-outcome-belaruss-integration- kuda-poletyat-belorusskie-drony-kamikadze.html russia-security-and-defence 19

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN ian dual-use factories that produce these chas- however that pressure could intensify in the sis – the Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) and the near future regarding the “integration” (read: Minsk Tractor Wheel Plant (MZKT) – particularly absorption) of MZKT83, due to the alleged failure vulnerable to Russian appetites. In fact, the Rus- of Russia’s own Platforma-O programme.84 sian VPK has ambitioned to “re-integrate” these Should Lukashenka “trade-off” the privatisation jewels of the Soviet crown into the Russian de- of MZKT in exchange for the resumption of Rus- fence production chain for quite some years.82 sian subsidies, or sell the Mozyr oil refinery to Alongside three other dual-use companies of refill state budgetary reserves, this would surely the Belarusian VPK (Grodno Azot, Peleng and In- be seen as relinquishing part of Belarusian eco- tegral), these chassis manufacturers have been nomic sovereignty. For now, nothing of the sort the object of an “integration bargaining” for is happening, however. over a decade: while Belarus demands that they’d be granted the same bidding rights as Zapad military exercises: positioning troops to their Russian competitors to all Russian govern- occupy Belarus? ment tenders, including defence procurements, Starting in 2015, several observers have be- Russia has offered instead a fusion-acquisition come wary of the alleged risk that Belarus might scheme for their privatisation and their vertical fall victim of a Russian military invasion along integration in its own VPK. Yet in that event Rus- the lines of a Crimean scenario (blitz occupation sia’s aim would be to repatriate the technologies and managed referendum on “reunification”). to Russia, rather than investing in the moderni- Most Belarusian experts consider that this is a sation of these companies, especially in the least very unlikely scenario however, because Russia productive state-owned enterprises (SOE). For might not actually need to occupy Belarus mili- the Belarusian regime, this scenario would imply tarily to subjugate it politically. high social costs: these plants employ dozens of Yet the recent reorganisation and beefing up thousands of workers who would either lose of the Russian Western military district, where their jobs or emigrate to Russia, thereby accel- the number of operational-level headquarters erating an already worrying brain drain. This, in has grown from four to six armies85, and two turn, would negatively impact Lukashenka’s ele- new motorized regiments were deployed near ctoral rating, since blue collars and employees of the Belarusian border (at Yelnia and Klintsy), de- SOEs form part of his traditional support base. note a revision of the functional logic of the Re- Up until now, Lukashenka has successfully re- gional Group of Forces, and a change of attitude sisted Russian pressure to open the capital of of the Russian leadership towards Belarus as a these and other strategic companies to foreign strategic ally.86 Going further, Arseni Sivitski and investors, favouring instead the pursuit of pro- Yuri Tsarik from the Minsk-based Centre for gramme-based cooperation. In fact, Belarus has Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies (CSFPS) trig- not sold any of the companies that Russia was gered a panic movement in early 2017 when interested in buying, save for the gas pipeline they alleged that Russia might intend to leave operator Beltransgas (in 2011). Experts contend troops behind on Belarusian territory following

82https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/2013-04- 84https://naviny.by/article/20191105/1572931859- 29/trading-sovereignty-outcome-belaruss-integration- belarus-pomogla-kitayu-obognat-rossiyu russia-security-and-defence 85https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian- 83 https://naviny.by/article/20191215/1576391301-mzkt- ground-forces-posture-towards-west mozhet-stat-zhertvoy-uglublennoy-integracii 86http://csfps.by/en/node/349 20

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN the September 2017 Zapad exercises, as it had Absorbing Belarus: a solution to Putin’s 2024 done in 2008 and 2014 when Russian troops mo- succession problem? bilised for military drills were used for attacking In 2018, another narrative erupted according 87 Georgia and Ukraine soon after. . to which the Kremlin would be considering using Their allegation built on the observation that a refurbished Union State as an instrument for the Russian Transport Ministry had received solving Putin’s so-called “2024 succession prob- from the Ministry of Defence a request for lem”.93 In both countries, analysts argued that providing it with over 4000 coaches for the Vladimir Putin, whom the Russian Constitution transport of troops and material to Belarus for forbids to run for a third consecutive term at the holding these exercises – that is 20 times more end of his current presidential term in March 88 coaches than for the Zapad 2013 exercises. 2024, could overcome this limitation by running This sparked concern in neighbouring countries for a similar position, but in a different capacity that Zapad 2017 could provide cover for prepar- – that is to say, as President of the Union State 89 ing another Russian military adventure , includ- of Belarus and Russia.94 This prospect was raised ing a possible attack on neighbouring NATO to explain why the Russian side was so eager to 90 member states. This fear was overblown, and intensify negotiations with Belarus on stepping never materialised: however impressive, such up and deepening “integration” throughout numbers could hardly permit the deployment of 2019, and fuelled the fear that Belarus would enough forces to invade Belarus and sustain a lose its sovereignty in the process. 91 long-term occupation of the country too. This This did not happen however, as Putin an- said, the scenario evoked by Sivitski and Tsarik nounced on 15 January 2020 the launch of a con- in 2017 could well become more topical in the stitutional reform instead, meant to allow him to coming months, should Russia overreact to stay in control after the formal end of his current NATO’s own Defender Europe 2020 exercises. presidential term.95 As Belarusian analyst Due to take place near Belarusian borders in Artyom Shraibman argued, this development is Spring 2020, in mid-March Defender Europe ex- only partly a relief for Belarus, which will have to ercises were scaled down and NATO cancelled “pay” Moscow back for its political autonomy at linked exercises in the region due to the Covid- some point anyway.96 92 19 pandemic however. By demanding “deeper integration” within the Union State, Vladimir Putin made Belarus an offer he knew Aliaksandr Lukashenka would not

87https://nationalinterest.org/feature/zapad-2017-nato- 92https://shape.nato.int/defender-europe/de- should-be-keeping-eye-russias-training-20540 fender/newsroom/exercise-defendereurope-20-an- 88http://csfps.by/en/node/341 nouncement-covid19-implications 89https://jamestown.org/program/rekindled-train- 93https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/11/belarus-presi- wagon-debate-calls-question-planned-size-zapad-2017- dent-wont-go-without-a-fight-lukashenko-putin/ exercise/ 94https://belsat.eu/en/news/putin-wrestling-with-the- 90https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/russia- year-2024-problem-khodorkovsky/ hit-multiple-targets-with-zapad-2017-pub-75278 95https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen- 91https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/sum- tary/2020-03-13/everlasting-putin-and-reform-russian- mary/so_close_to_russia_belarus_and_the_zapad_mili- constitution tary_exercise_7221 96https://euroradio.fm/en/shraibman-after-putins-state- ment-belarus-can-relax-some-sense 21

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN accept. The outcome of Belarus’ refusal to fur- Belarus belongs to the Russian World dates back ther integrate is that Russia might well reach in to 2015-2016, and it has been widely docu- a seemingly polite manner the goal which prob- mented since then.98 Russophile media and nu- ably was its priority from the onset: finalising the merous commentators close to the Kremlin “marketization” of Russian-Belarusian relations, keep issuing unveiled warnings against a “Ukrai- in order to relieve the Russian budget from the ne 2.0” scenario in Belarus – drowning into a so- burden of supporting Belarus economically. called civil war, thereby prompting a Russian in- Even though political integration seems post- tervention – should Lukashenka fail to prevent a poned for now, the Kremlin has not abandoned Colour Revolution or a pro-Western plot. its ambition to coerce the Belarusian leadership These statements multiplied in response to a into delivering more in terms of geopolitical loy- grassroots process, labelled “soft Belarusianisa- alty. As president Lukashenka will be seeking re- tion”, which erupted in Belarusian society in the election in 2020 – first round is set on 9 August – 2010s and accelerated after the annexation of he is now again particularly vulnerable to Rus- Crimea. Vadzim Mazhejka has conceptualised sian influence or possibly interference during soft Belarusianisation as referring to “the grad- the campaign. Whereas the Kremlin’s spin doc- ual, purposeful expansion of the use of Belarus- tors are unlikely to support an opposition candi- ian language, support for the development and date against the acting president, they might still dissemination of Belarusian culture, and the try and destabilise “Batka” Lukashenka by acti- preservation and promotion of the Belarusian vating, as they did in 2010, their (dis)information historical and cultural heritage”.99 Russian au- warfare arsenal against him. This threat should thorities interpret this national awakening as a be measured against the yardstick of Russia’s re- Russophobic type of nationalism – and, therefo- newed efforts at winning the hearts and minds re, as an illegitimate and dangerous trend.100 of Belarusians, a tactic which is part of a wider Lukashenka’s eccentric understanding of his soft power strategy meant to foster pro-Russian alliance obligations, and the fact that he tried to opinions in Belarus. exploit the rally-around-the-flag potential of soft Belarusianisation for regime-legitimation Not a myth: Belarus is extremely vulnerable to purposes, have convinced the Kremlin that an Russia’s ‘sharp power’ offensive offensive on the information front was neces- Much has been said about the level of inte- sary to prevent the drifting of Belarus further gration that exists between the peoples of Bela- away from Russia’s sphere of influence. This is rus and Russia in socio-cultural terms: their close where Russian neo-imperialist, authoritarian historical ties, linguistic proximity and the fact “soft power” tactics – aka “sharp power”101 – that Belarusians are inextricably integrated in came into play. the Russian information space97 justify claims Intel about the level of penetration of Russian that the two nations would actually be one, arti- soft power into Belarusian civil society has given ficially divided among two states since 1991. The activation of the narrative according to which

97http://east-center.org/information-security-belarus- 99https://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/6584.html challenges/ 100https://brill.com/view/journals/bela/9/1/article- 98https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-stud- p27_3.xml ies/2016-11-07/end-myth-a-brot-herly-belarus-russian- 101https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/forget-hearts- soft-power-belarus-after and-minds-sharp-power/ 22

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN rise to alarmist scenarios about Russia’s “creep- faire of the authorities with regards to this em- ing assault” on the sovereignty of Belarus.102 In erging nationalism.105 an eponymous report, Belarusian experts from Running counter to previous assessments the International Strategic Action Network for presenting Belarusians as apathetically pro-Rus- Security (iSans) detailed the channels of Russian sian, in recent years the issue of safeguarding influence that readily operate in Belarus. They Belarusian sovereignty against Russian en- evidenced how Russian foundations, GONGOs croachments has become an increasingly popu- (such as CIS-EMO) and internet platforms (Reg- lar endeavour. Soft Belarusianisation is not cir- num, Sputnik) advocate support for integration, cumscribed to the pro-European, pro-demo- and spread pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian sen- cratic, young, or urbanised middle class. In fact, timents in Belarus. As elsewhere, they rely on concern for the future of Belarus as an inde- connections with the Russian Orthodox Church, pendent, neutral country has become quite defenders of “West Russism” as well as right- trendy, and this of course impacted the self-per- wing youth (such as Rumol) and paramilitary ception of Belarusians as part of the Union State. groups (including Cossacks).103 Public opinion polls show that most Belarus- Due to a weak national self-identity, and after ians does not favour the prospect of “deeper in- two decades of Lukashenka’s “creole national- tegration”. Asked what format Belarus’ relation- ism”104, Belarusian public opinion is extremely ship with Russia should take, in August 2019 vulnerable to Russophile and integrationist nar- more than 75% opted for “independent and ratives. The capacity of Belarusian civil society to friendly” relations, whereas 15.6% preferred in- resist Russian assaults on its cultural sovereignty tegration within the Union State, and only 1.4% is still limited, in spite of the benevolent laissez that Belarus become part of the Russian Federa- tion (see Fig.1).106

Figure 1. The format of relationship between Belarus’ and Russia

102https://isans.org/wp-content/docs/Belarus_re- 7299790 port_eng_iSANS_10.03.2019_BRIEF_VERSION.pdf 105https://brill.com/view/journals/bela/9/1/article- 103https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/civil-soci- p27_3.xml ety-under-russias-threat-building-resilience-ukraine-bela- 106https://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/7015.html?fbclid=I rus-and-moldova wAR1O9FxONAmc3FiGKtv6u6KbqpDYIEw78ixzBfXfXEzqn 104https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/088832540 TteaCuz7OH-U3g 23

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

Figure 2. The choice between two Unions Confronted with a binary choice (“in which un- sistent with the trend, identified in 2018 by Eu- ion would it be better for Belarusians to live – in robarometer, that 61% of Belarusians consider the European Union or in a Union with Russia?”), peace, security and stability as the most im- the share of respondents favouring Russia has portant values, a preference that inspires them decreased from 63.9% in January 2018 to 54.5% growing distrust in Russia-led integration pro- in August 2019, and it was down to 40.4% in De- jects for that matter.108 cember 2019 (only 8 percentage points above As this section evidenced, mutual distrust is the answers favouring the EU, which rose from but one of the elements which shed doubt on 20.2% to 32% during the same period)107 (see the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Fig.2). Russia. Having debunked various myths regard- Uniting with the EU now has the preference ing the Russian-Belarusian alliance, the paper of a majority of people aged below 35, and sup- now moves on to highlight how it might evolve port for this option rockets to 46.2% among 18- and interact with its regional geopolitical envi- 24 year old Belarusians. Analysing this data, ronment. politologist Valeria Kostyugova noted that among the factors that weighed in favour of a REALITIES: THE WORST IS NEVER union with the EU, security considerations (“The CERTAIN EU will make life safer” or “Together with Eu- In 2016 the RAND Corporation conducted rope, we'll be more protected in defence wargames in the Baltic Sea Region109 which led terms”) received quite high scores. This is con- to conclude that NATO was “hopelessly out-

107https://nmnby.eu/news/analyt- 108https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-in- ics/7015.html?fbclid=IwAR1O9FxONAmc3FiGKtv6u6Kbqp formed/publications/opinion-survey-2018-belarus DYIEw78ixzBfXfXEzqnTteaCuz7OH-U3g 109https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_re- ports/RR1253.html 24

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN matched and perilously exposed to a Russian in- Belarusian vulnerabilities vasion (…) and, in the best case scenario, unable Now that Russia is apparently willing and able to prevent a Russian fait accompli seizure of the to constrain Belarus more than ever before, the 110 Baltic States in a short-notice conflict”. The is- question arises whether Belarus has the capabil- sue of what the Russian-Belarusian alliance will ities to resist Russia’s “coercion to integrate”.112 become is therefore a source of legitimate con- Even though an outright absorption of Belarus cern for neighbouring states, and it recently be- seems unlikely, Belarus remains vulnerable to came part of NATO’s so-called collective “North- Russian pressures for further political-military 111 eastern flank” problem. integration for at least two reasons. Firstly, Bel- Experts highlighted the pivotal role that Bela- arus is and will continue to be economically de- rusian territory, in providing Russia with strate- pendent on Russia. Secondly, in spite of its for- gic depth, would play in the event of a conven- mal resistance to “Russian World” narratives, tional conflict in the region. Few questioned, Belarusian civil society is and will continue to be however, the assumption that the Belarusian an easy target for Russian integrationist pres- leadership would necessarily side with the sures. This, in turn, increases the probability that Kremlin, and implement whole-heartedly the Russia will continue favouring “non-linear” (hy- measures which Zapad exercises have prepared brid) tactics in order to reach its strategic goal of the Belarusian army for. controlling Belarus. Yet and as the reality check conducted in this Since 2014, Belarus has started repositioning paper tried to evidence, these days the Russian- itself strategically by emphasizing its added Belarusian union does not guarantee a fully value as a mediator and bridge-builder in Eu- functional military alliance however. Due to its rope, and strives to strengthen Belarusian na- numerous vulnerabilities, Belarus could, in the- tional identity in the face of Russian “soft ory, be absorbed by Russia. Yet whether Russia power” projection in the country. This owed Bel- harbours any intention to annex it is a question arus considerable animosity from its Russian worth addressing too. A third determining factor neighbour, and fuelled fears that a Crimean or affecting mid-term scenarios for the region is Donbas scenario should not be excluded a priori. the volatility of Russia-NATO relations: the cur- In terms of identity and military might, Belarus rent mutual threat perceptions create security would not be strong enough to wage a war dilemmas for the various players, thereby rais- against Russia, should the latter attack it.113 Yet ing the probability of conflict-escalation too. Belarus would not withstand a Russian takeo- From this acknowledgement derive a number of ver either if it was to proceed by way of hybrid recommendations which decision-makers measures only. should keep in mind when designing their for- The process is actually already under way, ac- eign and neighbourhood policies towards Bela- cording to many Belarusian experts who factor rus and Russia. in the societal and informational dimensions of

110https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/outnumbered- of-the-report-coercion-to-integration-russias-creeping- outranged-and-outgunned-how-russia-defeats-nato/ assault-on-the-sovereignty-of-belarus/ 111https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-de- 113https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- terrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying- est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/ lyse231-EN.pdf 112https://isans.org/en/isans-publishes-a-brief-version- 25

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Russian interference in their analysis. The acti- The problem for Belarus is that its alleged vation of Russian soft (or “sharp”) power in Bel- neutrality is not credible enough to be re- arus raised concerns in NATO countries too, no- spected. Belarus is integrated in the Union State, tably in the Baltic States where Russian hybrid CIS and CSTO security architecture to such an ex- warfare is an all too familiar phenomenon.114 tent that it could hardly uphold its neutrality Among those experts providing policy-analysis pledge, should Russia step up pressure in order for US strategy-makers, Alexander Lanoszka for to extract concessions in the political-military example highlighted that as a result of this vul- field. Hosting a Russian airbase, air defence sys- nerability, Belarus may face Russian provoca- tems, or even more so ground troops – which tions at the sub-conventional level115, and be- probably remains an objective of Moscow’s pol- come “self-deterred from responding forcefully icy towards Belarus – “would undermine Bela- out of a desire to avoid militarily confronting a rusian aspirations for neutrality, by presenting superior foe in Russia” – a logical consequence both a potential source of hostile activity against of its alliance entrapment dilemma.116 Western neighbours and a target for counter- Belarus does not wish to go to war with Rus- measures”.120 sia, but it would not want to go to war for Russia Lukashenka traditionally exaggerates the either. Unlike its NATO neighbours, Belarus is danger of the Russian threat in the eyes of the lacking the financial means necessary for the Western public, so as to demand the lifting of modernisation of its military equipment. Bela- conditionality principles towards his regime. Yet rusian military expenditure, at 715 million USD this might not be sustainable in the long run, in 2018 (1.3% of GDP)117, is extremely modest, should Western partners stick to their own val- and clearly insufficient for covering the needs of ues and demand that the government of Belarus the Belarusian armed forces in terms of invest- deliver more in terms of democratic reforms and ments (for upgrading or replacing ageing equip- respect for human rights. For lack of a clear will- ment). According to the IISS Military Balance, ingness to comply, EU economic support is likely Belarus spends twice less on its military than to remain low. Lithuania does, despite having a population over At the close of the 2019 integration mara- three times the size of Lithuania’s.118 Hence Bel- thon, the new status quo within the Union State arus is likely to continue its strategy of war- is undeniably negative for Minsk. Lukashenka avoidance, which for the past years has proved can present his successful opposition to deeper successful and delivered some benefits, thanks integration as a personal diplomatic victory, but to the efficiency of president Lukashenka’s in economic terms Russia is clearly winning. Ne- “dictaplomatic bargaining” (with the West) and gotiations are not over, and they will remain “entrapment blackmailing” (vis-à-vis Russia).119 tough. 2020 is a challenging year for Lukashen- ka, who seeks re-election amid unprecedented domestic pressure. The outbreak of the Covid-

114https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publica- 117https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 118 tions/NATO_AT_70_and_Baltics.pdf , p. 306. https://mwi.usma.edu/strategic-enabler-point-vulner- ability-role-belarus-russias-military-plans/ 115https://www.stratcomcoe.org/alanoszka-russian-hy- 119https://fliphtml5.com/thbs/sojv/basic brid-warfare-and-extended-deterrence-eastern-europe 120https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- 116http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaParame- pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- ters2018.pdf fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 26

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19 epidemic aggravated economic recession, had indeed turned to third countries – Ukraine, and the way it has been (mis)managed sparked Poland, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic popular protests. Serious challengers unexpect- States – with trade offers which Latvia, Lithuania edly emerged in the wake of the campaign. Un- and Azerbaijan positively replied to. The Prime willing or unable to let elections proceed un- ministers of Poland and Lithuania have also been managed, the regime reverted to pre-emptive discussing how to help Belarus increase its en- authoritarian measures, arresting hundreds ergy security. This is crucial for Ukraine as well, throughout May. This tense situation opens up since over a third of the oil it imports comes avenues for Russian interference, increasing Bel- from Belarusian refineries. arus’ vulnerability to hybrid influence and inte- The United States unpredictably sent a strong grationist pressure, and putting Lukashenka’s signal to Minsk – and Moscow – on 1 February personal survival under stress.121 2020 when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo an- Back in January 2020 Belarusian political ana- nounced that the US was willing and able to sup- lyst Andrei Liakhovich was still ruling out Bela- ply Belarus “with 100% of the oil it needs, at rusian concessions to Russia, at least in 2020. competitive price”, in order to “help it achieve Russian pressure, he claimed, “will not be an ob- the independence and sovereignty it seeks”.125 stacle to Lukashenko’s victory in the presidential Should words turn into deeds, this would relieve “election” to be held in 2020.”122 In the same Belarus from Gazprom-diplomacy pressure for a vein, Liakhovich considered that even the termi- while. If not, then Belarus’ struggle for energy nation of Russian energy subsidies will not am- autonomy might lack leverage, and incur higher ount to an economic catastrophe for Belarus.123 costs.126 Yet Minsk’s ability to counterweight this pro- On a separate note, the problem remains that spect depends on the continuing diversification Minsk’s efforts at mending relations with the of its foreign and energy policy. West might hit a wall. In the event of mass pro- Energy dependence is a two-way relation- tests, the Lukashenka regime would probably re- ship: Russia too is dependent on Belarus, for the turn to its old practices of mass repression. This, transit of its gas exports, which makes Moscow in turn, would justify the reintroduction of West- interested in a trouble-free relationship with ern sanctions and opprobrium, pushing Belarus Minsk. The situation appears as less favorable back into Russia’s embrace. This should be ex- for Belarus when it comes to oil.124 Nonetheless, pected in case the government violently re- it can threaten to close its pipelines for Russian pressed street protests, for example against exports, and dedicate them instead to importing electoral fraud or following the likely degrada- oil from alternative sources, at least as a bar- tion of the economic situation, as happened in gaining chip. On 31 December 2019, Lukashenka 2011 when price hikes on car fuel led to street made a statement along those lines, and two protests known as the “clapping” (aka “silent”) weeks later his government announced that it revolution127. Even the ruling elite might hold

121https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/com- 124https://eurasia.expert/u-belarusi-ne-ostalos-rychagov- ment/belarusians-left-facing-covid-19-alone neftyanogo-davleniya-na-rossiyu/ 122Andrei Liakhovich, Development of the Situation in Bel- 125https://time.com/5775904/us-belarus-oil/ arus in the Second Half of November 2019 - the First Half 126https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-struggles-to- of January 2020, newsletter, January 2020. find-alternative-oil-supplies-as-standoff-with-russia-lin- 123https://thinktanks.by/publication/2019/03/19/andrey- gers/ lyahovich-rossiya-ne-sposobna-poglotit-belarus-i-ne- 127https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar- budet-pytatsya-eto-sdelat.html 27

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President Lukashenka personally responsible for Western sanctions are here to stay, and they mismanaging the Covid-19 crisis.128 These possi- would probably be expanded if Russia annexed ble developments are all highly susceptible to Belarus. This might act as a disincentive. Russian provocation and propaganda. Secondly, Russia doesn’t need force or even For now, Minsk seems capable of continuing “little green men” to integrate Belarus to the ex- its balancing game between Russia and the tent that it needs, that is to say merely as a ter- West: it can resist Russian demands for conces- ritory where to install a military base and air de- sions on deeper integration. How long this may fence missiles. This would be enough for Russia last mostly depends on the level of Moscow’s to expand its strategic depth and complete the own ambitions regarding Belarus. military encirclement of Ukraine, while also holding at bay those NATO states that it per- Russian intentions ceives as the most “anti-Russian” (the Baltic Since 2016 the possibility of a Russian military States, and Poland). operation against Belarus is taken seriously in Moscow’s end goal is not a forceful absorp- Western capitals.129 Several experts have fore- tion or occupation of Belarus: it only needs to in- casted a Russian takeover and the subsequent fluence the domestic situation enough to force “de-sovereignization” of Belarus, whose role as Belarusian authorities to make strategic conces- a buffer and potentially as a springboard is cru- sions that guarantee Russian interests.131 Throu- cial for Russia. Yet the likelihood of such scenar- ghout 2019 it was thought that a more inte- ios might be overrated. For now, Russia is mostly grated and institutionalised Union State would interested in limiting the foreign policy auton- fulfil that purpose, but Lukashenka resisted the omy of Belarus. Full Finlandization goes hand in move. Russia seems back to square one, with hand with vassalization, which could be one advantage though – sustaining Belarus and achieved thanks to non-conventional and sub- the Russian-Belarusian alliance will cost Russian versive means any Kremlinologist is familiar taxpayers much less in the coming years. with. This would exclude the scenario of an out- Ending subsidies is but one channel Russia right aggression. can use to coerce Belarus into complying with its For one, Russia is not interested in forcefully other demands, notably regarding the airbase. absorbing Belarus: it knows it lacks the capabili- Russian hybrid warfare and “sharp power” pro- ties to do so130: this would be a costly endeavour jection strategy include other subversive tactics in a short and mid-term perspective, with lim- that Russia masters well: interference in domes- ited long-term gains in return. The Belarusian tic politics, supporting opposition parties, med- population would not welcome absorption with dling in electoral campaigns, using agent provo- the same enthusiasm as Crimeans allegedly did. cateurs to ignite mass riots, or helping to foment With the “freezing” of the Crimean territorial is- a coup during a succession crisis, are but a few sue and the Donbas conflict, it appears that of the available tools.132 As long as they are de- niable, these measures could help Russia fulfil its

chive/2011/07/in-belarus-clapping-can-be-subver- 130https://thinktanks.by/publication/2019/03/19/andrey- sive/242271/ lyahovich-rossiya-ne-sposobna-poglotit-belarus-i-ne- 128https://nmnby.eu/news/analytics/7079.html budet-pytatsya-eto-sdelat.html 129https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- 131https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/up- pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- loads/2019/12/rfp3-sivitsky.pdf fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again 132https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468 28

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN aspiration to take over portions of Belarus’s ca- NATO’s dilemmas pability for self-defence, or for prestige-related The Russian-Belarusian alliance is developing purposes at home. in a very fluid and uncertain geopolitical envi- Thirdly, Belarus is indispensable for the Euro- ronment. The Baltic Sea area, where latent ten- pean facet of Russia’s Eurasian integration pro- sions between Russia and NATO – and specifi- jects. Given that the Kremlin repeatedly pre- cally its Baltic members – have escalated over sented the Union State of Belarus and Russia as the past decade, came to be seen as a hotspot a model and a locomotive for the reintegration and potential field for confrontation. While as- of the post-Soviet space, coercing Belarus to sessing the risk of a conventional attack as the deeper integration would amount to Moscow most dangerous and highest priority scenario, admitting that Eurasian integration as a whole is most stakeholders consider that a more likely nothing but an imperialistic project, and that scenario would be that Russia combined it with 133 Putin failed to achieve it by way of attraction. subversive means (interference in domestic af- Should Russia openly destabilise or attack fairs, cyber-attacks and other “non-conven- Belarus, other post-Soviet partners would con- tional” warfare) to try and change the regional clude that it became a rogue country, and a power balance to its advantage, without risking threat to their own independence – after all, the a nuclear Armageddon. 135 CIS and CSTO treaties stipulate that member Geography and the imbalance of conven- states must refrain from the use or the threat of tional forces locally are clearly to Russia’s ad- force against one another. A Russian aggression vantage. Wargames conducted in 2015 con- against Belarus would likely lead to a paralysis or cluded that Russia could conquer Riga and Tal- even the implosion of these multilateral regional linn unhampered in 30 to 60 hours.136 At the organisations, with cascading negative conse- early phases of a Russian aggression, for lack of quences for Russia’s aspirations to control them warning and rapid reaction, NATO would be un- and to showcase them as functional on the in- able to defend its Baltic allies. In an anticipation 134 ternational arena. In fact, Belarus might well novel published in 2016, retired British General use its 2020 chairmanship of both the CSTO and and DSACEUR Richard Shirreff popularised the the Eurasian Economic Union for building coali- idea that the Third World war could be ignited tions with Central Asian and South-Caucasian by a Russian hybrid attack against its Baltic members in order to deter Russia from stepping neighbours.137 Building on NATO wargames, it up pressure against their sovereignty. tended to show that the potential for destabilis- ing NATO would stem from Russia’s efforts to demonstrate alliance helplessness. This too ar- gues in favour of a hybrid scenario.

-2346.12509 loads/2019/12/Mickus-and-Kuusik-The-Baltic-Risk-Land- 133https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- scape.pdf;https://www.rand.org/con- est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- tent/dam/rand/pubs/research_re- lyse231-EN.pdf ports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf 134https://thinktanks.by/publication/2019/03/19/andrey- 136https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_re- lyahovich-rossiya-ne-sposobna-poglotit-belarus-i-ne- ports/RR1253.html budet-pytatsya-eto-sdelat.html 137General Sir Richard Shirreff, 2017: War With Russia: An 135https://vilniusinstitute.lt/wp-content/up- Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command, London: Coronet books, 2016. 29

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

Russia is readily using sub-conventional “ac- an Enhanced Forward Presence – four multina- tive measures” against its NATO neighbours as a tional battalions in Poland and the Baltic States. cheap alternative able to spark divisions within According to Lithuania’s ambassador at large for the Alliance. Any hybrid (cyber for example) at- hybrid threats, Eitvydas Bajarūnas, apart from tack, as long as it stays below the radar of Article strategic decisions, NATO Crisis Management 5 solidarity procedures, could give Russia time to Exercises (CMX) also began to include hybrid launch a fait accompli seizure of small pieces of scenarios, comprising disinformation, threats to contested territory (Narva for example, or Bela- critical infrastructure, and “grey zone” situa- rus for that matter).138 Pursuant of the new Rus- tions.142 In that sense, NATO appears as prepar- sian nuclear doctrine (small nuclear strikes as a ing for all possible scenarios. de-escalation measure), Russian strategists be- The Catch-22 problem is that Russia may lieve they can deter NATO from reacting, and “perceive actions taken by NATO as not in- the annexed territories would de facto remain tended to strengthen deterrence but rather to under Russian control.139 intimidate or coerce it. If [NATO] pursues an al- If Russia intended to bridge the Suwałki gap, ternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly as several NATO scenarios have postulated, the undefended, it might trigger war because Russia potential justification for a military intervention may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to would be “demanding – or establishing by sub- be exploited.”143 In fact, as Michael Kofman put terfuge or ‘humanitarian convoys’ – a land corri- it back in 2016, “deterrence is a difficult mistress dor to Kaliningrad”. As Keir Giles argued, this to court”, and the focus should not be “solely on would only happen “if [Russia] could predict, or those scenarios that proponents of more forces manage, the NATO response or lack of it”.140 Yet in the Baltics would prefer to deter”.144 In his the Kremlin would also need to trust in Belarus’ view “Moscow can handily demonstrate the alli- cooperation. If Belarus decided, or was per- ance’s weakness without invasion and occupa- suaded, to host advanced Russian air defence tion. NATO’s problem is not the scenario RAND systems, this would greatly extend their range presented, and their prescriptions won’t fix it ei- into NATO airspace, adding to the Kaliningrad ther”, he claimed. A2/AD bubble effect141 by deepening still further Going further, one could argue that since the the isolation of the Baltic states from the NATO role of the NATO European Command has “mainland”. moved from reassurance to (territorial) deter- NATO has met its Baltic members’ need for rence, distrust and hostility have in fact, in- reassurance and shown resolve however: it re- creased.145 From a Belarusian standpoint rising sponded to the annexation of Crimea by boost- military expenditure in neighbouring NATO ing its deterrence posture, notably in the Baltic countries is a matter of concern, as is the idea Sea region with the deployment and rotation of floated by Europeans of establishing a military

138http://www.alexlanoszka.com/lanoszkahunze- 142https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publica- kerssi.pdf tions/NATO_AT_70_and_Baltics.pdf; p. 306. 139https://icds.ee/closing-natos-baltic-gap/ 143https://securityanddefence.pl/NATO-S-DEFENCE-POL- 140https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-pa- ICY-DILEMMA-nIN-THE-BALTIC-STATES,103196,0,2.html pers/2017/belaruss-balancing-act-continues-minsk- 144https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-de- fends-off-the-ukraine-option-again terrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying- 141https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.20/ and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/ 145https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_belarus_an d_ukraine_fort_trump_accidental_victims 30

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Schengen, or the prospect that NATO’s De- arusian experts, too.150 Andrey Fedorov for ex- fender Europe 2020 exercises will mobilise an ample hypothesised that Putin offered to reply unprecedented number of troops, over a long by increasing Russian military presence on Bela- period (altogether, manoeuvres should spread rusian territory – and Lukashenka would again over 6 months), nearby Belarusian borders.146 have declined.151 Lukashenka’s statement on 28 These exercises undeniably give rise to nervous- October 2019 that “there’s no need to urge the ness in Belarus, especially under the backdrop of whole world to stand up for Belarus; we can de- previous and planned US military deployments fend ourselves alone”, was obviously aimed at in Poland (where president Andrzej Duda drea- Putin. Military expert Alexander Alesin for his ms of a “Fort Trump”), and in Lithuania with the part suspected that Russia could respond to De- positioning of Abrams tanks in Pabradė. fender Europe 2020 by moving forward the Za- The military activation on the Western flank pad 2021 exercises to the Fall 2020.152 The of the Union State is an unpleasant surprise for downscaling or postponement of NATO’s 2020 Belarus, as it forces Minsk to demand more from exercises due to the Covid-19 epidemic, make its Russian ally in terms of security guaran- this prospect less likely however. tees.147 Lukashenka theatrically promised an To picture the dilemma fully, it is worth re- “asymmetric reply”, reminding quite sarcas- minding that Belarus’ own posture towards tically, that 30 tanks and 30 armoured vehicles NATO is an ambiguous one. Even though Lukash- are “a joke”, compared with the Belarusian ar- enka has traditionally capitalised on anti-NATO my, which counts some 1,300 T-72 tanks, of discourses, cooperation with the Alliance is up which 400 allegedly ready for modern combat. and running. Belarus was even compared to a In October 2019 Lukashenka suggested that Rus- “silent partner” for NATO within the Northern sia and Belarus design a strong response to De- Distribution Network providing logistical sup- fender Europe 2020 exercises. Even though Rus- port for NATO forces in Afghanistan.153 Since sian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov character- Belarus joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace ised NATO’s plans as a direct breach of the programme in 1995, it has regularly participated NATO-Russia Founding Act, to date Moscow has in exchanges and training of military personnel left Lukashenka’s appeal unanswered.148 with various NATO member states including the Several Russian experts, such as Professor Al- UK and Germany. According to Andrei Parotni- exander Tikhanskij, consider that the most wel- kau “Belarus retains a heightened interest in come “joint reply” would be a reactivation of multifaceted dialogues (Belarus-Poland-Ukrai- Russian plans to open a military base in Bela- ne-Lithuania and Belarus-Poland-USA-Ukraine), rus149, a prospect which is taken seriously by Bel- which are treated as platforms for discussing ur-

146https://sputnik.by/defense_safety/20191014/1042970 150https://naviny.by/article/20181116/1542391261- 834/Belarus-i-Rossiya-gotovyatsya-k-neponyatnym- rossiyskoy-voennoy-bazy-v-belarusi-ne-budet-poka ucheniyam-NATO.html 151https://naviny.by/article/20191028/1572272563- 147https://www.sonar2050.org/publications/zashchitnik- kakoy-monstr-opasnee-moskva-mozhet-vzyat-belarus-i- ne-dlya-vseh/ bez-tankov 148https://bsblog.info/on-the-belarusian-russian- 152https://naviny.by/article/20180523/1527054699- response-to-nato/ minsk-torguetsya-za-status-zapadnogo-forposta-rossii 149 https://naviny.by/article/20191026/1572074786- 153https://jamestown.org/program/silent-partner-bela- amerikanskie-tanki-u-granicy-belarusi-chem-otvetit- rus-in-natos-northern-distribution-network/ minsk 31

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN gent regional security matters and a trust-build- and Russia are close strategic allies, that the ing instrument among the parties.”154 The prob- Belarusian army is but an extension of the Rus- lem, however, is that Belarus was prevented sian Western Military district, or that Russia from signing an Agreement on the Security of In- has already bitten off parts of Belarusian sover- formation with NATO, a sine qua non for formal- eignty, are in part myths which ought to be de- ising bilateral relations. bunked. Cooperation with NATO is meant to counter- Belarus does not share Russia’s bellicose am- balance Belarus’ dependence on Russia, but it bitions towards Ukraine and it succeeded in re- also serves as a reminder that Moscow should maining neutral in the current conflict opposing praise Minsk’s loyalty: a reorientation towards Moscow and the West. Although regular exer- NATO, following the Ukrainian model, would cises maintain a high level of interoperability be- add to Russia’s geostrategic and reputational tween the two armies, and in spite of Belarus’ dismay in the region. In this bargaining game, “alliance entrapment”, Minsk retains enough Lukashenka cleverly exacerbates Putin’s impe- autonomy to avoid being dragged into one of rial syndrome. On 24 December 2019, in an in- Russia’s wars. In the same vein, up until now terview to Echo Moskvy, the Belarusian Presi- Lukashenka has resisted Russian pressure to dent even said that “If Russia attempts to violate “trade off” Belarus’ sovereignty: he declined our sovereignty – you know how the world com- Russia’s ultimatum to grant the Union State su- munity will react. They will turn up involved in a pranational prerogatives; Belarusian industrial war. The West and NATO will react because they assets, such as the dual-use companies that Rus- will consider it as a threat to them, as well.”155 sia ambitions to reintegrate into its own mili- So much so for the Russian-Belarusian alliance… tary-industrial complex, have not been sold out in exchange for credits or discounts on military CONCLUSIONS equipment; as for Russia’s ambition to get a per- The above-said calls Western decision-mak- manent military foothold on Belarusian terri- ers to take the Union State for no more than tory, for lack of an airbase it still seems compro- what it is: a very lose political union, the military mised – at least for now. dimension of which is now subject to intense As long as Belarus remains independent, its bargaining too. For Minsk the Union State, as an leadership can refuse such security-outsourcing. incremental integration process, facilitated the Belarus has its own national security interests extraction of economic benefits (Russian subsi- and military doctrine, which are incompatible dies), but not to the extent that Lukashenka had with Russia’s: Belarus has not abandoned its hoped for. For Moscow, as a neo-imperialistic pledge to remain a neutral, nuclear-free coun- project, it allowed showcasing Belarus as a geo- try, and it consistently strives to stay away from political ally, but Putin still expects more loyalty the “new Cold War” between Russia and the from Lukashenka in return for economic sup- West. Its capacity to do so, however, is reliant on port. its ability to remain independent from Russia. The Belarusian-Russian brotherhood is thus Marred by recurring trade wars, diplomatic rather a fool’s deal. The notions that Belarus scandals and mutual distrust, the Union State

154https://belarusinfocus.info/security-issues/minsk-as- nato-i-zapad-zashhityat-belarus-esli-rossiya-narushit-su- pires-expand-military-political-cooperation-europe verenitet/ 155https://belsat.eu/ru/news/lukashenko-schitaet-chto- 32

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN project virtually hit a wall in 2019. Irreconcilable strengthen its influence through economic dom- views as to the purpose and outlook of reinte- inance and the promotion of well-heeled civil so- gration – a confederation of equals vs. a Russian ciety organizations.”156 This choice is also dic- absorption – should imply a further marketiza- tated by the bare reality that “Russia critically tion of bilateral relations. Belarus’ effort to resist depends on Belarus strategically”, as Siarhei Finlandization might not be sustainable in the Bohdan reminded, not only because Belarus is long run. For lack of reforms, the country is un- protecting the Russian core (Moscow and neigh- likely to get credits from alternative Western bouring regions), but also because “as one of sources. The diversification of its foreign eco- Moscow's few allies, [Belarus] helps the Kremlin nomic relations, including in the field of military keep the remnants of its imperial prestige by cooperation (with China for example), can participating in demonstrative shows of Russian hardly counter-balance Belarus’ dependence on strength”.157 This, however, does not guarantee Russia. The economic consequences of the alliance solidarity in war times. Covid-19 pandemic that broke out in early 2020 The very scenario that Russia and Belarus will probably aggravate this vulnerability. have been dreading materialised ten years ago Caught between a rock and a hard place – already: the expansion and military build-up of saving his “social contract” with the Belarusian NATO right across their borders has occurred, people, or Belarus’ sovereignty – Lukashenka, and the process is continuing. Running against being an autocratic leader, is likely to choose intuitive predictions, this has not fostered the first option, which offers better chances of greater cohesion within the Russian-Belarusian regime-survival. A determining variable that alliance however. Were Russia to launch a con- should be factored in, however, is whether Bel- ventional attack on its neighbours in order to arusian civil society, which has grown more sup- “bridge the Suwałki gap” – an option which is ra- portive of Belarusian statehood, but remains ther unlikely, but still dangerous enough to not susceptible to Russian soft power influence, will be excluded a priori – the military alliance of Bel- be resilient enough to not succumb to “Russian arus and Russia would probably not overcome World” propaganda, in case Moscow intensifies the intrinsic limitations that this paper has iden- its hybrid war tactics to try and subjugate it. The tified. evolution of Putin’s appetites in the region will, Even if Belarus and Russia demonstrate a high in turn, depend at least partly on NATO’s capac- degree of alliance compatibility in peacetime, ity to deter Russia from launching a “Ukraine Alexander Lanoszka for example doubts that 2.0” type of attack on Belarus. such policy convergence would “survive the du- In geostrategic terms, Russia is not interested ress of war”. What is more, he claims, “any foot- in annexing Belarus however: as this paper re- dragging shown by Lukashenka that hinders Rus- minded, Russia mostly needs Belarus as a buffer sian military preparations can buy NATO more territory and possibly as a military outpost. time”.158 Hence Russia will rather try to “keep the Considering Belarus as an extension of Russia Lukashenko regime on a shorter leash and might be a useful assumption for NATO plann-

156https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-inter- arms-what-minsk-has-given-in-exchange/ est/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAna- 158https://mwi.usma.edu/strategic-enabler-point-vulner- lyse231-EN.pdf ability-role-belarus-russias-military-plans/ 157https://belarusdigest.com/story/belaruss-new-russian- 33

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN ers, but this approach “risks overlooking poten- EU structures and member states (notably those tial opportunities” that could, in fact, benefit neighbouring on the Union State of Belarus and NATO.159 Lanoszka listed these benefits in a Russia), could readily implement for the sake of March 2019 US Army War College publication preserving peace and stability in the region. co-authored with Michael Hunzecker. In the un- likely scenario in which Russia is preparing a Recommendations for NATO neighbours large-scale conventional attack on NATO’s  Incorporate Belarus in the strategic north-eastern flank, they posit, Belarus could approach to regional security “inadvertently provide early warning to NATO”, In recent years NATO has taken stock of the since any invasion of Lithuania or Poland would crucial role that Belarus would play in the event see Russian forces traverse Belarusian territory. of a Russian attack targeting its “soft under- During such a crisis Belarus could well assert its belly” in North-Eastern Europe. Since 2018, US desire for neutrality, by withholding diplomatic strategists started incorporating Belarus in their support or delaying efforts to enhance interop- scenarios, for the purpose of “signalling to Putin erability or provide Russia with supporting that the US is no longer going to ignore Bela- forces. Although Minsk “might not derail the rus”161: rather than considering Belarus as a Kremlin’s regional ambitions”, Lanoszka argued mere extension of Russia’s Western military dis- in another policy paper, “it could still frustrate trict, they praise the role that a neutral Belarus them to NATO’s benefit”.160 could play for “buffering” the Baltic States and For this to happen, however, the Belarusian Poland against a conventional Russian attack. leadership – be it Lukashenka or his successor – A comprehensive approach to regional secu- would have to retain enough sovereign power to rity should incorporate Belarus in the picture resist Russian attempts at vassalizing it, whether and encourage NATO to intensify contacts and by ruse or by force. As this paper evidenced, cooperation with Belarus – something which Belarusian statehood currently remains ex- Turkey and Lithuania allegedly opposed up until tremely vulnerable to both a conventional and now. Taking into account the concerns of Baltic non-linear (hybrid) type of aggression on the neighbours, the upgrading of NATO’s relations part of Russia. This implies that Belarus, and with Belarus should be done in a way that does the institutional framework of the Union State, not push Russia to respond in kind and upgrade can still be used as a springboard for Russian its own military presence in, or pressure on, Bel- expansionism in the Baltic Sea region, should arus. the Kremlin consider this as a viable plan. While arguably the most dangerous scenario, a frontal Russian military attack on the Baltic RECOMMENDATIONS States – or Belarus for that matter – is also the The objective of this section is to advocate a ho- least likely, compared with other options that listic, foreign policy driven and diplomatically Russia would probably favour (a non-conven- sound approach towards Russian-Belarusian in- tional aggression), should tensions escalate or tegration, which decision-makers within NATO/

159http://www.alexlanoszka.com/lanoszkahunze- 161https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up- kerssi.pdf, p. 31. loads/2019/09/Howard-Why-Belarus-Matters- 160http://www.alexlanoszka.com/LanoszkaParame- web.pdf?x54374, p. 23 ters2018.pdf; p. 84. 34

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN opportunities arise.162 Bearing in mind that Rus- flexibility, and avoid entrenchment when ad- sia has already activated its “sharp power” ca- dressing NATO’s north-Eastern flank dilemmas. pacity to try and subjugate Belarus, it would Adjusting NATO’s crisis management system make sense for NATO to also incorporate Bela- to the realities of the Russian-Belarusian “alli- rus in its strategic approach to Russian hybrid ance” means preparing for a conflict-escalation warfare. in which Russia would malignly use Belarus as a With the establishment of a NATO Strategic proxy. Therefore, it is crucially important for Bal- Communications Centre of Excellence (in Riga) tic neighbours and Poland to review and update and of a joint EU/NATO European Centre of Ex- the agreements on confidence and security- cellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (in Hel- building measures that they have signed with sinki), NATO has considerably improved its ca- Belarus in the early 2000s. This would buy time pacity to assess, report and address hybrid in the event of an incident that Belarus is not re- threats in the region. A lot more can be learned sponsible for. from monitoring the situation in Belarus more If Russia were to move to attack the Baltic closely. Since the Baltic States are particularly countries using Belarus as an outpost, then knowledgeable about Russian hybrid warfare NATO should be prepared to escalate horizon- and disinformation, they should be encouraged tally by striking military targets within Belarus. to systematically exchange expertise and best However if Russia is clearly forcing Belarus to practices with selected Belarusian experts and align and coercing it to play the role of a wartime stakeholders. partner, “then such horizontal escalation might  Adopt a force posture oriented towards not be as diplomatically palatable as before”: ac- strategic flexibility, not entrenchment cording to Alexander Lanoszka, NATO could NATO’s dilemma boils down to the fact that even “exploit such friction so as to divide the in beefing up its presence to contain the Russian two allies and to impose further costs on Rus- threat and to “bridge the Baltic gap”, it unwill- sia”.164 A flexible and agile NATO should also dis- ingly fuels Russia’s fear and narratives about an play internal cohesion on such issues. alleged NATO encirclement. This arithmetically  Defend the independence of Belarus as a increases Belarus’ reliance on, and commit- sovereign nation-state ments to, its military alliance with Russia. Given For the sake of credibility, Western diplomats the evolution of the Russian doctrine regarding should readily make it clear that any coercive nuclear weapons – since 2000 Russia considers limitation of Belarusian sovereignty would using limited nuclear strikes as a de-escalatory amount to an act of aggression in the eyes of the measure – one of the best strategies is to make international community. This would send a decisions that afford the most opportunities for strong signal to President Lukashenka, who has managing escalation dynamics. “Place too many indirectly been calling for such help. NATO units in the Baltics and NATO creates a vulnera- neighbours of Belarus should be advised to use bility that Russian leaders will be forced to re- all possible diplomatic channels, including Bela- dress”, Michael Kofman warned back in 2016.163 rus’ probable accession to the WTO in the near Hence his recommendation to favour strategic future, to enhance the country’s resilience

162http://www.alexlanoszka.com/lanoszkahunze- and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/ kerssi.pdf, p. 66. 164https://mwi.usma.edu/strategic-enabler-point-vulner- 163https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-de- ability-role-belarus-russias-military-plans/ terrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying- 35

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN against Russian encroachments on its sover- facto neutrality against any further erosion”.165 eignty. Whereas NATO is not in a position to provide Supporting Belarus’ international actorness is Belarus reassurance measures, Belarus shares not void of risks, however. Russia’s resistance with neighbouring NATO members similar goals and counter-reaction to such moves are guaran- – preserving peace on the European continent, teed. Another, ethical problem is that uncondi- while also defending their territorial integrity tionally supporting Belarus’ statehood risks against Russian revisionist ambitions. granting Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime un- This inspired Glen E. Howard a comparison: in due external legitimation. Geopolitical concerns his view, Lukashenka could become another and pragmatic approaches fare ill with the pro- Tito, making Belarus play for the region a role motion of democratic values unfortunately. similar to that of Yugoslavia during the Cold War. Considering Lukashenka as the guarantor of Bel- In its effort to balance its relations with Russia arusian independence should not downplay the and the West, the Belarusian leadership is walk- fact that he is also a recidivist human rights vio- ing a tightrope, however. “Belarus will not take lator. the Baltic nationalist path and go for a clean In recent years Belarus has upgraded its level break in relations with Moscow”, Howard admit- of cooperation with UN human rights review ted: it will adhere to a “distinct Belarusian path mechanisms and it even hinted that it might in its ties to Russia unless Putin forces the issue adopt a moratorium on death penalty, a step and demands that Minsk accept an ‘either you which would open the door to the Council of Eu- are with us or against us’ approach.”166 rope, and greatly improve Belarus’ chances of Escaping this ultimatum requires that Bela- normalising and formalising its relations with rus’ neutrality gained international recognition the EU. While Western diplomats should be ad- and support. For now, Belarus’ neutrality ap- vised to show caution and stick to principles be- pears as situational, and thus lacks credibility. fore engaging with Lukashenka, they should Western partners should encourage Belarus to acknowledge and encourage whatever progress upholding the neutrality pledge enshrined in its on the road to liberalisation that the Belarusian Constitution, and continue acknowledging Bela- authorities will embark on. Even though distrib- rusian efforts at remaining neutral in the ongo- uting promises of reforms that he never holds is ing Ukrainian conflict. Finland, another formally a trademark of Lukashenka’s “dictaplomacy”, neutral neighbour of Russia, could share with there are people within the elite and the State Belarus its own experience of “deterrence by co- administration who know that building support operation”, which illustrates how good-neigh- for Belarus’ sovereignty cannot afford the econ- bourly relations with Russia and neutrality can omy of genuine reforms. accommodate closer cooperation with NATO.167  Support Belarusian aspirations to  Support Belarus’ ambitions as a bridge- neutrality builder in Europe Vladimir Socor was among the first to stress, Conflict-avoidance is a clear and deeply-root- back in 2015, the shared interest of Belarus and ed priority of Belarusian foreign policy, and Bel- its Western neighbours to “uphold Belarus’s de arus has consistently demonstrated its desire to

165https://jamestown.org/program/bringing-belarus- web.pdf?x54374, p. 19 back-in-from-the-cold-part-three/ 167https://www.cairn.info/revue-strategique-2019-1- 166https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up- page-329.htm loads/2019/09/Howard-Why-Belarus-Matters- 36

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN stay away from “others’ wars”. This has not been founding principles and democratic norms ex- an easy task, given Russia’s own demands for pected to guide their foreign and neighbour- alignment. The international community can as- hood policies. While awareness has risen about sist Belarus in taking Lukashenka to his word, the authoritarian features and “rogueness” of and encourage more active neutrality and good these countries in international affairs, some offices initiatives from Minsk. free-riders in the West have nonetheless argued This can take two complementary directions: in favour of more tolerance towards these re- firstly, responding positively to Minsk’s 2018 in- gimes. Staying true to its own democratic values, itiative to host “Helsinki-2” talks over the future the EU should, in fact, stick with a principled ap- of security and cooperation in Europe. Support- proach when dealing with them. The unique ing Belarus’ aspirations to act as a bridge-builder might of the EU’s normative power in interna- in the region could well consolidate the coun- tional affairs lies in its willingness and capacity try’s independence, while also offering a plat- to promote democratic reforms, respect for hu- form for Russia and the West to address and man rights and the rule of law, and to contribute hopefully solve some of their disagreements. to good-neighbourhood relations and peaceful Secondly, as a member of the Non-Aligned conflict-resolution. Democratic conditionality Movement, Belarus is also a legitimate broker in should remain a cornerstone of its international future arms control negotiations. Several of the policies, and cooperation with neighbouring treaties limiting armaments have recently ex- countries be geared towards sustaining demo- pired, were suspended (INF Treaty) or will expire cratic peace. soon (new START), creating a situation prone to  Encourage structural economic reforms in a new arms race between the United States and Belarus Russia. The deployment of conventional or nu- Whereas Putin’s Russia appears as imperme- clear forces in Belarus would not only violate its able to European democratising influence, in the CFE treaty obligations: it would augment the risk case of Belarus the EU’s Eastern Partnership pol- of a military escalation in the region.168 icies still have a potential to encourage positive change in order for the country to embrace Eu- ropean values – possibly once it enters a post- Recommendation for the EU’s Eastern Lukashenka era however. Belarus has been the Partnership instruments source of much frustration for Western democ-  Stick with democratic principles while racy-promoters in general, and for the EU in par- (re-)engaging with Belarus and Russia ticular, over the past 25 years. Yet neither the Several voices have been heard over the past Lukashenka regime nor Belarusian society is as decade that advocated adopting a more prag- monolithic as is customarily assumed. In fact, matic approach towards the EU’s Eastern Part- drawn into an impasse and recession, the Bela- ners and Russia. In the process, however, the rusian economy now seems ripe for reforms. risk has grown for the European Union and its Many Belarusians, including within the bureau- member states to downgrade a number of

168https://carnegieeurope.eu/strate- VJlS3NcL1wvaUZi- giceurope/81209?utm_source=rssemail&utm_me- ajB5N2dLejVWYXRVV1VFS1RtcFZqWUJmVDQ3d21tRG1y dium=email&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT1RZeU5XSTRa- YUNNTllvQitaWkRncWl- VEU1TTJVdyIsInQiOiI4dWxGNUlmUl- RRUlpVjdhbzVtOGRpUE1NNm1yaEhlQkJLbUo3In0%3D REa1hOYnArK05RQW9LejRpZjJZKytkSzlTTE9XNnVvR2p5Z 37

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN cracy, start to believe that liberalising the econ- could contribute by including Belarus more sys- omy is the only way to immunise Belarus against tematically in their own monitoring system of the threat of a Russian absorption (whether Russian hybrid threats, and sharing their exper- forceful, or by way of ruse, as could happen if tise and methodology in the fight against disin- Russia offered to “rescue” Belarus from bank- formation. rupt for example). The EU should stand ready to  Building resilience of Belarusian civil provide technical and financial support for struc- society: focus on media-awareness tural economic reforms as soon as a genuine in- Hybrid strategies traditionally focus on socie- tention to implement them emerges. Relaunch- tal vulnerabilities, which points to the im- ing the negotiation of a framework bilateral portance of civilian resilience for deterring a hy- agreement (Belarus has no Partnership and Co- brid Russian attack. Hence efforts should be tar- operation Agreement with the EU) could incen- geted on building resilience of Belarusian civil tivise reforms; so could the prospect of opening society too, including by investing in enhancing up much needed access to Western credits and civil consciousness and media-awareness. markets for Belarus, and of helping private busi- This can be done at various levels, relying on ness develop in and with the country. low-key, symbolic measures (e. g. supporting  Beef up and share the EU’s self-defence “soft Belarusianisation”) to taking more proac- instruments against Russian disinformation tive steps aimed at ensuring that pro-Western The EU has adequately beefed up its capacity views gain a foothold in the information sphere. to identify and debunk Russian disinformation, This implies supporting independent journalists notably since the EEAS established an East Strat- and bloggers more, and reacting faster when the Com Task Force, the flagship project of which, Belarusian authorities resume harassing them EUvsDisinfo, has contributed since 2015 to raise and limits their freedom of expression. In light of awareness of the Kremlin’s disinformation cam- the intensification of Russian disinformation paigns which affect the EU, its member states, warfare, Western efforts should be oriented to- and their neighbours. Increasing the outreach of wards “new” and Belarusophile media. Since its Disinformation Review in Eastern Partnership Russia started integrating Belarus in a hybrid countries would contribute to shielding them manner, attention should turn to cyber-space from the malign influence of Russian propa- and social media to create a lasting impact, no- ganda and fake news. This would be extremely tably on youth.169 useful in Belarus, where analysts and journalists  Aim at a reconciliation between Lithuania who have knowledge about Russian disinfor- and Belarus mation still have a limited capacity to reach out In the absence of a “reset” between Vilnius to potential audiences. While continuing sup- and Minsk, several of the steps recommended port for alternative TV and internet TV channels above will remain impossible to undertake. such as Poland-based BelSat, the EU should in- vest in funding initiatives that enhance the resil- ience and impact of independent journalists in Belarus proper. The Baltic and Nordic States

169https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/12/05/the-renais- sance-of-russia-belarus-relations/ 38

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ANAÏS MARIN is a political scientist specialising in IR, Russian and border studies. She holds her PhD from Sciences Po Paris (2006). She is currently con- ducting research on Russian “sharp power” at the Centre for French Civilisation with the University of Warsaw (OKF UW), funded by a 3-year grant from the Polish National Centre for Science (NCN). Since December 2019 she is also an associate fel- low with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, London. As a Belarus expert, over the past decade Dr. Marin cooperated with several European think tanks, notably the Helsinki-based Finnish Institute of International Affairs (2011-2014), the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW, Warsaw), the Estonian Cen- tre for Eastern Partnership (Tallinn) and the EU In- stitute for Security Studies (ISS, Paris). She has published extensively on Belarusian foreign and domestic policies, on Eurasian integration as well as on the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood policies. She also contributed policy papers and recommen- dations for various European governments and in- stitutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (AFET) and the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. Since November 2018 she holds the pro bono mandate of UN Spe- cial rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus. Contact mail: [email protected] List of publications: www.researchgate.net/profile/Anais_Marin

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA – BY ANAÏS MARIN

Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis Didžioji g. 5, LT-01128 Vilnius Tel. +370 612 25727 [email protected] www.vilniusinstitute.lt