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National Threat Assessment 2021 DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STATE SECURITY AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF SERVICE UNDER THE REPUBLIC OF THE MINISTRY OF LITHUANIA NATIONAL DEFENCE NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STATE SECURITY AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF SERVICE UNDER THE REPUBLIC OF THE MINISTRY OF LITHUANIA NATIONAL DEFENCE NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 VILNIUS, 2021 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 FOREWORD 5 SUMMARY 8 NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES 12 REGIONAL SECURITY 17 MILITARY SECURITY 27 ACTIVITIES OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES 41 PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 50 INFORMATION SECURITY 54 ECONOMIC AND ENERGY SECURITY 61 TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY 67 3 INTRODUCTION The National Threat Assessment by the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania (VSD) and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (AOTD) is presented to the public in accordance with Articles 8 and 26 of the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania. The document provides consolidated, unclassified assessment of threats and risks to national security of the Repub- lic of Lithuania prepared by both intelligence services. The document assesses events, processes and trends that correspond to the intelligence requirements approved by the State Defence Council. Based on them and considering the long-term trends affecting national security, the document provides the assessment of major challenges that the Lithuanian national security is to face in the near term (2021–2022). The assessments of long-term trends project the perspective up to 10 years. The assessment is based on the information available before 5 February 2021. The table below outlines the language of probability and definition of terms used in this assessment: < 25 % 25–50 % 50–75 % > 75 % UNLIKELY POSSIBLE LIKELY HIGHLY LIKELY Short term: 0–6 months Near term: 6 months – 2 years Mid term: 3–5 years Long term: 6–10 years Darius JAUNIŠKIS Colonel Elegijus PAULAVIČIUS Director of the State Security Department Director of the Defence Intelligence and Security of the Republic of Lithuania Service under the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania 5 FOREWORD Dear readers, This is the sixth edition of the National Threat Assessment prepared by the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and the Defence Intel- ligence and Security Service under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania. Lithuania is the only country in the region and one of the few in the world whose intelligence services provide a joint public threat assessment. It enables our society, decision makers, officials, security experts and foreign partners to receive an overall picture of the regional and global threats, the relevance and significance of which are acknowledged by the entire Lithuanian intelligence community. The main mission of Lithuanian intelligence services is to collect information, analyse it and assess threats to our state and society emanating from hostile foreign countries, their armed forces, intelligence and security services, eco- nomic influence, disinformation as well as from individuals willing to commit acts of radical extremism or terrorism – all what is encompassed by intelli- gence services’ scope of activity. The geographical position of Lithuania itself preconditions that sources of major emerging threats remain the same. However, threat manifestations and conditions are changing dynamically. The COVID-19 pandemic not only poses a threat to our people’s lives and health, but it also gives grounds for cyberes- pionage, conspiracy theories and disinformation against Lithuania. Russia and other authoritarian countries exploited pandemic containment as a pretext for adapting new public control measures that impose even more severe restric- tions on democratic freedoms. FOREWORD Belarusian authoritarian regime is striving to supress its nation’s peaceful pro- tests by employing violence and repressions. The Kremlin provides political, financial and military support to authoritarian Minsk. The instances of Rus- sian rapid military deployments and the demonstrative manoeuvres in Belarus are intended to send a message that Belarus belongs to the Russian sphere of influence. It is almost certain that Russia’s policy of denying the sover- eign choices of its neighbours will remain one of the most significant security threats in the Baltic Region in the future. Russian and Belarusian strategic military exercise Zapad–2021 due to take place in September 2021 will increase the risk of military incidents and provocations. In today’s fast changing environment the flow of information can hardly be covered, so only reliable sources shall be referred to when assessing relevant issues to Lithuanian national security. By presenting this Threat Assessment, intelligence services of Lithuania seek to provide information which would allow every member of its society to make objective and fact-based judge- ments rather than rely on rumours or speculations. Although in many cases we cannot provide detailed information related to threats, as a considerable scope of intelligence information is classified, the assessment reflects the most significant trends of the threats to Lithuania. By informing our society we intend to enhance confidence and trust in the intelligence services, the lack of which would make an intelligence officer’s work impossible. The State of Lithuania is strong so long as its residents, friends and partners are informed, aware and united. The National Threat Assessment prepared by the VSD and the AOTD is expected to contribute to strengthening of the state and society. 7 15min.lt / Scanpix 8 SUMMARY The COVID-19 pandemic is a game changer in the global threat landscape and poses not only medical but also social, economic and geopolitical threats. Authoritarian states abuse the tool of contact tracing to expand mass surveillance of their citizens and foreigners. Russia and China exploit the pan- demic to discredit perceived adversaries or, on the contrary, to improve their own international image. The two states use medical support and innovations as a power tool to expand their influence in the international arena. In many countries the spread of radical political ideologies and destructive conspiracy theories is increasing due to the pandemic. To a lesser extent the trend is also observed in Lithuania. The political crisis in Belarus is the most significant development taking place in the vicinity of Lithuania. It is highly likely that no future Belarusian political leadership will be able to ignore the role of its strengthening civil society. Massive protests that burst out after the rigged presidential election indicate that Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his political regime are no longer capable of genuinely responding to society’s needs and thus, of maintaining its support. The situation in Belarus will be conditioned not only by society’s ability to organize and Lukashenka’s capabilities to sustain the officials’ loyalty but also by Russia’s determination to strengthen its influence in the country. The use of the Belarusian Armed Forces and power structures in domestic affairs escalates tensions in Lithuania’s neighbourhood. The Belarusian for- eign and security policy will likely remain adherent to Russia in the mid term. So far Lukashenka has managed to avoid permanent presence of the Rus- sian Armed Forces’ combat units in Belarus, but it remains a possibility if the Belarusian regime weakens. The unprecedented demonstration of force of the Belarusian Armed Forces with the aim of countering the alleged threat from the West and Lukashenka’s determination to remain in power at all costs pose a risk to Lithuanian security. In the meantime, the State Security Committee of Belarus (KGB) continues to perpetrate aggressive intelligence activities against Lithuanian citizens in the territory of Belarus. In autumn 2020, Belarus hastily launched the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) without completing due system tests critical to its safe exploita- tion. The NPP poses a high risk to Lithuania’s national security as Belarusian authorities continue to neglect expert conclusions on safety requirements and to conceal information about the incidents. The industrial exploitation of the NPP starts in 2021. Belarus also aims to circumvent the restrictions and to sell electricity produced in the NPP to the Baltic States. SUMMARY Isolated, repressive and resentful Russia poses a major threat to Lithuania, as it feels less constrained not only by international law but also by interna- tional opinion. Strengthening its power, Russia’s ruling regime imitates demo- cratic processes but crushes its opponents. In terms of international relations, acting aggressively, Russian authorities increase their isolation and conflict possibilities. Russia has not abandoned its strategic objectives in the current and former members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but it is struggling to achieve them. The military power remains the main tool for Russia to maintain and expand its influence abroad. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Moscow announced its aims to deescalate military tension between Russia and NATO, but aggres- sive manoeuvres of the Russian Armed Forces near NATO borders proved the opposite. Russia’s preparedness to exert influence by confrontational – includ- ing military – means over its opponents will persist. Russia’s growing military potential will pose a threat to the national security of
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